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Abstract
Understanding the knowledge gaps in whistleblowing and
speaking up in health care: narrative reviews of the research
literature and formal inquiries, a legal analysis and
stakeholder interviews
Russell Mannion,1* John Blenkinsopp,2 Martin Powell,1 Jean McHale,3
Ross Millar,1 Nicholas Snowden4 and Huw Davies5
1Health Services Management Centre, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
2Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
3Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
4Hull University Business School, University of Hull, Hull, UK
5School of Management, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK
*Corresponding author r.mannion@bham.ac.uk
Background: There is compelling evidence to suggest that some (or even many) NHS staff feel unable to
speak up, and that even when they do, their organisation may respond inappropriately.
Objectives: The specific project objectives were (1) to explore the academic and grey literature on
whistleblowing and related concepts, identifying the key theoretical frameworks that can inform an
understanding of whistleblowing; (2) to synthesise the empirical evidence about the processes that
facilitate or impede employees raising concerns; (3) to examine the legal framework(s) underpinning
whistleblowing; (4) to distil the lessons for whistleblowing policies from the findings of Inquiries into
failings of NHS care; (5) to ascertain the views of stakeholders about the development of whistleblowing
policies; and (6) to develop practical guidance for future policy-making in this area.
Methods: The study comprised four distinct but interlocking strands: (1) a series of narrative literature
reviews, (2) an analysis of the legal issues related to whistleblowing, (3) a review of formal Inquiries related
to previous failings of NHS care and (4) interviews with key informants.
Results: Policy prescriptions often conceive the issue of raising concerns as a simple choice between
deciding to ‘blow the whistle’ and remaining silent. Yet research suggests that health-care professionals
may raise concerns internally within the organisation in more informal ways before utilising whistleblowing
processes. Potential areas for development here include the oversight of whistleblowing from an independent
agency; early-stage protection for whistleblowers; an examination of the role of incentives in encouraging
whistleblowing; and improvements to criminal law to protect whistleblowers. Perhaps surprisingly, there is
little discussion of, or recommendations concerning, whistleblowing across the previous NHS Inquiry reports.
Limitations: Although every effort was made to capture all relevant papers and documents in the various
reviews using comprehensive search strategies, some may have been missed as indexing in this area is
challenging. We interviewed only a small number of people in the key informant interviews, and our
findings may have been different if we had included a larger sample or informants with different roles
and responsibilities.
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Conclusions: Current policy prescriptions that seek to develop better whistleblowing policies and nurture
open reporting cultures are in need of more evidence. Although we set out a wide range of issues, it is
beyond our remit to convert these concerns into specific recommendations: that is a process that needs to
be led from elsewhere, and in partnership with the service. There is also still much to learn regarding this
important area of health policy, and we have highlighted a number of important gaps in knowledge that
are in need of more sustained research.
Future work: A key area for future research is to explore whistleblowing as an unfolding, situated and
interactional process and not just a one-off act by an identifiable whistleblower. In particular, we need
more evidence and insights into the tendency for senior managers not to hear, accept or act on concerns
about care raised by employees.
Funding: The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.
ABSTRACT
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
vi
Contents
List of tables xi
List of figures xiii
List of boxes xv
List of abbreviations xvii
Plain English summary xix
Scientific summary xxi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Whistleblowing: a complex and contested issue 1
Policy and legal context 2
Aims and objectives of this study 3
Project overview and reporting structure 4
Chapter 2 The conceptual underpinnings of whistleblowing 5
Introduction 5
The emergence of whistleblowing as a field of study 5
Raising concerns, speaking up or blowing the whistle? 6
Blowing the whistle on what? 8
Outsider whistleblowing? 10
Theoretical perspectives on whistleblowing 11
Cognitive perspective 12
Values and beliefs 12
Justice and institutional theories 12
Power and politics 13
Prosocial theory 13
Alternative perspectives 14
Methodological issues in whistleblowing research 14
Qualitative research 15
Surveys using hypothetical situations 15
Surveys of actual whistleblowing 15
Concluding remarks: further exploration of whistleblowing in the NHS 15
Chapter 3 Empirical evidence on whistleblowing 17
Introduction 17
Literature review methods 17
The whistleblowing literature uncovered 20
Wide dispersal of the whistleblowing literature 20
Growth in academic publications on whistleblowing 20
Limitations by place of study and participants included 20
Limited interconnectivity between the general whistleblowing literature and the
health-care-specific literature 22
Exploring the factors affecting whistleblowing 22
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr06300 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2018 VOL. 6 NO. 30
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2018. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health and Social Care. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional
journals provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should
be addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
vii
External context 24
Regional and national culture 24
The law and legal frameworks 24
Professional standards, including ethical codes of practice and guidelines 25
Economic and financial influences 25
Internal context 26
Organisational culture and climate 26
Education and training 26
Peer pressure and relationships 27
Leadership and management 27
Boundary definitions 28
Personal factors 28
Personal traits and characteristics 29
Position and role in the organisation 29
Responses to whistleblowing 29
Responses from organisations 30
Responses from peers 30
Responses from non-whistleblowing observers of wrongdoing 30
Concluding remarks 31
Chapter 4 The main whistleblowing inquiries and formal responses to
inquiry recommendations 33
Introduction 33
The formal NHS inquiries from the Kennedy report onwards 33
Kennedy 33
Ayling 34
Kerr/Haslam 35
Shipman 37
Francis 2010 37
Francis 2013 38
Summary of findings from the formal inquiries 39
Formal responses to whistleblowing inquiries 39
Secretary of State for Health (Bristol) 39
Home Secretary and Secretary of State for Health (Shipman) 43
Secretary of State for Health (Safeguarding Patients) 43
House of Commons Health Committee 44
Secretary of State for Health (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust) 44
British Medical Association (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust) 44
Royal College of Nursing (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust) 44
Nursing and Midwifery Council (Francis) 45
General Medical Council (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust) 45
Clwyd and Hart 45
Berwick 45
Keogh 45
House of Commons Health Committee 45
Dalton and Williams 46
Secretary of State for Health (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust) 46
Secretary of State for Health (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust) 46
Secretary of State for Health (Francis inquiries) 47
Francis 47
Hooper 48
House of Commons Health Committee 48
Secretary of State for Health 48
Concluding remarks 49
CONTENTS
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
viii
Chapter 5 The legal underpinnings of whistleblowing 51
Introduction 51
Context and structure 51
Employment law and blowing the whistle in the public interest: the Public Interest
Disclosure Act 1998 52
Introduction 52
Employees under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 53
Protected disclosures 53
Actors to whom disclosures can lawfully be made 55
Contractual confidentiality clauses 56
Remedies 57
Impact of the legislation in relation to whistleblowing in health care 57
Whistleblowing: a human rights perspective 58
Council of Europe and whistleblowers 58
Human rights, whistleblowers and the NHS 59
Whistleblowing and the open government and regulatory perspective: speaking up in
the public interest 60
Procedures enabling internal whistleblowing 61
The duty of candour 63
Concluding remarks 65
Chapter 6 Key informant interviews 67
Introduction 67
Methods 67
Emerging narrative storylines 68
Current problems facing whistleblowing in the NHS 68
A climate of fear 68
The limits to legal protection 69
Reframing the debate from whistleblowing to one of raising concerns 70
Formulating whistleblowing policy 70
Implementation of whistleblowing policy 71
Implementation challenges facing current policy 72
Bottom up or top down? 72
Legal protection 74
Improving whistleblowing practice 74
Concluding remarks 76
Chapter 7 Conclusions and research implications 77
Introduction 77
A reminder of the ambitions of this study 77
Research objectives 1 and 2: identifying key conceptual issues and empirical findings 78
Silence and voice 78
Hearing and acting 78
Interactional processes 79
Whistleblowing, or bell-ringing? 80
Policy impacts on local judgements 80
Personal factors in raising concerns 80
Key practice action points arising from research objectives 1 and 2 80
Research objective 3: the legal frameworks for whistleblowing 81
Oversight from an independent agency 81
Statutory requirement to establish whistleblowing procedures 82
Early-stage protection for whistleblowers 82
Incentives for whistleblowing 82
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr06300 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2018 VOL. 6 NO. 30
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2018. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health and Social Care. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional
journals provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should
be addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
ix
Confidentiality/gagging clauses 83
Using the criminal law to protect whistleblowers 83
Making additional compensation claims available to whistleblowers 83
Key practice action points arising from research objective 3 84
Research objective 4: learning from the findings of formal inquiries 84
Diverse definitions of whistleblowing 84
Few specific recommendations on whistleblowing 84
System failures rather than individual shortcomings 85
Cultural change over legal safeguards 85
Reinvention and retreads 86
Optimism over improvements 86
Key practice action points arising from research objective 4 86
Directions for future whistleblowing research in health care 87
Exploring the ‘deaf effect’, hearer courage and hearer protection 87
Progression from raising concerns to whistleblowing 87
Cultural and interpersonal differences 87
Research on other health professionals 88
Theory of planned behaviour 88
Better use of data 88
Types of wrongdoing 89
Media coverage 89
Research design 89
Study limitations 90
Concluding remarks 90
Acknowledgements 91
References 93
Appendix 1 Summary of key publications from the empirical and theoretical
literature on whistleblowing and speaking up 111
Appendix 2 Summary of key recommendations from the Inquiry reports 125
Appendix 3 Legal review 139
Appendix 4 Summaries of key Inquiry reports 149
CONTENTS
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
x
List of tables
TABLE 1 Types of whistleblowing (from Park et al.) 6
TABLE 2 Assessing wrongdoing: two illustrative vignettes 10
TABLE 3 Steps in the whistleblowing process (from Near and Miceli) 11
TABLE 4 The seminal papers: citations up to 2016 (as calculated by Google Scholar) 18
TABLE 5 Mapping health-care-related studies onto the Near and Miceli stage
model of whistleblowing 22
TABLE 6 Summary of the key inquiries covered in Chapter 4 40
TABLE 7 Reasons for and implications of whistleblowing for individuals and the NHS 41
TABLE 8 Summary of selected empirical literature exploring whistleblowing in
health care 112
TABLE 9 Theoretical papers of particular significance to this study 123
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr06300 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2018 VOL. 6 NO. 30
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2018. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health and Social Care. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional
journals provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should
be addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
xi

List of figures
FIGURE 1 Dimensions for assessing wrongdoing (adapted from Skivenes and
Trygstad, p. 97) 9
FIGURE 2 Theoretical perspectives on whistleblowing 11
FIGURE 3 Selection process for general literature on whistleblowing 19
FIGURE 4 Selection process for empirical papers in health care 19
FIGURE 5 Publications on whistleblowing by year since 1975 20
FIGURE 6 Percentage of health-care studies involving different professions 21
FIGURE 7 Percentage of health-care studies involving different nursing specialties 21
FIGURE 8 Percentage of health-care studies involving different student categories 21
FIGURE 9 The exit–voice continuum 27
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr06300 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2018 VOL. 6 NO. 30
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2018. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health and Social Care. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional
journals provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should
be addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
xiii

List of boxes
BOX 1 Interview sample 67
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr06300 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2018 VOL. 6 NO. 30
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2018. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health and Social Care. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional
journals provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should
be addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
xv

List of abbreviations
A&E accident and emergency
BMA British Medical Association
CEO chief executive officer
CHI Commission for Health
Improvement
CMO Chief Medical Officer
CQC Care Quality Commission
DHSC Department of Health and
Social Care
ECHR European Convention on
Human Rights
ERA Employment Rights Act
ERRA Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act
GMC General Medical Council
GP general practitioner
HCC Healthcare Commission
HR Human Resources
INO independent national officer
MP Member of Parliament
NCAA National Clinical Assessment
Authority
NCAS National Clinical Assessment
Service
NICE National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence
NMC Nursing and Midwifery Council
NPSA National Patient Safety Agency
NSS NHS Staff Survey
PALS Patient Advice and Liaison Service
PCAW Public Concern at Work
PCS paediatric cardiac surgery
PCT primary care trust
PIDA Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998
POP perception of organisational politics
RCN Royal College of Nursing
SHA Strategic Health Authority
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr06300 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2018 VOL. 6 NO. 30
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2018. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health and Social Care. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional
journals provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should
be addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
xvii

Plain English summary
When health-care professionals see poor or unsafe care, it is important that they speak up so that carecan be improved. Sometimes, speaking up is informal and managed within the care organisation.
At other times, speaking out happens by alerting outside authorities (whistleblowing). There is some evidence
to suggest that, in many parts of the NHS, staff may feel unable to speak up, and that even when they do
speak up, their organisation may respond inappropriately. As well as poor care going unaddressed, in some
instances staff have been bullied or victimised for raising legitimate concerns. This research seeks to better
understand the processes associated with effective whistleblowing policies in health-care contexts. It is based
on a review of the academic literature on whistleblowing and related matters; an analysis of formal Inquiry
reports into poor standards of care in the NHS; a review of the legal framework(s) that seeks to protect
whistleblowers; and interviews with key stakeholders. In doing so, we explore the factors that support
(or inhibit) whistleblowing, and examine why some managers do not respond (or respond inappropriately)
when concerns about care are brought to their attention. We conclude that current policy initiatives that
seek to develop better whistleblowing policies in the NHS are in need of a stronger theoretical and empirical
evidence base. We set out a wide range of issues that need consideration in developing whistleblowing
policies, including the need for better legislation to support and protect people when they raise concerns
about poor-quality care. We also highlight a number of areas that require more research, in particular the
reasons why some NHS managers do not respond when genuine concerns are raised.
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Scientific summary
Background
Recent inquiries and reports into poor standards of NHS care have highlighted the vital role that employee
whistleblowing and speaking up can play in the detection and prevention of harm to patients. Although
many concerns about poor or unsafe care are dealt with satisfactorily, there is compelling evidence to
suggest that some staff (perhaps many) may feel unable to speak up, and that even when they do,
their organisation may respond inappropriately. Against this background, we wanted to strengthen the
theoretical and empirical evidence-base underpinning whistleblowing policy and practice in the NHS.
Objectives
The overall purpose of this study was to identify theoretically grounded and evidence-informed lessons for the
design and implementation of employee whistleblowing policies in the NHS. The specific objectives were to:
1. explore the main strands of the academic and grey literature on whistleblowing and related concepts
such as employee silence, and to identify the key theoretical and conceptual frameworks that can
inform an understanding of employee whistleblowing
2. synthesise empirical evidence from different industries, sectors and countries with regard to the
organisational processes, incentives and cultures that serve to facilitate (or impede) employees raising
legitimate concerns
3. examine the UK legal framework(s) for whistleblowing in relation to health care, and review alternative
approaches to whistleblowing in other European Union member states, considering what lessons can
be learnt at a domestic level from such comparisons
4. distil the lessons for whistleblowing policies and practice from the findings of formal Inquiries into
serious failings in NHS care
5. ascertain the views, expectations and experiences of a range of key stakeholders, including service user
and carer representatives, about the development of effective whistleblowing policies in the NHS
6. on the basis of findings relating to points 1–5, develop theoretically grounded and evidence-informed
practical guidance for policy-makers, managers and others with responsibility for implementing effective
whistleblowing policies in the NHS.
Methods
The study comprised four distinct but overlapping and interlocking strands.
1. A series of linked narrative literature reviews of the theoretical and empirical literature related to raising
concerns, speaking up and whistleblowing across a range of sectors and contexts. We adopted a
narrative and interdisciplinary approach to reviewing, which sought to produce a synthesis that embraced
the complexities and ambiguities associated with developing an understanding of whistleblowing.
2. An overview of the legal issues related to whistleblowing in an international context. Literature searches
of primary legal sources (statutory and case law materials) were conducted and secondary literature
searches of legal databases were undertaken.
3. A review of formal Inquiries and government documents related to previous failings of NHS care; in
addition, we examined the responses of the main stakeholders to the corresponding Inquiry reports.
Electronic searches of the documents were performed using thematic coding in a deductive and
inductive manner via keywords generated by emerging findings arising from other strands of the study.
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4. Interviews with 16 key informants comprising a mix of representatives of user and carer groups, policy
advisors, academics, employee organisations, trade unions and the Royal Colleges. The interviews
ascertained the views about current whistleblowing policies in the NHS and how these could be
improved, and were used to inform and develop the other strands noted above.
Members of the research team liaised throughout the literature review process to discuss and synthesise
the emergent findings and ensure that insights were shared and integrated across the work packages.
For example, the review of conceptualisations and theories of whistleblowing informed the analysis of the
Inquiry reports and the content of the key informant interviews.
Results
This section takes each of the research objectives in turn. We take the first two objectives together as they
are informed by the same literature review; and we do not separate out the findings from objective 5 as
these were used to shape and inform the wider work.
Research objectives 1 and 2: key conceptual issues and empirical findings
The key conceptual and empirical issues uncovered by our review with practical import for understanding,
designing and improving whistleblowing and speaking up policies in the NHS include those detailed in the
following sections.
Silence and voice
Policy prescriptions have tended to conceive the issue of raising concerns about unsafe care as a simple
choice between deciding to ‘blow the whistle’ and determining to remain silent. Yet research suggests that
such simple dichotomies are unhelpful; for example, health-care professionals may raise concerns internally
within the organisation in more informal ways before (or instead of) utilising whistleblowing processes.
Such a view highlights the different routes through which health-care employees are able to articulate
their ‘voice’, and challenges the pejorative notion, often promoted in the media, that health-care
professionals are culpable bystanders who tolerate poor standards of care and are ‘silent witnesses’ to
malpractice and mistreatment.
Hearing and acting
The effective voicing of concerns is but the first stage in reshaping better, safer health care: those with
influence have to hear, and they have to act. In this regard, we discuss the ‘deaf effect’, a concept that has
been used in the management and organisation literature to describe the reluctance of senior managers to
hear, accept or act on concerns about care raised by employees lower down the hierarchy. Our conclusion
is that we need as sophisticated an understanding of these response dynamics as we do of the dynamics
of whistleblowing itself.
Interactional processes
Linked to the above is the recognition that whistleblowing is a situated and interactional process and not just
a one-off act by an identifiable whistleblower. Most previous research and policy around whistleblowing has
focused on the whistleblower, in particular the factors that inhibit whistleblowing and determine who has
‘the courage’ to speak up and under what circumstances. However, policy prescriptions need to better
acknowledge the complexity and ambiguity of speaking out, and a greater research focus needs to be placed
on why some managers respond effectively to concerns raised and others do not.
Whistleblowing, or bell-ringing?
As conceived in both the academic literature and wider public understanding, whistleblowing usually
describes internal organisational members raising concerns to those who can effect action. However,
‘bell-ringing’, or outsider whistleblowing, is also a possibility: the reporting of care failings by those other
than employees (e.g. patients themselves, relatives, or professionals from other agencies, such as social
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workers). Potentially, this is a more significant issue for health care than for any other sector. As the NHS
becomes ever more diverse in terms of collaboration with other sectors, and as social media and information-
sharing technologies become more developed, external staff and other stakeholders are increasingly exposed
to, and in a position to speak up about, poor-quality care. This is a key area for future research.
Personal factors in raising concerns
There is mixed evidence on the role and impact of personal factors in raising concerns. For example, in terms of
length and security of tenure, some studies have found that the more embedded and socialised into a particular
culture staff are, the less likely they are to spot poor practice and report it (perhaps because of personal and
social links with colleagues). Similarly, the evidence is mixed on whether nurses who, over time, become more
socialised and integrated members of the organisation become less likely (through de-sensitisation) or more
likely (through better organisational knowledge and developed networks) to detect and report poor care.
Research objective 3: the legal frameworks for whistleblowing
Here, we consider alternative approaches that may be taken in relation to the statutory basis and
regulation of whistleblowing.
Oversight from an independent agency
As part of a review of the law in this area, one approach is the creation of a specific national independent
whistleblowing agency, a free-standing body or within an existing agency. Such a body could receive and
investigate whistleblowing disclosures, collect information on workplace disclosures and have the power to
obtain information from regulators for subsequent action. It could issue penalties when organisations have
not followed up on information disclosure, order the cessation of retaliation against a whistleblower and
be able to order compensation and reinstatement.
Statutory requirement to establish whistleblowing procedures
The establishment and maintenance of whistleblowing procedures could be made a legal requirement. In
the Republic of Ireland, the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Republic of Ireland. Protected Disclosures Act
2014. Dublin: Government of Ireland; 2014) places a specific requirement on public bodies to create and
maintain procedures for employees to make protected disclosures and provide them with information
concerning this.
Early-stage protection for whistleblowers
Whistleblowers should be able to apply for whistleblower status to receive early-stage protection. Currently,
an employee can apply under section 128 of the Employment Rights Act (Great Britain. Employment Rights
Act 1996. London: The Stationery Office; 1996) to an employment tribunal and ask for an order that they can
remain employed. This will maintain the contractual arrangement while waiting for the whistleblower’s case
to be determined. However, this has limited utility: whistleblowers must act within 7 days, it is expensive and
employers cannot be forced to allow the whistleblower to continue working.
Incentives for whistleblowing
One possible approach that can be taken to encourage whistleblowers to come forward is the provision of
financial incentives, whether in the form of proportion of fines levied or other financial benefits obtained
as a result of their disclosure. Incentives have been used in other contexts, notably in the USA, where the
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (United States of America. Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Washington, DC: Library of Congress; 2010) provides
substantial incentives of between 10% and 30% of monies of > US$1M recovered by the government.
Confidentiality/‘gagging’ clauses
Confidentiality or so-called ‘gagging’ clauses may be seen as valid and appropriate from an employment
law perspective, but considerably less so from a freedom of speech approach to whistleblowing or from
a regulatory approach. It remains very questionable as to the extent to which such clauses are ever
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appropriate in the public sector, and in the past the Secretary of State for Health has indicated that these
would be banned. Further work and/or guidance in this area may be necessary.
Using the criminal law to protect whistleblowers
The legislation in England and Wales does not provide for criminal penalties against those who commit
reprisals against whistleblowers. In contrast, such provisions do apply in relation to certain other
jurisdictions. For example, the US Sarbanes–Oxley Act {Sarbanes–Oxley Act [2002] (Pub.L. 107–204, 116
Stat. 745, enacted July 30, 2002)} states that it is an offence to ‘knowingly and with intent’ take actions
harmful to another person.
None of the potential avenues for legal innovation laid out above offers simple or swift remedial action
to a patched and patchwork legal system. Nonetheless, they do lay out avenues for future discussion,
consultation and empirical research.
Research objective 4: learning from the findings of formal inquiries
There have been numerous formal Inquiries into care failings in the NHS, and we reviewed what these
had to say about whistleblowing, from the Kennedy inquiry up until the latest round of Francis Reports
following the care failures in Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust.
Few specific recommendations on whistleblowing
It is perhaps surprising given their subject matter, but there is little specific discussion of, or recommendations
concerning, whistleblowing across these Inquiries. The Inquiries focus (perhaps disproportionately) on patient
complaints rather than on employee voice. Of some 820 recommendations across all of the Inquiries
reviewed, only eight are directly concerned with whistleblowing.
Diverse definitions of whistleblowing
There appear to be three dimensions to whistleblowing contained with formal Inquiry reports: (1) whether
or not the person works for the organisation, (2) whether they raise concerns internally or externally
(or escalate from internal to external, if the internal route produces no results) and (3) whether or not they
are a whistleblower in the strict legal sense of the term and are making a ‘qualifying statement’.
Cultural change over legal safeguards
It was notable that most Inquiry accounts focused on the ‘system’ rather than on the people within it.
The most consistent system remedy drawn out from Inquiry recommendations is cultural reform and
renewal rather than legal safeguards. By finding fault with culture and providing prescriptions for change,
several Inquiry reports make assumptions that require examination. First, they presuppose that we can
identify and assess common aspects of culture, as well as identify which aspects are supportive of, or
inimical to, high-quality care. Second, they assume that these aspects of culture can be purposely changed,
that any changes will lead to improvements, and that the costs and dysfunctions from such prescriptive
changes will be outweighed by the benefits. However, much research shows more complex and nuanced
relations between cultures, practices and outcomes than implied by Inquiry reports.
Reinvention and retreads
Evident from the Inquiry reports is a high degree of reinventing the wheel, with some return to similar
solutions over time: a situation that has been described as ‘Groundhog Day’ as recommendations from
previous Inquiries become recycled. The clearest example of this is the repeated identification of culture as
both a culprit of and a solution to periodic failings in the quality of care in the NHS.
Optimism over improvements
Many of the reports appear to be somewhat optimistic that ‘things are getting better’: that institutions,
policies and procedures are in place that will not allow earlier problems to recur. Governments typically
tend to argue that ‘much has changed’ since the incidents took place, and that remedial policies have
been put in place. However, although there have been some positive changes, there remains a concern
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that the deep-rooted and diverse challenges exposed by these Inquiries have yet to be fully addressed,
and that the potential for effective whistleblowing policies has yet to be fully exploited.
Conclusions
Taken together, the arguments emerging through the various strands of this work highlight the need for
a new socially situated research agenda, not just of whistleblowing as aberrant activity, but of the full
range of organisationally embedded communications, sense-making, judgement-forming and responses.
Although some form of whistleblowing – and the social, legal and structural arrangements in support
of it – may always be necessary, a better understanding of these organisationally situated dynamics may,
paradoxically, enable a diminution of its prominence.
Current policy prescriptions that seek to develop better whistleblowing policies and nurture open reporting
cultures are in need of better evidence. Although we have set out a wide range of issues that need consideration
in the development of whistleblowing policies, it is beyond the remit of this research to convert these concerns
into specific recommendations of the ways in which current policies can be improved: that is a process that
needs to be led from elsewhere, in the light of this new evidence summary, and in full partnership with the
service. It is our view, however, that there is still much to learn regarding this important but under-researched
area of health policy and management practice, and to this end we have highlighted a number of important
gaps in knowledge that are in need of more sustained research.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Whistleblowing: a complex and contested issue
Employee whistleblowing – loosely, the raising of concerns or speaking up about unsafe, unethical or
poor-quality care by employees to persons able to effect action – has emerged as a central issue in debates
over quality and safety in many health systems.1 In the English NHS, recent inquiries and reports into poor
standards of care have highlighted the vital contribution that whistleblowing can play in the detection and
prevention of harm to patients.2 Yet, for all its importance, the act of whistleblowing is no simple issue3
and is fraught with ambiguity. For example, individual whistleblowers may be perceived as heroes by some
(for championing patients’ interests, promoting better care and challenging management) but may be seen
as villains by others (for denigrating services and damaging professional and organisational reputations).
Indeed, in the popular media whistleblowers are often portrayed either as ‘courageous employees’ who act
to maintain standards at great personal cost or as ‘disloyal malcontents’ who ‘snitch’ or ‘grass’ on colleagues
and pursue their own interests regardless of the dysfunctional consequences for individuals and organisations.
Moreover, it would be naive to assume that all whistleblowers are necessarily motivated entirely by genuine
concerns about patient care. Some may be motivated in addition by work grievances or personality clashes;
in the extreme, concerns may even be of a malicious nature. In fact, clear delineation between such labels is
problematic. Whistleblowing may arise out of complex and contested circumstances, as what is ‘safe’ and
what is ‘acceptable’ (in terms of quality) are disputable. Therefore, binary distinctions (such as hero/villain,
loyal/disloyal and warranted/unwarranted) are often unhelpful, and disguise the complexity and ambiguity of
whistleblowers and whistleblowing.
When concerns are raised, it is also important that organisations respond positively, learn from any
mistakes of the past and put in place effective policies to prevent such mistakes from happening again.
Unfortunately, in the NHS there have been all too many high-profile examples of front-line staff raising
serious concerns that have not been adequately dealt with by the organisation. Patients have suffered as a
result, and staff, too, may have been harmed from the direct and indirect consequences of their raising
concerns. As Sir Robert Francis’ independent review, Freedom to Speak Up, concluded:
. . . there is a culture within many parts of the NHS which deters staff from raising serious and sensitive
concerns and which not infrequently has negative consequences for those brave enough to
raise them.
Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.02
However, whistleblowing always happens in a deeply cultural and highly situated organisational and policy
context, and involves managing ambiguity and handling contestation. Whistleblowing policies thus need
very careful design, implementation and enacting to protect those raising legitimate concerns, as well as
offering support in cases of fallout from more doubtful or even vexatious whistleblowing.
Numerous surveys across different professional groups confirm significant shortcomings (or, at least,
perceptions of significant shortcomings) in the protection and support offered to whistleblowers seeking to
raise legitimate concerns about poor or unsafe patient care in the NHS. A possible reason for this is the
widely held perception among health professionals that they will be victimised, ostracised or bullied if they
raise concerns about colleagues or poor standards of care.4 This is not a new development. More than a
decade ago, the report following the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry recognised that many staff, particularly
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junior staff, remained silent in the face of poor care or wrongdoing as they feared raising concerns and/or
challenging superiors because of the possible repercussions:
There is a real fear among staff (particularly among junior doctors and nurses) that to comment on
colleagues, particularly consultants, is to endanger their future work prospects. The junior needs a
reference and a recommendation; nurses want to keep their jobs. This is a powerful motive for
keeping quiet.
Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.05
These concerns remain current. The 2015 NHS Staff Survey (NSS) found that, when asked whether or not
their organisation treated staff involved in near misses, errors and incidents fairly, fewer than half (43%)
of staff reported that this was the case. In addition, only half (50%) of staff reported that feedback was
given by their organisation about any changes that had been made in response to the reported error or
incident.6 In 2013, the Royal College of Nursing polled its members, with almost one-quarter (24%) saying
that they had been warned off or discouraged from whistleblowing and 45% saying that, even after they
had spoken out, their employer had taken no action. Similarly, a survey of doctors undertaken in 2012 by
the Medical Protection Society reported that only 11% of respondents said that they would be confident
in the process if they were to blow the whistle, and 49% of doctors reported that ‘fear of consequences’
is why the whistleblowing process is ineffective. Only one-third (33%) of doctors who had blown the
whistle said that colleagues supported their decision and < 40% felt that their concerns had been
addressed (with, as a result, 18% feeling isolated, 14% moving location or job and 12% reporting
health issues).4
That there should be so much uncertainty and disquiet about speaking out should not come as a surprise.
Local discursive practices (e.g. on the nature of success, failure, risk and performance) and local operational
contingencies (such as resource constraints, service rivalries and stakeholder pressure) will have a powerful
influence on the willingness of employees to raise concerns and the ability and willingness of employers to
respond appropriately. Of course, whatever the local contingencies and discourses, these play out within a
larger political, policy and legal context, and it is to these that we now turn.
Policy and legal context
Currently, protection for whistleblowers in England is enshrined entirely within an employment context and
is contained in the Employment Rights Act (ERA)7 as amended by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998
(PIDA)8 (see Chapter 5, which contains a fuller overview of the legal framework related to whistleblowing
in England). PIDA was passed to protect whistleblowers in the wake of the Bristol paediatric cardiac
surgery scandal and provides legal protection against detriment for workers who raise concerns in the
public interest (also known as making a disclosure) about a danger, risk, malpractice or wrongdoing in
the workplace that affects others. For a whistleblower to be protected, the disclosure must be in the public
interest, the worker must have a reasonable belief that the information shows the occurrence, or likely
occurrence, of one of the categories of wrongdoing listed in the legislation, and the concern must be
raised in the correct way. This is now enshrined in the NHS Constitution,9 which mandates that:
l staff should raise concerns at the earliest opportunity
l NHS organisations should support staff by ensuring that their concerns are fully investigated and that
there is someone independent, outside their team, who can provide support
l there is a legal right for staff to raise concerns about safety, malpractice or other wrongdoing without
suffering any detriment.
Whistleblowing policies have been mandated and promoted for many years outside any strict legal framework –
for example by health-care employers, regulators and professional associations – aimed particularly at securing
safe and effective services. Professional bodies, including the Royal College of General Practitioners and the UK
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Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC), have professional codes that place obligations on registrants to report
untoward incidents to their employers, and they have produced guidance for doctors, nurses, midwives and
students raising concerns about quality of care. In 2012, NHS Employers launched the Speaking Up Charter,10
which encouraged NHS organisations to pledge publicly a commitment to creating cultures and policies that
support staff in raising concerns and a continuous review and evaluation of such policies to ensure that they
remain effective. The Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) has also commissioned a whistleblowing
helpline that provides free advice and support to staff on whether or not and how to raise concerns at work.
Since 2015, a statutory duty of candour has operated that requires NHS bodies and all Care Quality Commission
(CQC)-registered providers (rather than individuals) to be open and honest when an unintended or unexpected
incident has resulted in, or could result in, death, moderate or severe physical harm, or prolonged psychological
harm. In such instances, providers must notify the patient involved, offer an apology and follow up the incident
in writing.
The report of the independent Freedom to Speak Up review, chaired by Sir Robert Francis,2 identified 20
principles and associated actions that should underpin whistleblowing polices in the NHS and recommended
that the Secretary of State for Health should review, at least annually, the progress made in their
implementation. These principles and actions include:
l a common policy and procedure for raising concerns, including better investigations and promoting a
model of good practice in the handling of concerns
l training for managers and all staff in the raising and handling of concerns
l cultural change towards creating more open, transparent and learning cultures that value
communication and staff engagement
l Freedom to Speak Up guardians to be appointed to each NHS organisation, supported by an
independent national officer (INO)
l legal changes to antidiscrimination laws to protect whistleblowers from discrimination in recruitment
l additions to the list of prescribed persons to whom protected disclosures can be made.
In July 2015, the Secretary of State for Health confirmed the steps to be taken to develop a culture of safety,
including the appointment of a national guardian alongside a local guardian in every NHS trust, with the goal
of promoting the raising of concerns across the NHS. Although all NHS organisations are now required to
have policies and procedures in place that urge staff to ‘speak up’ when necessary, there is no requirement
for uniformity, and, as noted by Francis,11 different sources of guidance express themselves differently and
there is, therefore, a risk that such a plethora of information, advice and guidance may be confusing for staff
working in the NHS. For example, staff may not know where to go for the best advice or if, having spoken to
a particular organisation, they still need to report their concerns elsewhere.
Aims and objectives of this study
Against this background, it is clear that there are serious uncertainties and challenges in relation to current
whistleblowing and speaking up policies in the NHS. Our study addresses these concerns with the aim of
developing theoretically grounded and evidence-informed guidance to assist policy-makers, managers
and others responsible for designing/implementing effective whistleblowing and speaking up policies.
The specific objectives were to:
1. explore the main strands of the academic and grey literature on whistleblowing and related concepts
such as employee silence, and to identify the key theoretical and conceptual frameworks that inform
the understanding of employee whistleblowing
2. synthesise empirical evidence from different industries, sectors and countries with regard to the
organisational processes, systems, incentives and cultures that serve to facilitate (or impede) employees
raising legitimate concerns
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3. examine the legal framework for whistleblowing in relation to health care as a mechanism for promoting
(or inhibiting patient safety) and review the approaches to whistleblowing in relation to European Union
member states and consider what lessons can be learnt at a domestic level from such comparisons
4. distil the lessons for whistleblowing policies and practice from the findings of formal Inquiries into
serious failings in NHS care
5. ascertain the views, expectations and experiences of a range of key stakeholders, including service user
and carer representatives, about the development of effective whistleblowing policies in the NHS and
use these views to help structure and inform the desk research set out above
6. on the basis of findings relating to points 1–5, develop theoretically grounded and evidence-informed
practical guidance for policy-makers, managers and others with responsibility for designing and
implementing effective whistleblowing policies in the NHS.
Project overview and reporting structure
Full details of the methods used at each stage of the project are reported within the corresponding
chapters, which broadly correspond to the six core objectives as set out above. In essence, the study
comprised four distinct but overlapping strands:
1. a series of linked narrative literature reviews of the theoretical and empirical literature related to raising
concerns, speaking up and whistleblowing across a range of sectors and contexts
2. an overview of the legal issues related to whistleblowing in an international context
3. a review of formal inquiry and government documents related to previous failings of NHS care
4. scoping interviews with key informants.
Throughout the project (completed in 1 year), the whole project team met extensively to discuss the emerging
findings from each strand and to ensure that these emerging findings informed and complemented the
ongoing work. In that sense, the work reported under separate chapter headings, although having a distinct
focus that maps to the core objectives, has been informed by the parallel stands of work reported elsewhere.
Supporting this, the scoping interviews with key informants were developed and implemented early in the
project and helped to structure and inform the main desk research.
The chapters reporting the key aspects of the research are as follows:
l Chapter 2 – the conceptual underpinnings of whistleblowing
l Chapter 3 – empirical evidence on whistleblowing
l Chapter 4 – the main whistleblowing inquiries and formal responses to inquiry recommendation
l Chapter 5 – the legal underpinnings of whistleblowing
l Chapter 6 – key informant interviews.
In compiling this report, we have sought to produce a synthesis that embraces the complexities and
ambiguities associated with developing an understanding of whistleblowing and related policies in the
context of health-care services, and to identify the different narratives and contours of debate in an
inclusive and holistic manner, interweaving and interlinking common themes across the various strands of
the study and thereby building a rich picture of whistleblowing across diverse sources of evidence. The
final chapter (see Chapter 7) continues this integrative process and draws out the conclusions and
research implications.
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Chapter 2 The conceptual underpinnings
of whistleblowing
Introduction
Any study intending to explore whistleblowing in the NHS requires an understanding of the conceptual
underpinnings of whistleblowing and the key theoretical and methodological debates within whistleblowing
research. This chapter, therefore, begins the process of unpacking what is meant by whistleblowing and
introduces some of the sources of the ideas, conceptual underpinnings and different approaches to
understanding whistleblowing and related terms such as ‘speaking up’. The material draws on the systematic
literature review detailed in Chapter 3 (see that chapter for an account of the methods by which the literature
was uncovered and collated), as well as from the accumulated expertise of the research team and from
discussions with leading researchers in the field.
The chapter is structured as follows. We begin by outlining how whistleblowing has developed as a
distinctive field of enquiry, and explore how whistleblowing and related concepts such as speaking up have
been defined in the literature. We then review the main theoretical perspectives on whistleblowing that
have been seen in the literature, and examine emerging perspectives that have the potential to develop our
understanding further. We then rehearse the key methodological challenges involved in whistleblowing
research, before drawing out some of the implications of these for more thorough NHS-specific research.
The emergence of whistleblowing as a field of study
Whistleblowing was first brought to wide public awareness in the 1970s, and has become progressively
more high profile. The release of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 was not the first example of whistleblowing,
but it was arguably the first to be widely known. There are three competing explanations for the origins of
the term ‘whistleblowing’, and these provide useful insights into the tensions and ambiguities that still
surround the practice. The most frequently encountered explanation is that it comes from an analogy with
police officers blowing a whistle, to attract the attention of an individual to whom the officer wished to
speak, or to bring other officers in the vicinity to the scene (in the days before mobile communications).
Another suggested analogy is with the use of a whistle by referees in sport to call a halt to a game after a
foul has been committed.
A third, perhaps less likely, but nonetheless intriguing, explanation, is that the term derives from 19th
century US legislation that required train drivers to sound a whistle when they approached crossings.
Failure to do so could lead to fines, and, moreover, citizens calling attention to these failures could receive
payment for doing so. Indeed, in the US legal system it remains the case that those blowing the whistle on
financial irregularities can sometimes stand to gain personally from the reporting of such wrongdoing. This
articulation of whistleblowing speaks to the still-current concern that whistleblowers might be motivated
by personal gain. Taken together, then, these putative etymologies describe whistleblowing variously as an
act of calling for help, crying foul or informing the authorities (perhaps) for personal gain.
The academic interest in whistleblowing followed its greater public profile, with a handful of seminal articles
published between 1983 and 1985 proving influential (see Chapter 3, Literature review methods). From
the outset, whistleblowing research was inherently multidisciplinary, with scholars from law, management,
public administration, sociology and psychology all interested in the phenomenon. An unusual feature of the
whistleblowing field is the relative lack of definitional debates. Over 30 years ago, Near and Miceli12 defined
whistleblowing as ‘the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or
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illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to
effect action’. This definition quickly gained almost universal acceptance and application, and remains the
standard definition. The surprising lack of debates on definition among whistleblowing researchers stands
in stark contrast to debates within wider society concerning the purpose and value of whistleblowing, the
motivation of whistleblowers and the circumstances under which they should receive legal protection for
their actions. The last issue is key: prospective whistleblowers are likely to be less concerned about how
academics define whistleblowing, and more concerned about how the law defines it and whether or not
they can expect protection under the law for their actions.13
The debate continues as countries around the world consider enacting whistleblowing protection
legislation or revising existing laws.
Raising concerns, speaking up or blowing the whistle?
Academics typically define a given social phenomenon more narrowly and precisely than the way in which
lay people talk about the phenomenon. Whistleblowing represents an unusual reversal of that pattern, as
the most widely used definition12 incorporates behaviour that most employees or citizens would be unlikely
to label whistleblowing. Park et al.,14 who developed a typology of whistleblowing based on a decision
tree, illustrate this. They suggest that individuals who have decided to raise concerns face three key
choices: to raise issues (1) informally or formally, (2) anonymously or on the record and (3) internally or
externally. This typology suggests eight types of whistleblowing, only some of which would fit with how
most people would understand the concept. For example, before deciding to blow the whistle employees
usually find themselves trying to work out exactly what is happening, often through engaging in dialogue
with colleagues.15 Such behaviour could be consistent with the informal/identified/internal whistleblowing
pathway,14 but it seems unlikely that staff would perceive such conversations as a form of whistleblowing.
Table 1 details how the Park et al.14 typology might translate into a health-care context.
Notwithstanding the Park et al.14 typology detailed above, the academic literature has traditionally focused
on a dichotomous choice between whistleblowing and silence; that is, when faced with wrongdoing,
an employee makes a conscious choice either to remain silent or to act by raising concerns.16 Yet, as
highlighted by Jones and Kelly,17 this simplistic dichotomy obscures a range of alternative strategies to
TABLE 1 Types of whistleblowing (from Park et al.14)
Type of whistleblowing Examples
Informal
Anonymous, internal Unsigned note sent to a manager in the internal mail; telephone call to HR
(or similar) giving no name
Anonymous, external Tip-off to a journalist; anonymous web postings
Identified, internal Discussing one’s concerns with a colleague
Identified, external Posts on social media criticising one’s employer
Formal
Anonymous, internal Leaving a message on a drug error hotline
Anonymous, external Medication error reporting programmes
Identified, internal Raising concerns with a Speaking Up guardian
Identified, external Raising concerns with a regulator; approaching a MP; speaking to a journalist
HR, Human Resources; MP, Member of Parliament.
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whistleblowing that may be just as effective in identifying and preventing wrongdoing. Such strategies might
include interpersonal approaches such as the use of humour or sarcasm to signal discontent, or informal and
off-the-record discussions with managers and employees. Jones and Kelly17 suggest that these ‘informal and
circumlocutory’ channels of communication may be valuable organisational mechanisms for addressing poor
standards of care. Indeed, they argue that these can prove more effective than formal reporting systems, as
they are more likely to circumvent the ‘deaf effect’ (see below). This fits with the current emphasis in NHS
policy debates on ‘raising concerns’ and ‘speaking up’, rather than whistleblowing per se, consistent with
our observations in Chapter 3 that the relevant literature within health care tends to emphasise voice
behaviours rather than formal whistleblowing.
Francis11 notes that many staff appear unhappy with the term whistleblowing, hence the suggestion that
terms like ‘raising concerns’ and ‘speaking up’ are to be preferred. However, it is useful to think of raising
concerns, speaking up and whistleblowing as a continuum, even though, arguably, all can be subsumed
under the academic definition of whistleblowing. We can differentiate between them in various ways, but
it may be most useful to think about how employees might distinguish between them. An employee who
has concerns about a particular issue that affects quality and safety of patient care might ‘raise concerns’
with their line manager, possibly informally. If they get no response, they may choose to ‘speak up’,
potentially talking again to the same manager, but this time more formally and perhaps making clear that
they expects their concerns to be a matter of record. If the issue is still not resolved, they may choose to
‘blow the whistle’ to someone more senior, or perhaps go outside the organisation.
From an employee perspective, the act of ‘raising concerns’ may be relatively low risk, something that might
be done routinely, perhaps even just in passing (e.g. ‘I think the new health-care assistant is a little brusque
with the older patients’). Speaking up is more serious: the very phrasing implies raising one’s voice or
breaking a silence. The perceived level of risk may not be very great; in some cases the employee may only
risk feeling foolish if they are mistaken, although their concern about this may, in itself, be enough to ensure
that they remain silent.15 Whistleblowing is a more significant act, to which the organisation may respond
negatively. Alford18 has argued that whistleblowers are defined post hoc, by the organisation’s response to
their action. Using the NHS terminology, someone who thought they were just ‘raising concerns’ or ‘speaking
up’ can discover that they are a whistleblower if the organisation responds negatively. The general perception
among NHS staff and the wider public is that NHS whistleblowers tend to fare badly,19 so staff thinking about
speaking up may, from the outset, be concerned that they will receive a very negative response. This may
lead individuals with relatively low-level concerns to refrain from raising them.
In a health-care context, another important distinction between raising concerns/speaking up and
whistleblowing may be the focus of the concern. The classic definition of whistleblowing specifies that it
is about ‘illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices’.20 Many issues that could affect care quality and patient
safety, and about which we would hope staff would raise any concerns, do not necessarily come under
any of those headings. Staffing levels, poor practice or poor performance (e.g. from a colleague dealing
with personal problems) are all issues that could have a detrimental effect on patient care, but that
staff would probably not view as ‘wrongdoing’ (see below for a more detailed discussion). Nevertheless,
such issues may eventually lead to whistleblowing if they are not properly addressed. If a junior doctor
raised concerns about a colleague’s confidence in dealing with challenging patients, they are clearly not
concerned about ‘illegal, immoral or illegitimate’ behaviour. However, if those concerns are not addressed,
and problems continue, a decision to speak to someone more senior about the issue is implicitly speaking
up about the failure to address the problem. Such action is more consistent with whistleblowing. This
is a subtle but important point that is often missed: whistleblowers are often described as blowing the
whistle about a specific issue (e.g. poor practice), but they are often effectively blowing the whistle on
management’s failure to act once made aware of the original issue.
Recent discussion of speaking up2,21,22 has tended to frame the problem in terms of creating environments
in which staff feel more able to voice their concerns. Yet, as Francis11 and Kelly and Jones19 observe,
in many scandals staff had voiced their concerns; the problem was getting someone to listen.
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This is consistent with the ‘deaf effect’, a term originally coined by Keil and Robey23 to describe the
reluctance of senior managers to hear, accept and act on challenging observations from lower down the
organisation. Vandekerckhove et al.24 suggest that researchers need to pay more attention to the question
of how recipients of whistleblowing respond, and in particular to ‘hearer action’, which we might view as
the antithesis of the deaf effect. Whereas it is widely recognised that it takes a degree of courage for
someone to blow the whistle, it is less immediately obvious that it may also take courage for a manager
to take on board the issues and act on them. Just as the whistleblower knows that the line manager may
not want to hear bad news, so the line manager knows that more senior management may be similarly
reluctant to be informed of breaches or the requirements of remediation. Whistleblowing recipients in
management roles know that their actions in raising the whistleblower’s concerns may receive a negative
response and may even lead to the sort of retaliation and victimisation that can sometimes be experienced
by whistleblowers themselves. For this reason, Vandekerckhove et al.24 suggest that there is a need for
research into ‘hearer courage’ to understand ‘which managers have the courage to hear, under which
circumstances, and with regard to which wrongs’ (p. 316). The same issues may pertain to the new
Speaking Up guardian roles in the NHS, for whom a whistleblower’s report may feel like the whistleblower
taking a burden off their own shoulders and placing it on the guardian’s.
Our analysis of the various public inquiries (see Chapter 4) suggests that senior management may
sometimes also suffer from ‘collective myopia’,25 a shared inability to see a problem. This is potentially
more problematic than the deaf effect, as it leaves those in management positions genuinely unable to
see what the whistleblower is trying to bring to their attention. This could lead an individual to proceed from
raising concerns to speaking up to internal whistleblowing, not in search of ‘someone willing to listen’ but in
search of ‘someone able to see’. However, the NHS can be viewed as a single large organisation in many
ways, and criticisms of regulator responses to cases such as that at the centre of the Mid Staffordshire NHS
Foundation Trust Public Inquiry11 suggest that even when the individual goes outside the immediate
organisation, they may still find people unable to see/unwilling to listen. There is a sense in which raising
concerns and speaking up in health care adhere to both organisational ‘etiquette’ and the hierarchical chain
of command, which inevitably means that management can choose to ignore the issue. There is also a sense
that individuals may feel that they have done their duty in raising the issue.26 Blowing the whistle, especially
externally, raises the stakes and is much harder to ignore.
Blowing the whistle on what?
Central to whistleblowing research has been the idea of wrongdoing, a catch-all term that includes
everything from persistent acts of minor incivility to multibillion-pound corruption. Within any given
organisation, there are various types of wrongdoing on which an individual might feel it necessary to blow
the whistle. The focus of the present project is on issues pertaining to the quality and safety of patient care,
but it is worth examining the ways in which perceptions of the nature of the wrongdoing might affect
whistleblowing. The bulk of whistleblowing research has been concerned with pecuniary wrongdoing such
as fraud and corruption, in which there is, in principle, a final legal judgement to be obtained as to whether
or not wrongdoing has occurred. In contrast, issues around safety and quality can be much more ambiguous,
a point illustrated by two cases that form part of NHS folklore on whistleblowing: the ‘Graham Pink case’27
and Bristol Royal Infirmary.5
The Graham Pink case is generally remembered as an archetypal whistleblowing narrative. Pink (a nurse)
raised concerns with the hospital’s management about dangerously low staffing levels; management would
not listen and did not act, so Pink ‘blew the whistle’ and was eventually removed from his post for his
trouble. Vinten28 suggests a somewhat different interpretation, arguing that there was ample evidence that
management took Pink’s concerns seriously and investigated, but found staffing levels to be appropriate.
Pink’s colleagues on the unit agreed with the management’s assessment, but were unable to get this
message across to the Royal College of Nursing, who found Pink’s account more compelling against a
backdrop of concerns about government policy in the NHS. The Pink case revolved around an issue –
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staffing levels – about which there was (and is) considerable scope for experienced practitioners to reach
very different views. Although there will be a level of staffing that everyone would agree is unsafe, it has
proved difficult to develop an evidence-based metric to calculate minimum safe staffing levels and
appropriate skill mix.29
The tragic events surrounding infant heart surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary might appear to be more
amenable to an evidence-based analysis, given that the extensive use of clinical audit data allows comparisons
of performance over time and between units. Yet, as Weick and Sutcliffe30 observe, even with such
extensive data there is still a need for organisations to make sense of the data, and all sense-making is
intentional and social. There was clearly a desire at Bristol Royal Infirmary to believe that the unit was
performing acceptably, and management and senior clinicians interpreted the data in terms of a learning
curve. They focused on evidence that the unit was improving, and overlooked evidence that it was still
underperforming relative to comparable units and that it was improving only slowly.
As the analysis of public inquiries shows (see Chapter 4), issues that appear unambiguous after the event
may have seemed open to interpretation of the event at the time. This creates a challenge for policy-makers:
we are generally dealing not with malevolent individuals or corrupt systems, but with individuals and systems
that are failing in some way, and resistant to hearing the messages about that failure. As the whole premise
of whistleblowing is ‘wrongdoing’, and wrongdoing appears a moral appellation, people are reluctant to
use the term and recipients are reluctant to hear it. This underlines the importance of developing a greater
understanding of hearer courage, particularly in a NHS context.
The inherent ambiguity of many of the situations complained about at the heart of whistleblowing in the
NHS draws further attention to the importance of definitional issues. Brown et al.31 suggest that wrongdoing
be defined as ‘when a person or organisation does things that are unlawful, unjust, dangerous or dishonest
enough to harm the interests of individuals, the organisation or wider society’. This definition is both more
precise and more encompassing than the traditional ‘illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices’,20 and would
certainly cover actions/omissions that could have a negative impact on care quality and safety.
Taking this further, Skivenes and Trygstad32 suggest that there are six ‘intrinsic dimensions’ that affect
individuals’ assessment ‘of an alleged act or practice of wrongdoing and the degree of importance (or
seriousness) of an act of wrongdoing’ (p. 97). These dimensions are (1) whether the perception of wrongdoing
is subject or objective, (2) whether it relates to values (such as dignity) or facts (such as clinical outcomes),
(3) the frequency of the wrongdoing (e.g. a rare occurrence or an ongoing problem), (4) whether or not the
wrongdoing was intentional, (5) whether or not there is a public interest dimension and (6) the persons/groups
affected (e.g. are they vulnerable?). In a NHS context, the final two dimensions are arguably ‘fixed’; the activities
of the service always have a public interest dimension, and patients are by definition vulnerable persons even
if they would not in the normal course of life be viewed in those terms. It is therefore only the first four
dimensions that influence whether or not a situation is assessed as wrongdoing, and, if so, how serious it is
(Figure 1; Table 2 provides some simple vignettes that illustrate the opposite ends of these dimensions).
The main purpose of the two examples in Table 2 is to illustrate the assessment dimensions, but vignettes like
these are also useful in allowing us to place ourselves in the place of staff observing possible wrongdoing.
Subjective – Objective
Values – Facts
Happens rarely – Happens often
Unintentional – Intentional
FIGURE 1 Dimensions for assessing wrongdoing (adapted from Skivenes and Trygstad,32 p. 97).
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Outsider whistleblowing?
The classic definition of whistleblowing is that it is an action taken by current or former members of
an organisation. The term ‘member’ is not explicitly defined, but it has generally been taken to mean
organisational members or employees.33 This excludes many individuals who may have links with an
organisation and be in a position to observe, and raise concerns about, wrongdoing within the
organisation. Miceli et al.34 note that many significant ‘whistleblowing’ cases reported in the press are
technically not examples of whistleblowing, as the person who raised the concerns was not a current or
former member of the organisation in question. Acknowledging that these cases are, nevertheless,
important, and deserving of further study, the authors propose the term ‘bell-ringing’ to describe the
raising of concerns by outsiders. Although we acknowledge the logic of this attempt to bring definitional
clarity to this new offshoot of the whistleblowing field, it is difficult for academics to impose such
definitional precision retrospectively, once a term is out in the public domain and being used ‘wrongly’.
Culiberg and Mihelic33 suggest that rather than framing the issue in terms of whistleblowing versus
bell-ringing, it might be more useful to refer to insider versus outsider whistleblowing.
Outsider whistleblowing is potentially a more significant issue for health care than for any other sector.
Examples of potential outsider whistleblowers would include patients, relatives and visitors, suppliers,
professionals working in other organisations [e.g. social workers and general practitioners (GPs)], clinical
tutors and contractors. Outsider whistleblowers might be assumed to be freer to speak up than staff, yet all
of these individuals may have reasons to be reluctant to blow the whistle. Patients, relatives and visitors are
obvious examples: all are likely to have concerns about the potential for the patient to suffer reprisals for
raising concerns. In addition, outsider whistleblowers themselves can be targeted; a recent radio programme
discussed the apparent rise in care homes ‘banning’ visitors and relatives who had raised concerns about
care. As the model of delivery for NHS services becomes more complex, involving a greater range of non-
NHS organisations, there is a need to think carefully about the role of outsider whistleblowers, and how they
might be encouraged and supported. This may be particularly important for employees of other organisations,
as they are presently unlikely to enjoy any legal protection under PIDA.
TABLE 2 Assessing wrongdoing: two illustrative vignettes
Example Assessment against dimensions noted in Figure 1
An Asian man is being admitted to a ward. He is very friendly
and chats non-stop to the ward team. The member of staff
dealing with his admission asks the nurse in charge which bed to
put him in; she points to a bay opposite ward control where
three white patients are sitting quietly by their beds, and says
‘Put him in there, he’ll add a bit of colour to the place’. The
patient does not say anything, although the nurse thinks he
looks rather surprised. She is also surprised, as she feels that the
remark was racist, although she has never heard her colleague
say anything like that before
Subjective, based on values, a one-off occurrence,
(probably) unintentional
A long-serving surgeon has a particular way in which he likes to
undertake a certain surgical procedure, which differs from that
of the other surgeons on the unit and from guidance issued by
NICE 3 years ago. This has been raised with him, but he simply
states that his approach leads to better outcomes from the
patient. The clinical outcomes data do not support his assertion
Objective, based on facts, a repeated occurrence and
intentional
NICE, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence.
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Theoretical perspectives on whistleblowing
Given the interdisciplinary nature of whistleblowing research, it is perhaps unsurprising that our review
of the literature, as with previous reviews (e.g. Kelly and Jones19), did not identify a universal or shared
underpinning theoretical framework for whistleblowing research. We can, however, identify a number of
different theoretical perspectives that provide useful lenses through which to view the phenomenon
(Figure 2). Note that these are not distinct ‘schools of thought’, and researchers often borrow ideas from
several perspectives in developing their research. The figure should be viewed as a useful heuristic, rather
than a strict mapping of the position of each perspective on some notional x- and y-axes.
In their seminal paper, from which much other work has derived its definition of whistleblowing, Near
and Miceli20 identified the steps involved in the whistleblowing process (Table 3). This framework has been
widely used in whistleblowing research. At one level, it is simply a description of a sequence of events, but,
by emphasising decisions, the framework reinforces a focus on decision-making, which in part explains the
dominance of the cognitive perspective in the whistleblowing literature.
Taking each of the perspectives shown in Figure 2 in turn, we can see that each has distinctive foci of
interest, and that each brings to the fore specific insights about the whistleblowing process.
Cognitive perspective
Values and
beliefs
Prosocial
behaviour
Justice and
institutional theory
Power and
politics
FIGURE 2 Theoretical perspectives on whistleblowing.
TABLE 3 Steps in the whistleblowing process (from Near and Miceli12)
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Observer’s decision 1: is the
observed activity illegal,
immoral or illegitimate?
Observer’s decision 2:
should the activity be
reported?
Organisation’s decision 1:
should the action be
halted?
Organisation’s decision 2:
should the whistleblower be
punished?
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Cognitive perspective
The cognitive view within psychology has been a major influence on whistleblowing research. Considering
its relevance to the understanding of how stakeholders respond to misconduct, Barnett35 highlights two
key assumptions, namely that ‘people cannot attend to all the stimuli competing for their limited attention’
and ‘factors particular to the person and the situation influence how one allocates his or her attention and
responds to stimuli’. Many whistleblowing researchers emphasise the importance of the decision-making
process that takes place after an event of potential wrongdoing is witnessed, typically at stage 2 of Near
and Miceli’s12 model of the whistleblowing process. The implication is that observers consciously weigh the
factors for and against blowing the whistle, such as wanton violation of rules and laws, negligence in a
duty of care or abuse of power. However, a cognitive perspective recognises that the decision to blow the
whistle is also influenced by factors of which the individual may be largely unaware. Research from this
perspective explores whistleblowing as a deed that results from the confluence of an individual’s values
and beliefs, and the context in which a problematic act occurs, that is, what behaviours ‘fit’ within the
potential whistleblower’s personal paradigm. Whistleblowing research adopting a cognitive perspective
recognises that, although the observer may not be fully aware of all of the various influences on their
decision, such influences must be accounted for if our understanding of the topic is to be improved.15,36
Values and beliefs
Research adopting this perspective is concerned with how externally derived values and beliefs influence
whistleblowing. These values and beliefs may come from macro-level societal-level influences (e.g. religious
teachings or national culture) or by more meso- or micro-level influences, such as the local organisational
culture, rules and regulations, or the influence of dominant team leaders. A key assumption is that guidance
relating to what is right and wrong is a principal driver of whistleblowing behaviour. This guidance is potentially
captured by organisational policies, but also by the teachings and traditions from other occupations. There is a
connection here with the cognitive view through cultural influence. However, with the values and beliefs
perspective, the distinction is that other parties create the influence on whistleblowing for the individual,
whereas the cognitive view presents the influences on the whistleblowing decision as being internally
constructed, albeit influenced by a myriad of other overlapping factors. In Figure 2, we located the values and
beliefs perspective wholly inside the cognitive perspective, reflecting the fact that values and beliefs can be
viewed as an influence on the decision-making process. Thus, religious beliefs may have a strong influence on
what individuals perceive as wrongdoing, and their perceptions of their own responsibilities as observers of this
wrongdoing, but ultimately the individual still has a decision to make.
For example, Rothwell and Baldwin,37 examining whistleblowing in police agencies in Georgia, USA,
noted that uniformed staff, in spite of close personal relationships with colleagues, were more likely than
civilian employees to blow the whistle on wrongdoing, suggesting that the external values and formal
regulation associated with uniformed service were important. Indeed, Alford38 discusses the threat posed
to organisations by the ‘ethical autonomy’ (cf. Kant) of their members. Organisations, therefore, would
find work from this perspective useful, as it could provide clues as to how to inculcate values and beliefs
that the organisation and wider society deem appropriate to encourage whistleblowing behaviour when
necessary. The review by Trevino et al.39 contributes to this perspective by exploring individual behaviours
that were judged as ethical or otherwise when measured against the norms in which those behaviours
occur. Sekerka et al.40 note that organisations typically encourage individuals to behave ethically by
imposition of external ‘rules and legal standards’, rather than by encouraging professional moral courage.
One of the key insights of this perspective is the importance of setting out clear rules, standards and norms
regarding what employees are expected to do if they encounter wrongdoing.
Justice and institutional theories
This perspective considers the impact that the legal system and organisational rules and regulations have
on the whistleblowing process. Embedded within the concept of ‘justice’ is that of ‘fairness’, and although
recognising the importance of the topic, a number of authors emphasise the range of perceptions of
fairness as a factor in whistleblowing. For example, Alleyne et al.,41 following Rawls,42 suggest that ‘justice
is seen as fairness when the allocation of resources in society is considered rationally as advantageous or
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disadvantageous’. They suggest that perception of injustice is a key driver of the act of whistleblowing,
a view supported by Near et al.43 Gundlach et al.44 note that ‘looking fair may be more important than
being fair’, and, for this reason, there is clear overlap with other theoretical perspectives, given that the
cognitive perspective relies on individual perceptions, and what is perceived as prosocial behaviour will vary
from one context to another. This raises the difficult question of perception of fairness, a perception that
inevitably interacts with national differences. In this review, we have focused on Western cultures, as this is
where the bulk of whistleblowing research has been undertaken. However, given the marked cultural and
national diversity of the NHS workforce, there is potential for considerable cultural differences in attitudes
towards whistleblowing, which may be highly significant.
Within the more institutionalist strand of this perspective, recent research has specifically examined how
institutional mechanisms in public sector organisations influence whistleblowing.45,46 This work has been
outside health care and the outside the UK, but could be very relevant to the NHS, particularly in terms of
understanding the institutional processes by which policy-makers influence the process (cf. Blenkinsopp
and Snowden47).
Power and politics
This perspective explores the impact that power and political actions in all organisations have on
whistleblowing. In their seminal work, Near and Miceli20 emphasise the importance of power in the
construction of their model of the whistleblowing process, and retaliation from organisations towards
whistleblowers can be viewed as a response to the threat they pose to organisational power.48 Avakian
and Roberts49 suggest that ‘Our analysis indicates that the imbalance of power results from the way the
whistleblower exercises the hidden knowledge in unexpected ways’. This links to recent work from a
Foucauldian perspective, which introduces the concept of parrhesia to whistleblowing research.50,51
Foucault used this term to describe ‘a specific modality of truth-telling (veridiction) that emerges in the
context of asymmetrical power relations’.51 This line of work offers valuable insights into the various
difficulties faced by individuals seeking to raise concerns about matters that are (usually) factual and
provide management with information that would appear useful (see Weinstein52 and Alford38 for
non-Foucauldian approaches to this issue).
Near et al.43 also explore the interface between theories of power and justice theory, and comment that
when organisations deliberately provide their own legal protection (and hence power) to a ‘role-prescribed
whistleblower’ (e.g. internal auditors), positive outcomes for both the whistleblowers and their organisations
are experienced. Pittroff53 supports the view of the centrality of power to successful implementation of a
whistleblowing system within an organisation, stating that ‘implementation of internal [whistleblowing]
systems is ostensibly driven by power theories’.
It is clear, therefore, that the papers exploring whistleblowing through focusing on the influence of power and
politics have a major role to play in developing our understanding of the topic. This perspective may be especially
relevant to the NHS, which is very hierarchical in nature, with considerable variations in power between different
occupational groups and different levels, and the added complication of a further powerful hierarchy above the
chief executive, who is ultimately accountable to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care.
Prosocial theory
The final theme to emerge from our review relates to works that explore the desire to ‘do good for others’
by blowing the whistle. Typically, such papers explore the concept of whistleblowing as an act that benefits
the welfare of others both inside and outside the organisation, even though there may be an element of
self-interest driving their decision to expose wrongdoing. As Dozier and Miceli54 state, ‘[whistleblowing] is
more appropriately viewed as ‘prosocial’ behaviour, involving both selfish (egotistic) and unselfish (altruistic)
motives on the part of the actor’. This creates a managerial dilemma; Dungan et al.55 state that ‘people are
moral hypocrites – espousing moral values when judging others, while actively ignoring when self-interest is
at stake’. The same authors point to scientific evidence that suggests that prosocial behaviour is intrinsically
rewarding, and, for this reason, imply that a natural positive predisposition towards whistleblowing exists.
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This is important to any attempt to support the reporting of wrongdoing, and perhaps has the potential to
challenge a common organisational perception of whistleblowers as ‘trouble causers’.
Alternative perspectives
The work considered in each of the subsections above demonstrates where authors have adopted a
particular stance on the topic, and we believe that different and productive interpretations of whistleblowing
can be generated by adopting different stances and using different lenses. As whistleblowing becomes more
high profile, and researchers from other academic fields become interested in exploring the concept, we are
witnessing the publication of articles that examine whistleblowing from new and illuminating perspectives.
Through an examination of language
The definitional complexities alluded to above draw attention to the importance of clarity in the language
used, but also the influence of language on how whistleblowing situations are framed. We might describe
the same behaviour as ‘raising concerns about an issue affecting patient safety’ or ‘blowing the whistle on
poor practice’, but the former phrasing may be more acceptable to staff and management, and more likely
to lead to change. It is, therefore, important to consider the language used in and around the act of
whistleblowing, with sensitivity to style and content. Contu56 argues that looking at how the language
used to explore a whistleblowing event evolves over time ‘opens up an appreciation of the ethical and
political valence of the process of whistleblowing’.
Through an examination of sense-making
The sense-making perspective57 offers potentially valuable insights. Its relevance to health care has been
acknowledged, as Weick and colleagues have examined ‘high reliability organisations’; for analyses directly
relevant to the NHS, see Weick and Sutcliffe30 and Weick et al.58 Blenkinsopp and Edwards15 drew on the
sense-making perspective to develop the concept of ‘cues for inaction’. They suggest that clinical staff are
very aware of the risks of whistleblowing (or even of just raising concerns) but are also aware of their
responsibility for the patient (under codes of conduct and NHS policies). Caught between a ‘rock and a
hard place’, they are motivated to find ways of making sense of the situation that allow them to stay
silent. The challenge for organisations is to find ways to create ‘cues for action’, and reduce or even
eliminate possible cues for inaction.
Given the diversity of conceptual lenses open to researchers, and the diverse insights thus available to
date, future empirical work on whistleblowing in the NHS should carefully exploit the conceptual diversity
for fresh insightful gains.
Methodological issues in whistleblowing research
Whistleblowing is an inherently difficult phenomenon to study. Although the act of whistleblowing involves
bringing a situation to the attention of others, in most cases that does not bring it to wider attention;
cases in which the situation becomes a matter of common knowledge within the organisation will be the
exception rather than the rule, and the proportion of cases in which the situation comes to wider public
attention is tiny. These high-profile cases of whistleblowing can provide researchers with valuable insights,
but the sensitivity of such cases make it difficult to gather data, especially if the situation is the subject of
investigations (criminal, disciplinary, fitness to practice) or other legal processes (e.g. negligence claims).
A further barrier to data gathering can arise in cases in which the whistleblower’s employment is terminated
through the employer and employee reaching a settlement agreement that includes non-disclosure clauses.
Despite these difficulties, researchers have developed various approaches to investigate whistleblowing.
Olsen59 identifies the main research methodologies used in whistleblowing research as experimental studies
(e.g. Burton and Near60), content analysis of legal cases and press coverage (e.g. Brewer61), analysis of
government data (e.g. records of whistleblowers contacting government agencies), qualitative case studies,
surveys using hypothetical scenarios and surveys of actual whistleblowing. These last three have been by
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far the most widely used, and below we consider each in turn (the specific findings emerging from each of
these methodological traditions are covered more fully in Chapter 3; here we concentrate on highlighting
differences in methodological approach).
Qualitative research
Some of the earliest studies of whistleblowing were qualitative or even journalistic examinations of
specific whistleblowing cases,28,62 including biographical and autobiographical accounts of whistleblowers
(e.g. Robison, Watkins26). More recent work in this vein includes more theoretically informed analyses
of cases.15,18,30
Surveys using hypothetical situations
This is the most widely used approach in whistleblowing research. The most common research design
is cross-sectional, generally using whistleblowing intentions as the dependent variable, as intentions to
perform a given behaviour are generally regarded as a good predictor of future behaviour.63 A typical
design would present participants with one or more vignettes describing a situation that might be viewed
as wrongdoing and asking how likely they would be to report it. Inviting individuals to imagine what they
would do in a given situation is problematic, as it relies on the participant being able to make a realistic
appraisal of what they might do in a situation that may be very unfamiliar to them. It does, however,
allow researchers to gather data on a range of permutations. A good example for health care is offered by
Lawton and Parker,64 who produced nine vignettes which varied across two dimensions: adherence to
protocols (compliance, deliberate violation, and improvisation in the absence of a protocol) and outcome
for the patient (good, poor or bad).
Surveys of actual whistleblowing
Bjørkelo and Bye65 suggest that approaches to measuring actual whistleblowing can be categorised as having
a behavioural versus operational definition. Behavioural approaches (e.g. US Merit Systems Protection Board
survey) ask individuals about whether or not they have observed wrongdoing (from a list of examples) and
whether or not they reported it, whereas an operational definition approach offers participants an explicit
definition of whistleblowing and asks whether or not they have blown the whistle. The behavioural approach
has the advantage of providing insights into how frequently wrongdoing is encountered, and what proportion
of people blow the whistle on it. However, it assumes that the types of wrongdoing listed are ‘illegal, immoral
or illegitimate’ in similar ways across all settings and cultures. The operational approach avoids this difficulty,
but leaves us unsure how to categorise those respondents who report that they have not blown the whistle.
Reviews of whistleblowing research59 indicate problems with identifying variables that consistently predict
key outcomes (e.g. the decision to blow the whistle, whether or not the action succeeds, whether or not
the whistleblower suffers retaliation). We suggest that it is not that the field has been unable to identify
key factors, but that contextual differences have a significant impact. Tolstoy once wrote that ‘Happy
families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way’,66 and whistleblowing involves very
unhappy (organisational) families. Although it would normally be impractical to develop frameworks
tailored to specific organisational contexts, there is nonetheless a tradition of looking at this issue for key
occupational groups (e.g. auditors) or sectors (e.g. financial services). For an organisation the size of the
NHS, it could be feasible to develop a model of what works specifically in that setting. What would be
required is research that builds on existing models of whistleblowing to identify how these models apply in
the specific context of the NHS, and it is to this that we turn in the next section.
Concluding remarks: further exploration of whistleblowing in the NHS
In this final section, we consider how existing theory and research might be translated into a more
thorough and conceptually rooted exploration of whistleblowing in the NHS. We start by considering how
much the NHS context matters. We noted above that there are some translational issues in applying
insights from mainstream whistleblowing research to health care, because so much of the literature
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focuses on wrongdoing such as fraud and corruption. However, having acknowledged that health care is
different from many other industries, we also need to consider whether or not there are factors associated
specifically with the NHS that make it different again.
The first point to note is that the NHS has a uniquely dominant position in health care, different from
health-care arrangements in other developed countries. The NHS is monolithic and comprises a large number
of organisations (and different types of organisation), each legally a separate employer. However, the reality
of ‘working for the NHS’ means that blowing the whistle on wrongdoing in one NHS organisation risks
not only retaliation from that organisation, but also an effective ‘blacklisting’ from employment elsewhere in
the NHS. Despite some expansion in private health care, the NHS remains the major employer for most
health-care professionals, so being excluded from the NHS almost amounts to being excluded from health-
care employment. A related point is that in the NHS, linked by formal and informal networks, staff may have
concerns about their ability to find an ‘honest broker’, with some former whistleblowers recalling being
shocked at how little support they received from professional bodies, regulators, and even unions.
Within the wider literature on organisational citizenship behaviour, there is a small body of research exploring
the influence of organisational politics, and in particular employees’ ‘perception of organisational politics’.67
When organisations are perceived to be highly political, there may be a perception that things are done not for
maximum effectiveness and efficiency, but for self-serving reasons. This creates a perception of organisational
politics (POP), which is defined as ‘an individual’s subjective evaluation about the extent to which the work
environment is characterised by co-workers and supervisors who demonstrate . . . self-serving behaviour’.68 POP
affects our confidence in the organisation following its own policies and procedures, which would clearly make
prospective whistleblowers less confident in speaking up.
All organisations are, to some extent, political (with a small ‘p’), but public sector organisations are also
political with a big ‘P’, with the NHS arguably the most political of all. Therefore, for the NHS we can
envisage a wider notion of POP, in which it may include a perception that the wider health-care system is
affected by politicking (even if a specific individual’s work is perceived not to be). This can create situations
in which staff perceive that management’s response will be driven by political concerns [e.g. about how a
particular issue might play out with politicians (local and national)], rather than by what is in the best
interest of patients.
The specific NHS context, then, highlights specific concerns that are not always fully addressed in the
existing whistleblowing literature. The variety of conceptual lenses through which whistleblowing has been
viewed does, however, provide fresh opportunities to bring these specific contextual issues to the fore
through a range of methodologically diverse projects. What follows next, in Chapter 3, is an exploration of
what is already known empirically about whistleblowing from diverse contexts including, but not restricted
to, those involving patient care.
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Chapter 3 Empirical evidence on whistleblowing
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we explored the wide variety of ways in which whistleblowing has been conceived
and defined within the theoretical and conceptual literature. In this chapter, we draw on the theoretical
insights gleaned to critically review empirical research on whistleblowing undertaken in both health-care
and non-health-care contexts. The chapter begins with a description of the innovative methodology
used to establish a broad bibliography that formed the basis of the review. We then present a thematic
narrative analysis of the literature uncovered. The remaining sections then describe the empirical research
findings with regard to the external, internal and personal factors that have influenced whistleblowing,
and the evidence on the range of organisational responses to whistleblowing.
Literature review methods
The literature that underpinned both this chapter and Chapter 2 aimed to identify the key theoretical and
conceptual frameworks that might inform an understanding of employee whistleblowing in health-care
contexts, and also sought to explore the empirical evidence as to how and why whistleblowing plays out
as it does. In doing so, we aimed to produce a synthesis that embraced the complexities and ambiguities
associated with whistleblowing first introduced in Chapter 1. We detail the review process below; for a
schematic overview, see Figures 5 and 6.
Systematic reviews are an established means of summarising available research. A number of approaches
are available, and selection depends on the review’s aims and the nature of the evidence to be explored.69
In developing a protocol for the review, we were guided by the principles advocated by Denyer and
Tranfield70 and Macpherson and Jones,71 although some important adaptations were required. Although
we undertook a systematic approach to literature sampling and reviewing, we did not evaluate evidence
from studies in the manner of a Cochrane review. There are two reasons for this. First, the whistleblowing
literature is very diffuse: indeed, some of the relevant literature may not even be labelled as whistleblowing
(e.g. research on incident reporting, employee voice and silence). Although there may be valuable insights
to be gained from these diverse sources, it would be difficult to achieve a clear synthesis of such widely
dispersed and divergently framed research. Second, there are very few studies that gather direct evidence
on whistleblowing. The topic is very sensitive, and whistleblowers who agree to participate in research could
put themselves at risk of retaliation, professional sanctions or even prosecution. To avoid these problems,
empirical researchers have typically explored participants’ responses indirectly, through, for example,
hypothetical scenarios. Such studies can clearly be evaluated in terms of the rigour of their research design,
and the findings do offer important insights to practitioners and policy-makers, but it would be difficult to
utilise the kind of formal weighting of the evidence required for a Cochrane-style review.
We began by searching Google Scholar (Google, Inc., Mountain View, CA, USA) using the search
terms ‘whistleblowing’, ‘whistle blowing’, ‘whistle-blowing’ and ‘blow the whistle’, but this yielded an
unmanageable 30,200 references. We reviewed a sample of these references to try to refine the search,
and also to develop inclusion and exclusion criteria to produce a more practicable bibliography. This proved
difficult for two reasons. First, whistleblowing research is undertaken by scholars coming from a range of
disciplines. It is, therefore, difficult to use disciplinary markers (e.g. journal title or subject-specific databases)
to narrow the search. Second, Google Scholar does not allow one to narrow searches to terms found in an
article’s abstract and/or keywords. Unable to identify a bibliographic database that could address both of
these issues, we sought to create our own de facto database. Academic fields often develop from an initial
burst of research activity, and we observed that whistleblowing research had emerged in the early 1980s
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and developed rapidly. Later research invariably draws on at least one of these early articles, if only to cite
the now widely agreed definition of whistleblowing established by these seminal papers. A comprehensive
list of papers citing these key early articles would, therefore, provide us with a manageable database of
potentially relevant papers that could then be readily searched, browsed and reviewed.
To identify the seminal articles, we searched Google Scholar for work on whistleblowing published before 1985.
A 1983 article by Near and Jensen72 appears to represent the earliest example of published whistleblowing
research; there are prior scholarly works, both books and articles, some of which have been widely cited (e.g.
Westin et al.73) but they do not represent the headwaters of the subsequent stream of whistleblowing research.
Taking 1983 as our starting point, and observing how rapidly the field developed, we undertook a second
search of Google Scholar for papers published between 1983 and 1987. We allowed this window because the
time delay in academic publishing could mean that articles published in 1987 were written much earlier, and
therefore without the authors being aware of key articles written around the same time. Using the ‘Publish or
Perish’ software (Harzing AW, 2007; https://harzing.com/resources/publish-or-perish; accessed 3 December 2015)
to generate a hierarchy of papers, we ranked the various papers by citation, and observed a natural break after
11 articles: the 11th article on the list had 73 citations, compared with the 12th, which had only 34. As a check
on the rigour of this selection of key articles, we repeated the exercise using two other bibliographic databases,
Scopus and EBSCOhost, which between them also cover a range of other databases (Academic Search Premier,
Business Source Premier, CINAHL complete, ERIC, MEDLINE, PsycARTICLES and PsycINFO). All 11 seminal papers
appeared in EBSCOhost, with five of them also found in Scopus. The ranking within the 11 papers was slightly
different from that in Google Scholar, but they were still clearly the most highly cited early papers. When
reviewing the citations for each article, we identified that one of these, Dworkin and Near,74 represented
something of an outlier, so we excluded it from our list (it was cited predominantly in relation to legal
proceedings, rather than research on whistleblowing, and the few non-legal citations of the paper were
to be found in the citation lists for one or more of the other articles). The 10 remaining ‘seminal papers for
whistleblowing research’ are listed in Table 4.
TABLE 4 The seminal papers: citations up to 2016 (as calculated by Google Scholar)
Citations Authors Title Year Publication
546 Near and Miceli12 Organizational dissidence: the case of
whistle-blowing
1985 Journal of Business Ethics
395 Dozier and Miceli54 Potential predictors of whistle-blowing:
a prosocial behaviour perspective
1985 Academy of Management
Review
321 Miceli and Near75 The relationship among beliefs,
organisation position, and whistle-blowing
status: a discriminant analysis
1984 Academy of Management
Journal
271 Miceli and Near76 Characteristics of organizational climate and
perceived wrongdoing associated with
whistle-blowing decisions
1985 Personnel Psychology
175 Near and Miceli20 Retaliation against whistleblowers:
predictors and effects
1986 Journal of Applied Psychology
160 Greenberger et al.77 Oppositionists and group norms: the
reciprocal influence of whistle-blowers and
co-workers
1987 Journal of Business Ethics
154 Brabeck78 Ethical characteristics of whistle blowers 1984 Journal of Research in
Personality
146 Near and Miceli79 Whistle-blowers in organizations: dissidents
or reformers?
1987 Research in Organizational
Behavior
96 Near and Jensen72 The whistleblowing process: retaliation and
perceived effectiveness
1983 Work and Occupations
73 Jensen80 Ethical tension points in whistleblowing 1987 Journal of Business Ethics
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This process, then, led to a set of 10 papers that could be seen as seminal to the field. Our next step
involved combining the citations from these 10 papers into a single bibliography of works relating to the
development of whistleblowing as a research field, starting with the most cited paper (Near and Miceli12)
and working down the 10 papers in order of number of citations. The articles citing each seminal paper
were downloaded into EndNote [Clarivate Analytics (formerly Thompson Reuters), Philadelphia, PA, USA],
using the links provided in Scopus and EBSCOhost. The process by which the bibliography was created is
outlined in Figure 3.
The review process produced a working bibliography of a manageable size, allowing us to review each
article in terms of its relevance to the objectives of the project. Although this methodology generated a
strong general academic literature, it was recognised that some more recent empirical health-care research
papers may not be found using this route. In recognition of this, the papers from the bibliographies of three
recent literature reviews in related fields (Milligan et al.,22 Okuyama et al.21 and Kelly and Jones19) were
converted into an ‘empirical health care’ bibliography (Figure 4). Papers were selected based on an academic
judgement of their relevance to this report. Further health-care papers were added via ‘snowballing’ from
the initial sources. The most significant papers from the bibliography are summarised in Appendix 1,
Tables 8 and 9.
A combined bibliography of all citing articles from the 10 seminal papers resulted
in 548 unique potential references
210 papers were removed based on: 
• non-academic papers in academic journals
• papers in which whistleblowing was not the focus
• papers that seemed to cite the seminal papers in error (e.g. papers that
   preceded the date of the seminal papers)
Google Scholar search using search terms ‘whistleblowing’, ‘whistle blowing’,
‘whistle-blowing’ and ‘blow the whistle’ yielded 30,200 potential references
Results refined to identify ‘seminal papers’ by:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Filtering (via Publish or Perish version 4 software) using date of publication
1983 – 7 (i.e. when whistleblowing emerged as a research topic)
Ranking results by the number of citations received, with papers receiving
over 70 citations considered for inclusion
Hand-searching to remove papers in which whistleblowing was not the focus
of the research
338 papers were imported into EndNote (version 17) and then exported into 
NVivo (version 10; QSR International, Washington, UK) for coding and analysis
FIGURE 3 Selection process for general literature on whistleblowing.
Hand-searching removed articles that were duplicated, not relevant or not based
on empirical data, resulting in 33 empirical papers
Bibliographies from Milligan et al.,22 Okuyama et al.21 and Kelly and Jones,19 each
of whom had previously reviewed literature relating to whistleblowing in
health care, resulted in 113, 27 and 53 (respectively) potential references being
identified, making 193 in total
‘Snowball’ search added a further 19 articles, resulting in the total of 
52 empirical papers that were reviewed (see Appendix 1)
FIGURE 4 Selection process for empirical papers in health care.
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The whistleblowing literature uncovered
Wide dispersal of the whistleblowing literature
The academic whistleblowing literature appears to be very widely dispersed across diverse journals. Within
the general literature reviewed, 188 different journals published one or more of the 338 whistleblowing
papers uncovered that had been published since 1983. The Journal of Business Ethics was by far the largest
contributor of articles, with some 62 papers published here. In contrast, no other single journal accounted
for whistleblowing papers numbering into double figures. The empirical health-care literature uncovered
(52 papers) was also very widely spread across diverse journals (42 outlets in total). The most common source
for these papers was Nurse Education Today, but even this accounted for only eight papers.
Growth in academic publications on whistleblowing
Both the general literature and the specific empirical health-care studies show a marked increase in
publication volume since the mid-2000s (Figure 5). The general literature in particular has seen increases to
20–25 new publications per year for each of the past 7–8 years, with the health-care-specific literature
contributing 6–8 new papers per year in the same period. (NB owing to the timing of this report, the
figures for publications in 2016 account for only the first 6 months of that year.)
Limitations by place of study and participants included
In terms of research specifically on whistleblowing in health care, it is striking the extent to which the UK
(29% of papers published) and Australia (27% of papers) dominate the literature, with a relative lack of
research emanating from the USA (9.5% of papers). Similarly, about 1 in 10 health-care papers came from
Canada (9.5%), with the rest of the world making up only one-quarter of the publications uncovered
(25%). Although this pattern undoubtedly reflects a bias in our bibliography towards English-language
publications, nonetheless, given the scale and contested nature of US health care, the relatively small
research contribution from here is, perhaps, surprising. The domination in this data set of just two
countries (the UK and Australia) is a potentially limiting factor in terms of gaining insights into ways in
which different health-care systems approach the issue.
A further potential limitation is that the health-care literature uncovered relates primarily to whistleblowing by
nurses: nurses and student nurses account of > 80% of participants in the studies reviewed (Figure 6). Moreover,
most of the reported studies leave unspecified the specialty of the nurses under study (64%; Figure 7). Over
one-quarter of the health-care studies (29%) used students as study participants (Figure 8), and these were mainly
student nurses (69%) with relatively few student doctors included (9%). Furthermore, it is interesting to note
that only two authors (Beckstead81 and Monrouxe et al.82) made an attempt to distinguish between male and
female participants, with only Monrouxe et al.82 commenting on any significant differences between the sexes
(specifically, in relation to noting the apparently raised emotions in women after witnessing poor patient care).
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Limited interconnectivity between the general whistleblowing literature and the
health-care-specific literature
Perhaps surprisingly, only 15 papers in the general literature review related to health care, of which six
presented original empirical research into whistleblowing in health care. We consider this to be one of the
most significant findings of our review, as it highlights the extent to which whistleblowing research in
health care has developed separately from the wider development of the field, and therefore has not
drawn on the theoretical and empirical insights of mainstream whistleblowing research.
Exploring the factors affecting whistleblowing
Whistleblowing has been widely recognised as a complex and contested phenomenon.44,77,83–86 Numerous
factors are recognised as having influence on the whistleblowing process, and that process itself has been
structured into five ‘stages’ by Near and Miceli.12 Table 5 details these stages, and notes the key empirical
literature that addresses aspects of these stages: from recognising an event or situation as problematic;
through decisions to take action (or not); the actions taken (internally and externally); the organisational
responses to these actions; and, finally, the whistleblower’s assessment of those responses (and, potentially,
future actions by the whistleblower). In that sense, then, the staged model by Near and Miceli12 might also
be thought of as a potentially continuing cycle of response, interpretation and action.
TABLE 5 Mapping health-care-related studies onto the Near and Miceli12 stage model of whistleblowing
Stage 1: potential
whistleblower
recognises event as
problematic
Stage 2: decides
on action to take
Stage 3: takes
action (or not) to
report internally
or externally
Stage 4: organisation
(or other stakeholder)
responds to
whistleblower’s
actions
Stage 5: whistleblower
assesses organisational
response and decides
on what (if anything)
to do next
Ahern and McDonald87
Attree88
Beckstead81
Bellefontaine89
Bickhoff et al.90
Black91
Bradbury-Jones
et al.92
Bradbury-Jones
et al.93
Espin and Meikle94
Firth-Cozens et al.95 Firth-Cozens et al.95
Fledderjohann and Johnson36
Gould and Drey96 Gould and Drey96
Greaves and McGlone97
Grube et al.84
Hutchinson and
Jackson98
Hutchinson and
Jackson98
Ion et al.86 Ion et al.86
Ion et al.99
Jackson and Raftos100
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TABLE 5 Mapping health-care-related studies onto the Near and Miceli12 stage model of whistleblowing
(continued )
Stage 1: potential
whistleblower
recognises event as
problematic
Stage 2: decides
on action to take
Stage 3: takes
action (or not) to
report internally
or externally
Stage 4: organisation
(or other stakeholder)
responds to
whistleblower’s
actions
Stage 5: whistleblower
assesses organisational
response and decides
on what (if anything)
to do next
Jackson et al.101
Jackson et al.102
Jackson et al.101
Jones and Kelly17
Jones et al.103
Kent et al.104
Killam et al.105
Killam et al.106
Kingston et al.107 Kingston et al.107
Ko and Yu108
Law and Chan109
Levett-Jones and
Lathlean110
McCann et al.111
McDonald and
Ahern112
McDonald and Ahern113
Mansbach et al.114
Monrouxe et al.82
Moore and McAuliffe115 Moore and McAuliffe115
Newton et al.116
Ohnishi et al.117
Peternelj-Taylor118
Prang and
Jelsness-Jorgensen119
Schwappach and Gehring120
Schwappach and Gehring121
Stevanin et al.122
St Pierre et al.123
Tella et al.124
Throckmorton and
Etchegaray125
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In this section, then, we surface the most significant of the factors that have been suggested as influencing
the whistleblowing process as these have emerged in the empirical health-care literature. To facilitate the
ordering of our findings, we have categorised the factors affecting whistleblowing into three broad areas,
although there is necessarily a degree of overlap among these:
1. the external context – including the role of regional and national cultures; the law and legal
frameworks; professional standards, including ethical codes and guidelines; and economic and
financial influences
2. the internal context – including organisational culture and climate; education and training; peer pressure
and local relationships; local leadership and management; and boundary definitions (i.e. what is seen to
count as ‘wrongdoing’ or unacceptable practice)
3. personal factors – including personal traits and characteristics; and the position and role in the organisation
occupied by the would-be whistleblower.
In the following sections, we take each of these broad areas in turn.
External context
Here we consider aspects of the environment that are external to the organisation, and over which
organisational members typically have little control.
Regional and national culture
Much has been written in the management and organisation studies literature on the regional and
national cultural dimension of power relations,126,127 and there has been mainstream work on the relevance
of national culture to whistleblowing (e.g. Park et al.14). In a health-care context, Ohnishi et al.117 note the
significant impact of national culture in their research with psychiatric nurses in Japan, and Cheng et al.128
compared British and Chinese students (from various disciplines) and noted that ‘individuals from
collectivist cultures are less likely to be whistleblowers, and less accepting of whistleblowing behaviour,
than individuals from individualistic cultures’.
Throughout its history the NHS has benefited from drawing upon the talents of a global workforce, some
coming from nations where speak up behaviour is less culturally acceptable and/or environments in which
speaking up is viewed as very risky. It is important that these potential differences are taken into account
in the design of speak up arrangements, and in the induction and training given to staff. However,
there is little empirical research in the field of health care specifically examining nationality as a factor in
whistleblowing. Tella et al.124,129 found that UK nursing students considered themselves better prepared
for reporting on problems in relation to patient safety than their Finnish counterparts, and Tabak et al.130
noted that knowledge of the concept of whistleblowing was relatively underdeveloped in Israel compared
with the UK, although it was reported that the same moral imperative to care for patients existed in
both countries. Skivenes and Trygstad131 discussed research carried out by the Norwegian government
on whistleblowing in the broader public sector, which suggests that, in contrast to the findings of many
international studies, Norwegians generally had very positive experiences of whistleblowing, reporting
constructive responses when reporting problems to employers. The authors posit that this was because of
the strong emphasis in Norwegian culture on collective arrangements, and the creation of clear reporting
structures that encourage an open and honest culture for communicating problems to senior managers.
The law and legal frameworks
Whereas the complexity of the legal perspective on whistleblowing is addressed in Chapter 5, in this
section, we consider the impact of the presence (or absence) of legal frameworks on whistleblowers
and whistleblowing. Research in the USA by Miceli and Near48 suggests that the introduction of new laws
in the 1980s that supported the protection of whistleblowers against retaliation from employers actually
had little impact on reducing the occurrence of employer retaliation. Interestingly, however, a later
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large-scale survey study of US employees found that the threat of retaliation did not, in fact, discourage
whistleblowing; instead, it encouraged reporting to external agencies able to effect action, rather than to
internal organisational members who may have been able to rectify the perceived wrongdoing but who
may also have been tempted to ‘kill the messenger’.132 Such counterintuitive behaviour may have resulted
from a belief that ‘the law will protect me’, or might have been driven by other factors. Legal protection
for actual and potential whistleblowers in the UK is enshrined in PIDA,8 and this is discussed at length in
Chapter 5.
In the health-care literature, the question of legal protection and responsibilities for whistleblowers did not
feature heavily in empirical studies. Greaves and McGlone97 reported interviews with public sector workers
in Australia (including nurses), and some of the participants perceived laws that protect whistleblowing
as ‘meaningless’. Similarly, the literature review by Delk133 suggests that although a comprehensive legal
framework may, in theory, provide health-care whistleblowers with protection against employer retaliation,
in reality the nature and diversity of retaliatory acts available to organisations against those who blow the
whistle means that legal safeguards seem to offer little deterrent.
Professional standards, including ethical codes of practice and guidelines
In accountancy, the existence of organisational whistleblowing policies and procedures has been perceived to
increase the likelihood of internal reporting of wrongdoing.134 In health care, the situation is more ambiguous:
Klaas et al.135 considered the impact of formal whistleblowing policies and processes within organisations, and
reported that such formal instruments were likely to make whistleblowing appear to be a strategy of last resort,
as it could be perceived as an open challenge to the authority of management. However, the existence of clear
professional standards and guidelines has been found to be an important factor in supporting whistleblowing
in health care in a number of empirical studies86,95,101,102,136 and particularly in nursing rather than other
health-care professions. However, Hutchinson and Jackson98 noted that the entrenched behavioural patterns
within health-care organisations are often at odds with the officially espoused organisational approach, and
Jones and Kelly17 reported that formal procedural approaches were ‘neutralised’ by organisational cultures that
opposed ‘voice’. Interestingly, Newton et al.,116 in a study involving 374 acute care nurses, found that nurses
often took independent action to address poor care rather than pursue official channels of compliant. McCann
et al.111 observed a similar phenomenon, whereby, in response to more challenging performance targets amid
a reduction in resources, both front-line and mid-management employees resorted to ‘a form of “street-level
bureaucracy” – a situation in which traditional professional norms are reasserted informally in ways that often
transgress prescribed performance systems’.
Economic and financial influences
There appear to be no studies within health care of whistleblowing over financial wrongdoing, whereas
in the mainstream literature this is the most common form of wrongdoing studied. The main financial
dimension in health-care research, albeit limited, was a focus on the pressure to achieve financial targets
and job security. Similarly, there was little attention afforded to potential variations in approaches to
whistleblowing between the public, private and voluntary sectors providing health care, with the literature
rarely making a distinction between these groups. The evidence from McCann et al.111 highlights the
impact of austerity measures in the NHS on whistleblowing, and more specifically on voice: given the
difficulties of meeting more challenging targets with fewer resources, the authors report that NHS staff
often resort to ‘under-the-radar’ tactics to deliver the quality of care that they feel meets their professional
standards, while avoiding the potential risks associated with ‘speaking up’. Set against the backdrop of
austerity in the NHS described by Hyde137 and McCann et al.,111 it can be seen how pressure to meet
business targets begins to undermine nurses’ confidence in their judgement on what is an acceptable level
of care, and thereby modify their behaviours in response. Given the increasing financial constraints in the
NHS that throw job security into sharper relief, staff are less likely to blow the whistle when doing so
brings them to the attention of management, which may result in retaliatory action.113
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Keil et al.138 suggest that whistleblowers engage in a holistic cost–benefit analysis when deciding whether or
not to blow the whistle and, therefore, financial incentives may encourage whistleblowing. However, Gino
et al.139 suggest that economic incentives and competitive pressures may result in workers abandoning their
ethical standards. Similarly, examining the reporting of fraud, Brink et al.140 found that offering an incentive
increased internal reporting, and decreased external reporting of wrongdoing. However, in the NHS,
providing financial incentives to staff to report concerns about patient safety or poor care quality would go
against the norms of NHS culture. In addition, if health-care workers fear being perceived by their peers as
having reported for personal gain, offering incentives may unintentionally reduce reporting, or weaken the
whistleblower’s credibility if an ‘offender’ challenged their evidence.
Internal context
In this section, factors internal to the organisation that influence whistleblowing are considered. These factors
can be, to a greater or lesser extent, influenced by the deliberate actions of key members of the organisation,
and include an organisation’s culture and climate, education and training, peer pressure and relationships,
leadership and management, and where the boundary is drawn between good and unsafe care.
Organisational culture and climate
The significance to whistleblowing of organisational culture has attracted much attention, as has the way in
which employees experience this culture (i.e. organisational climate). While investigating whistleblowing in
financial auditing, Hooks et al.141 commented that organisational culture had a greater influence on the decision
to blow the whistle than (for example) the social influences, personal characteristics and responsibilities of the
observer, or the characteristics of the wrongdoing itself. Kaptein142 explored a range of factors incorporated into
the ‘ethical culture’ of an organisation, and noted that careful management of these factors could ‘enhance the
self-correcting capacity of the organisation’.
Hutchinson and Jackson98 reported that many nurses experienced a contrast between the actual culture
and espoused mission of the organisation voiced by senior management and expressed in official
documents. Jones and Kelly17 highlighted how formal procedural approaches to encouraging open
reporting of concerns gave way to ‘[a] process of socialisation and habituation in the workplace’, in other
words, organisational culture ‘trumps’ organisational procedures in influencing whether or not staff feel
that it is safe and useful to report concerns about the quality of care. However, Kingston et al.107 formed a
different view, noting that the culture in nursing encouraged compliance with formal rules and protocols,
whereas the ‘medical’ culture encouraged dealing with incidents informally and ‘off-the-record’. Ahern
and McDonald87 found that nurses who blew the whistle on wrongdoing had a belief system that
privileged their role as ‘patient advocate’ (see Personal factors).
Those nurses who had witnessed wrongdoing but did not report it were more likely to believe that they
were equally as responsible to their colleagues and their employer as they were to the patient. Ion et al.99
suggests that a ‘blame culture’ exists within student nursing, and Prang and Jelsness-Jorgensen119 found
that organisational culture was perceived as a barrier to reporting concerns. The work by St Pierre et al.123
supports this view, finding that, in simulated critical situations, nurses were rarely likely to challenge
decisions that they believed to be dangerous, with justifications for that silence including a lack of
knowledge of whistleblowing procedures and a perceived inability to challenge superiors. The authors
argue that this points towards an organisational culture that suppresses voice and erodes the confidence
of nursing staff in their own judgement. We return to this theme in Personal traits and characteristics.
Education and training
The health-care literature thoroughly covers the part played by training nurses in reporting wrongdoing.
Indeed, student nurses are in a good position in terms of identifying poor-quality or unsafe care92 in that as
students they will have recently been trained to identify good and poor practice, and may not yet have been
socialised into a particular organisational culture. For example, Killam et al.105,106 observed how students on
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clinical placements are often well aware of unsafe clinical practices. However, as junior members of the
clinical staff they may lack the experience and confidence necessary to raise concerns with their superiors.104
Bradbury-Jones et al.92 noted how, in this respect, training and education can increase nurses’ confidence
and willingness to report and challenge poor practice. Similarly, Law and Chan109 emphasise the value
of formal mentoring of graduate nurses in order to enhance their understanding of what constitutes
good-quality (and poor-quality) care and to raise their confidence in reporting concerns. By contrast,
Tella et al.124,129 explored the views of British and Finnish nursing students and noted that in both groups
that there was a clear preference for learning in a formal environment rather than in a clinical setting.
The authors suggest that the workplace environment may ‘cloud’ nurses’ judgement of what constitutes
unsafe care. Johnstone and Kanitsaki143 suggest that nurses and others need to ‘learn from practice errors
and to use the lessons learned to help prevent future errors from occurring’, and so encourage educators
to present raising concerns in a positive light.
Peer pressure and relationships
Many authors report that (both internal and external) whistleblowers often suffer deterioration in their
relationships with their peers, irrespective of whether or not the concerns reported are genuine and
legitimate.81,113,133 The formal process of investigating a concern is often traumatic for complainants and for
subjects of complaints, as well as for bystanders.88,101,102,112,113,115,119,144 Jackson et al.145 explored this issue,
interviewing both whistleblowers and targets of whistleblowing. They found that ‘whistle-blowing had a
profound and overwhelmingly negative effect on working relationships’,145 with collegial and interprofessional
relationships damaged, and those involved suffered bullying and exclusion. Bystanders were not immune to the
impact of poorly managed whistleblowing, and could also suffer from a decline in peer relationships.145
Bradbury-Jones et al.93 noted that the fear of failing their placement assessment often deters health-care
students from speaking up when they see poor-quality care, and these authors cited the influential work
by Hirschman,146 who argues that exercising ‘voice’ with peers can have a negative outcome if that voice
is perceived as being too ‘loud’. Bradbury-Jones et al.93 described the impact of this fear as encouraging
‘exit’ by student nurses, implying a withdrawal from the potential whistleblowing situation, rather than
from the organisation. These authors went on to consider how students found ways to raise concerns,
or ‘negotiated’ a way to give voice to their concerns, and how this approach could be supported. In doing
so, the authors recognised the weakness of the idea of a binary choice between ‘voice’ and ‘silence’, and
discussed how student nurses explored different ways of raising concerns so that they could satisfy their
recognised duty to speak up while avoiding appearing ‘cocky’, that is, being perceived as having a ‘voice’
that was too loud. This ‘exit’ versus ‘voice’ continuum is displayed in Figure 9.
Leadership and management
The mainstream whistleblowing literature includes a number of studies that focus directly on the role of
leadership and management in encouraging or inhibiting whistleblowing; there are no comparable studies
in health care. Culiberg and Mihelic33 report on a number of studies that highlight the importance of
ethical leadership and positive leader–member relationships in promoting ethical behaviour, specifically
with regard to whistleblowing. Goldberg147 notes that the typical reactions to whistleblowing result in a
loss of ‘moral leadership’ (more so than appointed leadership) from health-care organisations. Hutchinson
and Jackson98 suggest that the very nature of the public sector predisposes health-care organisations to
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FIGURE 9 The exit–voice continuum.
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favour an authoritarian leadership style in which bullying and intimidation of staff can thrive and leads to a
punitive culture that discourages public sector employees from whistleblowing.
Many studies have found that nurses lack confidence in the reporting systems put in place by management
and that this acts as a barrier to reporting poor care.85,88,91 Cleary and Doyle148 describe a NHS report that
highlighted a sharp contrast between the positive perceptions of senior executives regarding the ease of
reporting wrongdoing and subsequent action, and the actual difficulties reported by nurses. Similarly,
Jackson et al.101 report that health-care managers were often perceived to have not dealt with complaints
appropriately, and comment that a more responsive and inclusive style of management would improve
standards of care.47
Jackson and Raftos100 highlight nurses’ perceptions of the barriers and obstacles put in place by
management that discourage the reporting of concerns internally. The authors argue that such defensive
behaviour among managers can serve to drive some nurses to report externally (although probably more
to simply remain silent). Furthermore, the perception by employees that management will fail to respond
positively to concerns is frequently cited in the literature as a key reason why health-care workers do not
to speak up when faced with unsafe care.88,91,95,100,107 However, this finding is in contrast to Moore and
McAucliffe,115 who found that nurse managers appeared to be more likely to report poor care than nurses
themselves, a finding supported by Schwappach and Gehring121 and Throckmorton and Etchegaray.125
Milligan et al.,22 drawing on research by Espin and Meikle94 with health-care students, note that some
of the barriers created by senior managers could be overcome by creating a more clearly defined ‘reporting
ladder’ (p. 27) that facilitates the recognition of a clear path through which concerns could be raised
in organisations.
In the first study of its kind, Mannion et al.149 explored the relationship between hospital board governance and
patient safety in the NHS. They found a statistically significant relationship between particular (self-reported)
board competencies and whistleblowing-related questions in the annual NSS. In particular, there was an
association between board competencies and staff’s reported willingness to report errors and incidents as well
as staff perceptions that their organisation would take positive action if they did report problems requiring
attention. This study draws attention to the wider governance context as well as local management and
leadership in supporting the reporting of front-line concerns.
Boundary definitions
The difficulty in identifying actions and behaviours that constitute ‘wrongdoing’ receives considerable
attention in the literature, particularly in that relating to student nursing. Enabling trainee health-care
workers to judge where the line is drawn in terms of delineating poor care from adequate care is considered
fundamental to nurse training, with many authors contributing to the general discussion on this.96,104,122,124,129
Ion et al.86 argue that student nurses often lack confidence in their own judgement, and Bickhoff et al.90
note the importance of linking nurse training to nurses’ own moral code and previous life experiences as a
benchmark for judging poor-quality care. The issue of boundaries is also addressed by Prang and Jelsness-
Jorgensen,119 who claim that, in addition to poor organisational culture and support, a lack of clarity around
routines and processes was a barrier to speaking up. Jones and Kelly17 note that the ‘incremental expansion
of normative boundaries’ leads to a gradual shift in what is perceived as acceptable behaviour, adding
further to local ambiguity and uncertainty.
Personal factors
Factors that are specific (but not unique) to an individual but that may influence whistleblowing behaviour
are presented in the following section. The literature here uncovers and explores various factors grouped
under the following broad headings: personal traits and characteristics; and position and role in the
organisation.
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Personal traits and characteristics
Ohnishi et al.117 note the large personal challenge of blowing the whistle: ‘The social significance of
belonging to a group, the psychological pain of disloyalty, obedience to the chain of command, fear of being
exposed as the whistleblower, and fear of accusation and retribution all hinder whistleblowing’. Indeed, the
authors draw attention to the complexity of social, ethical and personal forces at work in these situations.
Clearly, speaking up and whistleblowing are acts that cannot be untaken lightly by any organisation member.
Many empirical studies highlight the importance of nurses’ self-image and perceived duty as patient
advocates.85,87,90,91,102 This advocacy role has been recognised as a crucial part of a nurses’ training,109,122,124
and perceived as fundamental to helping nurses recognise when care is poor. Ion et al.99 note the natural
human tendency to describe oneself in the most positive light, leading whistleblowers to claim to be
strong characters, whereas non-whistleblowers blame factors outside their control for their failure to
report, perhaps suggesting that, at some level of consciousness, nurses understand and believe that their
primary responsibility is to the patient.150 Peternelj-Taylor118 supports this view, and implies that there is a
possible naivety among nurses who believe that organisations will respond to reports of wrongdoing in an
ethical matter consistent with their ‘nurse as patient advocate’ ideals. The author goes on to emphasise
that to be able to speak out about wrongdoing in the health-care sector requires resilience, confidence
and moral courage. This view is supported by several empirical studies, including Bickhoff et al.90 and
Monrouxe et al.151 In addition, Bellefontaine89 notes that a strong student–mentor relationship and
supportive university representatives are key to giving student nurses the personal confidence and
information necessary to speak up about concerns around patient safety.
Work by Schwappach and Gehring120 raises an interesting point relating to nurses being concerned about
how to raise concerns, rather than whether to raise them. This perhaps suggests that a person with a
reflective, reflexive personality would be more predisposed to blow the whistle than individuals who are
less self-aware. Although a number of the empirical studies recorded a predominance of women included
(mirroring health-care professions more widely), there was little attempt to differentiate the sexes with
regard to whistleblowing responses. Fledderjohann and Johnson,36 working with the general public, noted
that men were less likely to report child neglect, and Monrouxe et al.82 found that men were less likely to
classify themselves as distressed after witnessing poor patient treatment. However, Kent et al.104 found that
sex, age and ethnicity had little or no influence on the willingness of student nurses to speak up. There
clearly remains much to uncover here regarding personal predisposing factors to whistleblowing.
Position and role in the organisation
A number of papers highlight differences in willingness to speak up between individuals in different roles
and positions within health-care organisations: St Pierre et al.123 noted that, in critical situations, nurses
rarely challenged potentially dangerous decisions made by their superiors, in this case anaesthetists.
Moore and McAuliffe115 found that nurse managers were more likely than staff nurses to report poor care.
Throckmorton and Etchegaray125 contradict this finding to some extent, reporting that although (perhaps
not surprisingly for a postal questionnaire) 99% of nurses claimed that they would report incidents that
they felt would result in moderate to severe injury or death, error reporting was more likely to come from
nurses who were operationally closer to the patient, and from nurses who were less well established in
their roles. The lack of a managerial role for doctors and nurses appears to reduce the likelihood that they
will be willing to speaking up when confronted with poor or unsafe care.121
Responses to whistleblowing
In many articles, the fear of reprisal is cited as a central cause of failure to report wrongdoing. Typically,
the anticipated retaliation has its source as the organisational formal and informal apparatuses, but also
may include the fear of actions of peers, and the whistleblowers’ own inner personal turmoil as they try to
balance ‘doing the right thing’ against loyalty to their peers, to the organisation and, potentially, to their
profession. It is to these issues that we now turn.
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Responses from organisations
The employing organisation’s responses (both positive and negative) to whistleblowers have a great
bearing on the entire whistleblowing process. Indeed, the lack of response (i.e. a change in poor practice
or the addressing of wrongdoing) is widely cited as a key reason for a decision not to report.100,107,115,150
Although this could perhaps be seen as an attempt by non-reporting observers to justify the lack of action,
given the risks associated with whistleblowing, one would expect that seeing a positive response from the
organisation would support the further reporting of wrongdoing.112 Fear of retaliation by the organisation
emerged as a significant barrier to speaking up,88,93,133 yet there has been a dearth of research exploring
the proportion of whistleblowing that actually results in retaliation, or of positive responses to the raising
of concerns. It is quite plausible that highly publicised but isolated incidents of the mistreatment of
whistleblowers have a disproportionate impact on the level of apprehension that is experienced among
general employees. This underlines the need for a clearer picture of what health-care professionals (and
the public) understand by the terms whistleblowing and raising concerns, and a clearer sense of what
might happen as a consequence of those actions.
Responses from peers
Whistleblowers report the potential for reprisals from peers as a major factor in their decision-making
process, with McDonald and Ahern112 reporting ‘unofficial’ (i.e. not initiated by the organisation) reprisals
on whistleblowers from their colleagues taking the form of pressure to resign, social rejection, being
treated as a traitor and having their career progression halted. Attree88 discusses ‘negative social outcomes,
alienation and withdrawal of peer support’ as the experience of some whistleblowers, and both Peters
et al.144 and Bickhoff et al.90 report bullying and exclusion from social groups. Jackson et al.145 offer a
slightly different perspective, noting how nurses desire to blend in with their colleagues and to conform to
group norms, and depend on those norms to report, or not report, wrongdoing. Law and Chan109 raise a
further dimension to peer responses to whistleblowing, specifically the extent to which peers naturally
support colleagues who report wrongdoing, and consider the use of peers as mentors in these situations.
Responses from non-whistleblowing observers of wrongdoing
Newton et al.116 suggest that there are many ‘under-the-radar’ responses to the observation of poor care
that manifest as changed behaviours in those directly or indirectly affected by the wrongdoing; their
response to an observation may be to take their own action (i.e. outside their normal channels) to address
the problem and alleviate the moral distress they feel as a result of observing poor care. For example,
rather than blow the whistle, nurses may address problems by ‘contacting other healthcare team
members, making referrals and coordinating care with other departments such as home care and hospice,
as well as initiating contact with groups such as professional regulatory bodies or unions’. Newton116
suggests that nurses are ‘silenced’ by organisations, but are not always ‘silent’; that is, if they are not
listened to by the relevant authorities, or are told to be quiet, they may elect to address the poor care
directly and unofficially, rather than risk suffering the negative responses to whistleblowing from
organisation or peers that so many nurses seem to anticipate.
In discussing a study that involved interviewing practising oncology doctors and nurses, Schwappach
and Gehring120 uncovered a range of non-verbal communication signals that were exchanged between
colleagues in an attempt to avoid compromising patient safety. However, this behaviour was moderated by
the degree of severity of the risk to the patient, with greater risk garnering more overt and more direct
‘voice’. This suggests that bystanders’ (in)actions may be an important consideration alongside the actions/
voice of putative whistleblowers themselves. Perceptions of wrongdoing may also be important: Mansbach
et al.114 found that physiotherapy students tended to view management wrongdoing as more serious than
practitioner wrongdoing, whereas qualified practitioners took the opposite stance.
McDonald and Ahern112 found that the indecision around whether or not to blow the whistle on poor care
caused nurses moral anguish, with the most effective response to alleviate these symptoms being to take
problem-focused action, and the least effective being avoidance and denial. Monrouxe et al.82 looked more
closely at the anguish caused to observers of wrongdoing (irrespective of whether or not they blow the
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whistle) and highlighted the finding that male medical students claimed to be less distressed by observation
of poor-quality care than their female counterparts. Interestingly, the authors also found that increased
exposure to poor care apparently increased distress levels, which runs counter to what might have been
expected given the findings from other studies that suggest that as nurses become more socialised members
of an organisation, they become less likely to notice or become desensitised to poor care, and, therefore,
become less minded to report such cases.17,110 Blenkinsopp and Edwards15 commented on the emotional
response of failing to speak up, noting ‘strong negative emotions, including anger, fear and cynicism . . .
driven by fear of the consequences of speaking up’ (p. 187). Greaves and McGlone97 go further, reporting
on the long-term damage done to a whistleblower’s mental health as a result of the reprisals exacted by
their employing organisations. Similarly, Peters et al.144 emphasised the negative impact of whistleblowing
incidents on the emotional health of those involved, particularly if the ensuing investigations are protracted.
Concluding remarks
This chapter concludes our review of the theoretical and empirical literature on whistleblowing. We move
next to an analysis of key Inquiry reports into serious failings in NHS care, beginning with the Bristol Royal
Infirmary Inquiry report and covering the causes of concern, the main recommendations of the inquiry,
the response to recommendations and the fate of the whistleblower.
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Chapter 4 The main whistleblowing inquiries and
formal responses to inquiry recommendations
Introduction
This chapter focuses on distilling the key lessons for whistleblowing policy and practice from an analysis
of the findings of formal inquiries into serious failings in NHS care. It reviews inquiries dating back
to the Bristol Royal Infirmary5 and moving through Ayling,152 Kerr/Haslam,153 Shipman154 and Francis155–159
to the Francis Freedom to Speak Up review.2 The starting point was chosen on the grounds that Bristol
was the first major inquiry since PIDA, that it featured a clearly identified ‘whistleblower’ and that it
discussed issues that foreshadow those in subsequent inquiries, such as the importance of ‘culture’ and
the duty of candour. In addition, this chapter examines the responses of the main stakeholders to
the respective Inquiry reports, including the government, the Health Select Committee, and health-care
‘producer’ organisations such as the Royal College of Nursing and the General Medical Council (GMC).
For each Inquiry report, information is presented on the following issues.
l Who (if anyone) was the whistleblower?
l How and why did they ‘blow the whistle’?
l What factors did or could facilitate or inhibit the action?
l What organisational actions were taken as a result?
l What were the consequences for the whistleblower?
For each response to the inquiry, attention is focused on the recommendations of that inquiry.
As the inquiries contain thousands of pages, the traditional historical ‘reading’ of the documents160 would
have been problematic. Instead, electronic searches of the documents were performed using thematic
coding in a deductive and inductive sense through keywords from the conceptual and theoretical work of
the earlier chapters, and arising inductively from the documents. The most obvious search term is ‘Whistle*’,
but other terms used included ‘Concern’, ‘Bully*’, ‘Victim*’, ‘Intimidat*’, ‘Reprisal’, ‘Silen*’, ‘Fear’ and
‘Speak*’. These sections (and surrounding paragraphs, together with any signposted links) were then
explored in more detail. This chapter provides a summary of the inquiries and responses, followed by a
discussion of the emerging themes.
The formal NHS inquiries from the Kennedy report onwards
Each of the key inquiries is now taken in turn, with a structured summary provided of the events
underpinning the inquiry and the matters arising that are directly relevant to whistleblowing. Appendices 2
and 3 provide fuller details of these inquiries (and, indeed, of the formal responses made to the
recommendations for each inquiry).
Kennedy5
Kennedy5 reported on a public inquiry, set up in 1998, that examined the management of the care of
children receiving complex cardiac surgical services at Bristol Royal Infirmary between 1984 and 1995, which
particularly focused on the high mortality rates of two main surgeons, Mr Wisheart and Mr Dhasmana.
The surgeons and the chief executive officer (CEO), Dr Roylance, were found guilty of serious professional
misconduct in 1998. The Inquiry report stated that it would be reassuring to think that the situation could
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not happen again, but ‘we cannot give that reassurance. Unless lessons are learned, it certainly could
happen again’ (p. i).
Blowing the whistle
The main whistleblower was Dr Steve Bolsin. Soon after his appointment as consultant anaesthetist in
September 1988, Dr Bolsin began to have concerns about the duration of operations and the consequent
effect on outcomes (p. 136). He began to gather data in 1989 and attempted to raise concerns through a
number of internal and external routes. However, these actions had little impact, and in January 1995 the
death of 18-month-old Joshua Loveday following surgery led to an external inquiry.
Factors
The report pointed to a ‘club culture’, an imbalance of power with too much control in the hands of a
few individuals (p. 2). Many staff, particularly junior staff, remained silent in the face of poor care as
they were fearful of raising concerns and/or challenging superiors because of possible repercussions:
‘There is a real fear among staff (particularly among junior doctors and nurses) that to comment on
colleagues, particularly consultants, is to endanger their future work prospects’ (p. 2). The report regards
it as ‘significant’ that nursing staff did not bring concerns to senior figures. This was not a result of ‘any
lack of concern, but illustrating a larger truth of the hierarchical system that made it difficult for nursing
staff to voice concerns and be heard’ (p. 175). In short, nursing staff were ‘let down by a culture that
excluded them’ (p. 176).
Consequences for the whistleblower
Although there is nothing in the report on this issue, other sources (e.g. Hammond and Bousfield161) record
that Dr Bolsin was described as ‘the most hated anaesthetist in Europe’ and found himself unemployable
in the NHS. He left the UK in 1995 to work in Australia, but in 2013 he was awarded the Royal College of
Anaesthetists medal in recognition of the work that he has done to promote safety in anaesthesia (p. 8).162
Consequences for the NHS
The report presented 198 recommendations, under the following themes: respect and honesty; a health
service that is well led; competent health-care professionals; the safety of care; care of an appropriate
standard; public involvement through empowerment; and the care of children. Although there was no
explicit recommendation on whistleblowing, a number of recommendations foreshadowed some of
those of later reports, such as ‘a duty of candour’ to patients (recommendation 33), a framework of
regulation independent of government (recommendations 39 and 40), doctors’ Code of Professional
Practice incorporated in the contract of employment (recommendation 45), a regulatory body, and a
professional code of practice for health-care managers (recommendation 91), a national reporting
system (recommendations 109–112), and incentives to encourage the reporting of sentinel events
(recommendations 113–118). However, more generally, stress was placed on changing the ‘culture of
the NHS’.
Quotations in this sections are reproduced from Kennedy.5 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector
information licenced under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Ayling152
In 1998, Clifford Ayling was arrested and charged with indecently assaulting former patients. In 2000, he
was convicted on 12 counts of indecent assault relating to 10 female patients, and sentenced to 4 years’
imprisonment. His name was placed indefinitely on the sex offender’s register under the Sex Offenders
Act 1997.163 In 2001, the professional conduct committee of the GMC determined that Ayling’s name
should be erased from the medical register.
Blowing the whistle
Ayling worked in hospitals and as a GP. In the hospital setting there were a number of concerns, but only
two complaints, ‘which is indicative of the contemporaneous culture within the profession to rely upon
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informal mechanisms for raising concerns about a colleague’ (p. 37). Midwife Delphine Bentley wrote a
complaint in 1984, which appeared to result in no action. In 1980, Sister Penny Moore reported Ayling for
masturbating while carrying out a vaginal examination on a young woman.
Ayling became a GP in 1981 and remained in general practice until 2000. In 1991, a patient made a
complaint to Kent Police about the way he had examined her at his surgery. The Crown Prosecution
Service took the decision not to prosecute, but the incident was brought to the attention of the Family
Health Services Authority by a letter from the Kent Police. Ayling was ultimately tried and convicted of
indecent assault against the patient in 2000 (p. 63).
From 1985 until 2000, a succession of patients transferred from Ayling’s practice to a neighbouring
surgery, with many female patients referring to his apparent misconduct in the context of breast and
vaginal examinations (p. 65). In 1988, Dr Anderson contacted his medical defence organisation, and in
1993 Dr Pickering approached Kent Local Medical Committee, but these did not result in any action.
Both Dr Anderson and Dr Pickering worked at a neighbouring practice and had received requests for
patients to be transferred from Ayling’s practice.
Factors
The report pointed to the ‘individuals who could and should have acted on the information then available’
(p. 109), and identified a number of missed opportunities between 1971 and 1998. It discussed a number
of issues, such as clinical freedom and self-regulation; staff hierarchies; lack of openness; a failure to hear;
lack of clear professional guidance; preference for the use of informal systems; lack of information sharing
or ‘corporate memory’; barriers to making complaints; the lack of gathering and sharing ‘soft’ information;
and a lack of procedures for raising concerns. However, the single most important barrier to staff, such as
nurses and midwives, formally expressing their concerns about Ayling was ‘the absence of any formal
procedure for doing so’ (p. 138). The inquiry quoted some optimistic witnesses who considered that things
had changed for the better in terms of speaking up about any concerns, and stated that ‘NHS staff are
increasingly willing to speak up for patient safety, even at some personal risk’ (p. 159).
Consequences for the whistleblower
There appear to have been no consequences for the whistleblowers.
Consequences for the NHS
The report produced 19 recommendations on ‘sexualised behaviour’ (recommendations 1 and 2), ‘listening
and hearing’ (recommendations 3 and 4), ‘complaints procedures’ (recommendation 5), ‘tracking repeated
complaints and concerns’ (recommendations 6–8), ‘sole practitioners’ (recommendations 9 and 10),
‘chaperones’ (recommendations 11–13), ‘local medical committees’ (recommendations 14 and 15) and
‘criminal investigations’ (recommendations 16–19). Only one of these (recommendation 2) was concerned
with whistleblowing: ‘we recommend that local policies within all NHS trusts for reporting staff concerns
(whistleblowing) should specifically identify “sexualised behaviour” as appropriate for reporting within the
confidence of this procedure’ (p. 22).
Quotations in this sections are reproduced from Ayling.152 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector
information licenced under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Kerr/Haslam153
This inquiry was concerned with understanding the problem of the sexual abuse of psychiatric patients by
William Kerr and Michael Haslam at Clifton Hospital, York. In 2000, Kerr was convicted of one count of
indecent assault, and in 2003 Haslam was convicted of four counts of indecent assault (p. 4). This was
‘a story of management failure, failed communication, poor record keeping and a culture where the
consultant was all-powerful’. It argued that many ignored warning signs or dismissed rumours, and that
some chose to remain silent when they should have been raising their voices (p. 5). Moreover, it pointed
out that the failure to react and investigate emerged as a common theme in reports such as Shipman,154
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Ayling152 and Neale164 (pp. 466–7). This report struck an optimistic tone, claiming to detect a significant
change – beginning in the 1990s and carrying through to the present day – in both attitudes and systems.
However, it concluded that change of culture was at the heart of real change.
Blowing the whistle
The main whistleblower was Deputy Sister Linda Bigwood, but others who raised concerns included
Stephen Brooks, a community psychiatric nurse, and Dr Christopher Simpson, a newly appointed
consultant psychiatrist. The inquiry also discussed the GP whistleblowers Dr Wade (on Kerr in 1979),
Dr Moroney (on Haslam in 1987) and Dr Moran (on Haslam in 1988) (p. 431), but these GPs who took
action to pursue concerns ‘represented the minority’.
In 1983, Bigwood pursued her concerns about Kerr’s alleged sexual misconduct towards a number of
patients with the hospital authorities, the district health authority and, beyond that, the regional health
authority. However, an inquiry focused on the messenger rather than the message, and, despite letters
and meetings setting out Bigwood’s concerns over a period of almost 5 years and involving the most
senior NHS managers, no investigation was ever made into Kerr’s practice. The inquiry noted that in the
period before 1983, of the 30 concerns alleged to have been raised about Kerr, all but one (below) ‘fell on
deaf ears’ (p. 7). The failure of the local GPs to respond is a striking feature of the Kerr story (p. 12).
In 1988, Patient B7 informed Brooks that she had had problems with Haslam and was frightened to see
him, and later told Brooks that she had told her GP, Dr Moran, of these problems. Moran and Brooks
informed Dr Kennedy, the CEO of the district health authority. However, little was done until the end of
1997, when Professor Sir Liam Donaldson, the then regional director of the NHS Executive of Northern and
Yorkshire, set up the ‘Manzoor Inquiry’ into the allegations of sexual misconduct against Haslam between
1984 and 1988, which led to Haslam’s dismissal in September 1998.
Factors
The report pointed to an ‘unhealthy’ culture in which professionals were reluctant to take action against
consultants, through either a misguided sense of loyalty or fear of confrontation. It categorised the root
causes of this comprehensive failure to attend to patient concerns under five headings: organisational,
cultural, structural, professional practice and individual failings. It points to the key factors explaining
GPs’ lack of response: the ‘old-boy network’ or professional loyalty, the isolation of GPs, a tolerance of
sexualised behaviour, insufficient expertise in psychiatry, confidentiality, the power of consultants, and an
ambivalent attitude to relationships between doctors and patients. Rather unusually, compared with other
reports, the inquiry stresses the importance of individual ‘agency’ as opposed to collective ‘structural factors’.
Consequences for the whistleblower
Dr Simpson appeared not to have suffered any detriment, but Bigwood, like many other so-called
‘whistleblowers’, suffered professional detriment (p. 8). She was moved from an acute admissions ward
to a geriatric ward, which she viewed as a demotion, and she felt that she was being punished for raising
a patient’s disclosure (p. 181).
Consequences for the NHS
The inquiry recommended that the DHSC should review the effectiveness of whistleblowing policies
and initiatives within NHS-funded organisations (p. 29); that the NHS should adopt and reinforce the
recommendations in the Manzoor report (Manzoor Z, NHS Executive Northern and Yorkshire, unpublished)
and in ‘Making Amends’ (CMO 2003);165 that there should be a duty of candour imposed on, and
accepted by, NHS staff (p. 36); and that all Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) should set up a staffed
telephone helpline, where anonymised (or identified) concerns could be received and processed (p. 66).
The inquiry stated that there must be a ‘change of ethos’, but noted that it is one thing for a policy to be
put in place and quite another to establish a culture that supports, enables and encourages staff to raise
their concerns (p. 664).
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Quotations in this sections are reproduced from The Kerr/Haslam Inquiry.153 © Crown copyright. Contains
public sector information licenced under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Shipman154
The Shipman Inquiry report154 consists of six volumes, with the main material about whistleblowing in
volume 5. Harold Shipman was a GP who was convicted in 2000 of murdering 15 patients, and of forging
a will. The inquiry identified 215 victims, but ‘the true number is far greater and cannot be counted’154
(volume 1, p. 202).
Blowing the whistle
The Shipman Inquiry tried to avoid using the expression ‘whistleblowing’ whenever possible (p. 319). It
noted that there were a number of missed opportunities to raise concerns in 1976 and in 1994, and that
over the years some people (e.g. two home helps, a taxi driver and a niece of one of the victims) had
concerns, but did not report them. Funeral director Mrs Deborah Bambroffe mentioned these concerns to
GP Dr Susan Booth, which contributed to the raising of anxieties within Brooke Practice, which led, some
time later, to GP Dr Linda Reynolds’ report to the coroner. He, in turn, passed the information to the
police, but the first police investigation concluded that the concerns were without foundation. In short, the
inquiry considered that before March 1998 when Dr Reynolds reported her concerns, very few people had
had any concerns about Shipman (p. 24). It considered that none of these people were ‘whistleblowers’
per se, as they did not work in the same organisation as Shipman but were merely voicing their concerns
to those who they felt were the appropriate authorities. Another feature that set these people apart from
the typical ‘whistleblower’ was that most of them were far from confident that their concerns were
justified (volume 5, p. 318).154
Factors
The inquiry pointed to factors that may inhibit reporting, including the unclear duty to report; the fear
of being accused of disparagement; the ‘one-off’ or ‘genuine’ mistake; the insufficiency of evidence;
ignorance of procedures; the fear of being seen as a troublemaker or ‘maverick’; the fear of recriminations;
a concern that making a report might lead to proceedings for defamation; and a feeling of impotence
grounded in the belief that, even if the report is made, nothing will be done about it. There is a tendency
for attention to be focused on the messenger rather than on the message and the ‘whistleblower’ may
suffer reprisals (p. 320).
Consequences for the whistleblower
There appeared to be no consequences for the whistleblowers.
Consequences for the NHS
In contrast to many other inquiries, this inquiry stressed the role of ‘raising concerns’: ‘I believe that the
willingness of one health-care professional to take responsibility for raising concerns about the conduct,
performance or health of another could make a greater potential contribution to patient safety than any
other single factor’154 (p. 23). The inquiry made a total of 190 recommendations. The most relevant appear
to include the need for a general practice whistleblowing policy; that primary care trusts should provide
information and training about whistleblowing policies directly to practice staff; and the provision of a
telephone helpline. The inquiry appeared to be rather optimistic about the future, mentioning ‘radical
changes within the NHS’ since Shipman’s arrest.
Quotations in this section are reproduced from The Shipman Inquiry.154 © Crown copyright. Contains
public sector information licenced under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Francis 2010155,156
Concerns about mortality and the standard of care provided at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust
resulted in an investigation by the Healthcare Commission (HCC), which published a highly critical report in
March 2009, followed by two reviews commissioned by the DHSC.155,156
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Blowing the whistle
The main material on whistleblowing was given in a section covering pages 279–91. It stated that
whistleblowing could take many forms, including passing information to management or colleagues in the
same organisation or, in some cases, to some external body or individual or even the media (p. 279). The
inquiry was made aware of the facts of only three whistleblowing reports: a consultant who submitted a
memorandum to the parliamentary Health Select Committee, and later to the HCC in 2008; allegations of
poor care in ward 3 made by a nurse and a health-care support worker; and allegations of falsification of
patient documentation in order to avoid the breach of targets in accident and emergency (A&E) departments,
and a more general allegation of bullying and harassment made in 2007 against two sisters working in A&E.
It concluded that ‘all give cause for concern as to whether individuals who blow the whistle are properly
looked after and whether the concerns they raise are properly pursued’ (p. 281), and that ‘the experiences of
those involved in these three episodes arising out of raising serious concerns is not encouraging’ (p. 291).
Factors
The inquiry pointed to an organisational culture that included a culture of bullying, target-driven priorities,
disengagement from management, low staff morale, isolation, lack of candour, acceptance of poor
behaviours, reliance on external assessments, and denial (p. 152). It stated that fear manifested itself in
the reluctance of staff, particularly nursing staff, to come forward to the inquiry (p. 166), and that the
experience of staff who had raised concerns about colleagues suggests that trust management appeared
keener to protect the subject of the concern rather than the informant (pp. 174–5).
Consequences for the whistleblower
In the three whistleblowing cases discussed above, respectively, a consultant was suspended, allegations
made in 2005 that closely matched the 2010 inquiry’s main findings were dismissed, and the whistleblower
left the trust. The inquiry stated that the handling of these cases was unlikely to encourage others to come
forward, and the responses to the investigation of the concerns raised had been ineffective (p. 20).
Consequences for the NHS
The inquiry produced 18 recommendations, but only one focused on whistleblowing. Recommendation
8 states that ‘The Board should give priority to ensuring that any member of staff who raises an honestly
held concern about the standard or safety of the provision of services to patients is supported and
protected from any adverse consequences, and should foster a culture of openness and insight’ (p. 27).
It stated that there was a ‘very real reluctance’ to raise concerns, linked to the ‘widespread belief that
the protections offered are theoretical rather than real’. It continued that ‘The most important factor in
changing this will not be a new system or policy of protection for whistleblowers, but the fostering of a
culture of openness, self-criticism and teamwork’ (p. 409).
Quotations in this section are reproduced from Francis.155,156 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector
information licenced under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Francis 2013157–159
The Conservative Secretary of State for Health in the coalition government, Andrew Lansley, asked Francis
to undertake a wider public inquiry, with three reports resulting from this.157–159
Blowing the whistle
This included a mix of the same cases as the 2010 inquiry (with names and more details) and some new
cases. It discussed doctors who sought to raise issues of concern, but they ‘fared little better than the
nurses’ (p. 238).
Factors
There appear to be three main factors why whistleblowing was ineffective. First, the trust had an atmosphere
of not welcoming criticism, and the consultants were completely disenfranchised. Second, there was a
‘culture of fear’. Third, although the evidence supports what was heard during the first inquiry regarding the
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disengagement of doctors, it does not explain why no clinician appears to have taken his or her concerns
outside the trust to a regulator, the PCT or the SHA.
Consequences for the whistleblower
Helene Donnelly felt that the atmosphere in the department continued to be poisonous, and she left in
2008. Her experience illustrates one reason why staff may have been deterred from seeking to exploit
the so-called protection available to whistleblowers (pp. 235–7). She was subsequently awarded an OBE
and is the Ambassador for Cultural Change in Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent Partnership NHS Trust.
It appears that some staff who made complaints had been suspended pending the inquiry and were so
traumatised that they left the trust to work elsewhere (pp. 65–66). The suspension of Dr Singh ‘would
have discouraged colleagues from getting involved’ (p. 176). However, Dr Turner experienced no
recriminations from within the trust (p. 241).
Consequences for the NHS
The term ‘whistleblowing’ did not feature in the recommendations, which favoured cultural rather than
legal remedies: ‘the solution lies in creating the right culture, not in focusing on improvements to
whistleblowing legislation, important though such protection is’ (p. 242). The closest approximation was
recommendation 12, reporting of incidents of concern relevant to patient safety: compliance with
fundamental standards or some higher requirement of the employer needs to be not only encouraged but
insisted on. Staff are entitled to receive feedback in relation to any report they make, including information
about any action taken or reasons for not acting (p. 243).
Quotations in this section are reproduced from Francis.157–159 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector
information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Summary of findings from the formal inquiries
As Table 6 shows, the inquiries were of different types and focused on different sectors. Not all gave a
clear definition of whistleblowing, and the definitions given varied. In many cases there was no clear
internal management response, and only Francis11 led to responses by external professional bodies.
Table 7 summarises the answers to the main research questions. It shows a variety of whistleblowers who
took a number of internal and external different routes to raise concerns. There is little on factors that
facilitated action, but the overarching factor that inhibits action is broadly concerned with organisational
culture. Not all whistleblowers suffered detriment, but in some cases the consequences for them were
significant. Finally, only eight of the total of about 820 recommendations in all of the inquiries are directly
concerned with whistleblowing.
Formal responses to whistleblowing inquiries
This section now follows through from each of the inquiries to the formal responses to the
recommendations made by the government and other formal bodies.
Secretary of State for Health (Bristol)
The government166 accepted most of the Kennedy5 recommendations. It was stated that:
Bristol was a turning point in the history of the NHS.
p. 13.166 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
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TABLE 6 Summary of the key inquiries covered in Chapter 4
Inquiry Type Sector Definition of whistleblowing Internal management response
Professional
body response
Kennedy5 Public inquiry Acute Dr Bolsin was not a whistleblower, as, had
PIDA been in force, it would not have applied
to him, as his disclosures would not have
qualified as a ‘qualifying statement’
No clear response No clear response
Ayling152 Independent statutory
(non-public) inquiry
Acute No clear definition In 1998 EKHA became involved in the police
investigation
No clear response
Neale164 Independent statutory
(non-public) inquiry
Acute No clear definition Disciplinary hearing in 1995; negotiated
severance package; subsequently employed by
two hospitals; alert letter sent by RHA in 1998
No clear response
Kerr/Haslam153 Independent statutory
(non-public) inquiry
Mental health No clear definition In 1997 RHA set up an inquiry into Haslam No clear response
Shipman154 General practice The inquiry tried to avoid using the expression
‘whistleblowing’ whenever possible
There were no ‘whistleblowers’ per se, as they
did not work in the same organisation as
Shipman
No clear response No clear response
Francis155,156,159 Independent (non-public)
inquiry
Acute Whistleblowing can take many forms No clear response No clear response
Francis11 Public inquiry Acute No clear definition No clear response BMA; RCN; GMC
BMA, British Medical Association; EKHA, European Kidney Health Alliance; RHA, regional health authority.
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TABLE 7 Reasons for and implications of whistleblowing for individuals and the NHS
Inquiry Who? How? Why? Factors
With what effect to
the individual?
With what effect to
the NHS?
Kennedy5 Dr Steve Bolsin Various routes within
Bristol Royal Infirmary
and wider NHS
Concern that
operations were taking
a long time, and
mortality rates were
high
‘Club culture’; ‘culture of fear’ ‘Unemployable’ in
NHS; moved to
Australia
198 recommendations
Ayling152 Sister Penny Moore; Midwife
Delphine Bentley; GPs
Dr Pickering and Dr Anderson
Report/complaint Unclear Clinical freedom and self regulation;
staff hierarchies; lack of openness;
a failure to hear; lack of clear
professional guidance; preference for
the use of informal systems; lack of
information sharing or ‘corporate
memory’; barriers to making
complaints; and the lack of gathering
and sharing of ‘soft’ information
However, the single most important
barrier was the absence of any formal
procedure for reporting concerns
Unclear 19 recommendations
Neale164 None NA NA NA NA 27 recommendations
Kerr/Haslam153 GP Dr Mathewson, in Northern
Ireland in 1964; Deputy Sister
Linda Bigwood; GPs Dr Wade
(on Kerr in 1979), Dr Moroney
(on Haslam in 1987) and
Dr Moran (on Haslam in 1988);
Community Psychiatric Nurse
Stephen Brooks
Unclear Unclear ‘Unhealthy’ culture
Key factors explaining GPs’ lack of
response: the ‘old-boy network’ or
professional loyalty; the isolation
of GPs; tolerance of sexualised
behaviour; insufficient expertise in
psychiatry; confidentiality; the power
of consultants; and an ambivalent
attitude to relationships between
doctor and patient
Stressed the importance of individual,
‘agency’ as opposed to collective,
structural factors
Deputy Sister Bigwood
felt that she suffered
professional detriment
74 recommendations
continued
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TABLE 7 Reasons for and implications of whistleblowing for individuals and the NHS (continued )
Inquiry Who? How? Why? Factors
With what effect to
the individual?
With what effect to
the NHS?
Shipman154 GP from neighbouring practice,
Dr Linda Reynolds
Report to coroner
Resulted in police
investigation that
cleared Shipman
Concerns of large
numbers of deaths,
and nature of deaths
Fear of being accused of
disparagement; the ‘one-off’ or
‘genuine’ mistake; the insufficiency of
evidence; ignorance of procedures;
the fear of being seen as a
troublemaker or ‘maverick’; the fear
of recriminations; a concern that
making a report might lead to
proceedings for defamation; a feeling
of impotence that nothing will be
done about it; and fear that the
‘whistleblower’ may suffer reprisals
No apparent negative
repercussions
190 recommendations
Francis155,156,159 Three main whistleblowers:
consultant, nurse and
health-care support worker,
and nurse
Reports/complaints Unclear An organisational culture that
included a culture of bullying,
target-driven priorities,
disengagement from management,
low staff morale, isolation, a lack of
candour, an acceptance of poor
behaviours, a reliance on external
assessment, and denial
Left employment 18 recommendations
(including one on
whistleblowing:
recommendation 8)
Francis11 Named whistleblowers from
the 2010 inquiry, with more
detail
Reports/complaints Unclear Atmosphere of not welcoming
criticism; consultants completely
disenfranchised; ‘culture of fear’
Left employment 290 recommendations
NA, not applicable.
TH
E
M
A
IN
W
H
ISTLEBLO
W
IN
G
IN
Q
U
IRIES
A
N
D
FO
RM
A
L
RESPO
N
SES
TO
IN
Q
U
IRY
RECO
M
M
EN
D
A
TIO
N
S
N
IH
R
Journals
Library
w
w
w
.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
42
However, the government also argued that the organisational or institutional fix for the problems identified
in Bristol had already been carried out: the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI); the National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE); the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA); the National
Clinical Assessment Authority (NCAA); the National Service Frameworks; the NHS Modernisation Agency;
and the establishment of a new Council for the Quality of Health Care and a new Council for the
Regulation of Health Care Professionals (pp. 3–4).166
However, Kennedy set out a vision in which the patient should be at the heart of the NHS (p. 14),5 which is
associated with recommendations 33–36. In particular, the government agreed recommendation 33 on
‘a duty of candour’, meaning that a duty to tell a patient if adverse events have occurred must be recognised
as owed by all those working in the NHS to patients (p. 34).166 Recommendations 106–112 focused on a
single national system of reporting adverse events. Recommendations 113–118 were concerned with the
reporting of sentinel events. However, the government rejected recommendations 45–46, that codes of
professional conduct should be included in the contracts of employment for health professionals, as this was
already implicit in employment contracts: ‘we do not believe that we need to go further’ (p. 106).166 The
government agreed ‘in part’ with recommendation 91, that managers as health-care professionals should be
subject to the same obligations as other health-care professionals, including being subject to a regulatory
body and professional code of practice. The government did not think that it was practicable to establish
self-regulation for senior managers.
Home Secretary and Secretary of State for Health (Shipman)
The government167 stressed the acknowledgement of the Shipman Inquiry that the NHS today was in
many ways very different from the NHS in which Shipman practised. The response then focused on issues
in the fifth report of the use of routine monitoring data and of responding to complaints and concerns.
It agreed with most of the 190 recommendations of the Shipman Inquiry. In particular, it noted that it
recommended a number of improvements both to encourage the raising of complaints and concerns and
to ensure that primary care organisations took effective action on them. These key proposals included
PCTs treating expressions of concern as seriously, and in the same way, as complaints; health-care
organisations (including general practices) clarifying the arrangements for raising concerns about fellow
professionals; and strengthening the statutory protection for whistleblowers. However, it did not consider
that PIDA should be amended. It stated that the crucial first step in any system for managing professional
performance is the initial identification of cause for concern. In the case of Shipman, a number of potential
clues were missed, and similar lessons emerge from the Ayling and Kerr/Haslam inquiries of failure to
recognise the significance of concerns expressed (p. 22).
Secretary of State for Health (Safeguarding Patients)
This response168 set out the action that the government proposed taking regarding the four reports on the
abuse of trust by health professionals: the Shipman Inquiry’s fifth report, and the reports of the Ayling,
Neale and Kerr/Haslam Inquiries. It is noted that although the nature of the abuse differs among the four
reports, the underlying question is the same in each case: why did the NHS at the time fail to identify the
risk and take the appropriate action to protect patients (p. 5)?
The response noted that, between them, the reports contain a total of 228 recommendations (p. 8).
The government agreed that complaints (from patients or their representatives) and concerns (from fellow
professionals) can provide vital information in identifying potential risks to patient safety (p. 9). It proposed
that all organisations providing services to the NHS should have a written policy setting out the procedures
to be followed by staff wishing to raise concerns (p. 52). However, the government was not convinced by
Shipman Inquiry recommendation 37, of considering amending PIDA, as staff who disclose concerns to the
HCC are already protected by PIDA, as the commission was now a ‘prescribed person’ as a result of the
Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003.169
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House of Commons Health Committee
These reports170,171 considered that the NHS remained largely unsupportive of whistleblowing, and
recommended that the DHSC bring forward proposals on how to improve this situation. The key tasks of the
government were to ensure that the NHS develops a culture of openness and ‘fair blame’; strengthens,
clarifies and promulgates its whistleblowing policy; and provides leadership that listens to and acts on staff
suggestions for service changes to improve efficiency and quality (p. 7).
The committee stated that an important measure of an organisation’s safety culture is how it treats
‘whistleblowing’ (i.e. ‘spontaneous reporting outside normal channels by individual members of staff’)
(p. 50)172 as a last resort in order to draw attention to unsafe care. It noted that ‘In one sense,
“whistleblowing” can be seen as evidence of a failure to learn – people are far more likely to pursue
channels outside their own organisation if there has been a failure to act on or even acknowledge
concerns raised internally. To many a perceived need for external whistleblowing is in itself a sign that
organisational culture is seriously awry’ (p. 64) (© Crown copyright. Contains public sector information
licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0).172 Despite the ‘theoretical’ protection of PIDA, in
practice it seemed that many NHS staff feared the consequences of whistleblowing, and the fear of
victimisation may well have been a factor inhibiting staff from whistleblowing at the trust (p. 89). The
committee recommended that Annex 1 of the Health Service Circular, HSC 1999/198, The Public Interest
Disclosure Act 1998 – Whistleblowing in the NHS173 be recirculated to all trusts for dissemination to all
their staff as a matter of urgency.
Secretary of State for Health (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust)
The government174 stated that a toxic culture was allowed to develop unchecked that fostered the
normalisation of cruelty and the victimisation of those brave enough to speak up. For far too long,
warning signs were not seen or were ignored or dismissed (p. 5). The government stated that it would
listen to staff who were worried about the quality of care, praising them for speaking up, even if a
concern was misplaced (p. 11).
The government noted in its response that it intended to create the role of Chief Inspector of Hospitals,
and that this individual would be ‘the nation’s whistleblower’ (p. 17). It stressed the Francis themes of
‘openness, transparency and candour’ (p. 22), and supported Francis’ recommendation on ‘gagging
clauses’ (© Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government
Licence v3.0). It stated that it had already taken a series of steps to enhance the protections available
to whistleblowers, including staff contracts, the NHS Constitution, issuing new guidance to employers
and extending the national helpline to include staff in social care settings for the first time. In 2013,
the Secretary of State for Health wrote to all trusts reminding them again of their obligations to have
(PIDA-compliant) whistleblowing policies (p. 47). The government agreed an amendment to the Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform Bill, securing PIDA protections for all NHS staff. However, the government rejected
Francis’ recommendation of an independent authority to which staff could turn when their own
organisation is not listening (p. 50).
British Medical Association (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust)
The British Medical Association (BMA)175 stated that it would do all it could to work with others in
developing a new culture in the NHS to prevent similar catastrophes from happening again. However,
the BMA did not believe that pursuing the recommendation in the report to move to a statutory duty of
candour was the right way forward. Rather, there was a need to address the underlying culture in the
NHS, which can prevent doctors from reporting concerns, and to look at alternative ways of ensuring that
doctors feel able to report their fears, such as a separate reporting route parallel to management.
Royal College of Nursing (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust)
The RCN176 revised and publicised its ‘whistleblowing’ guidance for members and reviewed the way it
supported them to raise concerns (p. 10). It noted that the terms ‘openness, transparency and candour’
in the Francis report (2013) were wide-ranging, and applied to everything from informal feedback from
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patients and their families up to and including whistleblowing (p. 23). It pointed out that nursing staff
tended to view whistleblowing as a high-risk, low-benefit action (p. 26).
Nursing and Midwifery Council (Francis)
The NMC177 did not explicitly mention whistleblowing. However, it pledged that it would undertake a
planned review of the Code and other practice standards, including clear duties of nurses and midwives in
relation to complaints handling, communication with patients and raising concerns, in the following year.
At a recent listening event, there was some support for a statutory duty of candour but also considerable
concern about the consequences of introducing criminal sanctions (p. 14). The response did not support
the recommendation that the NMC should be tasked directly with investigating systems issues, as the
boundaries of the distinct roles and responsibilities of professional and systems regulators should not be
blurred (p. 24).
General Medical Council (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust)
The GMC178 stated that in 2012 it launched a confidential helpline for doctors concerned about patient
safety, and an online tool to guide them through the process of raising concerns, together with new
guidance on raising and acting on concerns about patient safety (p. 5).
Clwyd and Hart
Recommendations in Clwyd and Hart179 focused on four areas for change: improving the quality of care;
improving the way complaints are handled; ensuring independence in the complaints procedures; and
whistleblowing (p. 32). It needed to be clearly stated how whistleblowers were to be protected, and
gagging clauses should not be allowed in staff contracts (p. 34).
Berwick
Berwick180 contained no explicit discussion of whistleblowing. However, it noted that clear warning
signals were not heeded (p. 4). It stated that the most important single change was that the NHS should
become a system devoted to continual learning and improvement of patient care (p. 5). It produced
10 recommendations, including learning, transparency and patient and carer voice, but nothing on
whistleblowing. Its main message was that:
In the end, culture will trump rules, standards and control strategies every single time, and achieving a
vastly safer NHS will depend far more on major cultural change than on a new regulatory regime.
p. 11.180 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
Keogh
Similarly, Keogh181 contained nothing that explicitly referred to whistleblowing. However, it noted that all
14 trusts had recommendations in their action plans on workforce issues, with four taking forward actions
to improve whistleblowing policies (p. 22).
House of Commons Health Committee
The Health Committee report182 wanted to establish a culture that is comfortable with challenge, arguing
that the responsibility for establishing a truly open managerial and professional culture that would make
the role of the whistleblower redundant lies with each trust board. The section on the Francis report and
whistleblowers focused on Helene Donnelly. It considered that, despite the existence of whistleblowing
policies, she was not given adequate support when she attempted to raise concerns, which gave little
encouragement to other potential whistleblowers to come forward.
In evidence to the committee, Robert Francis182 stated that it has been remarked that he had not made any
recommendations specifically called ‘whistleblowers’. He considered that, whatever the system in place,
it would not be easy for staff to raise concerns that are not accepted by those for whom they work.
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Although theoretical protection is provided by PIDA, this is unlikely to be of much reassurance to staff who
have to face the wrath of their colleagues. He concluded that:
whistleblowing is only necessary because of the absence of systems and a culture accepted by all staff
which positively welcomes internal reporting of concerns. If that culture is absent, then raising concerns
external to the system is bound to be a difficult and challenging matter exposing the whistleblower to
pressure from colleagues. Therefore, the solution lies in creating the right culture, not in focusing on
improvements to whistleblowing legislation, important though such protection is.
© Parliamentary Copyright.182 Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament
Licence v3.0. www.parliament.uk/site-information/copyright-parliament/open-parliament-licence/
The committee observed that the government claimed in its initial response to the Francis Report that
it had already taken a number of steps to enhance protection available to whistleblowers. However,
although the government’s actions were welcome, as far as they went, the committee agreed with Francis
that a legislative solution focused on protecting whistleblowers was missing the point:
whatever legislation you have about whistleblowers, so-called, it will not in itself stop the sorts of things
that the Stafford whistleblowers had to put up with from their colleagues, so-called, in the ward.
© Parliamentary Copyright.182 Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament
Licence v3.0. www.parliament.uk/site-information/copyright-parliament/open-parliament-licence/
The committee agreed with Francis’ recommendation of a change in the culture.
Dalton and Williams
This report183 stated that, put simply, candour means the quality of being open and honest (p. 2). Its first
recommendation stated that a duty of candour required a culture of candour. The report that it had many
parallels with Berwick,180 and wanted to build on his recommendations and reaffirm that a culture of
openness and honesty required a full commitment from health and care organisations to create and
maintain effective systems of learning and improvement (p. 6). However, even in a culture of greater
candour, effective whistleblowing and complaints systems would continue to be vital parts of an open and
transparent culture that is committed to improvements in safety and quality (pp. 14–15).
Secretary of State for Health (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust)184
The Secretary of State for Health184 made clear that so-called ‘gagging orders’ are unacceptable, and
claimed that all health-care professionals would be protected by the provisions of PIDA. It was vital that
whistleblowing was taken seriously: in legislation, inspection and education and training. The government
also acted on compromise agreements.
Secretary of State for Health (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust)185
The second volume of the Secretary of State for Health’s response185 provided a detailed response to each
of the 290 recommendations made by the inquiry across every level of the system. It made clear which
recommendations were accepted and by whom, and what progress was being made towards their
implementation. The DH was to lead the system in providing an annual report on progress across the
system each autumn (p. 4), and the Health Select Committee in 2013 confirmed that it agreed with the
inquiry that it should monitor the implementation of all of its recommendations.
The government accepted recommendation 2 on a shared culture; accepted, in principle, recommendation 7,
that all NHS staff should be required to enter into an express commitment to abide by the NHS values and
the Constitution, both of which should be incorporated into the contracts of employment; and accepted
recommendation 12, that the reporting of incidents of concern relevant to patient safety needs to be insisted
on. It accepted, in principle, recommendation 98, that reporting to the National Reporting and Learning
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System of all significant adverse incidents should be mandatory on the part of trusts. It accepted most
of the recommendations on openness, transparency and candour, but accepted in principle recommendation
178 on incorporating the NHS Constitution into contracts of employment, and recommendation 181 on a
statutory obligation to observe a duty of candour for health-care providers, and for registered medical
practitioners and registered nurses and other registered professionals. However, it did not accept
recommendation 183 of making it a criminal offence to make untruthful statements, although it agreed
‘with the intention behind this recommendation’.
Secretary of State for Health (Francis inquiries)
The government stated that the online supporting annex to this document186 set out, in detail, the substantial
progress made regarding the 290 recommendations of the public inquiry. However, although this is important:
perhaps the most important point is that the ongoing need to change the culture in the NHS to one of
patient-centred, continual improvement in care and safety.
p. 17.186 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
It noted that the CQC and its chief inspectors would report annually to the Secretary of State for Health
with their assessment of how well the NHS was doing in taking forward the recommendations on both the
public inquiry and the Freedom to Speak Up review (p. 20).2
Whistleblowing plays an important role in raising issues and holding organisations to account across
many sectors of life, such as the aviation and off-shore oil industries, as well as the NHS. The government
has introduced a number of measures to make it easier for those working in the NHS to raise concerns,
including ‘unequivocal guidance’, adding new bodies to the Prescribed Persons list, applying the concept of
vicarious liability to the whistleblowing legislative framework, and writing in March 2014 to all chairpersons
in NHS trusts and foundation trusts in England, to reiterate the vital importance of fostering a culture of
openness and transparency in the NHS in which concerns about care can be raised, investigated and acted
on (p. 31). Finally, the Secretary of State for Health commissioned Francis to carry out an independent
Freedom to Speak Up review (below).
Francis
Francis2 stated:
I would have liked to report to you that there was in fact no problem with the treatment of ‘whistleblowers’
and their concerns. Unfortunately, this is far from the case. The effect of the experiences has in some cases
been truly shocking, and lives can be ruined by poor handling of staff who have raised concerns.
p. 5.2 Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v2.0
He went on:
There is a need for a culture in which concerns raised by staff are taken seriously, investigated and
addressed by appropriate corrective measures.
p. 6.2 Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v2.0
Francis pointed to:
a remarkable consistency in the pattern of reactions described by staff who told of bad experiences.
p. 8.2 Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v2.0
Although PIDA theoretically provides protection for whistleblowers, this legislation was limited in its
effectiveness. At best, it provided a series of remedies after detriment, including loss of employment,
had been suffered. The review included two recommendations, 20 principles and 38 actions (p. 22).
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Francis cited the words of Dame Janet Smith in the Shipman fifth report (see Chapter 7, Research objective 4:
learning from the findings of formal inquiries), that professionals raising concerns ‘could make a greater
potential contribution to patient safety than any other single factor’ (above), adding that her statement rang
as true now as it did then. He reported that in recent years there had been a number of reviews that had
considered whistleblowing or related issues in the NHS and other sectors [e.g. Francis;11,155,156 National Audit
Office;187,188 Public Concern at Work (PCAW);162 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills189].
He pointed to the complexity of the current legal whistleblowing position, and noted that the law seeking
to protect whistleblowers is cast entirely in an employment context (p. 49). From the evidence, the following
themes emerged: the need for culture change; improved handling of cases; measures to support good
practice; particular measures for vulnerable groups; and extending legal protection (p. 88). There was
near-universal agreement that the most important factor affecting people’s willingness to speak up or raise
concerns is the culture of the organisation (p. 94).
Francis considered whether or not the term ‘whistleblowing’ itself contributed to the barriers, and gave
serious consideration to recommending that the term ‘whistleblower’ should be dropped (p. 100). He
concluded that, although the existing legislation is weak, he did not recommend a wholesale review of the
ERA 1996, but considered that there are two steps that should be taken: extending the list of prescribed
persons to ensure that NHS workers are protected if they raise a concern with any relevant person/body,
and extending statutory protection to all students studying for a career in health care rather than just
student nurses. In addition, consideration needed to be given to extending discrimination law to protect
those who make a protected disclosure from discrimination either in the ERA 1996190 or in the Equality Act
2010191 or to finding an alternative means to avoid discrimination on these grounds (p. 192).
Hooper
Hooper192 was an independent review for the GMC of how it engages with individuals who regard themselves
as whistleblowers. Like Francis, Hooper cited Dame Janet Smith (2005) in the Shipman fifth report (above)
(p. 2). He stated that there was considerable evidence that, in the workplace, whistleblowers may well suffer,
or believe that they will suffer, reprisals at the hands of an employer or fellow workers (p. 5). Hooper was
concerned that employers may use the process of making an allegation to the GMC about a doctor’s fitness
to practise as an act of retaliation against a doctor who had raised concerns (p. 7). He made a total of eight
recommendations to reduce ‘retaliation by referral’, including declaring if the doctor being referred had raised
concerns about patient safety or the integrity of the system, and fully training investigators to understand
‘whistleblowing’, particularly in the context of the GMC and the NHS; and a simple, confidential and voluntary
online system to record concerns, run by an organisation independent of the regulators.
House of Commons Health Committee193
This report193 stated that the treatment of whistleblowers remained ‘a stain on the reputation of the NHS’
(pp. 3–4). PIDA was a deterrent rather than a remedy, and that if an employee had to have recourse to
PIDA’s provisions then his or her prospects were already substantially impaired (p. 35).
The solution appeared to mean establishing a reporting culture that paralleled the open reporting
culture in other safety-critical sectors such as aviation and nuclear energy: in which ‘the concept of the
whistleblower is quite simply redundant’ (p. 36). It recommended that there should be a programme to
identify whistleblowers who have suffered serious harm and whose actions are proven to have been
vindicated, and provide them with an apology and practical redress (p. 36).
Secretary of State for Health
This government response194 stated that the shocking evidence amassed by Francis2 detailed the price paid
by far too many NHS staff who spoke up with concerns about the quality of care. It agreed with Francis’
recommendation of a support scheme to help whistleblowers to find alternative employment if they can
demonstrate that they are having difficulty finding employment as a result of raising concerns.
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The DHSC accepted Francis’2 two overarching recommendations, and consulted on a package of measures
to implement these (p. 15). The consultation showed that most responses supported the Freedom to
Speak Up guardian role, while the majority of these supported the INO role hosted by the CQC (p. 18). It
favoured Francis’2 recommendation that the Freedom to Speak Up guardian should be appointed by the
chief executive of the organisation to act in a genuinely independent capacity, and should raise concerns
with the trust’s chief executive or the board. However, the government recommended that the guardian
be able to raise concerns with the INO if they had lost confidence, or if they considered that good practice
had not been followed, in how the organisation handled concerns (p. 28).
Concluding remarks
Despite the thousands of pages and hundreds of recommendations, and assurances of learning over
a period of nearly 15 years, there remain many cases of institutional failings (e.g. PCAW162) and poor
treatment of whistleblowers (e.g. Hammond and Bousfield,161 Sawer and Donnnelly195). Although it is
difficult to firmly establish the impact of any changes associated with the inquiries, the conclusion perhaps
mirrors the verdict of Ashton196 that PIDA’s achievements in effecting a tangible, sustainable cultural shift
towards transparency in the UK workplace appear incremental at best.
In the following chapter, we move on to review the legal framework for whistleblowing, which
underscores the fragmented legal background against which these cases unfolded.
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Chapter 5 The legal underpinnings
of whistleblowing
Introduction
In this chapter, we move on to consider the legal basis of whistleblowing. We begin by examining the
employment law perspective of whistleblowing in the NHS and explore the situations in which breaking a
duty of trust and confidence can be held to be justifiable and safeguarded first at common law and then
under specific provisions of the ERA 19967 as amended by PIDA8 and subsequent legislation. We note
the problems with both the substantive law and with its implementation. Second, we consider the
question of human rights and freedom of speech in the NHS and the potential but also the problem in
bringing such rights challenges. Third, the chapter considers whistleblowing from regulatory and open
government perspectives within the NHS. Finally, drawing on international comparisons, the chapter
considers some alternative legal and regulatory approaches that could be taken. This does not attempt to
provide a wholly comprehensive overview of comparative approaches given the scope of this issue and
the diversity of questions addressed in the literature, but it is informed by existing work in the area
(e.g. discussion in Council of Europe,197 Osterhaus and Fagan,198 Dworkin and Brown199 and Fasterling200).
It should be noted that there is no specific comparable legislation in another jurisdiction applicable in the
context of health care; rather, selected examples of approaches are utilised to suggest possible alternative
models that might be taken forward in the future.
The research methods employed involved searches being undertaken of primary legal sources (i.e. statutory
and case law materials). Secondary literature searches were undertaken in legal databases Lexis® (LexisNexis,
London, UK), Westlaw (Thomson Reuters, CA, USA), HeinOnline (William S Hein & Co Inc., Buffalo, NY,
USA) and Google Scholar (Google Inc., Mountain View, CA, USA). Reference was also made to published
books and edited collections.
Context and structure
There has been major recent controversy concerning whistleblowing in the NHS, but in fact legal controversy
in this area stretches back many decades. In 1967, in the context of conditions in mental health hospitals, the
then Minister of Health, Kenneth Robinson, when asked whether or not he would safeguard whistleblowers
from victimisation, responded, ‘yes certainly’.201 Yet nearly 50 years later whistleblowing and whistleblowing
safeguards remain a major problem for the NHS. More recent legal developments concerning whistleblowing
in the NHS can be seen as deriving from the case of Graham Pink, a nurse at Stockport General Infirmary,
who blew the whistle on poor patient care at the hospital in the late 1980s.202 Pink was disciplined for breach
of patient confidentiality when relatives claimed that they could identify their elderly family members from the
descriptions given. It led to an employment tribunal case that was eventually settled by the NHS body on
the basis of escalating costs.203 This was followed by findings at the Ashworth Special Hospital Inquiry that
staff at who had spoken out had been threatened and victimised.204 Numerous whistleblowing cases and
developments across a range of areas led to the establishment of the organisation PCAW, which provides
support for whistleblowers. In 1992, there was an unsuccessful attempt to introduce statutory safeguards in
the form of the NHS Freedom of Speech Bill introduced by Derek Fatchett MP (Member of Parliament).205
Although this was a time of major controversy in relation to NHS whistleblowing, there were also major
controversies surrounding standards in public life and safety in transport in the workplace, as exemplified by
the Nolan Report, the Clapham Junction Rail Crash Report and the Piper Alpha disaster (paragraphs 1 and
03–1.1.2).206 Legislation providing some protection for whistleblowers was finally enacted in 1998 in the
form of PIDA,8 and we explore these provisions below.
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Writing in the US context in 2012, Robert Vaughan suggested that there were four perspectives in
whistleblowing law that had an impact on legal standards and protections.207 Although these typologies
do not totally translate owing to jurisdictional differences, nonetheless these can be seen as reflected in
relation to how whistleblowing in the NHS context is viewed. The first of these typologies is that of
employment law. As we will see, much of the discussion in England and Wales concerns employment law
itself and, indeed, that is the perspective of the Freedom to Speak Up report.2 Second, Vaughan sets out
an open-government perspective. In relation to the NHS, this can be seen as whistleblowing facilitating
decision-making processes in the public sector in the public interest. Third, whistleblowing can be
considered from a market or regulatory perspective: seen as facilitating professional regulation (e.g.
blowing the whistle on poor performance by clinicians). Finally, it can be seen from a human rights
perspective. Of course, although these are separate perspectives they are nonetheless inter-related.
An employment perspective can incorporate a human rights perspective; a regulatory perspective can
incorporate an open-government/decision-making basis.
This chapter proceeds as follows: first, we explore employment law and blowing of the whistle in the
public interest, and in particular the role of PIDA.16 We then look at a human rights perspective on
whistleblowing, before taking a regulatory perspective that has come much to the fore with the Freedom
to Speak Up report of 2015.2 The chapter rounds off with a discussion of some of the implications of this
legal background for whistleblowing in the NHS.
Employment law and blowing the whistle in the public interest:
the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998
Introduction
The PIDA8 was enacted in 1998, some 3 years before the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry Report was published.
The 1998 Act was reformed by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.208 The employer–employee
relationship is one of trust and confidence.206 Such a duty is implied in the employment relationship.209,210
In addition, employment contracts may include specific confidentiality clauses. The emphasis is, therefore,
on non-disclosure rather than on freedom of expression. However, the law sanctions departure from the
standard boundaries of the employment relationship in certain situations in which this is in the public
interest.211 Today, individuals who have blown the whistle and suffered adverse consequences in the
employment relationship may be safeguarded through being able to institute proceedings in employment law
for unfair dismissal. Here, first we consider those situations in employment law cases in which the court may be
prepared to hold that employees may, in fact, have a duty to disclose. Second, we consider the application of
PIDA8 provisions that amended the ERA 19967 and safeguard what are known as ‘protected disclosures’
by employees.
In the past, the courts have considered whether or not an employee could have a duty to raise concerns.
In Bell v Lever Bros, the House of Lords rejected a claim that an employee could be placed under a duty
to disclose information.212 However, subsequently it was held that there was a distinction between an
employee reporting his own wrongdoing and having an obligation to report the wrongdoing of others.213
The court also held that a distinction could be drawn between reporting past wrongdoing and reporting
ongoing wrongdoing. In Rochern an obligation was placed on Roques, a senior employee who became
aware of the fact that employees within the organisation had set up rival companies while still employed
by the original employer to act in competition with that organisation.206 That case concerned an individual
reporting subordinates, but the court has also confirmed that this can extend to reporting superiors.214
The seriousness of the wrongdoing is important here in determining whether or not there is an
obligation.215,216 There have also been some indications that the court may be prepared to find that an
employee should disclose their own wrongdoing.217 This could mean that there was no real distinction
between drawing attention to your own wrongdoing, as opposed to that of others, and being seen as part
of the developing case law concerning the duty of trust and confidence in the employment relationship.
There may also be duties placed on an employer to investigate wrongdoing in an organisation.214 The
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notion of such positive employment duties to raise concerns could, of course, have very broad implications;
however, to date it appears that such legal principles have not been utilised further in general, either by
the court or in the specific context of disclosure in the NHS.
In examining the scope of the PIDA legislation, we will now focus on several distinct areas: the employees
who come under the scope of the Act, the types of disclosures that are protected and the actors to whom
disclosures can lawfully be made. We will then consider the role of contractual confidentiality clauses
(so-called ‘gagging clauses’), before looking at the remedies available when detriment has been suffered
and the impact of the legislation in relation to whistleblowing in health care.
Employees under the Public Interest Disclosure Act
The ERA 19967 safeguards disclosures made by a range of employees. ‘Employees’ refers to those in a
contractual relationship and also would include, for example, nurses employed via an agency working for
the NHS.218,219 The PCAW Whistleblowing Commission has suggested that the legislation should be
extended to incorporate others such as applicants for jobs, student health professionals, volunteers and
interns, and non-executive directors.162 The scope of the legislation was extended to include primary
health-care professionals, such as GPs and nurses, by amendments made to the ERA 1996 by the Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, section 20.208 Similarly, the Freedom to Speak Up report2 supported an
extension to job applicants and to students. Nursing students have now been included via regulations
amending the primary legislation in 2015.220 However, this does not appear to apply to all students.
Blacklisting was a concern raised by the PCAW Commission and in Freedom to Speak Up.2,162 As of 2010,
legislation has provided protection for trade unionists from blacklisting.7,221 In addition, following the FTSU
report, section 149 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015222 inserts a new section,
49B, into the ERA 2006, providing that the Secretary of State may make regulations prohibiting a NHS
employer from discriminating against a job applicant when it appears to the prospective employer that
the applicant has made a ‘protected disclosure’ under the Act. An action will be discriminatory when the
employer refuses the application or ‘in some other ways treat the applicant less favourably than is or
would be the case in relation to other applicants in relation to this contract/post or office’ [section 49B(3)
ERA 1996].7 This is potentially a very important provision if it operates correctly in addressing concerns
around the ‘blacklisting’ of whistleblowers.
Protected disclosures
The ERA 19967 safeguards what are known as ‘protected disclosures’. These are defined under
section 43A as:
a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a worker in accordance with any
of sections 43C to 43H.
Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0
Section 43B then goes on to set out what constitutes such ‘qualifying disclosures’:
In this Part a ‘qualifying disclosure’ means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief
of the worker making the disclosure, [is made in the public interest and] tends to show one or more of
the following
that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed,
that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject,
that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,
that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,
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that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or
that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has
been, or is likely to be deliberately concealed.
Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0
A disclosure of information is not a qualifying disclosure if the person making the disclosure commits an
offence by making it.
It should be noted from the outset that the courts have taken a purposive approach and that the aim of the
Act is to facilitate responsible whistleblowing.223,224 However, as Lewis et al.206 have noted, ‘responsible
whistleblowing may in some cases be in tension with the legislative objective of encouraging those in a position
to sound the early alarm to come forward and do so to an appropriate person’. The words ‘is made in the
public interest’ were included in section 43B in the amendments made to the 1998 Act by the Enterprise
Regulatory Reform Act (ERRA) 2013 in 2013. The Act excludes matters of personal rather than public interest.
The PCAW Commission expressed concern at this inclusion of ‘public interest’ into this provision, as it could
result in unpredictability and a consequent increase in litigation (p. 17).162 Lewis has argued that it may be
difficult to hold that a belief is reasonable in the case of whistleblowers who act alone.225
However, initial judicial determination suggests that a public interest requirement itself may not be difficult to
establish. Ashton196 suggests that it would be rarely the case that a workplace matter would solely affect one
employee as opposed to having broader implications. It is anticipated that the Court of Appeal will provide
useful guidance in the appeal in Chesterton. This was originally due to be heard in the Court of Appeal
in 2016, but the hearing was postponed.226 In relation to failing to comply with a legal obligation under
section 43B, this does not extend to something that may be a moral rather than a legal obligation, or to
general allegations, for example that an employee ‘is concerned with financial probity’ [see Lewis et al.206 at
paragraph 3.82 and Sim v Manchester Action on Street Health (EAT/10085/01)227]. Section 43B also makes
reference to disclosure of health and safety risks. Although trivial concerns are not excluded, the nature of
those concerns will be noted in determining whether or not they fall within the statutory provision.228
The 2013 legislative amendments have removed the requirement that the disclosure was in ‘good faith’
following recommendations in the Shipman report.154 Ashton notes that this had proved difficult in relation to
litigation196 and that, as Lewis et al.206 have commented, ‘the public interest in encouraging the disclosure of
concerns may be no less compelling because there are ulterior motives’. Nonetheless, as Ashton196 comments,
an element of good faith remains in relation to remedies, as a tribunal has a statutory power to reduce a
remedy by up to 25% if the disclosure is not made in good faith [ERRA 2013, sections 18(4)–(5)].
A qualifying disclosure refers to information disclosed by a worker in accordance with sections 43C to
43G. A disclosure may fall within this provision in a situation in which the belief is shown later to be
incorrect.229 There is some judicial guidance in relation to the operation of this provision. When a worker
believes that a criminal offence has been committed and such a belief is ‘objectively reasonable’, the
possibility that the belief is wrong or that the information does not concern a criminal offence will not, by
itself, mean that the belief is unreasonable.229 This test has both a subjective and an objective element.224
In addition, the employment appeal tribunal in Geduld v Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management
Ltd230 stated that there was a difference between the communication of ‘information’, which is protected
under the Act, and making what are ‘allegations’. In that case, Mr Justice Slade indicated that ‘health
and safety requirements are not being complied with’, which would be unprotected allegations. In
contrast, ‘to say the wards of the hospital have not been cleaned for two weeks and sharps were left lying
around’ is information that is protected under the legislation. Further consideration of what constitutes
‘information’ was subsequently provided in the case of Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth in
2016231 and see also discussion in Aamod and Paulin.232 Here, Mr Justice Langstaf stressed that there is not
a ‘ready-made’ distinction between what constitutes information and what amounts to allegations. He
noted that the sole issue is whether or not this is disclosure of information.231
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The PCAW Commission suggested that it would reduce uncertainty if the government or the employment
appeal tribunal provided guidance as to what constituted the public interest (p. 18).162 We return to the
question of the efficacy of the provision of further formal guidance and/or a statutory Code of Practice below.
Actors to whom disclosures can lawfully be made
The Act operates to safeguard, and thus effectively privilege, what Lewis et al.206 class as ‘three tiers’ of
disclosure. First, protected disclosures include disclosure to an employer (section 43C). This is unsurprising,
as it retains disclosure within the relationship of trust and of confidence. Disclosure to a legal advisor is also
included (section 43D). This is in line with the special position accorded to lawyer–client disclosures more
generally in English law through the doctrine of legal professional privilege. This provision does not include
disclosure to persons who may be performing related advice functions [e.g. trade union representatives
(p. 23)].162 Disclosure to Ministers of the Crown is also safeguarded in this way (section 43E), as is finally
disclosure to what is known as a ‘prescribed person’, as set out in Regulations (section 43F). Included in
this category are the CQC, NHS Commissioning Board, NHS Trust Development Authority and Health and
Safety Executive [Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) Order 2014: SI No 2418] and Monitor and
Healthwatch [Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) (Amendment) (No 2) Order 2015]. In addition,
other health-care regulators such as the General Chiropractic Council, General Dental Council, General
Pharmaceutical Council and Health and Care Professions Council are included. A new section, 43FA, also
provides for the production of regulations by the Secretary of State requiring a prescribed person to produce
an annual report in relation to disclosures made to them by workers. Such reports, however, would not
require detailed information that would allow workers or employees be identified from it.
The Act thus operates to facilitate internal organisational disclosure. As the Handbook on the NHS Constitution
for England notes, those individuals who raise reasonable concerns internally will be protected.233 They are also
expected to raise such concerns as soon as possible. But if this were all, the legislation would be of limited use.
The Act goes beyond this and does sanction external disclosures under two further provisions: sections 43G
and 43H.
First, section 43G outlines further criteria for disclosure, including, but not necessarily, in a situation in
which the employee has already raised concerns internally but, for example, nothing has happened and the
situation that led to the original disclosure (e.g. poor standards of health care) is continuing (this section
was amended by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013).208 It states that disclosures may be made
when a worker reasonably believes that the information/allegation is substantially true, that disclosure is not
for personal gain, that it is in all circumstances reasonable to disclose and that the criteria set out in section
43G(2) are complied with. These criteria are that the worker has reasonable belief when the disclosure is
made that they would be subject to detriment from the employer. The second provision is when there is no
prescribed person to disclose to and the worker reasonably believes that, if they disclose to their employer,
evidence will be concealed or destroyed, or they have previously disclosed what is substantially the same
information either to the employer or externally under the provisions in section 43F (discussed below).
Here the onus is placed on the employee to demonstrate reasonable belief that he or she believes this to
be true. The section does not protect disclosures that are made for personal gain. This disclosure must
be reasonable; relevant factors include to whom the disclosure is made, the seriousness of the matter,
whether or not it is ongoing and whether or not it has been made in breach of a duty of confidentiality
[section 43G(3)(d)]. So, for example, if a health-care professional had disclosed confidential patient
information, this would be relevant.234 Vickers suggests that, in such a situation, although ‘disclosure to the
press would be very difficult to justify; disclosure to another medical practitioner may be acceptable’.234
Third, in addition to section 43G, there is a further provision that sanctions directly blowing the whistle
outside the organisation. Section 43H provides that, in cases of disclosure of exceptionally serious failure,
there is no need to go through internal procedures before disclosing. The worker must reasonably believe
that the information disclosed or the allegations made are substantially true; in addition, the disclosure
must not be made for personal gain, and the failure must be exceptionally serious. In these circumstances
it is reasonable to make the disclosure, taking into account to whom it is made. Vickers suggests that
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workers who disclose such things as malpractice and incompetence or who disclose in situations such that
adequate care cannot be given will come within the provisions.234
The Act provides that the employee has a right not to be subject to detriment from his specific disclosure
[section 47(B), ERA 2006].7 What constitutes detriment is not defined in the legislation. Freedom to Speak
Up2 gives as examples ‘bullying, harassment or victimisation’ (paragraph 2.2.7). Some judicial guidance
has been given on this point.235 It is suggested that it will be construed at least as wide as, and possibly
wider than, the meaning given to detriment under the Equality Act 2010191 (paragraph 7.13).206 This
does not only relate to detriment from an employer but has also been extended to cover detriment by a
colleague (section 19 of ERRA and overturns decision in Fecitt & Others v NHS Manchester [2011] EWCA
Civ 1190).236 It does not apply only to employment but to the ‘employment field’ and this will include,
for example, provision of a reference after employment.237 In ascertaining detriment, an action would
be a detriment only if both this employee was actually disadvantaged and in this situation a reasonable
employee would be disadvantaged.238 It also extends to disclosures not made to the current employer.239
Although threats of detriment are not explicitly included in the legislation, it is envisaged that they would
be implicitly included (paragraph 7.14).206
The Act imposes a vicarious liability on employers and also a personal liability on workers. When a worker
is dismissed and this is because of a protected disclosure, or the protected disclosure is the principal reason
for the dismissal, this will be an unfair dismissal under section 103A. The causation tests for detriment and
dismissal are different, in detriment the test being more favourable for whistleblowing claimants. It has
been suggested that these provisions should be amended to bring the test for dismissal in line with the
test for detriment.
Contractual confidentiality clauses
One point of controversy for some time has been the use of contractual confidentiality clauses that are
inserted with the aim of stopping further disclosure by an employee; these are at times referred to as
‘gagging clauses’.240 The report on the Mid Staffordshire Inquiry commented that use of such ‘disparagement
clauses’ is widespread and that:
Any clause restricting an individual’s liberty to make a disclosure or imposing a duty of confidentiality
should be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the public interest and not the reputation of
any organisation or individual.
p. 1458. © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
The Mid Staffordshire report recommended that gagging clauses should be prohibited in relation to
health-care organisations, regulators and commissioners to the extent to which these prohibit what is bona
fide disclosure of public interest questions of safety of care. However, there are examples of continued use
as in relation to a whistleblowing NHS consultant in the Baby P case, in which multiple opportunities were
missed by health and social care agencies and Great Ormond Street Hospital to intervene and stop cruelty
and neglect.241 In 2013, the Secretary of State for Health, Jeremy Hunt, told the press that gagging orders
in the NHS would be banned.242 However, the use of gagging clauses continued.196 The amended section
43J of ERA 2006190 now provides that:
Any provision in an agreement to which this section applies is void in so far as it purports to preclude
the worker from making a protected disclosure.
This section applies to any agreement between a worker and his employer (whether a worker’s
contract or not), including an agreement to refrain from instituting or continuing any proceedings
under this Act or any proceedings for breach of contract.
© Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
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This does not mean that such a clause could not be inserted into a contract, but it is suggested that if
there was a breach of a clause relating to a protected disclosure this would not be enforceable.243 This still
means that an employee would need to use legal remedies to ultimately enforce their rights here. In
addition, as Freedom to Speak Up notes, the provision does not ‘cover clauses that impose on either or
both parties to the agreement or contract a duty to maintain confidentiality in other respects, such as in
relation to financial details or the personal details of third parties‘ (paragraph 2.2.11).2 Freedom to Speak
Up states that it had not seen any settlement agreements that were not compliant with the law but did
see some that seemed ‘unnecessarily draconian or restrictive’ and that ‘there is an atmosphere of fear
and confusion surrounding the obligations of confidentiality in such agreements so as to make them a
deterrent against public interest disclosures even where they do not have that effect in law’ (paragraphs
7.4.20 and 7.4.21).2 The report recommended that such clauses should be:
drafted in a way that is easily understood by both parties and are genuinely in the public interest.
Paragraph 7.4.26.2 Contains public sector information licensed under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
However, this raises the question of whether or not such clauses can ever be seen to be in the public
interest, an issue we return to below.
Remedies
Actions under the ERA may be brought against the employer or an employee who is claimed to be
responsible for the detriment suffered. When a worker has not been dismissed, a declaration can be
sought to establish that the complaint was justified along with compensation. Dismissal as a result of a
protected disclosure will constitute an unfair dismissal.222 If the worker is found to be unfairly dismissed,
then they can be awarded compensation, and an order may be made for their reinstatement. Historically,
reinstatement is rare and, moreover, employers are not required to comply with this, but should they not
do so a further award of compensation may be made save where they can demonstrate that it is not
practicable to do this (S117).7 Freedom to Speak Up commented that it was not practicable to force
individuals to be reinstated but that the NHS ‘has a moral obligation to support those staff whose
performance is sound but who have suffered as a result of speaking up.’ (paragraph 9.10).2 The extent
to which this can be effectively achieved, however, remains an issue.
Impact of the legislation in relation to whistleblowing in health care
Although legislation provides some safeguards for those who ‘blow the whistle’ in the NHS, this is not by any
means a panacea for facilitating whistleblowing in practice.244 Although the legislation has been in existence for
some 18 years in practice, how effective has it been in the health-care context? In relation to the impact of the
Act in general, commentators have been equivocal, with suggestions that it has led to limited change.196 In some
contexts, it has been suggested that the legislation is more deterrent than remedy (paragraph 107).245 Gobert
and Punch246 comment that for the honest and well-meaning whistleblower the Act may be seen as ‘a trap’. Not
only are organisations effective at intimidating troublemakers but, in addition, finding new employment for the
whistleblower – even if they are ultimately vindicated – may prove very difficult indeed. It remains to be seen
whether or not the new provisions aimed at addressing blacklisting in the NHS will remedy this situation.
There is also a perception that, although groundbreaking in its time, the legislation is dated and has been
overtaken in the approach taken in other jurisdictions. Blueprint has argued that, set against international
standards addressing coverage, protection and disclosure to remedies and relief administration and
engagement drawn up by international organisations and NGOs with whistleblower protection, the PIDA
provisions contain only 37% of the standards (pp. 15–17).247 Enforcing the legislation is also a problem.
The introduction in July 2013 of fees for claimants bringing employment tribunal proceedings has led to
a significant drop in the number of cases (paragraph 2.2.9).2 The cost of upfront lawyer fees may prove
a considerable deterrent to taking a case forward with ‘typical’ legal costs of between £800 and £2500,
and in some cases much higher (p. 35).247 Measures inhibiting access to justice in this way deterring
whistleblowers may ultimately result in the NHS having less opportunity to learn from its mistakes.
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In the context of health care specifically, the impact of the legislation is difficult to properly assess for a number
of reasons. Although some cases have been litigated, these may be seen as the tip of the iceberg. In a case with
a strong claim, the parties would be encouraged to settle rather than taking the litigation forward in tribunal. It is
uncertain how many such settlements have been reached by various NHS bodies during the period the Act has
been in force. Inevitably, the use of the legislation itself at tribunal demonstrates failure: it shows that raising
concerns has not been respected within the institution. Statistics from the Ministry of Justice indicate that the
proportion of total claims successful at hearing have varied between 3% and 5%.162 The vast majority of claims
are either settled at Acas (www.acas.org.uk/; accessed 5 July 2018) or withdrawn or privately settled.196 Greater
information may be available in the future. S. 148 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015222
provides that there is a power for the Secretary of State to require certain bodies listed on the Public Interest
Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) Act 2015248 to provide annual reports in relation to disclosures by workers. Further
requirements in relation to this disclosure are to be set out in regulations. This may enhance transparency and
also identify problems (e.g. if there are a large cluster of such cases in particular NHS bodies).
Whistleblowing: a human rights perspective
Another perspective that can be taken on whistleblowing is that of human rights.207 Here we consider the
potential impact of fundamental rights considerations from the perspective of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), which is now enshrined in domestic law following the Human Rights Act 1998.249
Three human rights are particularly pertinent in this context: Article 8 (the right to privacy), Article 9 (freedom
of conscience, religion and belief) and Article 10 (the right to free speech). It should be noted from the
outset that none is an absolute right: all are expressed in qualified terms with reference to the rights and
freedoms of others, the protection of health or morals or the reputation or rights of others. This is important
when, as below, we examine the interpretation of these provisions. Freedom to Speak Up, despite its title,
did not frame its discussion in terms of fundamental human rights in general nor in relation to freedom of
speech – this is in contrast to, for example, the Fatchett Freedom of Speech in the NHS Bill produced in
2012, and to the approach of the Council of Europe, which we turn to consider next.
Council of Europe and whistleblowers
In 2014, the Council of Europe issued a recommendation on the protection of whistleblowers.250 It viewed
whistleblowing as a ‘safe alternative to silence’ and as something that could ‘reinforce the value of facilitating
channels to report risk or wrongdoing’ (p. 14).251 Nonetheless, whistleblowing was also regarded as a
balancing exercise between employers’ rights and interests and the rights of the public to know when their
interests were at risk or when laws were broken (p. 15).251 The Council of Europe sees whistleblowing as
aligned with the work of the Group of States against Corruption, which monitors the corruption-prevention
standards of the Council of Europe.251,252
The Council of Europe defines a ‘whistleblower’ as ‘any person who reports or discloses information on a threat
or harm to the public interest in the context of their work-based relationship whether it be in the public or
private sector’ [Appendix to Recommendation CM/Rec (2014) 7, paragraph a].251 It provides that normative,
institutional and judicial frameworks should be designed with the aim of facilitating public interest reports and
disclosure. This should extend to all persons in both the public and the private sector, and extend beyond, in
some cases, those in a current employment relationship. It is recommended that member states undertake a
review of law, professional codes and internal rules to ascertain the scope of a possible normative framework
and provides guidance on what this can include. The emphasis is on proportionate measures. Channels for
reporting structures should also be established concerning both internal and external disclosures, including those
to the press or MPs (paragraph 11)251 (see Appendix 3). The recommendation also provides that, in general,
whistleblowers should be entitled to have their confidentiality maintained ‘subject to fair trial guarantees’.
Moreover, safeguards should be given against retaliation, either direct or indirect, against whistleblowers
(paragraph 21).251
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The recommendation noted above illustrates the multidimensional elements of whistleblowing and the
danger in this being seen in the legal context largely through the prism of employment law rather than in
relation to the broader frameworks/norms within which disclosures may take place. As we have seen above,
although existing law goes some way to address these issues, there remain real concerns as to the practical
effectiveness of existing protections. Furthermore, domestic law falls far short of the normative framework
suggested here and there needs to be a more thorough overview of such frameworks at the national level.
Human rights, whistleblowers and the NHS
To what extent does the Human Rights Act 1998 today have an impact on the position of whistleblowers
in health care? The Human Rights Act is directly applicable to the NHS, which is a public body (S.6).249
There are three human rights that may be of particular importance here: Article 10, which sets out the
right to freedom of expression; Article 8, the right to privacy; and Article 9, the right to safeguard freedom
of conscience, religion and belief. Freedom of expression is an international common right, and European
Convention on Human Rights Article 10 (2) is known as a ‘qualified right’. The courts will examine the
speech and determine whether or not it is proportionate [Handysides v UK (1976) EHRR 77].253 Factors that
the court will consider in ascertaining this will include the employee’s job, their conduct while employed,
the circumstances in which the disclosure is made and the nature of the information disclosed (p. 131).234
The ECHR has noted the need to protect whistleblowers under Article 10 in Guija v Moldova.254 Here the
Court held that the dismissal of a civil servant who had disclosed two confidential letters from the office of
public prosecutor to the press did constitute a breach of Article 10, and Castells v Spain255 stated that
government should be subject to very tight scrutiny not simply by the legislature or judiciary but also by
media or the public. In some instances the public interest will be sufficiently strong to outweigh the duty
of confidence.255
Although the court held that disclosure should initially be undertaken internally to a person’s superior or to
a competent body, it was recognised that external public disclosure could be undertaken as a last-resort
measure. They took into account what could be the chilling effect of the individual’s dismissal that might
stop others reporting misconduct.256,257
The question of confidentiality and whistleblowing in relation to the vulnerable arose in Heinisch v Germany,
in which the ECHR recognised that whistleblowing involved balancing of interests of employer and
employee and public policy concerns.258 Mrs Heinisch was a nurse in a state-operated nursing home. She
disclosed the mistreatment of elderly patients, and she was dismissed. After litigation in Germany with no
success, she succeeded before the ECHR. The ECHR noted that freedom of expression had been held
applicable in the context of employment.259,260 It held that the interference with freedom of expression was
a legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, in this case the employer, but in the
circumstances the interference here with Article 10 was not proportionate and public interest in details
about limitations in state-owned company institutional care for elderly people is more significant in a
democratic society than safeguarding the state-owned company's interests and business reputation.258
A fundamental human-rights-based employment policy based on concerns for procedural fairness and for
free speech might have interesting longer term consequences for perceptions of whistleblowing in the
workplace. It appears, however, that currently the courts and employment tribunals have not been willing
to recognise free speech provisions in relation to actions under Part IVA of the Employment Act 1996261
and the Freedom to Speak Up approach itself is one of an employment law driven rather than
fundamental human rights driven perspective.
A further possibility is the development by the courts of whistleblowing as part of a right to safeguard
individual conscience. This could potentially be seen as part of Article 9 of the ECHR, which safeguards
freedom of conscience, religion and belief. Domestic principles of English law provide no general recognition
for conscientious objection. However, two specific statutory safeguards do exist in relation to abortion and
reproductive technology treatment and embryo research (section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967,262 section 38
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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990,263 as amended). Both provisions can be seen in the light of the
considerable sensitivity and different cultural and religious positions concerning the status of the embryo and
the fetus. In the context of Canada and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its reference to
conscience it has been suggested that there is the possibility of utilising a strongly developed freedom of
conscience to provide further safeguards to the position of whistleblowers.264 English law has, however, yet to
follow such an approach, and it remains very uncertain whether or not this would be developed by the courts.265
Third, whistleblowing in the NHS can be viewed through the perspective of individual patient’s rights to
privacy and confidentiality. This was a major issue in the Pink litigation referred to above. Professional–patient
confidentiality is expressly safeguarded by health-care professionals’ ethical codes.266,267 In English law, respect for
patient confidentiality is underpinned by Article 8 of ECHR, the right to privacy and also safeguarded through the
operation of what is called the equitable remedy of breach of confidence. This was confirmed by the House of
Lords in the case of Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Limted (MGN).268 In this case a three-part test was
established. First, is there a reasonable expectation that the information is to be kept confidential? Second,
would disclosure be ‘highly offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities’? Third, is the information ‘obviously
private’? In practice, although there was a new test, this did not change the essence of protection for health-care
professional–patient information, which has always be recognised as ‘both private and confidential’.
This duty is based in equity but there is a separate tort relating to the misuse of private information.269
However, our focus here is on the equitable remedy of breach of confidence. Health-care confidentiality has
never been regarded in law as absolute; it is a balancing exercise between the public interest in confidentiality
and the public interest in disclosure.270 Furthermore, Article 8 is what is known as a ‘qualified right’, namely
qualified by reference to public health, national security and the prevention of crime and disorder. Thus,
disclosing information, even patient-sensitive information, may be justifiable when it is in the public interest to
do so. Disclosure may be in the public interest to stop the abuse of a particular patient and also justifiable
because that disclosure may avert future harm to patients. In addition, disclosure may be seen as justified in
relation to individual freedom of expression claims.271 Finally, confidential information may be disclosed
expressly in the public interest because this is sanctioned by statute.
Whistleblowing and the open government and regulatory perspective:
speaking up in the public interest
There is a final perspective in relation to whistleblowing in the NHS, which relates to two categories in
Vaughan’s207 typology, namely open government and a regulatory perspective. Raising concerns can be
seen as a means of highlighting defective standards of professional practice and poor patient care and,
thus, can be linked to professional discipline and to reducing the prospect of such harms in the future.
This can be seen as a professional practice obligation. It can also be regarded as an obligation within
the terms and conditions of employment. Reporting systems are increasingly a feature of the NHS. This
can be seen partly as a matter of addressing patient safety, partly as a question of general efficiency and
accountability, and partly as a matter of open government in that transparency can be seen ultimately as
necessary to ensure adherence to the statutory obligations placed on NHS actors and organisations under
the NHS Act 2006.272 NHS bodies are also now required to ensure that board-level directors are fit and
proper persons for their role.273 Freedom to Speak Up stresses the need for transparency for individuals
and the organisation (paragraph 7.4).2
There are a series of bodies that regulate health care. The CQC has extensive powers in relation to the
inspection of health and social care facilities. Further oversight is provided by the NHS Trust Development
Authority, which monitors NHS trust performance and undertakes appointments including those of
chairpersons and non-executive members to NHS trusts (paragraph 2.4.12).2 As we have seen above, in
relation to the discussion in the context of human rights, in addition health professionals may be mandated
under their professional codes to raise concerns and whistleblowers may refer concerns to professional
statutory regulatory bodies such as the GMC and the Nursing and Midwifery Council, which may result in
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professional disciplinary proceedings. The GMC has itself instituted the Hooper Review, into the handling of
the cases of whistleblowing doctors, which reported in 2015.192 In addition, it has produced whistleblowing
guidance.274 Raising concerns can also be seen as part of a process of reporting risks to patient safety through
other means such as the operation of health and safety law. So, for example, the Reporting of Injuries,
Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013 require employers to report and keep records of
work-related accidents that lead to death or serious injury.
Procedures enabling internal whistleblowing
Vickers, writing in 1999, suggested that the 1998 Act ‘creates a clear incentive to employers to provide
good internal procedures to enable concerns to be raised within the organisation’ (p. 129).234 Without such
procedures, external disclosure is more likely to be reasonable at tribunal. Internal procedures can facilitate
effective regulation and accountability. There is a long history of whistleblowing procedures in the NHS.275
Relevant here is the NHS Constitution for England. Section 1B of the NHS Act 2006 provides that:
In exercising functions in relation to the health service, the Secretary of State must have regard to the
NHS Constitution.
The NHS Constitution for England contains an obligation to:
raise any genuine concern you may have about a risk, malpractice or wrongdoing at work (such as a
risk to patient safety, fraud or breaches of patient confidentiality), which may affect patients, the
public, other staff or the organisation itself, at the earliest reasonable opportunity.
p. 15.275 Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0
The House of Lords Select Committee report in 2013, After Francis: Making a Difference, called for the
CQC to see if arrangements were in place for staff members who wanted to raise concerns during a CQC
inspection.276 The National Audit Office report into out-of-hours GP services by Serco in March 2013 stated
that the DHSC should require NHS organisations to publish their whistleblowing policies.
Freedom to Speak Up recommended the creation of a new INO, which would be:
resourced jointly by national systems regulators and oversight bodies and authorised by them to carry
out the functions described in this report.
p. 18, paragraph 7.6.11.2 Contains public sector information licensed under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
The INO was to:
review the handling of concerns raised by NHS workers where there is reason to believe that there has
been a failure to follow good practice, particularly failing to address dangers to patient safety or
causing injustice to staff
where this has occurred, to advise the relevant NHS organisation to take appropriate and proportionate
action, or to recommend to the relevant systems regulator or oversight body that it make a direction
requiring such action.
p. 19, paragraph 7.6.12.2 Contains public sector information licensed under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
The INO would not replace existing remedies, nor was it expected to review or investigate ‘historic cases’
(paragraph 7.6.13).2 The aim was not for them to take up cases themselves but, for example, to invite
others to take them up. It would not have binding powers and would not be ‘strictly comparable’ with
an ombudsman (paragraph 7.6.15).2 It was not an appeal body; rather, its role would be to advise
organisations as to action to be taken. It would have wide discretion (paragraph 7.6.15).2
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Following Freedom to Speak Up, a National Guardian’s Office was established (www.cqc.org.uk/content/
national-guardians-office; accessed 5 July 2018). This is operated from within the CQC rather than, as
Freedom to Speak Up suggested, by a series of regulators. Location within the CQC has advantages in
that it roots this within a body integrally concerned with NHS standards and in promoting processes within
the NHS. It can be seen in line with the Freedom to Speak Up recommendation not to have something
that would be cumbersome and bound by ‘legalistic process’ (paragraph 78).2 However, it could also be
argued that a totally independent body could be a better approach to signal that this issue is being taken
seriously. It appears that the guardian office will selectively review cases and provide recommendations but
very much following the recommendations of Freedom to Speak Up will not review historic cases nor
initiate investigations.277
The National Guardian’s Office got off to a somewhat problematic start. Dame Eileen Sills, Chief Nursing
Officer of Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust, left in March 2016 after only 2 months in the role,
which she explained was incompatible with her day job.278 This was followed by the resignation of David
Bell, the deputy guardian, in April 2016.279 A new whistleblowing guardian, Dr Henrietta Hughes, a GP and
NHS England Medical Director for North Central and East London, was appointed on a 4-day-per-week
basis while keeping jobs as a GP and a GP appraiser. This appointment sparked controversy, first because it
was not full-time and second because a representative from NHS England was on the board that had
appointed her.280
In April 2016, the Freedom to Speak Up: Raising Concerns (whistleblowing) policy for the NHS was
published.281 This emphasises that concerns could be raised about ‘risk malpractice and wrongdoing’ (p. 4)
in relation to services that are delivered or commissioned (see Appendix 3). It stresses that:
If you raise a genuine concern under this policy, you will not be at risk of losing your job or suffering
any form of reprisal as a result.
NHS England.281 Contains public sector information licensed under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
The guidance also stresses that there will be no toleration of harassment/victimisation/bullying. Concerns
can be raised confidentially (p. 4).281 It applies to current and former NHS workers and those who work
for independent organisations providing NHS services. The aim is to include ‘agency workers, temporary
workers, students, volunteers and governors’ (p. 5).281 Processes for raising concerns are set out; this may
be with the line manager or, when not appropriate or in a situation in which there has been no resolution,
with the Freedom to Speak Up guardian or risk management team. There is a third stage, which is to raise
concerns with the executive or non-executive director with responsibility for whistleblowing (p. 5).281 The
aim is to record concerns and respond within 2 days. If an individual has been unable to resolve it speedily,
then there will be a ‘proportionate investigation’. This will involve a person ‘suitably independent (usually
from a different part of the organisation) who has been properly trained’. The aim is that this will be
objective. If individuals are not comfortable raising concerns internally they can raise matters with a
number of external listed bodies as appropriate (p. 7).281 The guidance makes reference to the existing law
and notes that people may seek independent advice from ‘the Whistleblowing Helpline for the NHS and
social care, Public Concern at Work or a legal representative’ (p. 8).281
The NHS Contract 2016/17 stated that Freedom to Speak Up guardians were to be appointed in NHS trusts by
1 October 2016 (www.cqc.org.uk/content/national-guardians-office; accessed 5 July 2018). By January 2017,
guardians had been appointed in 86% of trusts.282 The National Guardian’s Office was to support their work.
The guardians’ declared ‘purpose’ is:
to support the organisation in becoming a more open and transparent place to work, where all staff
are actively encouraged and enabled to speak up safely.
Health and Social Care Act 2008.273 Contains public sector information licensed
under the Open Government Licence v3.0
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The key principles include that they should be impartial and able to hold trusts to account in relation to
developing a culture for speaking up and actions to make improvements. They are to be empowered,
visible, influential, knowledgeable, inclusive, credible, empathetic, trusted, resilient, forward thinking,
supported and effective. These are demanding criteria and clearly these will be challenging roles. Delilah
Hesling, the UK’s first Patient Safety Ombudsman, commenting on the Freedom to Speak Up guardian,
stated that she found her role difficult, although she was operating with the support of her chief
executive. It was reported that there could be obstruction from managers and that staff were initially
unwilling to come forward. She suggested that guardians needed ‘teeth’ if they were to be effective, but
at present they had not been given such enforcement powers,283 and the new whistleblowing guardian,
Henrietta Hughes, has stated that she does not think that such ‘teeth’ are necessary.284 A question remains
as to whether or not without real enforcement powers, ultimately the role will have traction. Cotton285 has
also suggested that the role of ‘leadership buy-in’ here is crucial and suggests that, without this:
individual guardians will go the way of decades of diversity and equality reps: burnt out and bullied
into silence themselves.
Cotton.285 This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution-No
Derivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-ND 4.0)
One further practical challenge is that the NHS is increasingly using a myriad of different providers to
provide NHS services. If care providers are, for example, GPs and consultants operating as locums, nurses
brought in from private agencies or private sector providers who are operating under a specific contract to
provide a range of services such as operations, what impact might this have on their willingness to raise
concern and their awareness of the whistleblowing procedures and processes in operation? There may be
a need to raise awareness of these issues in a diverse workforce, some of whom may not have received
their professional training in the UK. It is clear from recent evidence of implementation of legislation in
another context, that of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 from the House of Lords Select Committee Report
in 2013, that without continuing information and training health-care professionals are likely to remain
unaware of the applicable legal frameworks.276
Freedom to Speak Up suggested that mediation and dispute resolution techniques could assist in resolution
of disputes (paragraph 53).2 It proposed that resources should be available to NHS bodies to undertake
alternative dispute resolution methods to address concerns and build up trust and that mediation be
undertaken by trained experts (paragraph 53).2 Mediation can be considerably less costly than judicial
determination and may provide more flexible resolution (p. 52).244 However, there are some potential
disadvantages with alternative dispute resolution approaches. As Lewis244 notes, employees may regard
mediators as ‘authority figures’ who are, thus, much more likely to side with the employers. With both
mediation and arbitration, there is the danger that matters can be resolved and buried away from the public
gaze if the whistleblowing concerned is about addressing cultural and system changes more broadly rather
than simply an issue to be mediated/resolved/contained at an individual level. This raises fundamental
questions of professional and institutional responsibility as well as of free speech, and needs a much more
comprehensive structural approach to ensure that findings from whistleblowing processes are fed through
the system so that lessons can truly be learnt.
The duty of candour
The notion of a duty of candour goes back many years. In 1987, Sir John Donaldson, the Master of the
Rolls, stated that in professional negligence cases, in particular those concerning medical negligence, there
is a duty of candour and this can be seen as a part of the general duty of care arising in the doctor–patient,
NHS body–patient relationship.286
This statement was, however, not binding on subsequent courts. A duty of candour was advocated in
1995 in a British Medical Journal article by Jean H Ritchie QC and Sally C Davies, then a consultant
haematologist and later Chief Medical Officer.287 The duty of candour was also proposed in the Bristol
Royal Infirmary Inquiry report.5 A campaign for the introduction of a statutory duty was undertaken by
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Will Powell, the father of Robbie Powell from Ystradgynlais. Robbie had Addison’s disease; he was treated
by five doctors in the fortnight before his death and was found to have died as a result of neglect.288
Support for a duty of candour was contained in the Donaldson report Making Amends and included in the
recommendations in the Mid Staffordshire Inquiry Report (paragraph 22.164).289 Some notification duties
already existed in relation to adverse incidents, for example the CQC, which considered in inspections
whether hospital systems informed patients or others of adverse incidents that had arisen in relation to
their care and that could have caused harm.290 This is included in the standard contract between NHS
clinical providers and commissioners. Hospitals are also required to report serious untoward incidents to
the CQC without delay in circumstances in which patients have died as a result of circumstances that
cannot be reasonably attributed to the condition of the patient or when there has been an untoward
incident that has harmed a patient or shortened a patient’s lifespan [National Health Service (CQC)
Regulations291 and see Newdick and Danbury292 p. 958].
Following Freedom to Speak Up, section 81 of the Care Act 2014293 provides the Secretary of State for
Health with power to make regulations concerning the duty of candour:
[W]here an incident of a specified description affecting a person’s safety occurs in the course of the
person being provided with a service.
Care Act 2014.293 Contains public sector information licensed under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
As the explanatory notes to the legislation state:
This duty will mean that such providers will be required to ensure that patients and service users are
told when something unexpected or unintended occurs in the course of their care or treatment, helping
to ensure that honesty and transparency are the norm in every organisation overseen by the CQC.
Care Act 2014.293 Contains public sector information licensed under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
This provision now has to be read in conjunction with regulation 20 of the Health and Social Care Act
2008 (Regulated Activities)277 Regulations 2014. It places a statutory obligation on the registered person
where such a safety incident has arisen to inform the relevant person that this has taken place and provide
support. It sets out the manner in which this should be done including the fact it must be given in person
and include an apology and a written record of other enquiries that are to be undertaken, and this must
be followed by a formal written notification of information given, the apology, further enquiries, etc. (see
Appendix 3). Further guidance as to how this should operate has been provided by the GMC and Nursing
and Midwifery Council (see Appendix 3).
The scope, operation and effectiveness to date of the duty of candour have been questioned. The emphasis
is on apology in relation to individual failings, not in relation to apologies for systems failings or, indeed, the
failure of other persons. Nor is it directed at situations in which a patient’s condition worsens owing to
natural progression, but Oliver argued that these situations could cause distress and the conditions for
complaint.294 He argued that although an apology did not constitute an acceptance of liability, it remained
questionable whether or not health-care professionals would accept that this was, in fact, the case. He
stressed that the organisation must provide support to professionals. Oliver noted that the NMC/GMC
guidance focuses on doctors and nurses, but that although other health professionals and NHS managers
could play an important part in determining care conditions, they were not necessarily the subject of
registration or ethical codes.294 He argued that ‘for faults at the organisational or system level, the
organisation or systems leaders should apologise including the Health Secretary himself’.294
The operation of the duty in practice to date has been questioned. A recent report by the Action Against
Medical Accidents, reviewing CQC inspections of 90 trusts, highlighted major concerns regarding trusts
that were failing to address the duty of candour or that were superficial in the manner in which they had
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done so, and that there was evidence of inconsistent implementation across England (p. 15)295 and lack of
adherence to the duty.296 Following the Action Against Medical Accidents report, Robbie Powell’s father,
Will Powell, noted the problems with the existing legal position and stated that what was needed was a
free-standing duty of candour.297
As we have seen, failure to raise concerns can be seen as part of the professional obligations of health-care
professionals. Freedom to Speak Up recognises that managers should be accountable but is somewhat
equivocal as to how this can be achieved.2 Evidence to Freedom to Speak Up in 20152 suggested that
there should be a degree of statutory regulation of NHS managers. Freedom to Speak Up stated that the
duty of candour and Fit and Proper Person Test for Directors could provide a greater means of promoting
accountability (paragraph 7.5.13).2 However, it noted uncertainty and that this should be kept under review
(paragraph 7.5.14),2 but Francis ‘was not convinced that the time is right’ for a comparable system of
regulation for managers (paragraph 7.5.15).2
Concluding remarks
Legislative protection for whistleblowers has improved to some extent during the last 3 years through
targeted protection for whistleblowers such as some students and job applicants. This will be assisted by
having greater provision of information in relation to statutory requirements regarding the disclosure of
such cases to certain bodies. A broader culture of transparency and accountability may also be facilitated
through the statutory duty of candour. However, although some reframing of the legislation may indeed be
beneficial, and is to be welcomed, nonetheless expectations should not be raised unduly here. The legislation,
inevitably, has practical limitations because in reality only a small fraction of employees who are successful
at tribunal are ever reinstated. Experience in jurisdictions such as the USA before the introduction of PIDA8
indicated that, in reality, whistleblowing employment law can be seen only as a last resort, a measure utilised
when it is too late to ‘shut the stable door’. The movement towards establishing Guardians may facilitate
and improve the situation in relation to whistleblowing but, as currently constructed, Guardians have a very
challenging, and possibly unsustainable, role. Blowing the whistle in different areas of health care (e.g. in a
hospital compared with in primary care) gives rise to different challenges. In addition, there is little attempt
at present to fully reconcile the professional practice obligations of health-care professionals such as doctors
and nurses with not only the duty to be frank and open but also the idea that there may be a case for a
duty to blow the whistle. Twenty-four years on from the Fatchett Bill, there has been no attempt to provide
comprehensive statutory regulatory coverage for whistleblowers in the NHS. Whistleblowing does not seem
cast as a human right or as a tool of open government and effective regulation. Moreover, as Lewis et al.
have noted, ‘since disclosure by a whistleblower might prevent a disaster or perpetuation of fraud the
question arises as to whether there should also be a duty to blow the whistle and investigate the concerns
once they have been raised’.206 It is suggested that the time has come for the government to explore further
the effectiveness of whistleblowing law in general and the legal rights and duties of whistleblowers in the
NHS in particular.
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Chapter 6 Key informant interviews
Introduction
In this chapter, we present the findings from interviews undertaken to gain the contemporary views of key
informants on the design of current whistleblowing and speaking up policies and initiatives in the NHS.
The key messages from the interviews informed our team discussions that underpinned the integration and
interpretation of the findings relating to the wider objectives in the study, as well as providing important
steering to the analyses in the other main chapters. We begin with an overview of the methods used in
the key informant interviews, before presenting the main themes that emerged. The final section draws
together the key findings and offers some suggestions for future policy development in this area.
Methods
We selected for interview a purposive sample of 16 individuals holding key positions with regard to NHS
whistleblowing policy, namely informants occupying roles with specific involvement or knowledge
of whistleblowing policy formulation and delivery in the NHS (listed in Box 1). The interviews were
semistructured, and were based on an interview guide drawn up after early literature reading and after
discussions across the (highly experienced) research team. Interviewer questioning and prompts asked
participants about:
l contemporary issues related to the implementation of whistleblowing policies
l perceived problems with current approaches
l proposed solutions to overcoming any perceived difficulties.
Following in the tradition of other patient safety research projects,298–300 the key informant strand of the
present study adopted a narratological approach to data collection and analysis. In this regard, Waring299
summarises how storied accounts often help actors give meaning to complex and emotional situations
through the development of plotlines, which are sometimes ordered and linear, but are more often
fragmented and complex. In our data collection and analysis, we sought to weave together these storied
accounts into a series of interconnected and overlapping narratives that connected to wider debates
relating to the design and implementation of whistleblowing and speaking up policies in the NHS. The
NVivo computer software program was used to support the coding of information and focused on surfacing
current policy problems, solutions and recommendations with regard to improving whistleblowing policies in
the NHS. The interviews were carried out between January and June 2016. Ethics and research governance
arrangements were approved by the Health Research Authority (IRAS 189539). Informed consent was
BOX 1 Interview sample
l Representatives from the DHSC (n = 2).
l The two key regulators: Monitor (merged into NHS Improvement during fieldwork) and the CQC (n = 2).
l Professional and workforce representation through Unite, the GMC and NHS Professionals (n = 3).
l Workforce development representation through NHS Employers (n = 1).
l Patient/user perspectives through Action Against Medical Accidents and Point of Care Foundation (n = 3).
l Policy delivery perspectives from the Whistleblowing Helpline and PCAW (n = 3).
l Legal perspective from Capsticks legal firm (n = 1).
l A leading academic in the field of whistleblowing policy (n = 1).
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provided along with assurances that anonymity would be assured. In respect to the wishes of interviewees,
quotations have been anonymised.
Emerging narrative storylines
Here we present the key narrative lines voiced about the features of an effective whistleblowing policy.
Initially, the findings draw attention to key problems and challenges in relation to how whistleblowing is
currently framed and conceived of in the NHS. This is followed by a section that details the alternative
framings for whistleblowing in the NHS contributed by key informants. We then pay particular attention to
current initiatives to implement the speaking up agenda in the NHS. Sections then follow that document the
views of key informants regarding implementation of whistleblowing policies. The final section presents
views on how the current whistleblowing agenda for the NHS may be improved, including more training
and guidance in relation to whistleblowing policies and better use of data to track actions and responses
over time.
Current problems facing whistleblowing in the NHS
Key informants described a range of problems and challenges in relation to current whistleblowing policies
in the NHS. Central to these were widespread negative perceptions about the way in which the term
has traditionally been used in the NHS. These challenges were clustered into two broad narratives:
how speaking up in the NHS is synonymous with a ‘climate of fear’; and the limitations of existing legal
protection for those speaking up about poor practice. Each is now discussed in turn.
A climate of fear
Interviewees offered a range of insights into current problems and challenges associated with the ways in
which whistleblowing has traditionally been framed in the NHS. Many informants thought that, historically,
the NHS had been poor in encouraging, responding to and managing employee whistleblowing concerns.
The events at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust hospital were cited by some informants as a
case in point, in that they highlighted an organisation that did not listen to patients and staff when
legitimate concerns were raised and that managers would often dismiss such concerns or ‘scapegoated’
those individuals raising them. Informants presented the key policy challenge as one of providing better
protection for those ‘brave’ enough to speak up about problems with patient care. Many informants
believed that whistleblowing had become synonymous with high-profile negative cases that were widely
documented in the media, with those raising concerns often facing ‘frightening’ repercussions from
managers and colleagues for their actions:
You heard of chief execs whistleblowing or doctors whistleblowing and being suspended from work for
huge amounts of time and then losing their jobs. And those high-profile cases stick in people’s minds.
Every day across the NHS thousands of cases where people raise concerns, often purely on a one-to-one
basis . . . obviously, we don’t hear about them. All we hear about through the media are those horror
cases of which there are far too many. Where individuals have been very clearly, you know suffered
detriment as a result of raising, in good faith, concerns about what they’ve seen in the service.
The poor treatment of individuals who had blown the whistle had led to ‘campaigns’ from some
employees who were angry about the way they and their colleagues had been dealt with by the NHS:
You’ve got cases where the system has got it wrong and where the evidence has been considered and
weighed, in the way that employment tribunals do, they’ve determined that. And then you’ve got
others which have been to employment tribunals and lost, been to courts and still lost and still
maintain that they were right and everybody else was wrong. We’ve had people whose careers have
been destroyed . . . it’s the absence of transparency and the way that the culture would close in and
around whistleblowers.
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There are people who raise concerns who may have genuinely raised concerns don’t like the answer
they get. And then go on a crusade to crucify the people they work with.
Interviewees suggested that it was the combination of these elements that had created a ‘culture of fear’
in the NHS, with staff often unsure about the extent to which they would be supported and their identities
protected if they did raise concerns. The fear of negative reprisals and even dismissal – often alongside a
sense that nothing would be done – were thought to be having a negative impact on the willingness of
staff to speak up about poor care.
The limits to legal protection
Alongside the current climate of fear, interviewees described how the inappropriate treatment of
whistleblowers was exacerbated by an inadequate legal framework. Since 1998, PIDA8 (see Chapter 4)
has provided the legal framework for tribunal outcomes and awards to those who had been ‘victims’ by
exercising their whistleblowing rights:
[PIDA] is there to protect genuine people who suffer from, you know, genuine detrimental dismissal
because they’ve raised concerns. I mean it’s very . . . The legislation is very broad. So it doesn’t take
you much to get over the legal tests in terms of becoming a whistleblower . . .
Although PIDA was raised as helpful in supporting those speaking up about poor care, some had concerns
about how it was used to protect those in the NHS. Central to these were the emotional and practical
difficulties of going through PIDA:
One of the challenges remains the current system of paying to go to an employment tribunal, and it’s
a shame when it has to come to an employment tribunal, and part of our role is to keep people on
the right side of the legislation, so that isn’t the case.
The protection for individuals has always got a question mark against it because some organisations
might take the view, ‘oh, it’s going to cost us £140,000, that’s worth it, let’s get rid of him or her’,
so there’s that element to it.
PIDA is not what some people think it is, is it? It’s a remedy after the facts really, isn’t it? The use of
the term ‘protected disclosure’ is potentially a bit misleading because some people see it as you’ll be
able to protect me and no one will be able to do anything to hurt me or cause me detriment, whereas
it doesn’t really work like that, does it?
Informants also raised questions about PIDA being ‘synonymous with employment’, at the expense of clinical
and safety issues that were often at the root of the problems being raised. There were also thought to be
difficulties about being protected by the legal framework ‘the further away you go from the employer’:
I think this is one of the challenges around this, which is this mixture of employment and clinical safety
issues that gets put in the washing machine and spun round in a certain way, in a quite tricky and
very, very difficult way.
It’s a balancing act in the law, but it means that it’s very complex and actually there’s lots of problems
with the way the law’s drafted at the moment.
Based on these concerns, many informants believed that the key policy challenge was to create a
conducive climate within NHS organisations in which staff no longer felt the need to go outside their
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organisation to report problems. Informants described a need to encourage discussions and situations in
which externalising or moving into ‘the formal stages’ of legal action did not need to happen:
I think if you have to call someone a whistleblower, then it’s already gone wrong . . . I think you’ve
already, sort of, lost the battle.
Reframing the debate from whistleblowing to one of raising concerns
A key narrative emerging from the interviews was the call for a change in the nature of the current debates
surrounding whistleblowing. It was thought that ‘opening up’ whistleblowing to ‘new conversations’
was needed to ensure that whistleblowing concerns were acted on without fear of bullying or persecution.
A central driver for creating these new conversations was seen to be the work carried out by the Francis
inquiry and the subsequent report into whistleblowing practice. The work of Sir Robert Francis was
attributed with setting out a new agenda surrounding whistleblowing to one more clearly focused on
quality and safety. The subsequent review and report into whistleblowing, Freedom to Speak Up, was cited
as a significant milestone in helping to redefine the debate away from ‘whistleblowing’ to one of ‘raising
concerns’. It was thought that this report was clear in setting out how whistleblowing needed to cover more
than protected disclosures. The subsequent development of national whistleblowing policy has sought to
build on this agenda in the promotion of whistleblowing as one about raising concerns:
I think one of the aims of having a national whistleblowing policy is to normalise raising of concerns
and so it’s less of a case of something being a protected disclosure or not, but making sure that the
general premise is if you’re worried about something, you should say something. And if that happens
then the need to, for example, to maybe go outside the organisation or the need to think about
whether you need to make a protected disclosure, i.e. you need that protection, is reduced because
this is just normal behaviour. This is just an expected behaviour.
Raising concerns was the preferred term for the key informants, as it was thought that this ‘softened’ the
tone and made the action potentially more accessible and ‘doable’ for employees. This term provided a
more helpful way of ‘normalising’ any whistleblowing action and concerns. Key to this was a change
in mindset away from seeing whistleblowing as an issue worked through ‘bureaucratic policy and
procedures’ to one of becoming ‘absolutely standard practice’:
You want to encourage them [staff] to raise anything as opposed to debating whether or not it’s
serious enough. So, you know it’s helpful in say raising concerns to capture all.
It’s so emotive to talk about whistleblowing and it sounds like an unusual activity. I mean I’d like us to
stop talking about whistleblowing and just talk about raising concerns.
We all are striving to overcome [the view] that people think it’s a big deal to raise a concern. It’s just
done as a routine, you know part of the day-to-day interaction of people working alongside each
other with the aim of providing a decent standard of care.
Formulating whistleblowing policy
Those directly involved in the formulation of whistleblowing policy described the creation of a ‘broad front’
policy agenda promoting the need among staff to raise concerns. Recent developments in this area included
the introduction of a new training curriculum for staff to increase awareness and offer guidance regarding
whistleblowing. An employment support scheme was also being introduced to support whistleblowers back
into work as well as acting as a supporting mechanism for whistleblowers in ‘fear of their jobs’. Although
these initiatives were touched on, much of the attention and impact given to current policy concerned the
appointment of a national guardian and the creation of a network of local guardians. These were seen as
significant policy developments, with interviewees outlining both opportunities and challenges when
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implementing and supporting these roles. Policy-makers noted how the introduction of the national
guardian role should have a range of associated functions, involving providing an oversight role and making
sure that whistleblowing issues are handled appropriately; being a platform for disseminating knowledge
about what works well in whistleblowing policy; and providing guidance to local guardians by offering peer
support and training:
It sends a message . . . that it’s important that people can raise concerns safely and those that run the
systems are concerned that those systems support them to do that . . . I think those messages play a
really important role in changing culture . . . Because it’s saying that those who design the system
think this is important.
Local guardians were described as being central to the current approach. Policy-makers presented these
roles as a ‘step forward’ in demonstrating that whistleblowing would be taken seriously at a local level
through creating the conditions for people to speak out:
[The role is saying] we’re investing time and money in it and if you’ve got issues about safety about
quality about fraud, whatever it might be, that you want to raise, here’s a vehicle through which you
can do it.
Informants outlined a number of attributes that guardians would require in terms of mediation, listening
and communication. A knowledge of risk management and governance processes, as well as a familiarity
with ‘speaking to senior people’, was also required in the role:
[Local guardians] have to be trusted and respected and seen as a sort of, safe space, and a
confidential space by people who want to raise concerns. But they also have to have you know, the
ear and the confidence of senior management in an organisation so that the concerns that are raised
with them are listened to and can be acted upon.
I think they should be trusted. I think they should be respected. People should feel that they are part
of the solution and they’re not part of a closed culture. I think when we’ve asked whistleblowers,
they’ve said that they don’t think that the local guardian can be in HR [Human Resources] and this is
the connection with employment issues.
Implementation of whistleblowing policy
Policy-makers described how recent whistleblowing policies represented a genuine attempt by the
government to stimulate culture change and transformation at the local level. Building on Freedom
to Speak Up, the policy approach advocated a much more ‘bottom-up’ and ‘local approach’:
One size doesn’t fit all. We’re very conscious of not being prescriptive in what needs to happen. But I
think the report made loud and clear the issues that we really do have to address in some way, shape
or form. And it can’t be ignored. So, we need to get better at what we’re doing.
I don’t think you can shove this in from a national level. I think it’s got to be owned at the local level.
If people do this because they’ve got to do then I think we’re in danger of hitting a target, but
completely missing the point. And this will not be the panacea anywhere, but actually the purpose is
to begin to change the tenor of the debate taking place and the behaviours that are occurring. For
me, that’s what culture is: it’s a mixture of behaviours and discussion. And if we’re going to change
that, you can’t sit in offices in London and Birmingham and Newcastle and Manchester and affect
what they’re going to do in Norwich and Newquay quite frankly . . . it is that mixture of national
leadership, providing a framework, but local action.
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The policy approach taken was described as having a ‘trickle-down effect’. As a result, it was thought that
it was the role of boards to recognise the serious nature of the proposals and set the mood accordingly
within their trusts:
We think openness, we think responding to people who raise concerns with . . . Well in an open way,
in a kind of collegiate way really, is absolutely essential and that’s the message that they [boards]
should be seeking to promulgate . . . really and down through the organisation.
It’s a question of leadership within the trust, you know, you’ve got to have chief executive who literally
goes around and she or he will be saying every month, going around and seeing the staff, ‘do make
sure that I want to see and hear about any of your concerns’. It’s got to be as simple as that.
Implementation challenges facing current policy
Our interviewees voiced support and optimism regarding the current policy agenda. However, there were
particular issues flagged up in terms of how far this policy agenda would be implemented with the current
demands and financial pressures facing the NHS.
Bottom up or top down?
Although a ‘bottom-up’ approach was favoured, informants presented a range of barriers that might
impede the achievement of this goal. Given current demands and pressures, some interviewees thought
that there was a danger of the policy being interpreted as ‘something new that “needs to be dumped on
top” ’. In contrast, the bottom-up flexible approach espoused by policy-makers was susceptible to a lack of
full implementation. Such an approach had ‘no guarantees’ of being successful in terms of delivering the
culture change being called for:
What we see a lot of is that people on front-line teams often feel very disempowered generally. They
sort of wait – they feel that they can’t – that they need orders almost to do – or permission to do
things . . . it’s an environment in which even some of the most highly qualified, highly trained, clever
people don’t take initiative. So it’s a – there’s a tremendously difficult landscape to do this work on.
Although there was clear support for national and local guardians, some interviewees did express concerns
about how far these new roles would impact on changing entrenched behaviour and practice in NHS
organisations. Indeed, some informants were very sceptical about the extent to which the national guardian
would be able to influence local practice. Concerns were also raised about how far local guardians would
be able to fully exercise their duties within a service under severe financial pressures. Possible problems were
also raised in relation to the lack of legal authority associated with the role:
You’ve got to have someone there who’s doing it full time and is sitting there wearing legal armour
and not just the ability to phone up someone and say, ‘oh, I hear it’s not too good in your trust’.
Informants also voiced a range of potential issues regarding the assumed impartiality of local guardians.
One suggested option was to have the guardian role located outside the formal NHS management structure:
For local guardians, there is an issue for us . . . that the local guardian is still going to be employed by
the trust for which they are the local guardian. Well, you know, bit difficult, then isn’t it?
Important gaps in current policy were also noted. Social care remained ‘an important piece of the jigsaw’
that was relatively underdeveloped. It was thought that the nature of social care organisations posed a
range of challenges for the creation of environments that were conducive to staff raising concerns:
In social care, in small teams, the infrastructure often isn’t there to support people through this exercise
. . . they’re small organisations and people feel very, very vulnerable. They’re not a big machine like the
NHS with . . . behind it, the infrastructure, such as big HR [human resources] systems and that sort of
thing, so it is an important piece of the jigsaw, and sometimes I think one that we forget about.
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To ensure policy success, there were calls for a stronger, ‘top-down’ approach. Although various measures
were thought to have the potential to nurture virtuous culture change, concern remained that these
needed to be more robustly implemented:
The policy is right and some of the things that we’ve put in place are right but it’s actually seeing
them used and put into practice . . . It’s this following through on policy and regulations to actually
seeing regulatory action to make it stick that are the things that we think’s missing.
Gagging orders were raised as a case in point. Although the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care
had stated that there would not be compromise agreements on gagging orders, in practice these were still
taking place:
Gagging clauses, ministers have written out saying they disapprove of them, it shouldn’t be happening
but it should really be mandated.
Financial context
There were mixed views about the extent to which the current financial pressures affected whistleblowing.
Some believed that the financial circumstances had the potential to discourage people to ‘step out of line’:
If you’ve got a trust who has financial . . . well they’ve all got financial pressures but is struggling . . .
or, you know, running at a deficit . . . they’ve then got CQC who are coming to do an inspection
because, you know, they were rated as inadequate 6 months ago . . . I do wonder whether that’s the
environment . . . that trust and the staff are working in is probably not conducive to raising concerns
because everybody is so focused on the task in hand it’s just like right let’s do this move on to the
next thing.
A policy context of ‘targets and terror’ was thought by some to provide a negative context that did not
encourage staff to speak up when they had concerns. In such a situation it was thought that NHS managers
were often placed in a difficult position because of competing priorities: ‘squeezed from the top in relation
to budgets and squeezed from the bottom in relation to staff’:
I think the real issue is politics here isn’t it in that hospitals come under pressure. I’m being very blunt
. . . Come under pressure to deliver targets which put pressure on people. I mean things get . . . It
means that things go wrong.
Others noted that all whistleblowing issues should be dealt with appropriately, regardless of financial
constraints:
I think the pressures have been there all the time. They don’t go away. Organisations have to face
cuts. They have done for many, many years. So this is no different. And I don’t think that can be used
as an excuse not to do this and get this right.
In the face of severe financial pressures, it was suggested that the raising concern agenda could be framed
as a way to save money. Intervening at the early stage of concerns could prevent employment tribunals
and ‘getting into a high-profile cases’:
You know if you nip this in the bud you know and you look at your early interventions systems and
working with staff to find the solutions then this doesn’t become a big issue any more. It becomes just
a normal part of employment. So it is normal conversations and, you know staff are responsible for
the solution, not just the managers.
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Legal protection
Informants raised concerns that the current policy agenda had not sufficiently addressed the area of legal
protection. Alongside the changes being made, some interviewees suggested that policy needed to further
support legislative change, particularly the need for full legal protection. It was also noted that the NHS
could also usefully look to other countries, such as Australia and Ireland, that gave ‘clear messages’ to staff
regarding statutory provisions. Without such mandatory procedures, it was thought that current policy
would not translate into action:
What’s the missing part of the fabric on this is the legal framework extending to someone who has
got real, legal authority to come in to say to the chief executive of the trust, ‘this is what I’ve been told
by two or your staff, what the hell’s going on here?’. And being able to get full disclosure on what’s
going on. All that kind of thing, which you’d see as part of a very effective role which, so long as the
legal part of that armour isn’t there, will always be missing.
It was noted that the raising concerns agenda needed to make more of a direct reference to
whistleblowing. Whistleblowing as a term did not feature in Freedom to Speak Up; as a result, there was a
danger that it remained outside the discussion:
Lawyers will still call it whistleblowing. The media will still call it whistleblowing. Staff will have this
perception that whistleblowing is something out of the ordinary. But, you know, all your ordinary is
called something else and it doesn’t cross-reference to it, and I think that can – there’s a danger that
you entrench the negative views and you entrench the sense that whistleblowing is toxic, negative, or
where nothing’s being done and nobody’s listening. And of course there’s an element of, yes, you’re
trying to put in a process that deals with those more difficult scenarios, but don’t sort of completely
divorce it from business as usual.
It was thought that there was an opportunity to strengthen the legal framework in the national guardian role:
With a guardian, you know, great idea, could be very effective but with no legal authority, no legal
levers that it can pull . . . there is that – I think that’s a missing part of the whole sort of fabric of what
we’ve got with whistleblowing because there is no doubt that where we’ve got difficult trusts which
try to hide what’s going on . . .
Improving whistleblowing practice
Alongside the views and expectations regarding current policy, a number of interviewees were keen to
outline areas in which the NHS could improve the translation of whistleblowing policy into practice.
Although the raising concerns agenda was largely supported, interviewees described how a key challenge
lay in changing practice. The majority of NHS trusts had whistleblowing policies in place, as reflected in the
NSS results, yet further work was needed to translate policy into practice:
It isn’t just what you say in your policy, it’s how you operate the policy and how you are seen to be
reviewing it and questioning it and working out whether it is effective . . . it’s not just having a policy.
The NHS would tick all the boxes and would have done for 5 or 10 years on having a policy.
To reframe how whistleblowing is understood and dealt with in the NHS, a range of supporting factors
were outlined by informants as being critical to its success. Chief among these was a focus on internal
organisational dynamics regarding how the organisation responds to whistleblowing. A proactive, ongoing
approach was thought to be required to promote continuous quality improvement:
It’s not just a case of listening to a concern and saying thank you very much and not doing anything
with it . . . it’s supporting that person throughout the whole process because they can be subject to
bullying. We know that’s happened. And it’s something that we need to get better at identifying and
nipping in the bud very quickly . . . it’s about the whole rounded package.
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The challenge for managers was raised here in responding to concerns quickly to prevent escalation.
Further management guidance and training was needed to support the whistleblower and the wider team
in terms of what to do and who to go to:
The management culture seems to be critical. So a culture that genuinely encourages challenge in the
pursuit of safety and has a management style that is open and listening.
It was also thought that some managers required more sensitivity when working with professional groups.
Care needed to be taken with how any issues were discussed with professional groups to ensure that
raising concerns was done appropriately, with clear feedback processes in place:
The investigation itself can have a significant impact . . . regardless of the outcome. And therefore
what doctors have said is, well, that’s all very well, but that will have a significant impact on my
career. And there is a fear of that and therefore it is an effective tool to silence whistleblowers,
etc., etc.
Further training was thought to be required needed to educate staff about confidentiality and anonymity.
Although interviewees reported that the current helplines appeared be working as a ‘safe space’ where
people could explore options, issues regarding confidentiality and anonymity remained a ‘massively
misunderstood area’:
I don’t think people understand what that means in practice. I don’t think people, particularly staff,
but also managers, understand where the difficulties are with that and how in some circumstances it’s
not possible to be anonymous or it’s not possible for your identity to be protected and therefore to be
reporting something confidentially.
Interviewees described how improvements to whistleblowing practice could be achieved through further
analysis and ‘triangulation’ of organisational intelligence:
What we need to describe is a virtuous circle around raising concerns. So we need some hard and fast
measures to look across the system and I think the best one we’ve got is the staff survey but it’s far
from perfect.
How do you prove, how do you prove that your organisation has got that open culture? . . . we’ve
changed legislation, you know, we’ve done lots of different things but how at a grass-roots level, at a
local level are you going to be able to measure that your organisation is OK? I don’t know how you
measure that . . .
It’s how you understand the data you’re being given and how you take that forward and how that is
built into your organisational development plan. So that thing about continuous review . . . The key bit
that is missing out of policy so far. You know the key principles . . . organisations need to adopt in
regards assessing where the organisation is and you know what they need to do to make it better.
Some informants believed that better use of existing data sources would provide a number of
opportunities and serve as an ‘early warning system’, highlighting where problems in the whistleblowing
system were located. It was noted that the NSS results could provide a baseline measure for viewing any
improvements made. In addition, interviewees suggested other measures that could be used as indicators
to capture and triangulate a view of whistleblowing. These included statistically significant changes in the
following performance indicators:
l number of disciplinary incidents and grievances
l fraud and corruption returns from NHS Protect
l safeguarding information
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l benchmarks for openness and transparency
l serious incidents
l patient complaints
l inpatient survey results (how much people feel engaged in their care)
l Friends and Family Test.
The triangulation of such indicators was thought to provide a better way forward to understand
whistleblowing patterns and improvements across the NHS in terms of translating data analysis into
positive action; it was suggested that the introduction of local guardians provided an opportunity
to develop these arrangements. Their role had the potential to make appropriate links within the
organisation, collect the relevant evidence, and co-ordinate a ‘real-time alert system’ that would be
reported for consideration to NHS trust boards:
Boards will be getting that, and I’d like to think that there was somewhere that the monitoring of
whistleblowing could be standardised so that you can see a story being told . . . we can find the story
that fits the picture, and I think there needs to be something that pulls that information almost by
routine together.
Suggestions were also put forward about the need to capture and publicise ‘successful’ resolutions in
whistleblowing cases. This would involve developing case studies of staff raising concerns that have been
handled in an appropriate way and led directly to service improvements:
I think that the biggest message that will come out is when organisations start to use examples of
where it has worked, so that people see folk get on in their careers because they’ve changed the
attitude. So I think there’s a challenge there to be set almost, for the NHS, to start picking up people
who have perhaps progressed their career because they’ve almost bucked the system and moved on.
Concluding remarks
Our interviews with key informants have provided a range of views on and insights into current
whistleblowing policies in the NHS. The findings draw attention to the challenging and problematic
ways in which whistleblowing is currently framed (tending to reinforce a ‘climate of fear’), as well as the
difficulties associated with implementing the legal framework, PIDA. They also drew attention to how the
current policy agenda assumes that ‘raising concerns’ is the key mechanism by which whistleblowing policy
and practice can be improved. Although there is clear support for the approach being taken, problems
were raised with regard to how far the measures can be achieved solely through a ‘bottom-up’ approach.
In setting out future developments and recommendations, informants pointed to the need for further
training and guidance for NHS staff at all levels of the hierarchy, particularly about how best to handle
staff concerns. The informants also highlighted the need for more creative ways of using existing
performance measures and data that are routinely collected in the NHS, in particular the information
contained in the annual NSS. It was thought that nationally collected data sets could be better combined
and synthesised as a way of triangulating and highlighting statistical patterns and trends in whistleblowing
over time. Such information could be used to track the impact of new policy initiatives on the ability and
willingness of NHS staff to raise concerns and staff perceptions on whether or not they felt confident that
their organisation would respond appropriately if they did. This could, it was thought, serve as an ongoing
‘organisational barometer’ to gauge the extent to which the NHS was moving towards more openness in
its reporting cultures.
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and research implications
Introduction
As the NHS struggles to respond to periodic crises in health-care delivery, more interest is being shown
in supporting front-line staff in getting their voices heard and making sure that organisations respond
appropriately when genuine concerns are raised. Although many concerns about poor-quality or unsafe
care are dealt with satisfactorily, there is compelling evidence to suggest that in many parts of the NHS staff
feel unable to speak up, and when they do speak up there is a prevailing culture in the NHS ‘which not
infrequently has negative consequences for those brave enough [to raise concerns]’ (p. 1).2 This is despite the
existence of employment legislation (mainly PIDA; see Chapter 5) that offers protection for whistleblowers
and a plethora of national and local initiatives and guidance designed to support front-line staff in raising
concerns and providing advice to organisations on how best to respond.
Against this background, we wanted to strengthen the theoretical and empirical evidence base underpinning
whistleblowing policy and practice in the NHS. Drawing on a rich stream of academic research within and
beyond health care (see Chapters 2 and 3), an analysis of NHS inquiries (see Chapter 4) and a critical review
of the legal framework surrounding whistleblowing (see Chapter 5) underpinned by interviews with core
NHS stakeholders (see Chapter 6), our work has sought to surface the challenges and opportunities for
improved action on front-line concerns. In this final chapter, we draw together the main findings and
conclusions of the study and look forward at the emerging research agenda in this vitally important but
under-researched area.
A reminder of the ambitions of this study
In the design of this study we have sought to generate new knowledge and evidence to support improved
whistleblowing policies in the NHS. The specific objectives were to:
1. explore – in an integrative and interdisciplinary way – the main strands of the academic and grey literature
on whistleblowing and related concepts such as employee silence, and so to identify the key theoretical
and conceptual frameworks that inform contemporary understanding of employee whistleblowing
2. synthesise the empirical evidence from different industries, sectors and countries with regard to the
organisational processes, systems, incentives and cultures that serve to facilitate (or impede) employees
raising legitimate concerns
3. examine the legal framework for whistleblowing in relation to health care as a mechanism for
promoting (or inhibiting) patient safety and review the approaches to whistleblowing in relation to
European Union member states and consider what lessons can be learnt at the domestic level from
such comparisons
4. distil the lessons for whistleblowing policies and practice from the findings of formal inquiries into
serious failings in NHS care
5. ascertain the views, expectations and experiences of a range of key stakeholders, including service users
and carer representatives, about the development of effective whistleblowing policies in the NHS and to
use these views to help structure and inform the desk research set out above
6. on the basis of findings relating to points 1–5, to develop theoretically grounded and evidence-informed
practical guidance for policy-makers, managers and others with responsibility for designing and
implementing effective whistleblowing policies in the NHS.
Members of the research team liaised throughout the literature review process to discuss and synthesise
the emergent findings and ensure that insights were shared and integrated across the work packages.
These discussions across, for example, policy, organisation behaviour and law aided a more integrative
and interdisciplinary set of understandings as outlined in preceding chapters. For example, the review of
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conceptions and theories of whistleblowing informed the analysis of the Inquiry reports and the content of
the key informant interviews, and the key informant interviews provided many departure points for
assembling and interpreting the academic work emerging from across diverse disciplines.
In the rest of this chapter, we summarise the main findings of the research relating to each of these
objectives and identify the research issues arising from the study. We take the first two objectives together,
as they are highly inter-related and are informed by the same literature review. The key messages from
the stakeholder interviews have been reported in Chapter 6 and have informed our interpretation of the
findings relating to the other objectives as well as providing important steering to the analyses in the other
main chapters.
Research objectives 1 and 2: identifying key conceptual issues and
empirical findings
In Chapters 2 and 3, we outlined how whistleblowing has developed as a distinct field of academic enquiry
and identified the seminal publications that have influenced and shaped the contours of debate in this area.
An important finding from our review of the literature is that whistleblowing research in health care has
developed separately and has therefore not drawn on the theoretical and empirical insights of mainstream
whistleblowing research published in the management and organisation literature. We reviewed the
different theoretical approaches that have been used in the management and social sciences literature as
conceptual lenses to understand whistleblowing. The key conceptual and empirical issues uncovered by our
review, with practical import for understanding, designing and improving whistleblowing and speaking up
policies in the NHS, include the following important observations.
Silence and voice
There is no simple dichotomous choice between whistleblowing and silence (the collective-level phenomena
of doing or saying very little in response to significant problems or issues facing an organisation). Policy
prescriptions have tended to conceive the issue of raising concerns about unsafe or poor-quality care as a simple
(individual) choice between deciding to ‘blow the whistle’ or determining to remain silent. Yet research suggests
that such simple dichotomies are unhelpful; for example, health-care professionals may raise concerns internally
within the organisation in more informal ways before (or instead of) utilising whistleblowing processes. Before
coming to any decision on whether or not to blow the whistle, employees usually find themselves trying to
work out exactly what is happening, often through engaging in dialogue with colleagues and seeking a ‘second
opinion’. Other informal strategies may include the use of humour or sarcasm to signal discontent or the use of
‘off-the-record’ discussions with managers and employees. This kind of behaviour is framed sometimes as a
prelude to whistleblowing and sometimes as a substitute. It also draws attention to the fact that the process of
raising concerns about unsafe care may be largely hidden from view (apart from those participating directly in
the dialogue) and may therefore not readily be identifiable as voicing concern, much less ‘whistleblowing’.
Such a view highlights the different routes through which health-care employees are able to articulate their
‘voice’ and challenges the pejorative notion, often promoted in the media, that health-care professionals
are culpable bystanders who tolerate poor standards of care and are ‘silent witnesses’ to malpractice and
mistreatment. Silence or voice, then, is not a binary choice but more of a spectrum. It is also about more
than just individuals: it is collective and cultural (see later discussion of culture in this chapter).
Hearing and acting
Effective voicing of concerns is but the first stage in reshaping better safer health care: those with influence
have to hear, and they have to act. In this regard we discussed the ‘deaf effect’, a concept that has been
used in the management and organisation literature to describe the reluctance of senior managers to hear,
accept and act on concerns by those raised by employees lower down the hierarchy. In some cases it is clear
that senior players seek to ostracise and isolate individuals by undermining their concerns. In extreme cases,
health-care professionals have been disciplined, suspended or reported for misconduct to professional
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bodies on pretexts derived from a very particular and partisan reading and framing of events. In an intensely
hierarchical organisation such as the NHS, entrenched status and power differences between different
professional and occupational groups (e.g. between nurses and doctors or between front-line staff and
managers) that have been affirmed over decades and woven into the fabric of health-care delivery can serve
to limit or attenuate the development of open reporting cultures.
Any articulation of a whistleblowing strategy must deal with the challenging organisational dynamic of
resistance to bad news, especially by those in positions of power who may already be vested in narratives
of success. Just as whistleblowers’ actions may be complex, variably motivated, ambiguous and contested,
so too can be the responses of those in authority (within and outside the organisation) when confronted
with new information and demands for action. Although an unwillingness to hear and resistance to
change are commonplace, other responses may be seen: from shifts in attitudes and understanding to
direct actions; from actions that support beneficial change to those that denigrate and damage the
whistleblowers. Thus, we need as sophisticated an understanding of these response dynamics as we do of
the dynamics of whistleblowing itself.
In this respect, the work of Dixon-Woods et al.301 can be used to shed light on this issue. On the basis of
empirical work in the NHS, the study grouped senior management’s responses into two broad categories of
behaviour: ‘problem-sensing’ and ‘comfort-seeking’. Problem-sensing was assessed to occur when senior
managers actively sought out problems in their organisations using a blend of hard and soft intelligence.302
Comfort-seeking arose when managers sought information from only a range of limited sources and had a
preoccupation with compliance, meeting external requirements and receiving positive news that served to
provided ‘reassurance that all was well’. Managers actively disassociated themselves from issues raised by
front-line staff and perceived any reported problems as ‘whining or disruptive behaviour’. Such comfort-
seeking (as opposed to problem-seeking) behaviours among senior managers in the NHS may, therefore,
serve to support the ‘deaf effect’.148 Senior management may sometimes also suffer from ‘collective
myopia’,25 a shared inability to see a problem. This is potentially even more problematic than the deaf effect
as it leaves those in management positions genuinely unable to see what the whistleblower is trying to
bring to their attention. Moreover, powerful systematic biases in group and team decision-making, including
Groupthink, can serve to suppress the willingness of health-care professionals to report, hear and respond
to concerns about unsafe care.303,304
Interactional processes
Linked to the above is the recognition that whistleblowing is an interactional process and not just a one-off
act by an identifiable whistleblower. The process is better seen as a dynamic and recursive interaction
between whistleblower and recipient: it is not just that the speaker requires the courage to speak up
but also the recipient(s) need to hear what is being said and to take appropriate action.24 Most previous
research and policy around whistleblowing have focused on the whistleblower, in particular the factors that
inhibit whistleblowing and determine who has ‘the courage’ to speak up and under what circumstances.
This has traditionally led to policies and interventions designed to lower the speaker-courage threshold in
health-care contexts, such as legal protection, anonymous reporting channels and attempts to nurture
‘no-blame’ cultures. However, more focus needs to be placed on why some managers respond effectively
and others do not, and the personal and organisational factors that can contribute to lowering the
hearer-courage threshold.
Taking this one step further, attention should also be extended to understanding ‘protector courage’,
whereby managers make an effort to protect whistleblowers from adverse consequences. According to
Vandekerckhove et al.,24 protector courage is, thus, ‘a way of understanding which managers have the
courage to stand up for, or organise interventions around those who blow the whistle within areas under
their influence or control in order to reduce or combat the familiar risks of retaliation, conflict or suspicion
of the reporting action’ (p. 321). Managers able to effect hearer action may not always be in a position
to support protector action and vice versa. An understanding of how, when and why NHS managers can
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take on such roles and the organisational factors that support (or impede) them is central to the design of
better whistleblowing policies in the NHS.
Whistleblowing, or bell-ringing?
As conceived in the academic literature as well as in wider public understanding, whistleblowing usually
describes internal organisational members raising concerns to those who can effect action. However,
‘bell-ringing’, or outsider whistleblowing, is also a possibility, and is potentially a more significant
issue for health care than for any other sector. Examples of potential outsider whistleblowers include
patients, relatives and visitors, or suppliers, consultants and professionals working in other organisations
(e.g. social workers, GPs or management consultants). As the NHS becomes ever more diverse in terms of
collaboration with other sectors (public, private, third sector), and as social media and information-sharing
technologies become more developed, external staff are increasingly exposed to, and in a position to
speak up about, poor-quality care. Indeed, staff from other sectors and those from other countries may
bring very different values and beliefs (for good or ill) regarding what constitutes unsafe care and this may
influence the NHS staff with whom they collaborate. Our review of the literature also uncovered evidence
that health-care staff coming from different countries can have very different values regarding whether or
not and when it is appropriate to blow the whistle.
Policy impacts on local judgements
Notions and assumptions about what is deemed to be good or substandard care, and therefore on
decisions to speak up, are not only shaped locally but also influenced by the national context including
current government policy, the action of interest groups, ethical codes and guidelines promoted by
professional bodies, and care standards expected by national regulators. For example, in the current
financial climate in the NHS some services may be withdrawn and staff levels reduced, posing new
challenges to local perceptions of care adequacy.
However, as highlighted by Hyde,137 it is unlikely that reductions in care delivery will benefit patients;
but when is it deemed by staff to be unacceptable practice? When, precisely, should staff raise the
alarm when the level of care has deteriorated? In such situations, the best course of action is not always
apparent. In addition, in an era of austerity, increasing financial constraints and job insecurity in the NHS,
many staff may be reluctant to raise concerns because of potential retaliatory action by management.
Any consideration of whistleblowing policy in the NHS must, therefore, be alert to the influence of such
background factors on employees’ willingness to speak up and the responses of organisations when
they do.
Personal factors in raising concerns
There is mixed evidence on the role and impact of personal factors in raising concerns. For example, in
terms of length and security of tenure, some studies have found that the more embedded and socialised
into a particular culture staff are, the less likely they are to spot poor practice and report it (perhaps
because of personal and social links with colleagues). Other studies have shown that newly qualified
nurses are in a position to blow the whistle because of their increased knowledge and confidence as to
what constitutes poor care. Similarly, the evidence is mixed on whether nurses who, over time, become
more socialised and integrated members of the organisation are less likely (through de-sensitisation) or
more likely (through better organisational knowledge and developed networks) to detect and report poor
care. These issues are under-researched in the NHS context and require detailed local study.
Key practice action points arising from research objectives 1 and 2
l Managers should not be resistant to ‘bad news’ and should endeavour to seek out problems in their
organisations using a blend of hard data and soft intelligence. Finding ways to encourage this will be a
key challenge for management education and leadership training.
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l NHS organisations should nurture cultures that are supportive of staff raising concerns and respond
positively to such concerns when they are raised; greater attention should be paid to communicating
such changes in culture to care staff.
l Particular attention should be focused on ensuring that staff are not penalised or ‘scapegoated’ for
raising legitimate concerns (or perceived to be); particular attention will need to be paid to the effect
that singular breaches of this will have on undermining leadership pronouncements of open cultures.
l Whistleblowing policies should take into consideration how reporting channels are opened up to
external staff, how organisations respond to external concerns, and the influence of external staff and
those from other countries on the values that underpin health-care delivery, including the reporting of
clinical incidents.
Research objective 3: the legal frameworks for whistleblowing
In this section, we reflect on the current position and consider alternative approaches that may be taken to
the statutory basis and regulation of whistleblowing. Sir Robert Francis, in Freedom to Speak Up,2 after
stating that he did not regard the current legislation adequate, went on to say:
The legislation applies to all employers, not only those in the NHS, so it would not be appropriate to
make recommendations for amendment which might impact on other sectors in ways that I am not
aware of.
p. 22, paragraph 95.2 Contains public sector information licensed under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
In contrast, other reports have been prepared to engage with reform of the law in this area (e.g. PCAW162
and Blueprint247). A number of avenues are open for future legal protection in relation to whistleblowing.
These are set out below.
Oversight from an independent agency
As part of a review of the law in this area, one approach is the creation of a specific national independent
whistleblowing agency, either a freestanding body or within an existing agency (Lewis;305 Blueprint, pp. 27–8247).
Blueprint has suggested that such a body could receive and investigate whistleblowing disclosures, collect
information in relation to workplace disclosures and have powers to obtain information from regulators for
subsequent action. It could issue penalties when organisations did not follow up in relation to information
disclosure, order the cessation of retaliation against a whistleblower and be able to order compensation and
order reinstatement. In addition, it could provide advice and support to whistleblowers, monitor and review
frameworks, and raise public awareness about such issues.
Savage and Hyde306 support such an approach in principle; however, as they then comment, the ‘prevailing
political climate appears to be against the creation of a regulatory body to specifically cater to whistleblowing
disclosures’. There are some further practical challenges here. First, the remit of such a body would be vast, so
vast that it is reasonable to ask would it be ultimately bound to fail? It would require a robust, independent
permanent chairperson and secretariat who would have sufficient time to address to their tasks. Proper
resourcing would be needed to ensure that it could operate effectively. The interface between its operation
and that of other regulators would need very careful clarification to ensure that information was disclosed
appropriately. Research undertaken of national regulators has highlighted existing inconsistencies in the way
in which these operate to handle concerns and it would be important to ensure that such inconsistencies
were not further replicated in the way in which any national body might operate.306 The ability to require
reinstatement would go to the heart of the employment relationship. Historically, reinstatement is very rarely
possible and would be unlikely to be ordered by the courts. This is related to practical issues given that by the
time the issue is dealt with by the legal system the employment relationship is likely to have broken down
to such an extent that the relationship of trust and confidence that exists in relation to the employment
relationship is unlikely to be satisfactorily re-established, or to be re-established only in very rare cases.
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At national level, such a general agency would thus require careful consideration; within the NHS a
whistleblowing agency may have more traction. The Guardian’s Office goes some way towards this, but it is
non-statutory and would need considerable restructuring to bring it in line with Blueprint’s proposals.
Statutory requirement to establish whistleblowing procedures
The establishment and maintenance of whistleblowing procedures could be made a legal requirement.
In the Republic of Ireland, the Protected Disclosures Act 2014307 places a specific requirement on public
bodies to create and maintain procedures for employees to make protected disclosures and to provide
them with information concerning this. Ministers can issue guidance to the bodies on their obligations
under this section. The public body is also under a duty to submit an annual report in relation to the
number of protected disclosures made to it. This could also be accompanied by the production of a
Code of Practice. The PCAW Commission proposed that PIDA could be amended to provide that
the Secretary of State, after consultation, could issue a code of practice on whistleblowing to taken into
account by courts and tribunals (p. 12, paragraph 49).162 Such a code could also assist in framing
requirements for whistleblowing guidance within the NHS itself.
Early-stage protection for whistleblowers
It has been suggested that whistleblowers should be able to apply for whistleblower status to receive
early-stage protection (p. 55).247 Currently, under section 128 of the ERA 2006, an employee can apply
to an employment tribunal and ask for an order that they can remain employed. This maintains the
contractual arrangement while waiting for the whistleblower’s case to be determined. However, as
Blueprint has noted, this has limited utility: whistleblowers must act within 7 days, it is expensive, and
employers cannot be forced to allow the whistleblower to continue working (pp. 5–6).247 The ERA does
not stop retaliation against a whistleblower at that stage, cases may take around 20 months to conclude
and such litigation is costly.247 In contrast, the law on whistleblower protection in the institutions of
Bosnia and Herzegovina provides that employees can be given whistleblowing status through pre-emptive
action by applying to the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and the Coordination of Fight Against
Corruption. The agency has to respond to the request within 30 days. If such status is given, it prevents
action being taken against an employee who has reported corruption under the law (p. 13).247 It is not
clear to date the extent to which this has been used in the health-care context in Bosnia, although it
appears to have been used effectively in the context of corruption (p. 55).247 Blueprint suggests that such a
system could be established so that whistleblowers could apply for a Whistleblower Protection Certificate
with the aim of stopping further retaliation. The whistleblower could apply to an independent agency for
such a certificate or to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (p. 55).247 They propose that,
where there is evidence that an organisation has ignored such a certificate in three or more instances or
has undertaken aggressive retaliation against whistleblowers, the organisation should be required to
appoint a whistleblowing monitor to produce a plan for improving whistleblowing protection in the
workplace and produce an annual report for regulators (p. 55).247
Incentives for whistleblowing
One possible approach that can be taken to encourage whistleblowers to come forward, supported by
Blueprint, is the provision of financial incentives, whether in the form of proportion of fines levied or other
financial benefits obtained as a result of their disclosure (p. 26).247 They suggest that the absence of such
incentives ‘significantly reduces the ability of a whistleblower to be encouraged to come forward and in
turn be rewarded for the risk undertaken’ (p. 26).247 Incentives have been used in other contexts, notably
in the USA,199,308 where the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010309 provides
substantial incentives of between 10% and 30% of monies of > US$1M recovered by the government as
a consequence of an enforcement action (p. 254).13 The use of incentives and facilitating whistleblowing
can be seen as the aftermath of the failure of the Madoff Ponzi scheme (p. 673).199 Incentivising
whistleblowing in this way in the context of health care is likely to prove extremely controversial. It is also
predicated on an assumption that individuals working in the NHS would be motivated by such financial
incentives, something that may be less applicable than in other areas. PCAW commented that incentives
could be seen as inconsistent with current culture and the moral stance of whistleblowers, and could
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undermine the credibility of witnesses in subsequent legal proceedings and be seen as inconsistent with
the current compensatory regime (paragraph 60).162 Freedom to Speak Up stated that there was no
demand for such incentives, that these would not increase the number of persons coming forward and
that they could cause resentment (paragraph 5.7.4).2 The report noted that representatives from other
sectors whom the report team had met did not offer financial incentives (paragraph 5.7.5),2 and cited
research, produced by the Financial Conduct Authority, that they would ‘be unlikely to increase the
number of quality disclosures made to them’ (paragraph 5.7.6).2 The introduction of such incentives would
require careful consideration. However, although it may not be thought to be easily transferable as a
model in relation to standard health and social care whistleblowing, in contrast such a model could be
applicable more directly if the whistleblower was, for example, exposing major fraudulent conduct by
senior NHS management and, consequently, saving the NHS major sums of money.
Confidentiality/gagging clauses
The question of confidentiality or so-called ‘gagging’ clauses was discussed in Chapter 5. These clauses
may be seen as valid and appropriate from an employment law perspective but are considerably less so
from a freedom of speech approach to whistleblowing or from a regulatory approach. It remains very
questionable as to the extent to which such clauses are ever appropriate in the public sector and, as noted,
the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care has previously indicated that these would be banned.
Further work and/or guidance in this area may be necessary.
Using the criminal law to protect whistleblowers
The legislation in England and Wales does not provide for criminal penalties against those who commit
reprisals against whistleblowers. In contrast, such provisions do apply in relation to certain other jurisdictions.310
For example, section 1107 of the US Sarbanes–Oxley Act 2002311 provides that it is an offence to knowingly
and with intent retaliate or take action harmful to another person. This includes the interference with a
person’s lawful employment or livelihood if they have provided a law enforcement officer with information
that is truthful concerning the commission, or possible commission, of a federal offence. The section provides
for the imposition of a fine or of a period of imprisonment of up to 10 years. The extent to which this can,
however, be seen in terms of discrete whistleblower protection or rather as an extension of more general
offences concerning obstruction of justice has been questioned.
The criminal law could be used to provide specific protection for whistleblowers who blow the whistle in
relation to gross negligence manslaughter and are called to give evidence in a subsequent criminal trial.
In relation to prosecutions of this nature, such whistleblowers could be classed as ‘intimidated witnesses’
and given greater protection at a criminal trial in terms of the manner in which they gave evidence.310
The further engagement with the criminal law in this way is a question that has much broader implications
than this report.
Making additional compensation claims available to whistleblowers
In addition to providing redress in employment law, another approach taken in the Republic of Ireland is
that of providing additional compensation claims for whistleblowers. The Protected Disclosures Act 2014312
provides that if a person causes detriment (including intimidation, harassment, discrimination or injury) to
another person who has undertaken a protected disclosure, then the person seeking protected disclosure
will have a right of action in tort against the person who has caused the detriment (section 13).307 The Act
gives express immunity for liability in relation to civil actions in a situation in which an individual makes a
protected disclosure save in relation to a defamation action. It also provides for a ‘qualified privilege’ in
relation to defamation law and that a whistleblower’s identity can be safeguarded in certain situations.
It is too early to assess properly the impact of these provisions, but such an approach may also assist
whistleblowers who are prepared to come forward in the future.
None of the potential avenues for legal innovation laid out above offer simple or swift remedial action
to a patched and patchwork legal system. Nonetheless, they do set out avenues for future discussion,
consultation and empirical research, hopefully before new legislative proposals are brought forward.
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Key practice action points arising from research objective 3
l The legal framework surrounding whistleblowing is likely to change in the near future (possibly, but
not necessarily, along the lines suggested above) and it is incumbent on managers to keep abreast of
developments so that local whistleblowing and speaking up policies are continually updated and
aligned with any changes in the law.
l The potential deficiencies and deficits of the existing legal frameworks should be openly acknowledged
and ‘worked around’ with due consideration of the needs of an open culture – and should not be used
‘tactically’ to depress open reporting or excuse managerial inaction on such reporting.
Research objective 4: learning from the findings of formal inquiries
In Chapter 4 we presented the findings of our analysis of Inquiries dating back to the Bristol Royal
Infirmary5 through Ayling,152 Kerr/Haslam,153 Shipman,154 Francis155,156 and Francis11 to the Freedom to
Speak Up review.2 A number of issues arise from these analyses of the inquiries and response reports,
which are now outlined.
Diverse definitions of whistleblowing
First, and as highlighted in Chapter 2, there is no clear and universally accepted definition of whistleblowing.
Indeed, the Shipman Inquiry tried to avoid using the expression ‘whistleblowing’ whenever possible (319),154
and Francis2 considered replacing the term. Francis2 presented a broad definition as ‘a person who raises
concerns in the public interest’. Hooper192 defined it as ‘the raising of a concern, either within the workplace
or externally, about a danger, risk, malpractice or wrongdoing that affects others’ (p. 1). Hooper continued
that it is sometimes said that a whistleblower is a person who raises concerns externally, but ‘this is not
right’. Many persons who raise concerns do not necessarily, at the time of raising the concerns, see
themselves as whistleblowers. They are likely to come to regard themselves as whistleblowers only if they
suffer detriment as a result of raising the concerns or if no action is taken on their concerns (p. 2). The
Shipman Inquiry considered that none of these persons who raised concerns were ‘whistleblowers’ per se,
as they did not work in the same organisation as Shipman (p. 318). The Bristol inquiry did not appear to
recognise Dr Steve Bolsin as a whistleblower, as it is stated that had PIDA been in force it would not have
applied to Dr Bolsin because he did not make a ‘qualifying statement’ (160).5 So, there appear to be three
dimensions to whistleblowing contained in formal Inquiry reports: (1) whether or not the person works for
the organisation; (2) whether they raise concerns internally or externally (or escalate from internal to external,
if the internal route produces no results); and (3) whether or not they are a whistleblower in the strict legal
sense of the term and are making a ‘qualifying statement’.
Few specific recommendations on whistleblowing
It is perhaps surprising, given their subject matter, but there is little specific discussion of, or recommendations
concerning, whistleblowing across these inquiries. The inquiries focus (perhaps disproportionately) on patient
complaints rather than on employee voice. However, the Shipman Inquiry stated that ‘I believe that the
willingness of one healthcare professional to take responsibility for raising concerns about the conduct,
performance or health of another could make a greater potential contribution to patient safety than any
other single factor’ (p. 23)160 (subsequently cited in Hooper192 and Francis2). Similarly, as Niall Dickson, CEO of
the GMC, put it in 2012: ‘The eyes and ears of health professionals are often the most valuable means of
protecting patients and ensuring high quality care’.192 Of some 820 recommendations across all of the
inquiries reviewed, only eight are directly concerned with whistleblowing. Even the Shipman Inquiry, which
stressed the role of health professionals in raising concerns, had only 3 of its 190 recommendations focused
on whistleblowing.
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System failures rather than individual shortcomings
It was notable that most inquiry accounts focused on the ‘system’ rather than on the people within it:
structural and collective, rather than agency or individual, explanations. However, Kerr/Haslam153 contrasted
the action of the first ‘whistleblower’ in the case of Kerr, Dr Mathewson, a GP practising in Northern
Ireland, who gave evidence at a disciplinary tribunal in 1964, with the result that Kerr’s career in Northern
Ireland came to an end, with the inaction of GPs in England: ‘it is a sad fact . . . that once in England
there was not a single GP who displayed the fortitude of Dr Mathewson in pursuing any one of the many
complaints against William Kerr to the logical conclusion of any form of disciplinary’ (p. 446; © Crown
copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0).153 As the
counsel for the patients put it to the inquiry: ‘for the main part, we do not say they are system failures,
they are personality failures, where patients were so short-changed by individuals, not by the system: the
system worked in 1966 [a reference to Northern Ireland], the system could have worked if individual
doctors, GPs, had taken extra steps’ (volume 2, pp. 801–2; © Crown copyright. Contains public sector
information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0).153
Cultural change over legal safeguards
The most consistent remedy drawn out from inquiry recommendations has been cultural reform and
renewal rather than legal safeguards. Inquiries since Kennedy5 have consistently argued in favour of ‘culture
change’ (without specifying in any detail how this was to be achieved). For example, Francis155,156 pointed to
the problem of organisational culture and considered that ‘the most important factor in changing this will
not be a new system or policy of protection for whistleblowers, but the fostering of a culture of openness,
self-criticism and teamwork’ (© Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under the
Open Government Licence v3.0). Francis11 cited Ken Lownds of Cure the NHS that regardless of protective
legislation and policies it was the culture that mattered. Without a positive culture, it would never be easy
to raise concerns. Francis considered that whistleblowing was only necessary because of the absence of
systems and a culture accepted by all staff that is receptive to internal reporting of concerns. ‘Therefore, the
solution lies in creating the right culture, not in focusing on improvements to whistleblowing legislation,
important though such protection is’ (p. 242; © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information
licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0).11
Similarly, whether expressed in terms of ‘a system devoted to continual learning’179 (© Crown copyright.
Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0) or ‘a culture which
is comfortable with challenge’182 (© Parliamentary Copyright. Contains Parliamentary information licensed
under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0. www.parliament.uk/site-information/copyright-parliament/open-
parliament-licence/) it has been claimed that ‘culture change’ would make the role of the whistleblower
redundant. Similar points are made by the government: although progress on Francis’ 290 recommendations
were important, ‘perhaps the most important point is that the ongoing need to change the culture in the
NHS to one of patient-centred, continual improvement in care and safety’ (© Crown copyright. Contains
public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0).186 That cultural change is as
unproblematic as such pronouncements seem to suppose has, however, received some considerable
challenge.313
The Francis public inquiry,11 like the Kennedy inquiry at Bristol more than a decade earlier, went to considerable
trouble to try to understand the meaning of culture in a health-care context. Yet the subtlety of some of
the supporting evidence to the inquiry was not matched by the same degree of nuance in the inquiry’s
recommendations about culture, which are somewhat aspirational and broad brush.313 By finding fault with
culture and providing prescriptions for change, Francis made several assumptions that require examination.
First, he presupposes that we can identify and assess common aspects of culture as well as identify which
aspects are supportive of or inimical to high-quality care. Second, he assumes that these aspects of culture can
be purposely changed, that any changes will lead to improvements and that the costs and dysfunctions from
such prescriptive changes will be outweighed by the benefits. Finally, although acknowledging that culture may
vary ‘from organisation to organisation and from department to department’, Francis emphasises the need for
‘a positive and common culture throughout’. This presumes that common cultures are possible and desirable
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even in systems as large and distributed as the NHS. However, much research shows more complex and
nuanced relations between cultures, practices and outcomes than implied by Francis and other inquiries.314
Reinvention and retreads
Evident from these Inquiry reports is a high degree of ‘reinventing the wheel’, with some return to similar
solutions over time: a situation described as ‘Groundhog Day’ as recommendations from previous Inquiries
become recycled.315 The clearest example of this is the repeated identification of culture as both culprit
and solution to periodic failings in the quality of care in the NHS (discussed above). A further example is
the term ‘duty of candour’, which appeared in Kennedy5 through Kerr/Haslam,153 to Francis,11 Dalton and
Williams183 and the DHSC.275 However, this term appears to be rather widely and vaguely defined, and it
remains to be seen what sanctions may be applied to those who fail to display their statutory duty of
candour in future.
Similarly, there has been a repeated emphasis on reissuing policies and guidelines despite scant evidence
that these have much effect.153,154,168,170,171 Indeed, Francis11 noted that the Mid Staffordshire Trust had
actually had a policy on whistleblowing since 2001 but events exposed the ‘hollowness’ of that policy.
Perhaps in earlier periods, one major problem may have been that many staff were not fully aware of
whistleblowing policies or procedures. For example, the single most important barrier to staff such as
nurses and midwives formally expressing their concerns about Ayling was the absence of any formal
procedure for doing so.152 However, it now seems that that there is a problem of ‘bridging the gap’
between being aware of issues and being willing to blow the whistle (see Chapter 2).
Although some recommendations of the inquiries have been implemented (see Appendix 2), the impact of
these changes remains unclear, and there is not yet any coherent body of case law on the impact of the
ERRA 2013208 (see also Chapter 5; and Ashton196).
Optimism over improvements
Many of the reports appear to be somewhat optimistic that ‘things are getting better’, that institutions,
policies and procedures are in place that will not allow earlier problems to recur.152,154 Governments tend
to argue that ‘much has changed’ since the incidents took place and that remedial policies have been put
into place.166,186 However, although there have been some positive changes,196 there is a concern that the
pattern in health care will follow that of child abuse inquiries: that lessons have been learnt and it will
never occur again – until the next time.
Overall, the impression gained across these inquiries is one of missed opportunities and failed learning.
Indeed, the word ‘hindsight’ was used 456 times in the testimony to the Francis public inquiry.316 In terms
of whistleblowing and speaking up, the NHS appears to have much to learn in becoming a learning
organisation.317 At times the NHS appears to be an organisation without much of a memory: ‘sorry’
may be the hardest word but learning and implementation seem to be the hardest activities.317
Key practice action points arising from research objective 4
l Many of the larger-scale and more prominent NHS failures could have been dealt with more effectively
and more timely if local managerial cultures were more appropriately attuned to ‘hear’ signals of
challenge, highlighting the importance of open cultures.
l The challenge is for local management and leadership to create open and responsive cultures. The
evidence indicates that at national/policy level actions in response to manifest failures are often both
slow and lacking specificity in relation to local contexts.
l Recommendations from NHS inquiries need careful interpretation and implementation at the local level,
as not all recommendations will be appropriate or useful for particular organisations or different
circumstances and staff.
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Directions for future whistleblowing research in health care
Taken together, the arguments emerging through the various strands of this work highlight the need
for a new socially situated research agenda, not just of whistleblowing as aberrant activity but of the full
range of organisationally embedded communications, sense-making, judgement-forming and responses.
Although some form of whistleblowing – and the social, legal and structural arrangements in support
of it – may always be necessary, a better understanding of these organisationally situated dynamics may,
paradoxically, enable a diminution of its prominence.314 Given this, we now explore some of the directions
such a revitalised research agenda might take.
Exploring the ‘deaf effect’, hearer courage and hearer protection
Most previous research has focused on whistleblowers themselves, and there is a paucity of evidence on
the nature of the managerial and organisational responses to those raising serious concerns in health-care
contexts. Future research could, therefore, usefully explore the personal and organisational factors that
appear to support (or impede) appropriate (or inappropriate) responses from managers across a range of
health-care contexts. In particular, the factors associated with hearer courage and hearer protection need
to be explored so that lessons can be transferred across the NHS. As whistleblowing is a dynamic and
recursive process (not a singular event), any research in this area needs to be alert to this dynamic and
recognise that such a process is mutually constituted. In doing so, the creation of socially situated
perceptions, and the discourse(s) that support and/or impede these, will be crucial. The unit of analysis,
then, becomes the unfolding interactional process, not the whistleblower or responding manager per se.
It could also be productive to investigate the informal measures taken by health-care professionals to
address poor care, and to consider the factors that lead workers to follow this route rather than more
formal signals to (internal or external) authority.
Progression from raising concerns to whistleblowing
In Chapter 2, we proposed a distinction between raising concerns, speaking up and whistleblowing. There
is a need for work that examines whether or not this proposed framework is robust, and that clarifies the
relationship between raising concerns, speaking up and whistleblowing. For example, should these acts be
viewed as a chronological sequence through which staff may progress in highlighting problems, or are
they essentially separate, distinct and discrete phenomena?
An important issue is to identify how interventions aimed at strengthening one element affect the others.
It seems intuitively appealing to focus on encouraging raising concerns, partly because this may ensure that
problems are addressed earlier, but also because we might assume a greater willingness to raise concerns
will flow through into greater willingness to speak up and blow the whistle if needed. However, our
review of the health-care literature on whistleblowing suggests that negative responses to whistleblowers
make staff less willing to raise concerns. It may be that the best way to ensure that the majority of staff
are prepared to raise concerns is to publicly support and protect the minority who do blow the whistle.
Linked to this, there is an obvious need for research on the implementation and effectiveness of the local
Speaking Up guardians and the national guardian. How are different NHS organisations introducing these
new roles and what is their impact on reshaping organisation strategies, structures, incentives and cultures
with regard to raising concerns and speaking up?
Cultural and interpersonal differences
The NHS is one of the most culturally and ethnically diverse organisations in the world, and so there is a
pressing need to explore how cultural differences in values, beliefs and attitudes towards whistleblowing
affect the willingness of staff to raise concerns, and also the willingness of managers and organisations to
respond. The existing literature has barely begun the task of theorising cultural, gendered, experience-led
or personality-related drivers of local actions and reporting.
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For example, one of the most striking findings from the literature review is that nurses who perceive
themselves as first and foremost the patient’s advocate are inherently more likely to blow the whistle than
those who perceive patients as just one of several stakeholders to whom they have obligations (it would be
useful to see whether or not this pattern might also be observed among other health-care professionals).
In the modern NHS, HR policy and practice is frequently directed towards gaining commitment and
engagement from staff that might unintentionally reinforce the perception that their obligations to the
organisation over-ride or trump their obligations to the patient. Senior management then may be able
to influence this by emphasising the extent to which staff are empowered to put the patient first.
This provides just one example of an area ripe for further empirical work and subsequent guidance.
Research on other health professionals
Recognising that much of the literature is focused on nurses, and particularly on student nurses, it would
be valuable to explore whistleblowing beliefs, practices and experiences of non-nursing health-care
workers more comprehensively. An important area for research should be an examination of the influence
of professional standards, codes and guidelines, as these are a powerful influence on voice behaviour.
There is some suggestion that the code of practice onus placed on nurses to ensure that patients do not
come to harm leads to them taking independent action to resolve issues of poor care, avoiding the risks
(to them) of whistleblowing but also potentially increasing risk to patient safety (as underlying problems
are not brought to management attention). Future whistleblowing research needs to be sensitive not only
to the local context and wider policy background, but also to the details of professional socialisation and
regulatory wrap-arounds.
Theory of planned behaviour
Park and Blenkinsopp,318 Bjorkelo and Bye65 and Vanderkerkchove et al.24 have all suggested the theory of
planned behaviour63 as a general model for whistleblowing research. One of the key insights of this model
is that the relationship between attitudes towards an action (in this case whistleblowing), intention to
act and, finally, acting is influenced by perceived behavioural control (i.e. whether or not the individual
believes he or she could, in principle, carry out the action) and subjective norms (i.e. the individual’s beliefs
about what significant others would think of them undertaking the action). Perceived behavioural control
and subject norms are both implicitly ‘composite’ variables. To illustrate, in measuring subjective norms Park
and Blenkinsopp318 asked participants what five groups might think of their behaviour: family members,
co-workers, immediate supervisors, friends and neighbours. It is clearly possible for these groups to have
different views about the behaviour and also for the would-be whistleblower to weight these views
differently (e.g. he or she may be largely unconcerned about the views of co-workers, but place great
weight on what family members think). Similarly, among the various factors that might affect perceived
behavioural control, there may be one or two key elements that are most significant. There is a need then
for further research in NHS settings to understand the factors that influence perceived behavioural control
and subjective norms, which may vary considerably between occupations, units and organisations.
Better use of data
We have alluded to the considerable ambiguity and interpretation around whether a particular situation
is a quality and safety problem or just acceptable variation in level of service. Given the number of data
now collected by the NHS, and the increasingly sophisticated ways in which they can be analysed, it
ought to be possible to reduce this ambiguity but also, potentially, to reduce the need for whistleblowing;
potential problems may be detectable as trends in the data, making the service less reliant on staff
bringing it to management’s attention. The use of evidence such as clinical audit data to reduce the need
for whistleblowing, and also the ambiguity around whether or not a particular practice or situation is
acceptable, could, therefore, be a topic for translational research. In addition, the annual NSS collects data
on staff perceptions in relation to whistleblowing and organisational responses when concerns are raised;
these could be exploited to look at trends over time and across services and staff groups to highlight
potential system weaknesses. Early quantitative work in this area using NSS data has identified a
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statistically significant association between hospital-board-level competencies and the willingness of staff to
report concerns, as well as staff perceptions that their organisation will respond positively when they do.319
Types of wrongdoing
Wrongdoing covers a range of issues, ranging from financial mismanagement to physical abuse and, in the
extreme, murder. Future research should aim to highlight how the type of wrongdoing affects the willingness
of staff to speak up, as well as the response from health-care organisations. There are differences, for
example, in practice and theory when it comes to the issue of speaking up about ‘everyday’ poor practice due
to mistakes, low staffing on wards, exhaustion and unpleasant working cultures, and speaking up about
‘extreme’ predatory or abusive individuals.
Media coverage
The political sensitivity of the NHS, and the media scrutiny it attracts, raises the stakes for senior
management in responding to problems raised by staff. It would, therefore, be useful to examine how the
interaction of media coverage and the efforts of NHS organisations to manage this coverage influence
managerial responses to whistleblowing, including hearer courage and hearer protection, as outlined
above. The aim would be to identify ways to ‘lower the stakes’ for management, making it easier for them
to acknowledge and address problems. Comparative research would be particularly revealing here, as the
NHS is an outlier in terms of the level of scrutiny it receives from the media compared with health care in
other countries.
Research design
As with all research, a robust and rigorous study design enhances the credibility of findings, and future
research into whistleblowing and speaking up in the NHS would benefit from a number of design and
methodological features.
l Future studies should be mixed method and multidisciplinary/interdisciplinary in design, drawing on a
range of appropriate quantitative and qualitative methods. Detailed ethnographic and autobiographical
approaches would seem particularly suitable for exploring many of the sensitive and contextual specific
issues related to whistleblowing and speaking up in complex and fast-changing health-care settings.
l As the phenomena under study are essentially dynamic (performance, reporting and organisational
responses), a longitudinal study will offer important additional insights over cross-sectional designs.
For example, a longitudinal statistical analysis of the NSS could be used to uncover changes in
reporting practices and organisational responses, over time, as policies change. Longitudinal
qualitative work could also assesses the long-term career consequences for whistleblowers and
those health-care services that have been subject to concerns.
l Investigating the nuances surrounding whistleblowing in different health-care settings would require
researchers to gain very substantial access to organisations in order to be able to investigate whistleblowing
in context. This could involve ‘co-production’ of research with those NHS organisations that recognise that
they have particular problems in terms of employee voice or a history of inappropriate responses when
legitimate concerns have been raised. Similarly, there may be benefit in researching ‘positively deviant’
organisations, that is, those that have a history of responding quickly and positively to genuine concerns.
l Data relating to the whistleblowing and speaking up questions contained in the NSS could be used to
identify potential organisational case study sites that appear to have particular problems in terms of
staff raising concerns, as well as those organisations that appear to perform better in this respect.
l An analysis of NSS whistleblowing data could also be used to track the longitudinal impact of new
policy initiatives on the willingness of staff to raise concerns and staff perceptions on whether or not
they feel confident that their organisation would respond appropriately if they did. Such an analysis
could then be used to gauge the extent to which the NHS is moving towards more openness in its
reporting cultures.
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Study limitations
As with all research projects, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the study. The first relates to
the linked narrative literature reviews that examined peer-reviewed studies written in English. Although every
effort was made to capture all of the relevant papers in relation to the published theoretical and empirical
work in this area, using comprehensive search strategies, some may have been missed owing to poor
indexing across disparate disciplines. The predominance of nursing students’ studies found in the literature
necessarily skews the field, by focusing on a group that is important (and numerous) but not necessarily
typical. Second, our review of Inquiry reports and related documents was on a purposeful sample of material,
and if our scope had been wider we may have drawn into the analysis materials that offered divergent
perspectives from the ones reviewed. Third, our review of the legal literature was necessarily selective, given
the amount of work in this area, and this may have had an impact on our findings. Finally, we interviewed
only a small number of interviewees (at one point in time) as part of the empirical part of the stakeholder
interviews, and our findings may have been different if we had included a larger sample or different
individuals with wider roles and responsibilities.
Concluding remarks
Current policy prescriptions that seek to develop better whistleblowing policies and nurture open reporting
cultures are in need of a more secure evidential base. In this review, we have drawn on a rich stream of
academic research and documentary and legal analysis with the aim of sharpening the thinking around the
nature of whistleblowing and related concepts in health-care settings. Although we have set out a wide
range of issues that need consideration in developing whistleblowing policies, it is beyond the remit of this
research to convert these concerns into specific recommendations of the ways in which current policies can
be improved: that is a process that needs to be led from elsewhere, in the light of this new evidence
summary, and in full partnership with the service. It is our view, however, that there is still much to learn
regarding this important, but under-researched, area of health policy and management practice, and to
this end we have highlighted a number of important gaps in knowledge that are in need of more
sustained research.
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Appendix 1 Summary of key publications from
the empirical and theoretical literature on
whistleblowing and speaking up
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TABLE 8 Summary of selected empirical literature exploring whistleblowing in health care
Authors, country,
journal Health-care sector Context (aims) Method of investigation Summary of findings
1 Ahern and McDonald,87
Australia, Journal of
Advanced Nursing
Nursing To explore the beliefs of nurses who
wrestled with ethical dilemmas
Empirical
A statistical analysis of responses to
a questionnaire containing ‘belief
statements’; 95 responses from
whistleblower and non-whistleblower
nurses
Whistleblowers believed in primacy of their
role as patient advocate. Non-whistleblowers
believed that they were equally responsible
to the patient, physician and employer
2 Attree,88 UK, Journal of
Nursing Management
Nursing (medical,
surgical and older
people)
To explore factors that influence nurses’
decisions to raise concerns about
standards of practice
Empirical
Grounded theory. Qualitative data were
taken from semistructured interviews
with 142 practising nurses, theoretically
sampled from three acute NHS trusts in
England
Fear of repercussions, retribution, labelling
and blame for raising concerns, about which
they predicted nothing would be done, were
disincentives to raising concerns. Reporting
was perceived as a high-risk/low-benefit
action. Nurses lacked confidence in reporting
systems
3 Beckstead,81 USA,
International Journal
of Nursing Studies
Nursing To analyse the thinking processes nurses
use when making decisions to report
peer wrongdoing, particularly relating to
substance abuse
Empirical
Scenario-based behavioural
questionnaire issued to 113 female and
seven male nurses
Working under the influence of any type of
substance considered a very serious offence.
Combination of ‘incompetence’ and
‘substance-abuse’ cues occurred in complex
ways, possibly due to education and practice
4 Bellefontaine,89 UK,
Nursing Times
Student nursing To explore the factors that influence
nursing students in reporting concerns
about practice
Empirical
Qualitative study, using a
phenomenological approach.
Semistructured interviews with six
student nurses
Four main themes were identified: the
student–mentor relationship in clinical
placement; actual or potential support
provided by both the practice area and
university; students’ own personal
confidence and professional knowledge
base; and fear of failing clinical placements
5 Bickhoff et al.,90
Australia, Nurse
Education Today
Student nursing How nursing students demonstrate
moral courage when in whistleblowing
situations, and factors that encouraged
or inhibited their willingness to speak up
Empirical
Qualitative descriptive study. Thematic
analysis of interview data from
10 nursing students attending an
Australian university
Of importance are patient-advocate identity,
linking to knowing one’s own moral code
and previous life experiences; consequences
for both patient and participant; impact of
key individuals; and picking battles carefully
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6 Black,91 USA, American
Journal of Nursing
Nursing Nurses’ experiences with workplace
attitudes towards patient advocacy
activities
Empirical
Postal questionnaire, resulting in
quantitative analysis of 564 responses
from Nevada State registered nurses
One-third of respondents reported failing to
report conditions potentially harmful to
patients: key drivers were fear of retaliation
and belief that reporting would not change
the situation
7 Bradbury-Jones et al.,92
UK, Nurse Education
Today
Student nursing A study exploring the empowerment of
nursing students in clinical practice
Empirical
Longitudinal study underpinned by
hermeneutic phenomenology.
13 first-year nursing students recruited
using a purposive sampling strategy.
Annual, in-depth interviews over
3 years
The nurses’ education process resulted in a
feeling of greater empowerment. External
spheres influence the extent to which
nursing students are likely to experience
increased knowledge and confidence, and
thus empowerment. However, nursing
students use a number of strategies to
promote their own empowerment in clinical
practice
8 Bradbury-Jones et al.,93
UK, Nurse Education
Today
Student nursing Explore the phenomenon of ‘voice’ and
the extent to which nursing students are
able to exercise voice during their clinical
practice experiences
As above In situations that called for nursing students
to ‘speak up’ they did one of two things: exit
(typically metaphorically) or voice. However,
there was bridging of these actions in the
form of ‘negotiating voice’, where
participants were conscious of their own
attempts to explore how to raise concerns in
different ways so that their voice was
‘heard’, and without suffering retaliation
9 Espin and Meikle,94
Canada, Journal of
Nursing Education
Student nursing Investigate perception of (and reporting
of) events potentially harmful to patients
in fourth-year nursing students
Empirical
Data from 10 fourth-year students who
were individually interviewed after
reading each of five risk scenarios
Students noted scope of practice,
professional roles, and presence or absence
of harm as important in their decision-
making process
Authors mention a ‘reporting ladder’ as a
mechanism through which a report can be
escalated
10 Firth-Cozens et al.,95 UK,
Clinical Governance: An
International Journal
Nursing, hospital
doctors, GPs
To expose causes of under-reporting of
errors, and suggest improvements
Empirical
Statistical analysis of questionnaire-
based survey of 342 nurses,
201 hospital doctors and 81 GPs
Willingness to report poor care was higher
than imagined, particularly in nursing. Need
for clear guidance both on what should be
reported and the systems for doing so. Need
to ensure ‘safety’ of reporters, and that
change occurs in response to reporting
continued
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TABLE 8 Summary of selected empirical literature exploring whistleblowing in health care (continued )
Authors, country,
journal Health-care sector Context (aims) Method of investigation Summary of findings
11 Fledderjohann and
Johnson,36 USA, Social
Science Quarterly
Child protection
agencies
The influence of community context and
bystander characteristics on actions taken
towards observed child neglect
Empirical
Large telephone survey of general
public (3679 respondents). Statistical
analysis of results
At the individual level, age, gender, place of
residence and sentinel status were all found
to have a significant effect on bystanders’
willingness to report observed child neglect
12 Gould and Drey,96 UK,
American Journal of
Infection Control
Student nursing Understand nursing students’
experiences of infection control in the
clinical setting
Empirical
488 responses to online survey
Students demonstrated sound understanding
of infection control and were able to identify
lack of compliance on the basis of preclinical
classroom instruction. A culture of blame
was observed between different groups of
staff. In the few cases where they challenged
poor practice, students had been penalised
13 Greaves and McGlone,97
Australia, Social Medicine
Various public sector
roles, including nursing
Explore the health consequences of
speaking out
Empirical
Narrative enquiry using 11 unstructured
interviews
Whistleblowers found laws to be
‘meaningless’ and organisational procedures
to be ineffective in providing protection. As a
result of reporting, health and careers were
ruined, but self-respect was maintained
14 Grube et al.,84 USA,
Health Communication
Nursing Discover when and why nurses report
unsafe patient practices when they see
them
Empirical
Quantitative analysis of
330 questionnaires
Probability of reporting unsafe practices
increases (1) as the frequency of unsafe
practices increases and (2) when nurses
have a strong role identity and strong
organisational role identity. However, the
highest probability for reporting occurs when
both organisation and nurse role identities
are low
15 Hutchinson and
Jackson,98 Australia,
Nursing Inquiry
Public sector, focusing
on health and social
care
Illuminate the connections between
bullying, abuse of power and
institutional failures
Empirical
Cross-sectional survey (n = 3345) from
public sector organisations in one state
of Australia. Covered public sector
health and non-health organisations
Need to understand the practices of power
in public sector institutions. Bullying as an
indicator of broader institutional failings.
Contrast between culture and espoused
organisational mission
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16 Ion et al.,86 UK, Nurse
Education Today
Student nursing Understand the influences on student
decisions on whether or not to report
poor clinical practice that is a result of
deliberate action and that is witnessed
while on placement
Empirical
Qualitative interviews with
13 pre-registration (adult and mental
health) nursing students from the UK.
Age range from 20 to 47 years
Drivers for ‘voice’ were own moral position
and professional code of conduct
Drivers for ‘silence’ were perceived threat
of retaliation, lack of confidence in own
judgement, and unfamiliar procedures and
process
17 Ion et al.,99 UK, Journal
of Advanced Nursing
Student nursing Improve understanding of lack of
reporting of poor care
Empirical
Discourse analysis of semistructured
interviews with 13 pre-registration
(adult and mental health) nursing
students from the UK. Age range from
20 to 47 years
Both reporters and non-reporters construct
narratives that present themselves in a
positive light: reporters lay claim to positive
character strength and commitment;
non-reporters blame factors outside their
control
18 Jackson and Raftos,100
Australia, International
Journal of Nursing
Practice
Residential care nurses Exploration of experiences of
whistleblowers
Empirical, drawing on feminist research
theory
Data collected via field notes taken
from serial interviews with three nurses
Three distinct emotional phases occurred as
the decision to whistleblow externally was
taken: trepidation and optimism as incident
was reported internally; barriers and
obstacles from management; disillusionment
and defeat due to lack of change, resulting
in external whistleblowing
19 Jackson et al.,101 Australia,
Contemporary Nurse
Nursing To present and describe the effects
of whistleblowing episodes on the
workplace relationships of the nurses
involved
Empirical
Qualitative narrative inquiry.
18 participants with direct experience
of whistleblowing as whistleblowers,
bystanders or subjects of complaint
Whistleblowers can lose their employment,
be bullied, excluded and unsupported by
management and colleagues, and have their
collegial professional relationships destroyed
20 Jackson et al.,100
Australia, Journal of
Advanced Nursing
Nursing Explore the reasons behind the decision
to blow the whistle and provide insights
into nurses’ experiences of being
whistleblowers
Empirical
Qualitative narrative inquiry. Data from
11 nurse whistleblowers (as in Jackson
et al., 2010101)
Whistleblowing was highly stressful for
blowers, who wrestle to reconcile their fear of
reprisals (organisational and individual) against
their indignation at perceived wrongdoing.
Nurses are driven to whistleblow by perceived
duty of care for patients. Clarity needed
regarding the role nurses have as patient
advocates. Need for clearer opportunities to
voice concerns, a timely and appropriate
response from health-care systems, and a safe
environment in which to raise concerns
continued
D
O
I:10.3310/hsdr06300
H
EA
LTH
SERVICES
A
N
D
D
ELIVERY
RESEA
RCH
2018
VO
L.6
N
O
.30
©
Q
ueen
’s
Printer
and
C
ontroller
of
H
M
SO
2018.
This
w
ork
w
as
produced
by
M
annion
et
al.
under
the
term
s
of
a
com
m
issioning
contract
issued
by
the
Secretary
of
State
for
H
ealth
and
SocialC
are.
This
issue
m
ay
be
freely
reproduced
for
the
purposes
of
private
research
and
study
and
extracts
(or
indeed,
the
fullreport)
m
ay
be
included
in
professional
journals
provided
that
suitable
acknow
ledgem
ent
is
m
ade
and
the
reproduction
is
not
associated
w
ith
any
form
of
advertising.
A
pplications
for
com
m
ercialreproduction
should
be
addressed
to:
N
IH
R
Journals
Library,
N
ationalInstitute
for
H
ealth
Research,
Evaluation,
Trials
and
Studies
C
oordinating
C
entre,
A
lpha
H
ouse,
U
niversity
of
Southam
pton
Science
Park,
Southam
pton
SO
16
7N
S,
U
K
.
115
TABLE 8 Summary of selected empirical literature exploring whistleblowing in health care (continued )
Authors, country,
journal Health-care sector Context (aims) Method of investigation Summary of findings
21 Jackson et al.,100
Australia, Contemporary
Nurse
Nursing Effects of whistleblowing on workplace
relationships
Empirical
Qualitative narrative enquiry, drawing
on face-to-face or telephone interview
data from 18 nurses who had been
involved as whistleblower, bystander or
subject of complaint
Whistleblowing resulted in hostility at work,
manifesting as damaged collegial and
interprofessional relationships, bullying and
exclusion. Whistleblowers, bystanders and
subjects of complaints were all potentially
affected
22 Jackson et al.,145 Australia,
Contemporary Nurse
Nursing To summarise and critique the research
literature about whistleblowing and
nurses.
Integrative literature review of 15
empirical papers, capturing data from
seven countries
Nurses have a key role to play in maintaining
practice standards and in reporting care that
is unacceptable. However, the repercussions
to nurses who raise concerns are
insupportable
23 Jones and Kelly,17 UK,
Sociology of Health &
Illness
Care of Elderly People Explore employee perceptions of
whistleblowing in in care for the elderly
settings, & identify alternative strategies
to whistleblowing
Empirical.
Qualitative study, deploying interview
and focus group techniques with
60 participants from various elderly
care settings
Formal procedural approaches adopted by
organisations in order to facilitate raising
of concerns are largely neutralised by
‘[a] process of socialisation and habituation
in the workplace’ – these everyday
behaviours are the key to improving the
reporting culture
24 Jones et al.,103 UK,
International Journal of
Nursing Studies
Executive board nurses Explore the experiences of nurse
executives, particularly in relation to
ensuring that their views and concerns
about quality and safety are taken into
account at board level
Empirical
Purposive sample comprised 40 executive
board nurses. Semistructured interviews
followed by thematic analysis
Two successful strategies for raising concerns
and tackling ‘groupthink’ at board level were
exposed: to ‘brief’ (i.e. exchange information
pre board meeting) and build relationships;
preparing and delivering a credible,
evidence-based case
25 Kent et al.,104 UK, Journal
of Nursing Education
Student nursing Effects of a course and placement aimed
at increasing nursing students willingness
to speak up for patient safety
Empirical
Quantitative survey (H-PEPSS) on
63 student nurses. Testing was pre and
post a short course on raising concerns/
challenging authority figures
No significant relationships were found with
regard to age, gender or ethnicity on the
expressed possibility of raising concerns. An
increase in confidence in speaking up was
found in the post-test (p = > 0.001), but no
increase in willingness to challenge someone
in authority
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26 Killam et al.,105 Canada,
BMC Nursing
Student nursing Perception of unsafe clinical practices by
final-year baccalaureate nursing students
Empirical
Q methodology: 59 fourth-year
students sorted 43 theoretical
statement cards, descriptive of unsafe
clinical practice
Final-year nursing students perceive that
deficits in knowledge, patient-centred
practice, professional morality and
authenticity threaten safety in the clinical
learning environment
27 Killam et al.,106 Canada,
Nurse Education Today
Student nursing Perception of unsafe clinical practices by
first-year baccalaureate nursing students
Empirical
Q methodology: 64 first-year students
sorted 43 theoretical statement cards
that described of unsafe clinical practice
Viewpoints included an overwhelming sense
of inner discomfort, practising contrary to
conventions, lacking in professional integrity
and disharmonising relations. Overall, a
consensus viewpoint described exonerating
the clinical educator as not being solely
responsible for clinical safety
28 Kingston et al.,107
Australia, Medical
Journal of Australia
Consultants, registrars,
resident medical officers,
senior nurses, junior
nurses
(1) To examine the attitudes of medical
and nursing staff towards reporting
incidents (adverse events and near-
misses), and (2) to identify measures to
facilitate incident reporting
Empirical
Qualitative, semistructured questions
were given to five focus groups, one
each for consultants, registrars, resident
medical officers, senior nurses and
junior nurses, a total of 14 medical and
19 nursing staff from three public
hospitals
Nurses reported more habitually than doctors
because of a culture that provided directives,
protocols and the notion of security (by
following prescribed processes). The medical
culture favoured dealing with incidents ‘in
house’, and was less reliant on directives.
Barriers to reporting incidents included time
constraints, unsatisfactory processes,
deficiencies in knowledge, cultural norms,
inadequate feedback, beliefs about risk and
a perceived lack of value in the process
29 Ko and Yu,108 Republic
of Korea, Journal of
Patient Safety
Nursing Explore the correlations among nurses’
perceptions of patient safety culture,
their intention to report errors, and
leader coaching behaviours
Empirical
The views of a total of 289 nurses from
five Korean hospitals were assessed
using self-report instruments. Data
were statistically analysed
Coaching behaviour by senior nurses led to
an improvement in patient safety culture and
intention to report errors
30 Law and Chan,109
Hong Kong, Journal
of Clinical Nursing
Graduate nurses To explore the process of learning to
speak up in practice among newly
graduated registered nurses
Empirical
Stories of experiences of speaking up
emerged naturally during repeated
unstructured interviews with 18 new
graduates
Speaking up is helped by (1) more than
one-off training and safety tools,
(2) mentoring of speaking up in the midst of
good and bad educative experiences and
(3) making public spaces safe for telling
secret stories
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TABLE 8 Summary of selected empirical literature exploring whistleblowing in health care (continued )
Authors, country,
journal Health-care sector Context (aims) Method of investigation Summary of findings
31 Levett-Jones and
Lathlean,110 UK and
Australia, Nurse
Education Today
Student nursing Examined nursing students’ experience
of relationship between belongingness,
conformity and compliance when
undertaking clinical placements
Empirical
Mixed-methods case study;
18 third-year nursing students from
two universities in Australia and one in
the UK were interviewed, and the data
were thematically analysed
Three subthemes emerged: don’t rock the
boat, getting the registered nurses offside
and speaking up
Students described how and why they
adopted or adapted to the teams’ and
institution’s values and norms, rather than
challenging them, believing that this would
improve the likelihood that they would be
accepted and included by the nursing staff
32 Mansbach et al.,114
Israel, Physiotherapy
Physiotherapy students
and physiotherapists
Investigation into misconduct reporting
tendencies of student physiotherapists vs.
practitioners
Empirical
A total of 227 participants in two
groups (126 students and 101
practitioners) were presented with two
vignettes: one describing a colleague’s
misconduct and the other describing a
manager’s misconduct. They were then
asked to make a decision about
whistleblowing
Both students and practitioners viewed
misconduct that had an impact on patient
welfare as being serious, and were prepared
to act. Students perceived managers’
misconduct as more serious, and preferred
to report externally (possibly because of a
lack of understanding of the personal
consequences of doing so). Practitioners saw
colleagues’ misconduct as more serious and
preferred to report internally. The results
suggested that older participants, and more
experienced participants, were less likely to
report misconduct
33 McCann et al.,111 UK,
Human Resource
Management
Front-line and
mid-management
NHS employees
Explore the impact of metrics-based
target systems on patient care and staff
morale
Empirical
Ethnographic study of four NHS
organisations over 3 years
The challenge of reconciling the increasing
demand for economic efficiency alongside
improving patient outcomes resulted in
‘street-level bureaucracy’, a situation in
which traditional professional norms are
reasserted informally in ways that often
transgress prescribed performance systems
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34 McDonald and Ahern,112
Australia, Nursing Forum
Nursing What are the coping responses of nurses
who identified misconduct at work,
and what responses were considered
effective?
Empirical
Descriptive survey design, resulting in
analysis of 95 postal questionnaires
completed by whistleblowers and
non-whistleblowers. Response rate
of 20%
Most effective responses (in terms of
avoiding feelings of moral anguish) were
problem-focused actions, but require
personal attributes of conviction,
self-confidence and assertiveness. Least
effective were avoidance and denial
35 McDonald and Ahern,113
Australia, Journal of
Professional Nursing
General and mental
health nursing
Uncover the professional consequences
of reporting misconduct or remaining
silent for nurses
Empirical
Data were taken from 1999 study112
Official reprisals included demotion (4%),
reprimand (11%) and referral to a
psychiatrist (9%). Unofficial professional
reprisals included threats (16%), rejection by
peers (14%), pressure to resign (7%) and
being treated as a traitor (14%). 10%
reported a halted career
36 Monrouxe et al.,151 UK,
Medical Education
Medical students
(29 dentistry, 13 nursing,
12 pharmacy and
15 physiotherapy)
To examine dental, nursing, pharmacy
and physiotherapy students’ narratives of
professionalism dilemmas: the types of
events they encounter (‘whats’) and the
ways in which they narrate those events
(‘hows’)
A qualitative cross-sectional study;
69 health-care students participated in
group/individual narrative interviews,
resulting in 226 personal incident
narratives that were analysed and
coded
By focusing on common professionalism
issues (including whistleblowing and
challenging) at a conceptual level,
health-care students can share experiences
through narratives. The role-playing of
idealised actions (how students wish they
had acted) can facilitate synergy between
personal moral values and moral action
enabling students to commit and recommit
to professionalism values together
37 Monrouxe et al.,82 UK,
BMJ Open
Medical students
(study 1), and nursing,
dentistry, physiotherapy
and pharmacy students
(study 2)
To understand the prevalence of health-
care students’ witnessing or participating
in something that they think is unethical
(professionalism dilemmas) during
workplace learning
Empirical
Two cross-sectional online
questionnaires; 2397 medical students
(67.4% female) and 1399 other
health-care students (81.1% female)
Students commonly encountered student
abuse and patient dignity and safety
dilemmas. Men were more likely to classify
themselves as experiencing no distress;
women were more likely to classify
themselves as distressed. While some
evidence suggested more exposure to
unethical behaviour resulted in less distress,
other evidence suggested distress increased
with increased exposure
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TABLE 8 Summary of selected empirical literature exploring whistleblowing in health care (continued )
Authors, country,
journal Health-care sector Context (aims) Method of investigation Summary of findings
38 Moore and McAuliffe,115
Ireland, Clinical
Governance: An
International Journal
Acute nursing Examination of experiences of those who
have observed and reported poor care,
and the consequences of doing so
Empirical
Exploratory quantitative study,
using data from 152 anonymous
questionnaires (26% response rate)
A total of 88% of respondents had observed
poor care in the previous 6 months, with
70% of these reporting it. Nurse managers
were more likely to report than staff nurses.
Only one in four was satisfied with how
reports of poor care were dealt with. Fear of
retribution and perceived improbability of
change were barriers to reporting
39 Moore and McAuliffe,150
Ireland, Clinical
Governance
Nursing (acute) Explore why some health-care
professionals report incidents and others
fail to do so
Data as in Moore and Auliffe115 Key findings as above, with addition that the
‘best interests of the patient’ was the key
driver for reporting
40 Newton et al.,116 Canada,
Nursing Leadership
Acute care nursing To understand nurses’ response to being
unable to blow the whistle (i.e. being
silenced)
Empirical
Qualitative and quantitative postal
survey of 374 nurses (22% response
rate)
Nurses took independent action to address
the poor care, rather than pursue official
complaint channels, or to resort to
whistleblowing, raising questions regarding
empowerment and control of health-care
employees
41 Ohnishi et al.,117 Japan,
Nursing Ethics
Psychiatric nursing Unveil the process of whistleblowing Empirical
In-depth semistructured interviews with
two psychiatric nurses who blew the
whistle on one Japanese case
National/social culture has a significant
impact on willingness to blow the whistle
Blowers required more clarity on boundaries
of acceptable behaviour
Whistleblowing process is influenced
by complex social, ethical, personal,
organisational and professional forces
42 Orbe and King,136 USA,
Health Communication
Nursing Explores the ways in which registered
nurses communicate about
organisational wrongdoing
Empirical
Critical incidents were gathered
from 202 registered nurses. An
analysis was conducted through a
phenomenological process of
description, reduction and
interpretation
Five themes emerged as central to responses
of policy violations and personal ethics in the
workplace: (1) perceptions of wrongdoing,
(2) upholding the ideals of the profession,
(3) clarity and evidence of wrongdoing,
(4) consequences of reporting and
(5) workplace dynamics
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43 Peternelj-Taylor,118
Canada, Nursing Ethics
Psychiatric nursing Discuss consequences of whistleblowing Empirical
Single case study
Speaking out requires resilience, confidence
and moral courage. Clear ethical models and
faith that organisations will respond provide
support for speaking up
44 Peters et al.,144 Australia,
Journal of Clinical
Nursing
Nurse health and
well-being
Illuminate the emotional sequelae of
whistleblowing
Empirical
Qualitative narrative enquiry. Interview
data were from 14 nurses who were
either whistleblowers or subjects of
whistleblowing complaints
Emotional health was significantly
compromised as a result of the
whistleblowing incident. The protracted
nature of resultant enquiries intensified the
emotional health consequences
45 Prang and Jelsness-
Jorgensen,119 Norway,
Geriatric Nursing
Residential care nurses Explore the barriers to incident reporting
in nursing homes compared with in
hospitals
Empirical
Semistructured interviews with
13 nurses working in nursing homes.
Qualitative thematic analysis of data
Organisational barriers were (1) lack of
support and culture, (2) unclear outcomes
and (3) unclear routines
Individual barriers were (1) fear of vilification
and conflicts, (2) lack of technological
confidence and knowledge, (3) time and
(4) assessment of degree of severity
46 Schwappach and
Gehring,120 Switzerland,
BMJ Open
Experienced oncology
doctors and nurses
To explore the experiences of staff
regarding communicating safety
concerns and to examine the situational
factors and motivations surrounding the
decision whether and how to speak up
Semistructured interviews with
32 experienced oncology health-care
professionals. Interviewees were
self-selected
Participants commonly experienced situations
that raised concerns and required questioning,
clarifying and correcting. Non-verbal
communication was often used to signal safety
concerns. Speaking up behaviour was strongly
related to a clinical safety issue. Most episodes
of ‘silence’ were connected to hygiene,
isolation and invasive procedures. However,
medication doubts and concerns were readily
raised by all. Nearly all interviewees, particularly
lower-ranking nurses, were concerned with
‘how’ to raise concerns
47 Schwappach and
Gehring,121 Switzerland,
PLOS ONE
Experienced oncology
doctors and nurses
To investigate the likelihood of speaking
up about patient safety in oncology and
to clarify the effect of clinical and
situational context factors on the
likelihood of voicing concerns
A total of 1013 nurses and doctors in
oncology rated four clinical vignettes
describing co-workers’ errors and rule
violations in a self-administered factorial
survey
While dealing with hypothetical situations,
clinicians’ willingness to speak up about patient
safety is surprisingly high, but is considerably
affected by contextual factors. Physicians and
nurses without managerial function report
substantial discomfort with speaking up
continued
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TABLE 8 Summary of selected empirical literature exploring whistleblowing in health care (continued )
Authors, country,
journal Health-care sector Context (aims) Method of investigation Summary of findings
48 St Pierre et al.,123
Germany, Der
Anaesthesist
Nurses and anaesthetists Investigate the impact of organisational
hierarchy on the voicing of concerns in
critical situations
Empirical
18 nurses and 59 anaesthetists took
part in seven simulated critical
situations
Nurses rarely (one in four) challenged
decisions they believed to be dangerous for
the patient: 37% could give no reason for
this, 35% felt that they lacked knowledge
and 12% did not feel able to challenge their
superiors
49 Stevanin et al.,122 Italy,
Nurse Education Today
Student nursing Assess students’ perceptions of their
knowledge about and competence
regarding patient safety
Empirical
A total of 574 students responded
to an Italian version of the Health
Professional Education in Patient Safety
Survey
29% of students had witnessed a safety
‘incident’, and in 96% of these incidents
students observed an ‘adverse event’ form
being completed. Most students considered
themselves to have a high degree of
knowledge and competence regarding
patient safety. Classroom and clinical settings
for learning were of equal value
50 Tabak et al.,130 Israel,
Medicine and Law
Nurses Investigate the meaning, concept and
attitude of nurses to whistleblowing
Empirical
Questionnaire distributed to
110 registered nurses
Of the nurses, 70% did not know the
meaning of whistleblowing, but 77% were
motivated to report on negligence. Most
(58%) recognised the threat to their career
of reporting and saw whistleblowing as a
last resort; 95% noted the need for clearer
reporting standards and open communication
channels
51 Tella et al.,124 Finland/
UK, Journal of Clinical
Nursing
Student nursing Explore and compare Finnish and British
nursing students’ perceptions of their
learning about patient safety in clinical
settings
Empirical
A questionnaire-based cross-sectional
comparative study of 195 Finnish and
158 British student nurses
British students perceived themselves to have
been better prepared for reporting on
patient safety by their training than their
Finnish peers. Both groups valued formal
learning over clinical settings for developing
knowledge of patient safety
52 Throckmorton and
Etchegaray,125 USA,
Journal of PeriAnesthesia
Nursing
Nursing Explore nurses’ willingness to report
(i.e. voice) errors of varying degrees of
severity and the factors that impacted
that intent
Empirical
Anonymous postal questionnaires:
411 responses (64% response rate).
Saying you would report and reporting
are very different
A majority of nurses were willing to report all
levels of errors. Primary position, reasons for
not reporting, and years since initial licensure
were predictors of intent to report incidents
with scenarios that involved no or minimal
injury to patients; 99% indicated that they
would report incidents resulting in moderate
to severe injury or death
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TABLE 9 Theoretical papers of particular significance to this study
Author/publication Profession Focus of paper Type of paper Key conclusions
Alford,320 USA, International
Journal of Health Policy and
Management
Non-specific Highlight the need for support for
whistleblowers
Discussion paper Importance of lowering the barriers to whistleblowing
Bolsin et al.,321 Australia,
Journal of Medical Ethics
Generic health care Considers the importance of consideration of
whistleblowing in medical ethics training
Theoretical paper
Considered literature and
experience from health-care
ethics education
Health-care whistleblowing should become an
essential part of health-care training. Self-reporting
via portable digital technology could help to
develop a non-punitive, personal development-
orientated culture
Delk,133 USA, Workplace
Health and Safety
Nursing (occupational
health)
Provide a guide to the legal protection afforded
to whistleblowers in different states in USA
Literature review (of state
law)
State law provides significant theoretical protection,
but such measures fail to combat the reality of
retaliation on whistleblowers by peers and
organisations who typically have negative
perceptions of the act
Elcock,322 UK, British
Journal of Nursing
Student nursing Explore how student nurses are able to raise
concerns
Discussion paper Students are well placed to notice poor care and bad
practice, but need (1) to feel welcome and secure in
their work placement, (2) to know how to report
these concerns and (3) to feel safe in doing so
Firtko and Jackson,85
Australia, Australian Journal
of Advanced Nursing
Nursing Discuss dilemmas, repercussions and
definitions of whistleblowing in relation to
nursing, and explore the role of the media
Review of literature Implies that whistleblowing occurs only when
reporting is to a person or body not normally
involved in the organisation’s normal problem-
solving strategy. Nurses’ advocacy role is vitally
important, and must be protected
Goldberg,147 Canada,
Healthcare Quarterly
Generic health care Discuss the barriers to whistleblowing in
health care
Discussion paper Seeing whistleblowing as opportunities to learn
requires cultural change in organisations
Johnstone and Kanitsaki,143
Australia, International
Journal of Nursing Studies
Nursing Understand issues surrounding self-reporting
of nursing errors
Discussion paper A ‘nursing error’ is poorly defined in the literature.
Consequences of self-reporting are often severe,
causing under-reporting, and should be viewed as
opportunities to learn
Johnstone,323 Australia,
Australasian Emergency
Nursing Journal
Nursing (emergency
room) acute??
Discuss the incidence and impact of
preventable adverse events in emergency-
room contexts, and the development of a
‘culture of safety’, drawing lessons from other
hazardous industries
Discussion paper Failure rates in other hazardous industries are
significantly lower (notwithstanding the fact that
emergency-room ‘normal’ is to service high-risk
‘customers’)
‘Culture of safety’ can be encouraged by deploying
a systems approach to clinical risk management
continued
D
O
I:10.3310/hsdr06300
H
EA
LTH
SERVICES
A
N
D
D
ELIVERY
RESEA
RCH
2018
VO
L.6
N
O
.30
©
Q
ueen
’s
Printer
and
C
ontroller
of
H
M
SO
2018.
This
w
ork
w
as
produced
by
M
annion
et
al.
under
the
term
s
of
a
com
m
issioning
contract
issued
by
the
Secretary
of
State
for
H
ealth
and
SocialC
are.
This
issue
m
ay
be
freely
reproduced
for
the
purposes
of
private
research
and
study
and
extracts
(or
indeed,
the
fullreport)
m
ay
be
included
in
professional
journals
provided
that
suitable
acknow
ledgem
ent
is
m
ade
and
the
reproduction
is
not
associated
w
ith
any
form
of
advertising.
A
pplications
for
com
m
ercialreproduction
should
be
addressed
to:
N
IH
R
Journals
Library,
N
ationalInstitute
for
H
ealth
Research,
Evaluation,
Trials
and
Studies
C
oordinating
C
entre,
A
lpha
H
ouse,
U
niversity
of
Southam
pton
Science
Park,
Southam
pton
SO
16
7N
S,
U
K
.
123
TABLE 9 Theoretical papers of particular significance to this study (continued )
Author/publication Profession Focus of paper Type of paper Key conclusions
Kelly and Jones,19 UK, Quality
in Ageing and Older Adults
Care of older people Understand the process of whistleblowing and
its role in maintaining care standards
Literature review No widely accepted theoretical framework or
conceptual underpinning for whistleblowing
An imposed, rather than chosen, route to raise
concerns
The term has attracted overwhelmingly negative
connotations
Mannion and Davies,3 UK,
International Journal of Health
Policy and Management
Generic health care Highlight that safer health care requires
cultures that support whistleblowing
Theoretical paper
Considered literature and
experience from health-care
research
Whistleblowing is a complex and ambiguous
phenomenon, and cannot be guaranteed simply by
managerial decree or policy-making
Mannion and Davies,319 UK,
International Journal of Health
Policy and Management
General health care Highlight emerging issues relating to the
challenge of whistleblowing in health care
Discussion/response paper Need for a new, socially situated research agenda
to address communication, sense-making and
judgement-making in health care and (more widely)
that will result in a reduced need for whistleblowing
Skivenes and Trygstad,131
Norway, Human Relations
Public sector Explore the findings of a Norwegian
government report on whistleblowing in the
public sector
Secondary research Findings from the study contrast with those of
international research, showing Norwegian
experiences of whistleblowing to be significantly
more positive than in many other countries.
Structures that favour a communication culture are
(in part) seen as responsible
White,324 UK, Best Practice
& Research Clinical
Anaesthesiology
General health care Discuss the development of the law and ethics
in the area of whistleblowing
Discussion paper Error is inevitable in large, complex organisations
By causing fear of personal reprisal, ‘blame culture’
leads to institutional secrecy, and reduces the
reporting of medical error, making its repetition
more likely. Centralised, voluntary, transparent,
‘blame-free’ error-reporting systems improve
(patient) safety
Whistleblowing is morally justifiable if it forces
remedial action to prevent violations and, therefore,
further identifiable patient harm
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Appendix 2 Summary of key recommendations
from the Inquiry reports
This appendix draws together and summarises the key recommendations contained within the Inquiryreports, beginning with the Kennedy report.
Kennedy5
The report presented 198 recommendations under the following themes: respect and honesty; a health
service that is well led; competent health-care professionals; the safety of care; care of an appropriate
standard; public involvement through empowerment; and the care of children.
Although there was no explicit recommendation on whistleblowing, the most relevant recommendations
appear to be the following:
l R33 – ‘a duty of candour’, meaning a duty to tell a patient if adverse events have occurred must be
recognised as owed by all working in the NHS to patients
l R39 – the framework of regulation must consist of two organisations: a Council for the Quality of
Health Care (including CHI, NICE and the proposed National Patient Safety Agency), and a Council
for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals) including the GMC and the NMC) (in effect this is
the body referred to in the ‘NHS Plan’325 as the Council of Healthcare Regulators
l R40 – the two organisations must be independent of government and report both to the DH and
to Parliament
l R45 – the doctors Code of Professional Practice, as set down in the GMC’s ‘Good Medical Practice’
should be incorporated in the contract of employment between doctors and trusts
l R46 – The relevant codes of practice for nurses, for professions allied to medicine and for managers
should be incorporated into their contracts of employment with hospital trusts or primary care trusts.
l R91 – managers as healthcare professionals should be subject to the same obligations as other healthcare
professionals, including being subject to a regulatory body, and professional code of practice
l R106 – We support and endorse the broad framework of recommendations advocated in the report
‘An Organisation with a Memory’ by the Chief Medical Officer’s expert group on learning from adverse
events in the NHS. The National Patient Safety Agency proposed as a consequence of that report should,
like all other bodies which contribute to the regulation of the safety and quality of healthcare, be
independent of the NHS and the DH
l R107 – Every effort should be made to create in the NHS an open and non-punitive environment in
which it is safe to report and admit sentinel events
l R109–112 – there should be a national reporting system
l R113–118 – there should be incentives to encourage the reporting of sentinel events, including:
¢ R113 – the reporting of sentinel events must be made as easy as possible, using all available
means of communication (including a confidential telephone reporting line)
¢ R114 – members of staff in the NHS should receive immunity from disciplinary action by the
employer or by a professional body if they report a sentinel event to the trustor to the national
database within 48 hours, except where they themselves have committed a criminal offence
¢ R115 – members of staff in the NHS who cover up a sentinel event may be subject to disciplinary
action by their employer or their professional body
¢ R116 – the opportunity should exist to report a sentinel event in confidence.
Kennedy.5 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
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Secretary of State for Health (2002)166
l R33 – A duty of candour, meaning a duty to tell a patient if adverse events have occurred, must be
recognised as owed by all those working in the NHS to patients.
¢ We agree. The broader implications for clinical negligence legislation will be addressed in the
CMO’s work on clinical negligence, leading to a White Paper early in 2002.
l R39 – The framework of regulation must consist of two overarching organisations, independent of
government, which bring together the various bodies which regulate healthcare. A Council for the
Quality of Healthcare should be created to bring together those bodies which regulate healthcare
standards and institutions (including for example, the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI),
the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and the proposed National Patient Safety
Agency). A Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals should be created to bring together
those bodies which regulate healthcare professionals (including, for example, the GMC and the
Nursing and Midwifery Council); in effect, this is the body currently referred to in ‘The NHS Plan’
as the Council of Healthcare Regulators. These overarching organisations must ensure that there
is an integrated and co-ordinated approach to setting standards, monitoring performance, and
inspection and validation. Issues of overlap and of gaps between the various bodies must be
addressed and resolved.
¢ We agree. Proposals for the creation of the Council for the Regulation of Health Care
Professionals were published for consultation in August 2001. They are designed to replace the
current fragmented arrangements and to lead to more effective co-ordination and clearer
accountability mechanisms. We plan to legislate to effect the changes in the NHS Reform and
Health Care Professions Bill.
l R40 – The two Councils should be independent of government and report both to the DH and to
Parliament. There should be close collaboration between the two Councils. The DH should
establish and fund the Councils and set their strategic framework, and thereafter periodically
review them.
¢ We agree in principle. We will establish and fund a new administrative Council for Quality of
Health Care in 2002 to ensure co-ordination between the Council for the Regulation of Health
Care Professionals and other organisations with an interest in service quality, including NICE, CHI,
NCAA and the NPSA. This will be at arm’s length from the Department of Health. The Council for
the Regulation of Health Care Professionals will be independent and report to Parliament.
l R45 – The doctors’ Code of Professional Practice, as set down in the GMC’s ‘Good Medical Practice’,
should be incorporated into the contract of employment between doctors and trusts. In the case of
GPs, the terms of service should be amended to incorporate the Code.
¢ We reject. The standard documentation for consultants’ appraisal – a contractual requirement
from April 2001 – already explicitly includes the headings set out in the GMC’s Good Medical
Practice. The same principles will apply to other NHS doctors including GPs where appraisal is
under negotiation.
l R46 – The relevant codes of practice for nurses, for professions allied to medicine and for managers
should be incorporated into their contracts of employment with hospital trusts or primary care trusts.
¢ We agree in principle. Contracts of employment for health care professionals are already based
on the premise that they are properly registered with their regulatory body. Many contracts
include this specific provision but it is implicit in all contracts of employment.
APPENDIX 2
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l R71 – In addition, a single body should be charged with the overall co-ordination of the various
professional bodies and with integrating the various systems of regulation. It should be called the
Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals. (In effect, this is the body currently
proposed in ‘The NHS Plan’, and referred to as the Council of Healthcare Regulators.)
¢ We agree. Proposals for a Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals were set out
in a consultation document Modernising Regulation in the Health Professions, published in
August 2001 and we have introduced legislation to give these effect.
l R106 – We support and endorse the broad framework of recommendations advocated in the report
‘An Organisation with a Memory’ by the Chief Medical Officer’s expert group on learning from
adverse events in the NHS. The National Patient Safety Agency proposed as a consequence of that
report should, like all other bodies which contribute to the regulation of the safety and quality of
healthcare, be independent of the NHS and the DH.
¢ We reject the recommendation that the NPSA should be outwith the NHS. It was established in
July 2001 as a Special Health Authority. This provides the independence necessary to give the
Agency credibility with patients and the public while ensuring it has the confidence of health
care staff and is able to work closely with the NHS.
l R107 – Every effort should be made to create in the NHS an open and non-punitive environment in
which it is safe to report and admit sentinel events.
¢ We agree. The work of the NPSA together with the clinical governance initiative and the
Department’s Risk Management System aims to develop a ‘just culture’ where non-punitive
reporting of adverse incidents will help to improve patient safety.
l R109 – There should a single, unified, accessible system for reporting and analysing sentinel events,
with clear protocols indicating the categories of information which must be reported to a
national database.
¢ We agree. The new national reporting system will be rolled out early in 2002.
l R113 – The reporting of sentinel events must be made as easy as possible, using all available means
of communication (including a confidential telephone reporting line).
¢ We agree. The aim is that most reports of adverse incidents to the NPSA will be transmitted
electronically. A free-phone confidential telephone line will also be established.
l R114, 115 and 117 – Members of staff in the NHS should receive immunity from disciplinary action
by the employer or by a professional body if they report a sentinel event to the trust or to the national
database within 48 hours, except where they themselves have committed a criminal offence.
l Members of staff in the NHS who cover up or do not report a sentinel event may be subject to
disciplinary action by their employer or by their professional body.
l There should be a stipulation in every healthcare professional’s contract that sentinel events must
be reported, that reporting can be confidential, and that reporting within a specified time period
will not attract disciplinary action.
¢ We agree in principle, unless for example a criminal offence has been committed, and will be
exploring, through the work of the CMO’s Committee on Clinical Negligence, how this can
be introduced.
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l R116 – The opportunity should exist to report a sentinel event in confidence.
¢ We agree. Information reported to the NPSA will be held in confidence.
Secretary of State for Health.166 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information
licenced under the Open Government Licence v3.0
Secretary of State (2007)168
Shipman, Fifth Report
l R15a – Concerns expressed about a GP by someone other than a patient or patient’s representative
(e.g. by a fellow healthcare professional) should be dealt with in the same way as patient complaints.
Such concerns should be investigated (where necessary) by the inter-PCT investigation team.
¢ Agree.
l R15b – . . . or, in a case raising difficult or complex issues, by the Healthcare Commission.
Consideration should be given to amending the relevant provisions of the draft Complaints
Regulations to permit the Healthcare Commission to accept and investigate concerns referred to
it by a PCT or healthcare body without the need for a reference from the Secretary of State
for Health.
¢ See R13 – Accept may be need to help healthcare organisations with the more complex
investigations but do not accept that an automatic referral to Healthcare Commission would
be helpful.
l R17 – In order to ensure that, so far as possible, complaints about healthcare can reach the
appropriate destinations, there should be a ‘single portal’ by which complaints or concerns can be
directed or redirected to the appropriate quarter. This service should also provide information
about the various advice services available to persons who are considering whether and/or how to
complain or raise a concern. Advice must be provided for persons who are concerned about the
legal implications of raising a concern.
¢ Accept need for support for patients who are unsure where to make a complaint. Preferred
solution is to introduce standards so that all bodies receiving complaints will forward to right
recipient and tell complainant what they have done.
l R33 – PCTs should keep a separate file for each individual GP on their lists. That file should hold all
material relating to the doctor which could have any possible relevance to clinical governance. If a
doctor moves from one PCT to another, the file (or a copy of it) should be sent to the new PCT.
¢ Accept in principle, and will take forward in discussion with stakeholders.
l R34a – Every GP practice should have a written policy, setting out the procedure to be followed by a
member of the practice staff who wishes to raise concerns, in particular concerns about the clinical
practice or conduct of a healthcare professional within the practice. Staff should be encouraged to
bring forward any concerns they may have openly, routinely and without fear of criticism.
¢ All NHS organisation should have such a policy; will discuss with stakeholders how best to
carry forward.
APPENDIX 2
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l R34b – In the event that a member of the staff of a GP practice feels unable to raise his/her concern
within the practice, s/he should be able to approach a person designated by the PCT for the
purpose. The contact details of that person should appear in the written policy. The designated
person should make him/herself known to all practice staff working in the PCT area. PCTs should
ensure, through training, that practice staff understand the importance of reporting concerns and
know how to do so.
¢ Accept in principle that an appropriate channel for such concerns should be available. Either the
PCT or SHA may have a role; will discuss further with stakeholders.
l R35 – The written policy should contain details of organisations from which staff can obtain free
independent advice. If the ‘single portal’ is created, in whatever form, the policy should set out
contact details of that also.
¢ Agree.
l R37 – Consideration should be given to amending the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 in order
to give greater protection to persons disclosing information, the disclosure of which is in the
public interest.
¢ Not persuaded that change to PIDA is needed. Will work with NHS organisations to draw up
protocols under Act which will give equivalent protection to that sought by Inquiry.
l R38 – Written policies setting out procedures for raising concerns in the healthcare sector should be
capable of being used in relation to persons who do not share a common employment.
¢ Agree.
l R39 – There should be some national provision (probably a telephone helpline) to enable any
person, whether working within heath care or not, to obtain advice about the best way to raise a
concern about a healthcare matter and about the legal implications of doing so. It might be
possible to link this helpline with the ‘single portal’ previously referred to.
¢ We will discuss with SHAs and PCTs the best way of providing a locally or regionally based
helpline for health service staff, or members of the general public, who want confidential
advice about raising concerns. This could be linked to the service described in the response to
recommendation 34.
Secretary of State for Health.168 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information
licenced under the Open Government Licence v3.0
Ayling152
(Recommendations not numbered in original report.)
l R2 – In parallel with this, we recommend that local policies within all NHS Trusts for reporting staff
concerns (whistleblowing) should specifically identify sexualised behaviour as appropriate for
reporting within the confidence of this procedure.
¢ We will follow up this recommendation.
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l R8 – We recommend that the regular reports on patient complaints and concerns made to NHS
Trust Boards and other corporate governance bodies should be structured to provide an analysis
not only of trends in subject matter and clinical area but also to indicate whether a named
practitioner has been the subject of previous complaints.
¢ We agree that clinical governance staff in healthcare organisations should analyse data on
complaints and concerns in order to identify any ‘clusters’ relating to individual health
professionals. We would not necessarily expect the individuals to be named in reports to Trust
Boards unless further investigation confirmed that there was significant cause for concern.
For doctors, the local clinical governance team will also wish to discuss with the GMC affiliate.
© Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced
under the Open Government Licence v3.0
Neale164
l R25 – The National Patient Safety Agency should take the lead in developing adverse event
reporting systems. Data taken from complaints should be integrated with and/or read alongside
other data from such sources as confidential reports on near misses, patient satisfaction surveys
and clinical and medical audit.
¢ The government agrees that it is vital for local information systems to be able to integrate
information from different sources such as complaints, clinical audit, patient satisfaction surveys
and adverse incident reports, in order to identify clusters of indicators which might point to
poor professional performance or systems failures. Some PCTs have developed impressive
‘practice profile’ systems of this kind.
¢ At present the NPSA’s core role is to collect patient safety incident data from local reporting
systems and other sources through the National Reporting and Learning System and the
Patient Safety Observatory. The Observatory analyses these incident data alongside other
national level data relevant to safety, e.g. clinical negligence claims from the NHS Litigation
Authority. In the light of the recent report Safety First the Department of Health and NPSA are
reviewing the future role of NPSA and of local patient safety action teams in encouraging the
development of integrated local systems.
l R27 – Statutory provision should be made to encourage the reporting of adverse events.
¢ The government agrees the importance of encouraging health professionals to report any
concerns about the safety of services but considers that this is better promoted by professional
ethical guidance rather than through statutory provision. A proposed ‘duty of candour’ was
rejected by Parliament during debate on the 2006 NHS Redress Act.
© Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced
under the Open Government Licence v3.0
Kerr/Haslam168
(Recommendations not numbered in original.)
l R8 – The Department of Health should develop and publish a specific policy, with practical guidance
on implementation, to guide NHS managers in their handling of allegations or disclosure of
sexualised behaviour.
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¢ The Department of Health accepts these recommendations and is asking Council for Healthcare
Regulatory Excellence to progress them as part of the project referred to in para 6.4 of this response.
l R23 – The Department of Health should urgently investigate and report upon the need for a
co-ordinated method of mandatory data collection and mandatory recording, in relation to the
area of abuse of patients by mental healthcare professionals.
¢ The Department of Health will encourage the professional regulators to carry out a
retrospective analysis of recent fitness to practice cases to determine in what proportion
boundary violations have been a factor.
l R27 – Within 12 months of publication of this Report, the Department of Health should issue
guidance as to how and where any disclosure or complaint of abuse by another healthcare
professional made to a doctor or nurse should be recorded (if at all) in the patient’s medical
records, and elsewhere.
¢ Agree in principle. The Department of Health will work with stakeholders to develop guidance
on the content of the files to be held by healthcare organisations relating to the performance
of individual professionals, including complaints and concerns. It would not normally be
appropriate for such information to be held in the patient’s clinical records and the
Department will consider, as part of the wider review of the complaints system, whether
further guidance is needed on this point.
l R30 – The current regulations relating to complaints procedures should be amended to enable any
person with a concern about the safety and effectiveness of the NHS to be allowed more readily to
use the NHS complaints procedure.
¢ The government agrees that the complaints procedure should be as simple as possible for
patients and their representatives to use; this is one of the key principles of the review of the
complaints system described in chapter 5 of this response. For people with a generalised rather
than personal concern about safety and effectiveness of the NHS a number of possible routes
are available, including the PALS services.
l R31 – The Department of Health review the effectiveness of whistleblowing policies and initiatives
within NHS-funded organisations.
¢ The government fully agrees the need to support healthcare workers who wish to raise
concerns about the services in which they work or the performance of individual professionals.
l R32 – As a matter of some urgency the NHS should clarify the context of the positive obligation of
NHS staff to inform NHS management of concerns in relation to the suspicion of the abuse of patients.
¢ This principle is already covered in ethical guidance from the professional regulators and from NCAS
[National Clinical Assessment Service]. We will discuss with the professional regulatory bodies and
universities how this duty can be further emphasised especially in undergraduate education.
l R37 – Front-line staff who receive complaints about issues which compromise patient safety –
whether or not in the confines of a therapeutic disclosure – should be under an express obligation
to report that matter to a complaints manager (in or beyond their own organisation) whether or
not they work for the organisation named in the complaint.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr06300 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2018 VOL. 6 NO. 30
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2018. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health and Social Care. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional
journals provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should
be addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
131
l R57 – In line with the recommendations of the Shipman Inquiry, a centralised database [should] be set up
which is capable of recording a range of information about the performance of individual doctors.
¢ Agree in principle. For doctors, the GMC register will act as the central depository of information
on the registration status of doctors, together with any related information including disciplinary
action by employers and alert notices. See Trust, assurance, safety.
l R70 – The NHS should adopt and reinforce the recommendations in the Manzoor Report and in
Making Amends, that there should be a duty of candour imposed on, and accepted by, NHS staff.
This duty would mean that there is a responsibility to be proactively informative with patients and
with their relatives and carers.
¢ Members of the medical, nursing and midwifery professions are already under a professional
obligation to inform patients when things go wrong during treatment. The Government made
clear in debates on the NHS Redress Act why it did not consider it appropriate to impose a
statutory duty on top of these professional obligations, and the Shipman Inquiry came to a
similar conclusion in their Fifth Report. We will discuss with the Council for Healthcare
Regulatory Excellence and the other regulators whether a similar approach could be adopted
for the other health professions.
l R73 – All Strategic Health Authorities should set up a manned telephone Helpline (perhaps called a
‘PatientLine’), where anonymised (or identified) concerns could be received and processed. Any
information received through the Helpline should be logged and received in confidence (unless
there is express identification of the caller), and if there is sufficient information disclosed, should
be discussed with the relevant NHS Trust or PCT. Consideration should be given as to how this
information could best be collated either regionally or nationally.
¢ The government believes that staff with concerns over patient safety issues should be invited in
the first instance to share their concerns in confidence with local management. We recognise
however that there are situations (not just in primary care) in which staff feel unable to raise
their concerns with the organisation in which they work. In these circumstances, the PCT or
SHA may have a role to play; we will explore this in more detail with stakeholders.
© Crown copyright.168 Contains public sector information licenced under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
Home Secretary and Secretary of State for Health167
The government proposes:
l to issue guidance on the level at which complaints should be investigated, in particular ensuring
that those which may raise more general issues about the performance or conduct of health
professionals are investigated at a sufficient level of seniority, and that complaints from more
vulnerable people who may find it difficult to articulate their true concerns are taken seriously
l to place a responsibility on PCTs to maintain an overview of complaints against GPs, including
where necessary taking over the investigation of complaints even where they were lodged with the
practice in the first instance, as recommended by the Shipman Inquiry154
l to work with the NHS to build capacity and skills in practices, PCTs and hospital trusts to
investigate serious allegations, including collaboration between PCTs where this would help to
concentrate skills and experience
l to develop more robust arrangements for the performance management of complaints handling in
healthcare organisations.
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Underpinning these specific measures, the Government proposes, as Parliamentary time allows, to
strengthen the statutory responsibility for quality of healthcare organisations, including a specific
responsibility for ensuring that lessons are learnt from medical errors and complaints. This fulfils
recommendations from the Shipman Inquiry and from the CMO’s review.
In relation to the inquiry’s fifth report, the action set out in the Government’s formal response
Safeguarding patients and in the White Paper on professional regulation Trust, assurance and safety
(see Annex B for detailed references) should be seen as a single programme of action. The overall objective
must be to ensure patient safety, and to reassure the public that in future any behaviour by health
professionals which puts that safety at risk will be swiftly identified, investigated, and dealt with. Although
the broad thrust of the action programme is clear, many issues of detail remain which the Department of
Health will need to discuss with patient, NHS, and professional groups. The Department will
l in due course publish an integrated action plan setting out a timetable for all the action envisaged
in the two documents; and
l establish a national advisory group with all relevant stakeholders to advise the Department
on implementation.
l As the Shipman Inquiry noted, it will never be possible to give absolute assurances against the
possibility of criminal action like that perpetrated by Shipman. The Government believes however
that the actions summarised in this paper
l represent a proportionate response to the challenges posed by the Shipman case
l will make it highly unlikely that any future criminal could go long without being detected; and
l will achieve this without putting undue obstacles in the way of that overwhelming majority of
health professionals who want to give the best possible service to their patients.
© Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
Francis156
R6 – The Board should review the Trust’s arrangements for the management of complaints and
incident reporting in the light of the findings of this report and ensure that it:
l provides responses and resolutions to complaints which satisfy complainants;
l ensures that staff are engaged in the process from the investigation of a complaint or an incident
to the implementation of any lessons to be learned all part of the recommendation;
l minimises the risk of deficiencies exposed by the problems recurring; and
l makes available full information on the matters reported, and the action to resolve deficiencies, to
the Board, the governors and the public.
R7 – Trust policies, procedures and practice regarding professional oversight and discipline should be
reviewed in the light of the principles described in this report.
R8 – The Board should give priority to ensuring that any member of staff who raises an honestly held
concern about the standard or safety of the provision of services to patients is supported and
protected from any adverse consequences, and should foster a culture of openness and insight.
R9 – In the light of the findings of the Next Stage Review,326 the Secretary of State and Monitor should
review the arrangements for the training, appointment, support and accountability of executive
and non-executive directors of NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts, with a view to creating and
enforcing uniform professional standards for such posts by means of standards formulated and
overseen by an independent body given powers of disciplinary sanction.
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R11 – The Board should review the management structure to ensure that clinical staff and their views
are fully represented at all levels of the Trust and that they are aware of concerns raised by clinicians
on matters relating to the standard and safety of the service provided to patients.
© Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
Francis (2013, volume 3)159
This is complex and contains multiple clauses (e.g. R1 has 4 parts; R2 has 5 requirements).
l R2 – The NHS and all who work for it must adopt and demonstrate a shared culture in which the
patient is the priority in everything done.
l R7 – All NHS staff should be required to enter into an express commitment to abide by the NHS values
and the Constitution, both of which should be incorporated into the contracts of employment.
l R12 – Reporting of incidents of concern relevant to patient safety, compliance with fundamental
standards or some higher requirement of the employer needs to be not only encouraged but
insisted upon. Staff are entitled to receive feedback in relation to any report they make, including
information about any action taken or reasons for not acting.
l R98 – (National Patient Safety Agency functions) Reporting to the National Reporting and Learning
System of all significant adverse incidents not amounting to serious untoward incidents but
involving harm to patients should be mandatory on the part of trusts.
l R109–122 – Effective Complaints handling (but not staff concerns).
l R173–184 – Openness, transparency and candour (Openness – enabling concerns and complaints to be
raised freely without fear and questions asked to be answered; Transparency – allowing information
about the truth about performance and outcomes to be shared with staff, patients, the public and
regulators; Candour – any patient harmed by the provision of a healthcare service is informed of the fact
and an appropriate remedy offered, regardless of whether a complaint has been made or a question
asked about it.)
l R173 – Every healthcare organisation and everyone working for them must be honest, open and truthful
in all their dealings with patients and the public, and organisational and personal interests must never be
allowed to outweigh the duty to be honest, open and truthful.
l R178 – The NHS Constitution should be revised to reflect the changes recommended with regard to a
duty of openness, transparency and candour, and all organisations should review their contracts of
employment, policies and guidance to ensure that, where relevant, they expressly include and are
consistent with above principles and these recommendations.
l R179 – ‘Gagging clauses’ or non disparagement clauses should be prohibited in the policies and
contracts of all healthcare organisations, regulators and commissioners; insofar as they seek, or
appear, to limit bona fide disclosure in relation to public interest issues of patient safety and care.
l R180 – Guidance and policies should be reviewed to ensure that they will lead to compliance with Being
Open, the guidance published by the National Patient Safety Agency.
l R181 – A statutory obligation should be imposed to observe a duty of candour:
¢ On healthcare providers who believe or suspect that treatment or care provided by it to a patient
has caused death or serious injury to a patient to inform that patient or other duly authorised
person as soon as is practicable of that fact and thereafter to provide such information and
explanation as the patient reasonably may request;
¢ On registered medical practitioners and registered nurses and other registered professionals who
believe or suspect that treatment or care provided to a patient by or on behalf of any healthcare
provider by which they are employed has caused death or serious injury to the patient to report
their belief or suspicion to their employer as soon as is reasonably practicable. The provision of
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information in compliance with this requirement should not of itself be evidence or an admission
of any civil or criminal liability, but non-compliance with the statutory duty should entitle the
patient to a remedy.
Francis.11 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
Secretary of State for Health185
This document accepted recommendation 2 on a shared culture; accepted in principle recommendation 7,
that all NHS staff should be required to enter into an express commitment to abide by the NHS values and
the Constitution, both of which should be incorporated into the contracts of employment; and accepted
recommendation 12, that reporting of incidents of concern relevant to patient safety needs to insisted on.
It accepted in principle recommendation 98, that reporting to the National Reporting and Learning System
of all significant adverse incidents should be mandatory on the part of trusts. It accepted most of the
recommendations on openness, transparency and candour, but accepted in principle recommendation 178
on incorporating the NHS Constitution into contracts of employment, and recommendation 181 on a
statutory obligation to observe a duty of candour on health-care providers, and on registered medical
practitioners and registered nurses and other registered professionals. However, it did not accept
recommendation 183 of a criminal offence for any registered medical practitioner, or nurse, or allied
health professional or director of an authorised or registered health-care organisation to make untruthful
statements, although it agreed ‘with the intention behind this recommendation’.
The document makes clear which recommendations have been accepted and by whom and what progress
is being made towards their implementation. The DHSC will lead the system in providing an annual report
on progress across the system each autumn. The Health Select Committee confirmed in its third report,
After Francis: Making a Difference,182 published in September 2013, that it agreed with the inquiry’s
recommendation that it should monitor the implementation of all of Francis’ recommendations:
l R2 – The NHS and all who work for it must adopt and demonstrate a shared culture in which the
patient is the priority in everything done.
¢ Accepted.
¢ We are putting in place legal changes that place a statutory duty of candour on healthcare
providers and which create a new offence of providing false or misleading information. We
believe that the combination of positive reinforcement of the value of openness with sanctions
for the most serious failings in candour and honesty will support the NHS to become a far more
open culture than the one examined by the Inquiry’s report.
l R7 – All NHS staff should be required to enter into an express commitment to abide by the NHS values
and the Constitution, both of which should be incorporated into the contracts of employment.
¢ Accepted in principle.
l R12 – Reporting of incidents of concern relevant to patient safety, compliance with fundamental
standards or some higher requirement of the employer needs to be not only encouraged but
insisted upon. Staff are entitled to receive feedback in relation to any report they make, including
information about any action taken or reasons for not acting.
¢ Accepted.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr06300 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2018 VOL. 6 NO. 30
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2018. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health and Social Care. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional
journals provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should
be addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
135
l R98 – Reporting to the National Reporting and Learning System of all significant adverse incidents
not amounting to serious untoward incidents but involving harm to patients should be mandatory
on the part of trusts.
¢ Accepted in principle. Reporting of patient safety incidents involving severe harm and death is
already mandatory nationally under the Care Quality Commission regulations and these incidents
are actively reviewed by NHS England as well as being shared with the Care Quality Commission.
The Government’s current policy is not to introduce a mandatory reporting system at this stage
however the Government does agree there should be a new duty on providers to be candid to
patients (as set out in recommendation 174) and more should be done to promote the reporting
of all patient safety incidents among healthcare professionals (as set out in recommendation
181). The National Reporting and Learning System already receives over 1.2 million incident
reports a year and NHS England continues to encourage increased reporting from across the
healthcare system. Indicator 5.1 of the NHS Outcomes Framework requires that the NHS
continues to increase the numbers of incidents that are reported to the National Reporting and
Learning System as this is a good indication of the development of a mature patient safety
culture where organisations are open about incidents. NHS England will continue to drive
the development of the safety culture within the NHS, not least by implementing relevant
recommendations from the Berwick report. Organisations should routinely collect, analyse and
respond to local measures that serve as indicators of the level of quality and safety of healthcare,
including the voices of patients and staff, staffing levels, the reliability of critical processes
and other quality metrics. As stated in recommendation 97, the Chief Inspector of Hospitals’
assessment will include an inspection for patient safety which will inform the ratings of all NHS
providers and the Care Quality Commission and NHS England will work closely together to share
information, including reported incidents from the National Reporting and Learning System,
to support Care Quality Commission’s surveillance and inspection.
Secretary of State for Health.185 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced
under the Open Government Licence v3.0
Openness, transparency and candour
The Inquiry identified the principles of openness, transparency and candour as the ‘cornerstone
of healthcare’.
The Government has introduced a new statutory duty of candour on providers that will ensure
patients are given the truth when things go wrong, and that honesty and transparency are the norm
in every organisation.
In April, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013202 strengthened the position of
whistleblowers so that an individual now has the right to expect their employer to take reasonable
steps to prevent them suffering detriment from a co-worker as a result of blowing the whistle. The
Government now requires the inclusion of an explicit clause in compromise agreement to make it clear
that staff can make a protected disclosure in the public interest, and the Care Quality Commission is
using staff surveys and the whistleblowing concerns it receives as part of the data in its new intelligent
monitoring system. Since September the Care Quality Commission’s new inspection system includes
discussions with hospitals about how they deal with, and handle, whistleblowers.
l R173 – Every healthcare organisation and everyone working for them must be honest, open and
truthful in all their dealings with patients and the public, and organisational and personal interests
must never be allowed to outweigh the duty to be honest, open and truthful.
¢ Accepted.
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l R174 – Where death or serious harm has been or may have been caused to a patient by an act or
omission of the organisation or its staff, the patient (or any lawfully entitled personal representative
or other authorised person) should be informed of the incident, given full disclosure of the
surrounding circumstances and be offered an appropriate level of support, whether or not the
patient or representative has asked for this information.
¢ Accepted.
Secretary of State for Health.185 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced
under the Open Government Licence v3.0
The Secretary of State for Health legally required NHS England to insert a contractual duty of candour
into the NHS Standard Contract in 2013–14. This means that NHS Trusts and Foundation Trusts are
contractually required to operate a duty of candour. The contract also refers organisations to the Being
Open framework that was first produced by the National Patient Safety Agency.
The Government has also introduced in the Care Bill a new requirement for a statutory duty of candour
and this will be included as a new registration requirement for health and social care providers registered
with the CQC.
l R178 – The NHS Constitution should be revised to reflect the changes recommended with regard to
a duty of openness, transparency and candour, and all organisations should review their contracts
of employment, policies and guidance to ensure that, where relevant, they expressly include and are
consistent with above principles and these recommendations.
¢ Accepted in principle.
While we generally agree with the importance of these recommendations, The NHS Constitution
focuses specifically on setting out the values of the NHS along with the rights and pledges to
patients and staff, and their responsibilities. As it is not intended to address organisational
reporting processes and interactions with regulatory bodies, it is not considered appropriate to
reflect these issues in The NHS Constitution. We do not think that including a duty of openness,
transparency and candour into contracts of employment is relevant, not least because of the
difficulty in defining these terms for contractual purposes.
l R179 – ‘Gagging clauses’ or non disparagement clauses should be prohibited in the policies and
contracts of all healthcare organisations, regulators and commissioners; insofar as they seek, or
appear, to limit bona fide disclosure in relation to public interest issues of patient safety and care.
¢ Accepted. We understand the critical importance of fostering and sustaining an open culture
in which concerns about care can be raised, investigated and acted upon without fear of
retribution. Our policy is clear that any attempts to prevent individuals from speaking out in
the public interest will not be tolerated. NHS guidance has been consistently clear that local
policies should prohibit the inclusion of confidentiality clauses in contracts of employment and
compromise agreements which seek to prevent an individual from making a disclosure in
accordance with the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA). We are, however, also aware that
some confidentiality clauses that may make some people feel as though they are being
‘gagged’ even though they are not. Such clauses, although not illegal, may have what is
known as a ‘chilling effect’ on some people. We now therefore require the inclusion of an
explicit clause in the compromise agreement to make it absolutely clear to staff signing an
agreement that they can make a disclosure in the public interest in accordance with PIDA,
regardless of what other clauses may be included in the agreement.
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l R180 – Guidance and policies should be reviewed to ensure that they will lead to compliance with
Being Open, the guidance published by the National Patient Safety Agency.
¢ Accepted.
l R181 – A statutory obligation should be imposed to observe a duty of candour:
¢ On healthcare providers who believe or suspect that treatment or care provided by it to a
patient has caused death or serious injury to a patient to inform that patient or other duly
authorised person as soon as is practicable of that fact and thereafter to provide such
information and explanation as the patient reasonably may request.
¢ On registered medical practitioners and registered nurses and other registered professionals
who believe or suspect that treatment or care provided to a patient by or on behalf of any
healthcare provider by which they are employed has caused death or serious injury to the
patient to report their belief or suspicion to their employer as soon as is reasonably practicable.
The provision of information in compliance with this requirement should not of itself be
evidence or an admission of any civil or criminal liability, but non-compliance with the statutory
duty should entitle the patient to a remedy.
¢ Accepted in principle.
The Government agrees that the professional values of individual clinicians are critical in ensuring
an open culture in which mistakes are reported, whether or not they cause actual harm. General
Medical Council, Nursing and Midwifery Council and other professional regulators will be
working to agree consistent approaches to candour and reporting of errors, including a common
responsibility across doctors and nurses, and other health professions to be candid with patients
when mistakes occur whether serious or not, and clear guidance that professionals who seek to
obstruct others in raising concerns or being candid would be in breach of their professional
responsibilities.
l R183 – It should be made a criminal offence for any registered medical practitioner, or nurse,
or allied health professional or director of an authorised or registered healthcare organisation:
¢ knowingly to obstruct another in the performance of these statutory duties;
¢ to provide information to a patient or nearest relative intending to mislead them about such
an incident;
¢ dishonestly to make an untruthful statement to a commissioner or regulator knowing or
believing that they are likely to rely on the statement in the performance of their duties.
¢ Not accepted, however we agree with the intention behind this recommendation.
Secretary of State for Health.185 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information
licenced under the Open Government Licence v3.0
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Appendix 3 Legal review
This appendix provides additional supporting material for the legal review contained in Chapter 5.
Extract from the Employment Rights Act 2006190
s43G A qualifying disclosure is made in accordance with this section if –
S43G (a) . . .
(b) [the worker] reasonably believes that the information disclosed, and any allegation contained in it,
are substantially true,
(c) he does not make the disclosure for purposes of personal gain,
(d) any of the conditions in subsection (2) is met, and
(e) in all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable for him to make the disclosure.
(2) The conditions referred to in subsection (1) (d) are –
(a) that, at the time he makes the disclosure, the worker reasonably believes that he will be subjected to
a detriment by his employer if he makes a disclosure to his employer or in accordance with section 43F,
(b) that, in a case where no person is prescribed for the purposes of section 43F in relation to the
relevant failure, the worker reasonably believes that it is likely that evidence relating to the relevant
failure will be concealed or destroyed if he makes a disclosure to his employer, or
(c) that the worker has previously made a disclosure of substantially the same information –
(i) to his employer, or
(ii) in accordance with section 43F.
(3) In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) (e) whether it is reasonable for the worker to
make the disclosure, regard shall be had, in particular, to –
(a) the identity of the person to whom the disclosure is made,
(b) the seriousness of the relevant failure,
(c) whether the relevant failure is continuing or is likely to occur in the future,
(d) whether the disclosure is made in breach of a duty of confidentiality owed by the employer to any
other person,
(e) in a case falling within subsection (2)(c)(i) or (ii), any action which the employer or the person to
whom the previous disclosure in accordance with section 43F was made has taken or might
reasonably be expected to have taken as a result of the previous disclosure, and
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(f) in a case falling within subsection (2) (c) (i), whether in making the disclosure to the employer the
worker complied with any procedure whose use by him was authorised by the employer.
Employment Rights Act 2006.190 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced
under the Open Government Licence v3.0
Extracts from the Council of Europe recommendation CM/REC (2014)
Council of Europe250
The normative framework should reflect a comprehensive and coherent approach to facilitating public
interest reporting and disclosures.
8. Restrictions and exceptions to the rights and obligations of any person in relation to public interest
reports and disclosures should be no more than necessary and, in any event, not be such as to defeat
the objectives of the principles set out in this recommendation.
9. Member States should ensure that there is in place an effective mechanism or mechanisms for
acting on public interest reports and disclosures.
10. Any person who is prejudiced, whether directly or indirectly, by the reporting or disclosure of
inaccurate or misleading information should retain the protection and the remedies available to him or
her under the rules of general law.
11. An employer should not be able to rely on a person’s legal or contractual obligations in order to
prevent that person from making a public interest report or disclosure or to penalise him or her for
having done so.
Channels for Reporting and Disclosure should be established and should comprise:
– reports within an organisation or enterprise (including to persons designated to receive reports
in confidence);
– reports to relevant public regulatory bodies, law enforcement agencies and supervisory bodies;
– disclosures to the public, for example to a journalist or a member of parliament.
Whistleblowers should be entitled to have the confidentiality of their identity maintained, subject to
fair trial guarantees.
21. Whistleblowers should be protected against retaliation of any form, whether directly or indirectly,
by their employer and by persons working for or acting on behalf of the employer. Forms of such
retaliation might include dismissal, suspension, demotion, loss of promotion opportunities, punitive
transfers and reductions in or deductions of wages, harassment or other punitive or discriminatory
treatment.
Reproduced with permission from the Council of Europe250
European Union statements concerning treatment of whistleblowers in
European Union institutions
Obligations are placed on officials or civil servants within the EU requiring them to report fraud, corruption
and other illegal activities. There are positive obligations to disclose and also protections given to those
who make such disclosures.
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Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and
the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community
and the European Atomic Energy Community327
Any official who, in the course of or in connection with the performance of his duties, becomes aware
of facts which give rise to a presumption of the existence of possible illegal activity, including fraud
or corruption, detrimental to the interests of the Union or of conduct relating to the discharge of
professional duties which may constitute a serious failure to comply with the obligations of officials of
the Union shall without delay inform either his immediate superior or his Director-General or, if he
considers it useful, the Secretary-General, or the persons in equivalent positions, or the European
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) direct.
Information mentioned in the first subparagraph shall be given in writing.
This paragraph shall also apply in the event of serious failure to comply with a similar obligation on the
part of a Member of an institution or any other person in the service of or carrying out work for an
institution.
2. Any official receiving the information referred to in paragraph 1 shall without delay transmit to
OLAF any evidence of which he is aware from which the existence of the irregularities referred to
in paragraph 1 may be presumed.
3. An official shall not suffer any prejudicial effects on the part of the institution as a result of having
communicated the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, provided that he acted reasonably
and honestly.
4. Paragraphs 1 to 3 shall not apply to documents, deeds, reports, notes or information in any form
whatsoever held for the purposes of, or created or disclosed to the official in the course of,
proceedings in legal cases, whether pending or closed.
EUR-Lex.255 Reproduced with permission. © European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/, 1998–2018
Article 22b goes on to provide that:
1. An official who further discloses information as defined in Article 22a to the President of the
Commission or of the Court of Auditors or of the Council or of the European Parliament, or to the
European Ombudsman, shall not suffer any prejudicial effects on the part of the institution to which
he belongs provided that both of the following conditions are met:
(a) the official honestly and reasonably believes that the information disclosed, and any allegation
contained in it, are substantially true; and
(b) the official has previously disclosed the same information to OLAF or to his own institution and has
allowed OLAF or that institution the period of time set by the Office or the institution, given the
complexity of the case, to take appropriate action. The official shall be duly informed of that period of
time within 60 days.
EUR-Lex.255 Reproduced with permission. © European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/, 1998–2018
In 2013 the European Parliament called on the European Commission to introduce a legislative proposal
to create effective and comprehensive protection for whistleblowers in both the public and private
sectors. Although there have been subsequent calls for the EU to take forward such proposals, this
has not happened to date, although there is some recognition of whistleblowing by, for example, the
EU ombudsman.
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Comparative whistleblowing approaches in European countries
Although, as set out above in this appendix, there have been recommendations at EU and Council of
Europe level, to date European nation states’ approaches are governed by their domestic jurisprudence.
A comprehensive overview and analysis of the state of whistleblowing laws in G20 countries is given by
Wolfe et al.247 and that of European countries by Transparency International.328 Here we explore some
notable examples of the different approaches taken to whistleblowers across European states to provide
potentially useful comparisons with/contrasts to the UK position. The focus here on European states
reflects the fact that Council of Europe member states are affected by the same fundamental human rights
norms as stated in the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights. What is striking is the diversity in
approaches across states. Transparency International, in a report published in 2013, divided EU countries
into three categories.328 The first were those countries with advanced protection. These include the UK,
Luxembourg, Romania and Slovenia. Today the Republic of Ireland can also be included in that list with
its Protected Disclosures Act 2014, aspects of which are considered below and in the main body of this
report. The second category concerns partial protection provided for whistleblowers in a countries laws;
this includes countries such as Austria, Belgium, France and Germany. The third category comprises
countries where there is no protection for whistleblowers or, where such protection exists, it is exceedingly
limited in nature. Within each category, the application of applicable legal principles may also be affected
by questions of existing substantive law, including such things as fundamental principles of human rights.
What is notable is that the UK provides a much more comprehensive framework than is the case in
relation to many other European states.
In relation to the first category, the UK’s PIDA was the first major piece of legislation in this area. The first
protection in continental Europe was that provided in Romania in 2004, where a Whistleblower Protection
Act was enacted that applies to government employees. In 2010, Hungary passed legislation that governs
whistleblowing in both public and private sectors. In Ireland, broad legislation was enacted in 2014 that is
modelled on the UK approach but goes considerably beyond it in scope and in the level of safeguards
provided to those who blow the whistle.186 The backdrop to the Irish legislation was that of high-profile
scandals in relation to clergy, banking, police and health care. Ireland now has legislation that provides
some safeguards to whistleblowers in the form of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014,307 which amends
the Unfair Dismissal Act 1977.329 There are notable similarities to the approach taken in the UK legislation
but also some sharp differences, as the Act provides greater safeguards not only in relation to unfair
dismissal but also in relation to other forms of litigation; these are discussed in Chapter 5 of the report.
The second category noted above concerns partial protection; this operates, for example, in France,
where there are a series of limited safeguards in specific contexts.330 Here, between 2007 and 2014,
five separate pieces of legislation were adopted in relation to public and private sectors facilitating
some disclosures in the context of grave risks to health, environment and matters of corruption. There is
now a new law known as Sapin 2 (Act is No 2016–1691 of 9 December 2016). This strengthens the
law concerning corruption. Chapter II of the Act provides enhanced protection for whistleblowers who
revealing crimes, breach of ratified and approved international commitments or serious breaches of law or
serious threats/harms to the public interest. In addition, although French civil servants are obliged in law to
disclose crimes and other offences, when they have knowledge of them, to the state prosecutor, at the
same time there are no specific protections given to them, which has led to individuals losing employment
or to those who remain in employment being ostracised.328 Protection is given in French labour law to
disclosures in the context of corruption and, in addition, the courts have protected whistleblowers through
the use of freedom of expression principles.330 However, in some instances, data protection provisions have
been used to inhibit whistleblowing.330
In Austria, the Public Service Law has since 2012 contained specific protection from discrimination provisions,
which are the first specific provisions in relation to whistleblowing. In addition, the Labour Law safeguards
employees from dismissals that have the effect of violating Austria’s basic social principles, which include the
principle of freedom of speech.328 In Bosnia and Herzogovina, the Law on Whistleblower Protection in the
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Institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina includes a provision enabling employees to be given whistleblowing status
through pre-emptive action by applying to the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and Co-ordination of Fight
Against Corruptions, which has to respond to the request within 30 days. If such status is given, then this prevents
a state institution from undertaking action against an employee who has reported corruption under the law.
This is a potentially powerful provision and there is nothing comparable currently in UK law.
In Germany, there are conflicting attitudes to whistleblowers and indeed historically very negative language has
been used to describe whistleblowers.331,332 As noted in the main text of the report, whistleblowers have brought
ECHR challenges under Article 10. Article 4 of the Grungesetz – the Constitution – provides that there is a
freedom of conscience, of information and of expression with a right to petition. This includes rights to bring
requests to complaints to government agencies. There is a constitutional principle of indirect third-party effect,
such that a court would be required to make reference to human rights provisions when they are interpreting
general Civil Code clauses. In addition, it has been said that the Labour Act provides that discrimination should be
forbidden by a certain allowed exercises of rights. However, there are rights to disclose externally [e.g. in the area
of health and safety law [section 17(2) 1, Employment Protection Act)]. Other protections also exist in relation to,
for example, information being provided to external authorities in the context of money laundering.332 In Croatia,
there is no general whistleblowing law at present, but certain specific protections are given to those who
reveal corruption.333
Finally, there remain some member states, such as Portugal, where there is minimal or non-existent
protection.328 It appears that in relation to these European countries to date, none has any extensive
empirical research on the impact of whistleblowing specifically in the health-care context.
Extracts from Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998249
The Articles set out below are from Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act and are relevant provisions of the
Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that
legislation must be interpreted and given effect to in a manner compatible with Convention rights.
Quotations in this section are reproduced from the Human Rights Act 1998.249 © Crown copyright. Contains
public sector information licenced under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Article 8
Right to respect for private and family life
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 9
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
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Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 10
Freedom of expression
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises.
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to
such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence,
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
If there is breach of one of the substantive articles of the Convention, as set out above and there is in
addition an allegation of discrimination then an additional claim may also be brought under Article 14
as set out below.
Article 14
Prohibition of discrimination
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
The duty of candour
Extracts from Regulation 20 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated
Activities) Regulations 2014273
l (1) [Registered persons] must act in an open and transparent way with relevant persons in relation
to care and treatment provided to service users in carrying on a regulated activity.
l (2) As soon as reasonably practicable after becoming aware that a notifiable safety incident has
occurred a [registered person] must –
¢ (a) notify the relevant person that the incident has occurred in accordance with paragraph
(3), and
¢ (b) provide reasonable support to the relevant person in relation to the incident, including
when giving such notification.
l (3) The notification to be given under paragraph (2)(a) must –
¢ (a) be given in person by one or more representatives of the [registered person],
¢ (b) provide an account, which to the best of the [registered person’s] knowledge is true, of all
the facts the [registered person] knows about the incident as at the date of the notification,
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¢ (c) advise the relevant person what further enquiries into the incident the [registered person]
believes are appropriate,
¢ (d) include an apology, and
¢ (e) be recorded in a written record which is kept securely by the [registered person].
l (4) The notification given under paragraph (2)(a) must be followed by a written notification given
or sent to the relevant person containing –
¢ (a) the information provided under paragraph (3)(b),
¢ (b) details of any enquiries to be undertaken in accordance with paragraph (3)(c),
¢ (c) the results of any further enquiries into the incident, and
¢ (d) an apology.
l (5) But if the relevant person cannot be contacted in person or declines to speak to the
representative of the [registered person] –
¢ (a) paragraphs (2) to (4) are not to apply, and
¢ (b) a written record is to be kept of attempts to contact or to speak to the relevant person.
l (6) The [registered person] must keep a copy of all correspondence with the relevant person under
paragraph (4).
Health and Social Care Act 2008.273 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information
licenced under the Open Government Licence v3.0
Guidance on the duty of candour has been produced by the GMC and Nursing and Midwifery
Council.267,274 This emphasises that patients must ‘be fully informed’ about their care (paragraph 6).267,274
The statements in relation to information provision reflect existing law concerning consent to treatment.
It stipulates that it is relevant where something has gone wrong and harm has resulted (paragraph 8).267,274
Onus is placed on the health professional or on someone in their team to speak to the patient; the
guidance notes that ‘the most appropriate team member will usually be the lead or accountable clinician’
(paragraph 9).267,274 This should be done as soon as possible and, moreover, the guidance states that:
You should share all you know and believe to be true about what went wrong and why, and what the
consequences are likely to be. You should explain if anything is still uncertain and you must respond
honestly to any questions. You should apologise to the patient.
Paragraph 11.267,274 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
When patients do not want more information, this option should still be raised with the patient. Their
wishes should be respected ‘as far as possible’ and their decision should be recorded (paragraph 12).267,274
It is also the case that individuals are not expected to take responsibility for things that are not their fault,
but there is an expectation that an individual will receive an apology from an appropriate team member.
This could lead to interesting and difficult dynamics in relation to who provides the apology if a range of
different people’s actions have contributed to the harm caused (paragraph 15).267,274 The guidance states
that patients expect three things in relation to an apology:
a. what happened
b. what can be done to deal with any harm caused
c. what will be done to prevent someone else being harmed.
Paragraph 13267,274 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
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At the same time it states that this does not constitute legal liability (paragraph 14).267,274 It may also
amount to evidence of insight at a professional practice panel (paragraph 14).267,274 While it is suggested
that a formulaic response to apologising is not being encouraged, the guidance does provide some
structured criteria in relation to apologies such as comprehensible information, delivered in a manner
respecting of privacy/dignity as appropriate and that a personalised approach can be ‘more meaningful’
rather than a ‘generalised expression of regret’ (paragraph 16).267,274 The guidance also notes the need to
be open and honest in relation to those close to the patient if the patient has died or harm of such a
severe nature has been suffered such that they are unlikely to regain decision making capacity (paragraph
17).267,274 Emphasis again is placed on appropriate sensitivity being used and appropriate support being
given (paragraphs 18 and 19).267,274 The guidance makes reference to the ‘near miss’, which is defined as
being ‘an adverse incident that had the potential to result in harm but did not do so’ (paragraph 20).267,274
The guidance states that professional judgement is to be exercised as to whether or not patients are
told but that there can be some circumstances in which if patients are not told then this could damage
their trust and confidence in the team (paragraphs 20 and 21).267,274 It is likely that these could prove
challenging questions for clinical teams in the future. The guidance makes express reference to the need
to encourage ‘a learning culture by reporting errors’ (paragraph 22 onwards).267,274 It is stated that:
When something goes wrong with patient care, it is crucial that it is reported at an early stage so that
lessons can be learnt quickly and patients can be protected from harm in the future.
Paragraph 22267,274 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
Moreover, it is stated that health-care organisations are required to have policies in relation to the
reporting of adverse incidents and near misses (paragraph 23).267,274 The guidance notes existing reporting
systems (paragraph 24);267,274 these are referenced above in relation to health and safety considerations.
The guidance notes the need for organisation support, and critically states that:
Your organisation should support you to report adverse incidents and near misses routinely. If you do
not feel supported to report, and in particular if you are discouraged or prevented from reporting,
you should raise a concern in line with our guidance.
Paragraph 26267,274 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
This demonstrates that raising issues under the duty of candour will necessitate internal whistleblowing.
Moreover, the guidance goes on to state:
You must not try to prevent colleagues or former colleagues from raising concerns about patient
safety. If you are in a management role, you must make sure that individuals who raise concerns
are protected from unfair criticism or action, including any detriment or dismissal.
Paragraph 27267,274 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
Essentially, the guidance means that the GMC and NMC are recognising the need to safeguard those who
blow the whistle. Furthermore, specific responsibilities are placed on those nurses, midwives and doctors
with management responsibilities, as well as on ‘senior or high profile clinicians’ (paragraphs 29 and
30).267,274 Here, duties are set out very clearly:
Senior clinicians have a responsibility to set an example and encourage openness and honesty. In
reporting adverse incidents and near misses. Clinical leaders should actively foster a culture of learning
and improvement.
Paragraph 29267,274 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
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If you have a management role or responsibility, you must make sure that systems are in place to give
early warning of any failure, or potential failure, in the clinical performance of individuals or teams.
These should include systems for conducting audits and considering patient feedback. You must make
sure that any concerns about the performance of an individual or team are investigated and, if
appropriate, addressed quickly and effectively.
Paragraph 30267,274 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
The onus is, thus, on the management in terms of both setting the tone and developing culture, but in
addition, and importantly, making sure that the appropriate systems are in place. This again illustrates
that health professionals in such a situation have a dual role: as health professionals with responsibility
in relation to their professional code and as employees who are managers.
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Appendix 4 Summaries of key Inquiry reports
This appendix provides a summary of inquiries and reports, from Bristol Royal Infirmary5 to the Francis2Freedom to Speak Up review, and the responses of the main stakeholders to these reports. For each
report, information is presented on issues such as who was the whistleblower, how and why did they ‘blow
the whistle’, what factors did or could facilitate or inhibit the action and what were the consequences for the
whistleblower? For each response, attention is focused on the recommendations of the associated inquiry.
Kennedy
This was a public inquiry set up in 1998,5 with the terms of reference to inquire into the management of
the care of children receiving complex cardiac surgical services at Bristol Royal Infirmary between 1984 and
1995; to make findings as to the adequacy of the services provided; to establish what action was taken both
within and outside the hospital to deal with concerns raised about the surgery; to identify any failure to take
appropriate action promptly; to reach conclusions from these events; and to make recommendations that
could help to secure high-quality care across the NHS (p. 1). In particular, it examined high mortality rates,
focusing on two main surgeons, Mr Wisheart and Mr Dhasmana. It was estimated that during the period
1991–5, between 30 and 35 more children aged under 1 year died after open-heart surgery in the Bristol
unit than would be expected had the unit been typical of other paediatric cardiac surgery (PCS) units in
England at the time (p. 2). The report stressed that it is ‘not an account of bad people’ (p. 1), but a ‘tragedy
born of high hopes and ambitions and peopled by dedicated hard-working people’ (p. i). However, Mr Wisheart,
Mr Dhasmana and CEO Dr Roylance were found guilty of serious professional misconduct in 1998 (p. 25).
The report stated that it would be reassuring to think that it could not happen again. ‘We cannot give that
reassurance. Unless lessons are learned, it certainly could happen again’ (p. i).
Blowing the whistle
The main whistleblower was Dr Steve Bolsin, a consultant anaesthetist. However, the term ‘whistleblower’
was mentioned only once, where it was stated that had PIDA been in force it would not have applied to
Dr Bolsin as he did not make a ‘qualifying statement’ (p. 160). Dr Bolsin was appointed as consultant
anaesthetist in September 1988, and soon began to have concerns about the duration of operations
and the consequent effect on outcomes (p. 136). Dr Bolsin began to gather data in 1989. He wrote to
Dr Roylance in 1990, with copies sent to the Chair of the Health Authority and the Chair of Her Majesty’s
Courts service. Dr Bolsin was called to Mr Wisheart’s office and rebuked for taking information about PCS
to ‘outsiders’, including apparently the CEO. A copy was also sent to the chairperson of the division of
anaesthetics, Dr Williams, who stated that ‘No one supported the way in which Steve Bolsin had raised
the issue but all were fully supportive of his efforts to obtain appropriate data to assess the situation more
accurately in an endeavour to improve results’. At a meeting in 1991, Dr Bolsin said that he was told
to ‘keep his head down’ (p. 138). In 1991, he showed his data to Professor Prys-Roberts (Professor of
Anaesthesia, and later President of the Royal College of Anaesthetists 1994–7), who advised him to collect
more data. In 1993, a report was shared with colleagues in the Department of Anaesthesia, but not
with the surgeons Mr Wisheart or Mr Dhasmana. In the autumn of 1991, Dr Bolsin spoke to the director
of anaesthetics and medical director of a neighbouring hospital, Dr John Zorab, who sent a letter to
Sir Terrence English, President of the Royal College of Surgeons of England (1989–92) (p. 139). In 1992,
Private Eye published articles about the Bristol PCS. A concerned parent read the article and contacted
the NHS Management Executive. Mr Wisheart drafted a letter stating that results at Bristol were good.
In April 1992, Dr Bolsin met Dr Phil Hammond, whom he regarded as a ‘concerned trainee GP’, and who
was, unknown to Bolsin at that time, the author of the Private Eye articles (p. 141). In late 1993, Bolsin
spoke to Dr Jane Ashwell, a senior medical officer at the DHSC (p. 145), and in July 1994 Dr Bolsin gave
data to Dr Peter Doyle, a senior medical officer at the DHSC, who ‘did not look at the data’ and ‘filed the
document’ (p. 148). In December 1994, 18-month-old Joshua Loveday was scheduled to have a switch
operation performed by Mr Dhasmana. On 6 January 1995, Professor Angelini tried to persuade Mr Wisheart
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that it would not be wise for the operation to go ahead, which he claims was the first time that he recalls an open
expression of concern about PCS. A clinical meeting on 11 January decided that the operation should go ahead,
and on 12 January Joshua Loveday died following surgery (p. 149). Later in January, an external independent
inquiry was set up. In February, Mr Wisheart claimed he first heard about Dr Bolsin’s audit data (p. 150).
The report examined ‘Dr Bolsin’s actions’ (pp. 159–62). In 1988, he approached the problem as a clinical
issue within his own division. In 1990, in a ‘rather oblique’ approach, he sent a letter to the CEO. In 1991
he raised his concerns at a meeting of cardiac anaesthetists who ‘were supportive of his concerns, though
critical of the manner of his approach’. In late 1991, his concerns became known to anaesthetists outside
University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust; to Dr Phil Hammond in April 1992; to surgical colleagues
other than those whose work gave rise to his concerns in 1993; and to senior medical officers in the DHSC
in 1993–5. The report stated that Dr Bolsin’s role has been lionised by those who were critical of the PCS
service, and attacked by those who support the Bristol surgeons. He did not follow the ‘Three Wise Men’
route advised by the DHSC, which is ‘not surprising’ as this route was perceived as dealing primarily with
individual clinicians whose performance was affected by problems such as ill health, and Mr Wisheart
would have been one of the ‘Three Wise Men’. It concluded that ‘In addition to the contacts Dr Bolsin
made, there was no other obvious route for raising questions about quality of care’.
Factors
The report pointed to a ‘club culture’, an imbalance of power with too much control in the hands of a few
individuals (p. 2). Career development depended on ‘fit’ within the club rather than performance, and any
challenge to policy was regarded as disloyalty (p. 201). It discussed the structural and individual elements
of hierarchies that prevented open discussion (pp. 161–2). This included the difficulty of an anaesthetist
being critical of a surgeon, particularly a senior figure such as Mr Wisheart. ‘In our view, the possibility
of such open discussion was barred by the firmly held views of Mr Wisheart’. For example, one witness
reported that when Professors Angelini and Farndon tried to raise concerns with Mr Wisheart, he spoke
to them ‘like a couple of schoolboys’ (p. 161). He encountered the ‘territorial loyalties and boundaries
within the culture of medicine and the NHS, and also the realities of power and influence’ (p. 161). It was
‘understandable’ that Dr Bolsin did not approach Mr Wisheart, a senior figure of whom he was in some
awe, and probably some fear. However, it was less clear and ‘unfortunate’ why he did not approach
Mr Dhasmana. In general, Dr Bolsin’s path was therefore ‘understandable’, and ‘in summary, while Dr Bolsin’s
actions may not always have been the wisest, and sometimes he gave mixed signals . . . he persisted, and was
right to do so’.
More widely, other anaesthetists shared his concerns, and a number of attempts were made to bring those
concerns to the attention of Dr Roylance and Mr Wisheart, by the anaesthetists clinical director, Dr Monk
(p. 173). According to Kennedy,5 many staff, particularly junior staff, remained silent in the face of poor
care or wrongdoing as they were fearful of raising concerns and/or challenging superiors because of the
possible repercussions: ‘There is a real fear among staff (particularly among junior doctors and nurses) that
to comment on colleagues, particularly consultants, is to endanger their future work prospects. The junior
needs a reference and a recommendation; nurses want to keep their jobs. This is a powerful motive for
keeping quiet’ (p. 273).
The report regarded it as ‘significant’ that it was not heard that concerns were brought to senior figures by
the nursing staff. This was not due to ‘any lack of concern; but illustrating a larger truth of the hierarchical
system that made it difficult for nursing staff to voice concerns and be heard (p. 175). For example, one
witness described a ‘culture of fear’, with Director of Operations and Nursing Advisor, Mrs Maisey, being
described as ‘the Rottweiler of the Trust’ (p. 171). In short, nursing staff were let down by a culture that
excluded them (p. 176).
Consequences for the whistleblower
There is nothing in the report on this issue. According to Hammond and Bousfield,161 Dr Bolsin was a
hero; yet the medical and managerial establishments turned against him for exposing how dangerous and
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self-protective they were. They continued that Bolsin, a leading thinker in patient safety, would have been
a huge asset to the NHS had he not been ostracised and briefed against. At a European cardiac surgeons
meeting, he was described as ‘the most hated anaesthetist in Europe’ and found himself unemployable in
the NHS. He left the UK in 1995 to work – very successfully – in Australia. At a patient safety conference
on 23 October 2013, Dr Bolsin was awarded the Royal College of Anaesthetists Medal in recognition of
the work that he has done to promote safety in anaesthesia.162
Consequences for the NHS
The report presented 198 recommendations, with the caveats that ‘there are no right answers; just, perhaps,
less wrong answers’, ‘cultural and institutional change takes time and can be slow’, and ‘there are no quick
fixes’. The recommendations were classified under the following themes: respect and honesty; a health
service that is well led; competent health-care professionals; the safety of care; care of an appropriate
standard; public involvement through empowerment; and the care of children. Although there was no
explicit recommendation on whistleblowing, a number of recommendations foreshadowed some of those
of later reports, such as ‘a duty of candour’ to patients (recommendation 33), a framework of regulation
independent of government (recommendations 39–40), doctors’ Code of Professional Practice incorporated
in the contract of employment (recommendation 45), a regulatory body, and professional code of practice
for health-care managers (recommendation 91), a national reporting system (recommendations 109–112),
and incentives to encourage the reporting of sentinel events (recommendations 113–118).
More generally, stress was placed on changing the ‘culture of the NHS’. For example, the culture of
the future must be a culture of safety and quality and a culture of openness and accountability (p. 13).
Learning from error rather than seeking a person to blame had to be the priority (p. 11). However,
although there were flaws with the hospital, its organisation and culture and the wider NHS, there were
individuals who ‘should and could’ have behaved differently (p. 9). Finally, there had to be more openness
(p. 3). Although the term was not used, the importance of ‘soft’ evidence or intelligence was stressed.
Concerns, albeit without ‘hard evidence’, had been raised as early as 1986–7, with Emeritus Professor
Andrew Henderson distributing a letter at a meeting of the South Glamorgan Health Authority that ‘it is
no secret that their [UBH’s paediatric cardiac] surgical service is regarded as being at the bottom of the UK
league for quality’ (p. 134), and in June 1987 BBC Wales broadcast the programme ‘Heart Surgery – The
Second Class Service’ (p. 135). The hospital’s own data showed the unit’s high mortality figures, but these
were disregarded or explained away. In short, Bristol was ‘awash with data but was, at the same time,
singularly uninformed’ (p. 176).
In 2001 the Secretary of State for Health announced the setting-up of three separate, independent
statutory inquiries,152,153,164 none of which was to be held in public, which became known as the ‘three
inquiries’. They had broadly similar terms of reference, which required in each case an investigation of
how the NHS locally had handled complaints about the performance and/or conduct of the doctors.
Quotations in this section are reproduced from Kennedy.5 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector
information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Ayling152
This was one of the three inquiries announced in 2001, and on 6 September 2002 the Secretary of State
for Health announced that Anna Pauffley QC (later The Honourable Mrs Justice Pauffley) would chair this
inquiry. In 1998, Clifford Ayling was arrested and charged with indecently assaulting former patients. In
2000, he was convicted on 12 counts of indecent assault, relating to 10 female patients, and sentenced to
4 years’ imprisonment. His name was placed indefinitely on the Sex Offender’s Register under the Sex
Offenders Act 1997. In 2001, the professional conduct committee of the GMC determined that Ayling’s
name should be erased from the Medical Register.
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Blowing the whistle
Ayling worked in hospitals and as a GP. Although some midwives at Thanet had concerns during 1975–88,
only one written record of staff complaints was found, which is indicative of the contemporaneous culture
within the profession to rely on informal mechanisms for raising concerns about a colleague (p. 37). Midwife
Delphine Bentley wrote a complaint in 1984, but it would appear that this resulted in no action of any kind.
It appears that the serious failure of the senior staff and management at Thanet and King’s College Hospital
to recognise and address concerns about Ayling’s conduct resulted from inadequate communication within
the professional hierarchies (p. 43). There was also an incident at Thanet Antenatal Clinic in 1980 when,
according to Sister Penny Moore’s account, she was called urgently by a nurse chaperone at a postnatal
examination, and, on entering the room, found Ayling masturbating while carrying out a vaginal
examination on a young woman. She asked the patient’s consultant, Mr Fullman, to come to the hospital
immediately and told him that she did not want Ayling at the clinic again. However, some time later, the
other consultant, Mr Paterson, reintroduced Ayling to the clinic. The report considers that the incident
reported by Penny Moore clearly warranted an immediate investigation and action at the highest level,
including – if substantiated – dismissal and referral to both the police and the GMC. This could have ended
Ayling’s career 20 years before he finally ceased to practise. ‘We deplore that fact that no such investigation
was undertaken’ (p. 45).
Ayling became a GP in 1981, and remained in general practice until 2000. In 1991 a patient made a
complaint to Kent Police about the way he had examined her at his surgery. Ayling was ultimately tried
and convicted of indecent assault against the patient in 2000. In 1991 the Crown Prosecution Service took
the decision not to prosecute, but brought to the attention of the Family Health Services Authority by a
letter from Kent Police (p. 63). The report stated that it was clear that the incident had not been taken
sufficiently seriously by the Family Health Services Authority’s senior management and that there had been
a significant failure on their part to ensure appropriate investigative or supervisory action (p. 64).
From 1985 until Ayling’s conviction in 2000, a succession of patients transferred from his practice to a
neighbouring surgery. It turned out that many female patients referred, in more or less explicit terms, to
apparent misconduct by Ayling in the context of breast and vaginal examinations (p. 65). Two partners,
Dr Pickering and later Dr Anderson, conducted the ‘transfer interviews’ (p. 66). It was not until late 1993
that Dr Pickering decided to approach the Kent Local Medical Committee, after further discussions with
his partners. A few months later, he was told that there was no need for the committee to do anything,
as the William Harvey Hospital, which employed Ayling as a part-time clinical assistant, had received
complaints of a similar nature and was taking action (p. 69). By 1998 Dr Anderson had become sufficiently
concerned to telephone his Medical Defence Organisation. He was told that, unless a patient came
forward to complain, there was little he could do. He subsequently spoke to Dr Snell, the European Kidney
Health Alliance’s medical advisor, on 5 November 1998, and thereafter became involved in the ongoing
police investigation (p. 71).
Factors
The report pointed to the ‘individuals who could and should have acted on the information then available’,
and identified a number of missed opportunities from 1971 until 1998 when concerns and complaints
about Ayling might have been acted on (p. 109). It looked at some of the underlying causes within the
culture and systems of the NHS in those years, which seem to us to be as significant in the creation of
the missed opportunities and perhaps even more so than the actions of individuals at the time.
It stated that patients were reluctant to complain, and there was an almost complete lack of support
available to patients who might have wanted to raise a concern. Doctors were believed over patients or
other staff: the fear that patients had, namely that their word would not be believed, was not unjustified
(p. 113). There was a lack of a truly inquisitive or inquisitorial approach, as well as a defensive response to
complaints, which was a product of a culture that saw complaints as a challenge, rather than a source of
information and an opportunity to learn from that information (p. 113).
APPENDIX 4
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
152
It discussed a number of issues such as clinical freedom and self regulation; staff hierarchies; lack of
openness; a failure to hear; lack of clear professional guidance; preference for the use of informal systems;
lack of information sharing or ‘corporate memory’; barriers to making complaints – staff and colleagues;
the lack of gathering and sharing ‘soft’ information; and lack of procedures for raising concerns.
However, the single most important barrier to staff such as nurses and midwives formally expressing their
concerns about Ayling was the absence of any formal procedure for doing so (p. 138), and it was not
until 1993 that formal guidance was given to the NHS on concerns at work. Until 1995, the GMC route
was ambiguous and suggested that reporting concerns about a fellow doctor should be tempered with
caution about denigration and defamation (p. 138). Moreover, a repeated theme during the inquiry was
the need to capture ‘soft’ or informal information that fell short of a formal complaint, and an ‘open and
fair culture’ would have encouraged staff to speak up about the activities they had witnessed (p. 155).
The inquiry quoted some optimistic witnesses who considered that things had changed for the better in
terms of speaking up about any concerns, and stated that ‘whilst substantial improvement is still needed,
NHS staff are increasingly willing to speak up for patient safety, even at some personal risk’. However ‘it
would take considerable courage on their part to use a whistleblowing policy, especially in light of the
reported accounts we heard of Ayling’s aggressive denial of questionable conduct and practice (p. 159).
Moreover, ‘the impact of the Government’s plans and investment in health services has dramatically
altered the landscape of the NHS. At an organisational level, it is almost unrecognisable as the NHS in
which Ayling practised’. However, it was too early to conclude that, if individual patients should encounter
another Ayling, particularly in the general practice setting, the improved systems were yet fully developed
that would enable their concerns to be heard and acted on (p. 163).
Consequences for the whistleblower
There appeared to be no consequences for the whistleblower.
Consequences for the NHS
The report produced 19 recommendations on ‘sexualised behaviour’ (recommendations 1–2), ‘listening
and hearing’ (recommendations 3–4), ‘complaints procedures’ (recommendation 5), ‘tracking repeated
complaints and concerns’ (recommendations 6–8), ‘sole practitioners’ (recommendations 9–10), ‘chaperones’
(recommendations 11–13), ‘local medical committees’ (recommendations 14–15) and ‘criminal investigations’
(recommendations 16–19). Only one of these (recommendation 2) was concerned with whistleblowing: ‘we
recommend that local policies within all NHS Trusts for reporting staff concerns (whistleblowing) should specifically
identify ‘sexualised behaviour’ as appropriate for reporting within the confidence of this procedure’ (p. 22).
Quotations in this section are reproduced from Ayling.152 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector
information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Neale164
In 1985 Richard Neale was erased from the Canadian Medical Register following a disciplinary hearing,
but in 1984 he was offered employment by the Yorkshire Regional Health Authority, working at Friarage
Hospital and Darlington Memorial Hospital, and, after reorganisation in 1992, by Northallerton Health
Services NHS Trust, where later that year he was appointed Clinical Director of Obstetrics and Gynaecology.
In 1993, media stories revealed that he had been struck off in Canada in 1985, and had been involved
in an incident at a public toilet in Richmond, Yorkshire, for which he had been cautioned by the police. In
December 1993 Dr Richard Peterson headed an investigation panel into these disclosures, resulting in Neale
being demoted from his post as clinical director. In 1995 the trust decided to set up a disciplinary hearing
into various allegations concerning his conduct and activities. It was decided to negotiate a severance
package, and he left the trust’s employment after a year’s sabbatical, but was subsequently employed by
two hospitals in Leicester and the Isle of Wight.
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The Regional Chief Medical Officer, Liam Donaldson, first became aware of clinical concerns about
Richard Neale in late January 1998, when a BBC regional television programme made revelations about
Neale involving women who had been treated by him in North Yorkshire. On 12 June 1998, an alert
letter was sent out by the Northern and Yorkshire Regional Office to NHS health authority and trust chief
executives about Richard Neale, at the instigation of Professor Donaldson and Dr Cresswell. On 25 July 2000,
the GMC erased Richard Neale’s name from the Register (p. 15).
Blowing the whistle
Although there was a paper on whistleblowing shared with other inquiries, and a seminar on supporting
staff in raising concerns about colleagues, the inquiry contained little on whistleblowing.
Factors
The report stated that both the system and those working in it were not operating as effectively as they
should have been to guarantee patient confidence and patient safety.
The report considered that between 1985 and 1997 there were systems failures within the employment
and complaints procedures within the NHS, and, very importantly, failures within other professional bodies
on which the NHS was dependent. A sense of complacency undoubtedly contributed to what occurred,
and there remained an urgent need for a root-and-branch change in attitudes and culture within the NHS.
However, the most perplexing aspect was that Neale had been struck off in Canada, but was able to
retain his licence to practise medicine in the UK (p. 13).
The 1995 investigation covered a number of concerns: inappropriate leave, lack of supervision of junior
staff, clinical mismanagement and working relationships with colleague. The 2004 report concluded
that staff were, to a considerable degree, in awe of Mr Neale and felt unable to challenge his clinical
competence even if they had had grounds to do so. His personality made him difficult to challenge (p. 180).
The trust pointed to the ‘cardinal rule’ of going through the proper channels ‘. . . you must resist the
temptation to do things by the back door!!’ The report considered that this could be viewed as an
inhibiting message to staff faced with problems about a more senior member of staff and reflected a
culture described by many staff of a reticence to raise concerns about Neale, which would make it
extremely difficult for patients to raise concerns or complaints, and echoes a comment heard in the
evidence: ‘we have no complaints at the Friarage’ (p. 199).
Consequences for the whistleblower
There appears to be no whistleblower.
Consequences for the NHS
The report produced 27 recommendations, but none had much relevance to whistleblowing. However,
it appeared to suggest the optimistic message that, even before the inquiry began, many of the wider
lessons had been learnt and change had been implemented (p. 180).
Quotations in this section are reproduced from the Richard Neale Inquiry.164 © Crown copyright. Contains
public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Kerr/Haslam153
This report was concerned with understanding the problem of the sexual abuse of psychiatric patients.
William Kerr started working as a locum senior house officer in psychiatry at Clifton Hospital in York in
1965, was appointed as consultant in 1967 and retired in 1988. The first complaint against Kerr in
North Yorkshire was in 1965, his very first year in the post, and evidence received indicated that 38 former
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patients claimed that they had made disclosures to NHS staff of sexualised behaviour by William Kerr
before his retirement. Not one of these led to any investigation of his practice (p. 6).
Michael Haslam took up his post as consultant in psychological medicine at Clifton Hospital, York,
and Harrogate District Hospital in 1970. In 1974, the first complaint (of which the inquiry was aware)
concerning Michael Haslam was brought to the attention of a local GP (p. 8). The inquiry received
evidence indicating that at least eight patients had, during Haslam’s time in York, raised concerns about
his alleged sexual advances towards them (p. 294). In 2000, Kerr was convicted (in his absence, on a Trial
of the Facts) of one count of indecent assault, and in 2003 Haslam was convicted of four counts of
indecent assault (a conviction of rape was quashed on appeal) (p. 4).
The inquiry posed the central questions:
l How could it be that the voices of the patients and former patients of William Kerr and Michael Haslam
were not heard?
l Why were so many opportunities to respond and investigate missed?
l How could it happen that the abuse of patients, evidenced by the convictions of William Kerr and
Michael Haslam, went undetected for so long? (pp. 4–5).
The report stated that the story was one of management failure, failed communication, poor record-
keeping and a culture in which the consultant was all-powerful. It argued that many ignored ‘warning
bells’ or dismissed rumours, and some chose to remain silent when they should have been raising their
voices. Although the majority stood back, there were, as in all such stories, some who stepped forward,
but even those lone voices were not heard. Above all it was an account of psychiatric patients, many in
number, whose concerns and complaints fell on ‘deaf ears’ (p. 5).
The inquiry stated that the overall picture was one of failure, or missed opportunities, over a number of
years. The first serious investigation into William Kerr’s practice was in 1997, almost 10 years after he had
left the NHS. In relation to Michael Haslam, the Manzoor inquiry took place in 1998, again almost 10 years
after he left the North Yorkshire NHS. Moreover, a failure to react and investigate has emerged as a
common theme in reports such as Shipman,154 Ayling152 and Neale164 (pp. 466–7).
However, the report also struck an optimistic tone, claiming to detect a significant change – beginning in
the 1990s and carrying through to the present day – in both attitudes and systems. Many professionals
who gave evidence to the inquiry describing their response to concerns and complaints in the 1970s and
1980s stated that they would act differently now. Not only was there a willingness to change, but there
are now in place systems throughout the NHS – some say too many – that treat the patient as consumer,
entitled to be dissatisfied and to express their dissatisfaction (p. 16). Colleagues reporting concerns about
fellow colleagues has become much more widely accepted as a result of the Bristol Royal Infirmary inquiry
and of the multiple deaths of vulnerable older patients in the case of Harold Shipman (p. 663), and that
there have been signs that professional loyalty as previously understood is no longer an acceptable barrier
to protecting patient safety (p. 664).
However, the report concluded that change of culture is at the heart of real change. Whatever the systems
in place, if those who operate them at all levels are not focused on patient safety, then other factors,
other pressures, will prevail (p. 808). Individuals with the attitudes and responses reflected in some of the
evidence given to the inquiry create a culture that is infectious and leave a legacy that cannot be changed
overnight (p. 811). The inquiry feared that all of its concerns had not been addressed: ‘There may have
been recent wake-up calls – recognised in this and several other Inquiries. But the tendency of institutions
to develop a culture of accepting, or denying the existence of, the unacceptable has not fundamentally
changed’ (p. 810).
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Blowing the whistle
The most determined and persistent whistleblower was Deputy Sister Linda Bigwood. However, others
who raised concerns included Community Psychiatric Nurse Stephen Brooks, and newly appointed
consultant psychiatrist at the Friarage Hospital in Northallerton, Dr Christopher Simpson, in October 1987.
The inquiry also discussed GPs, each of whom to a greater or lesser extent sought to pass on their concern
and, in modern terminology, ‘blow the whistle’: Dr Wade (on Kerr in 1979), Dr Moroney (on Haslam in
1987) and Dr Moran (on Haslam in 1988) (p. 431). These clear instances of GPs taking action to pursue
concerns ‘represented the minority’; the more characteristic picture was of GPs who were well aware of
patient concerns about the practices of Kerr and/or Haslam, and did nothing or very little (p. 415). The
inquiry suggest some temporal dimension in that the responses of Doctors Moroney and Moran to a
complaint about Michael Haslam show a markedly different approach from that of many of the GPs
who were the recipients of concerns a decade or more earlier (p. 439).
Kerr
In 1983 an account of an alleged sexual relationship between a psychiatric patient, Patient A17, and her
treating consultant, William Kerr, was disclosed to Deputy Sister Bigwood: not by way of complaint, but
as part of the patient’s life story. Unlike so many of her colleagues, she was not prepared to ‘turn a blind
eye’, and pursued her concerns about Kerr’s alleged sexual misconduct towards not only Patient A17 but a
number of patients, with the hospital authorities, the district health authority and, beyond that, with the
regional health authority.
Perhaps as a result of COHSE’s involvement, the focus was on ‘the grievances of Linda Bigwood’, and
there was a failure to focus on the patient safety issues raised by the extremely serious allegations against
William Kerr. In concentrating on the messenger, the substance of the message was both lost and ignored
(p. 189). An inquiry, chaired by Mr Ray Wilk, the director of nursing services (mental illness), entirely
excluded from its remit the most concerning aspect of Linda Bigwood’s complaint, namely that a
consultant psychiatrist was allegedly sexually abusing his female patients and that knowledge of these
allegations was widespread among other health-care professionals (p. 236). Despite letters and meetings
setting out Bigwood’s concerns over a period of almost 5 years and involving the most senior NHS
managers, and despite the support of her union representatives, no investigation was ever made into
Kerr’s practice.
This can be contrasted with the complaint against Michael Haslam in 1974, when Patient B1 informed her
GP, Dr Foggitt, that (allegedly) she had been having an affair with Michael Haslam. However, in a pattern
that echoed the response to complaints regarding Kerr, this was never pursued either by the patient
herself or by Dr Foggitt as a formal complaint or as an issue that needed to be reported to health service
management (p. 9). The report continues that the stories of Haslam and Kerr, perhaps inevitably, overlap.
Indeed, Linda Bigwood, whose efforts as a whistleblower were concentrated on William Kerr, also brought
concerns about Michael Haslam to the attention of management (p. 10).
The report noted that a significant number of concerns, whether or not raised as formal complaints, were
voiced but not heard. In the period before 1983, of the 30 concerns alleged to have been raised about
William Kerr all but one fell (below) on deaf ears (p. 7). It stated that the response of GPs, who in many
instances were the first and often only recipient of concerns expressed by patients of Kerr and Haslam, was
varied (p. 11). The first complaint concerning Haslam of which the inquiry was aware was communicated
to Dr Foggitt. In the same way as GPs had failed to forward their concerns about Kerr to any higher
authority, Dr Foggitt (although he took steps to refer his patient, Patient B1, to another consultant)
did not seek to inform the authorities of Haslam’s alleged sexual relationship with Patient B1. However,
the later complaints against Haslam, arising in 1987 and 1988, provoked a very different response from
Dr Moroney and Dr Moran, which is perhaps explicable by the gradual change of culture that had
occurred by this stage (p. 12).
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The failure by the local GPs to respond is a striking feature of the William Kerr story (p. 12). One of the
potentially most alarming aspects of Linda Bigwood’s written complaint was the suggestion that rumours
of William Kerr’s alleged abuse of female patients were well known to GPs in Harrogate, to the extent
that some would no longer refer young female patients to him (p. 209). The report found only one
instance of a GP, Dr Wade, taking any active steps to pursue a complaint about Kerr in 1979 (p. 12). This
was the case of Patient A222. However, ‘it is one of the great ironies in this account that the consultant to
whom Dr Wade chose to speak about his concerns regarding William Kerr was Michael Haslam’. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, given his attitude to sexual contact between patients and doctors, Haslam did not take the
matter any further (p. 7).
What was revealed by the Patient A17 story was a disturbing picture of inaction, or part action, amounting
in the end to a total failure by hospital staff and administrators to investigate the allegations against
William Kerr (despite Linda Bigwood’s dogged pursuit of the issue). As was later recognised by the health
authorities in written submissions to the inquiry, Bigwood was ‘courageous, persistent and determined in
her fight to have a proper investigation into Patient A17’s allegations to her’. The inquiry concluded that
Bigwood deserved a better hearing (p. 175).
Haslam
On 26 September 1988, Patient B7 informed community psychiatric nurse Stephen Brooks that she had
had problems with Michael Haslam and was frightened to see him. Brooks was clear in his evidence that
he had a duty to take this matter further and that he explained this duty to Patient B7. This is in marked
contrast to the evidence of some other witnesses, who told us that they felt so constrained by patient
confidentiality that they could not pass on the concerns. The clarity of Brooks’ evidence as to his duty to
inform where there is potential risk to patients serves to highlight the confusion which then (and probably
now) exists as to what should be done in such circumstances (p. 342).
On 28 September 1988, Patient B7 told Brooks that she had told her GP, Dr Moran, that Haslam had been
unprofessional and that she ‘just froze’. Dr Moran spoke to his GP partners and contacted Brooks. Moran
and Brooks met on 29 September 1988 to discuss the matter and took the decision to inform Dr Kennedy,
CEO of the DHA (p. 343). Dr Kennedy later returned Dr Moran’s telephone call and Dr Moran formed the
impression that a decision had been taken that Haslam would be asked to resign. However, Patient B7
did not want to take the matter further (p. 344). At the criminal trial, Patient B7 indicated that that she
considered that her complaint would be considered by the ‘authorities at Bootham Park’ and that the
police would be involved (p. 346).
At the end of 1997, Professor Sir Liam Donaldson, then Regional Director NHS Executive Northern and
Yorkshire, set up an inquiry into the allegations of sexual misconduct against Haslam between 1984 and
1988, chaired by Mrs Zahida Manzoor, Regional Chairperson, NHS Executive Northern and Yorkshire
(p. 384). Haslam was dismissed from his post at South West Durham Mental Health NHS Trust in September
1998 following the production of the Manzoor Report (p. 393). The police had decided not to proceed with
laying charges against Haslam, but in September 1997 the police reopened their investigations in relation
to Haslam on receipt of further evidence from Patient B7. Owing to Patient B7’s reluctance to proceed to
give evidence in court, the police were forced to discontinue their investigations in November 1997, without
laying charges (p. 395).
However, the report points to the first ‘whistleblower’. In 1964, Dr Mathewson, a GP practising in
Northern Ireland, ignored express pressure that he should not give evidence against a colleague, and
pursued a complaint by a young female patient against Kerr. Dr Mathewson gave evidence at a disciplinary
tribunal, with the result that Kerr’s career in Northern Ireland came to an end. It is a sad fact not only that
Kerr was able to evade the consequences of the disciplinary hearing by relocating to England, but that
once in England there was not a single GP who displayed the fortitude of Dr Mathewson in pursuing any
one of the many complaints against William Kerr to the logical conclusion of any form of disciplinary
(p. 446).
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Factors
The report pointed to an ‘unhealthy’ culture in which professionals were reluctant to take action against
consultants, through either a misguided sense of loyalty or fear of confrontation. Administrators felt
powerless, and devised mechanisms to protect themselves, rather than the patients or those who raised
concerns. Sadly, some of the failure arose because it was easier, and perhaps professionally safer, to do
little or nothing at all (p. 13). The report categorised the root causes of this comprehensive failure to
attend to patient concerns under five headings: organisational, cultural, structural, professional practice
and individual failings. It pointed to the key factors explaining GPs’ lack of response: the ‘old-boy network’
or professional loyalty; isolation of GPs; tolerance of sexualised behaviour; insufficient expertise in
psychiatry; confidentiality; the power of consultants; and an ambivalent attitude to relationships between
doctors and patients.
Rather unusually, compared with other reports, the inquiry stressed the importance of individual ‘agency’
as opposed to collective, structural factors. It stated that it accepted as broadly correct the following
summary from the submissions made on behalf of the health authorities:
The reason why a consultant was able to continue in practice and assault his patients . . . was a
mixture of a flawed structure, poor procedures, systems failures, individual and collective failures in an
institution that was created at a time when to most, if not all, people the idea that patients might
need protection from doctors was unthinkable.
pp. 214–15
However, with different emphasis on ‘individual and collective failures’, this summary broadly accords
with the submissions made on behalf of the former patients of both Kerr and Haslam (volume 2, p. 801).
As the counsel for the patients put it to the inquiry:
For the main part, we do not say are system failures, they are personality failures, where patients
were so short-changed by individuals, not by the system: the system worked in 1966 [a reference to
Northern Ireland], the system could have worked if individual doctors, GPs, had taken extra steps.
Volume 2, p. 802153
Consequences for the whistleblower
Shortly after she had passed on Patient A17’s disclosure, Linda Bigwood was informed that she was to be
moved from Ash Tree House Ward, an acute admissions ward, to Rosedale Ward, a geriatric ward. She viewed
this move as a demotion and felt that she was being punished for raising Patient A17’s disclosure (p. 181).
The inquiry pointed to ‘some courageous individuals’ who spoke out and raised their concerns. Some did
so being new into their jobs and not steeped in the culture of ‘the way we do things around here’, such
as Dr Simpson, a new consultant psychiatrist, who was able to raise concerns and suffer no detriment to
his position. Others, such as Linda Bigwood, were not so fortunate (volume 2, p. 664). Bigwood – as with
many other so-called ‘whistleblowers’ – in personally raising the issue of how the complaints were handled
suffered professional detriment (p. 8).
Consequences for the NHS
The report recommended that the DHSC should review the effectiveness of whistleblowing policies
and initiatives within NHS-funded organisations (p. 29); that the NHS should adopt and reinforce the
recommendations in the Manzoor report and in Making Amends; that there should be a duty of candour
imposed on, and accepted by, NHS staff (p. 36); and that all SHAs should set up a manned telephone
helpline, through which anonymised (or identified) concerns could be received and processed (p. 66).
It stated that health professionals acting as Linda Bigwood did should be regarded as people to be treated
positively and given support. They are not threats to the NHS, but the essential catalysts that will bring
about better patient care and better patient protection (p. 20). There must be a ‘change of ethos’,
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which can be promoted in three ways: education, promoting the obligation to speak out and promoting
knowledge and skills. Patient safety requires a culture in which speaking out (whether or not categorised
as whistleblowing) is welcomed. The NHS must fully support its staff, who in turn must be left in no doubt
that the culture of turning a blind eye is unacceptable, and that to stay silent may be to perpetuate and
thus participate in wrongdoing. There should be no career detriment for those who speak out to promote
patient safety (p. 21). Enabling staff to feel able to raise these concerns constructively, so that something is
done and they (as the whistleblower) are not victimised either by the individual they raise concerns about
or the wider staff team, remains a challenge in the modern-day NHS. It is one thing for a policy to be put
in place and quite another to establish a culture that supports, enables and encourages staff to raise their
concerns (p. 664).
Quotations in this section are reproduced from The Kerr/Haslam Inquiry.153 © Crown copyright. Contains
public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Shipman154
The Shipman Inquiry consists of six reports, with the main material about whistleblowing in volume 5.
Harold Shipman was a GP who was convicted in 2000 of murdering 15 patients, and of forging a will.
However, the inquiry identified 215 victims, but ‘the true number is far greater and cannot be counted’154
(volume 1, p. 202). It considered that:
it is deeply disturbing that Shipman’s killing of his patients did not arouse suspicion for so many years.
Had it not been for Shipman’s grossly incompetent forgery of Mrs Grundy’s will, it is by no means
clear that his crimes would ever have been detected.
Volume 1, p. 200154
When it came to light at his trial that, in 1976, Shipman had been convicted of offences of forgery,
unlawful possession pethidine and obtaining pethidine by deception, ‘many people began to ask how
it was that he had been able to return to unsupervised general practice in 1977, just over a year later’,
and how his repeated killing of patients had escaped the notice of the authorities. From 1977, Shipman
worked at the Donneybrook practice in Hyde, Greater Manchester, until in late 1991 he set up as a
single-handed practitioner (volume 5, p. 1).
Blowing the whistle
The inquiry tried to avoid using the expression ‘whistleblowing’ wherever possible (p. 319). It noted that
there were a number of missed opportunities to raise concerns. In 1976, the GMC allowed Shipman to
continue to practise. In 1994, Shipman gave a gross overdose of diamorphine to a 46-year-old patient,
who later died in Tameside General Hospital. Both of the consultants in charge did not report the event
and ‘must be criticised’ for their failure to report Shipman’s actions, but this is ‘tempered’ because the
culture within the profession at the time was that to report a colleague was ‘not done’, and many doctors
throughout the country would have failed to act, as these two doctors did. Moreover, it was most unlikely
that Shipman would have been erased from the medical register (p. 22). Over the years some people
(e.g. two home helps, a taxi driver and a niece of one of the victims) had concerns, but did not report
them. ‘There must not be a word of criticism of these people for what, on the face of it, appears to be
failure to raise serious concerns in the appropriate quarter’ (p. 319).154 The only other person who had
attempted to raise a concern was Mrs Christine Simpson, the resident manager of Ogden Court, a
sheltered housing development in Hyde, who in 1995 or 1996 tried to alert her line manager (p. 24).
Funeral director Mrs Deborah Bambroffe mentioned concerns to GP Dr Susan Booth, which contributed
to the raising of anxieties within the Brooke Practice and led, some time later, to GP Dr Linda Reynolds’
report to the Coroner. He passed the information to the police. Unfortunately, the first police investigation
resulted in the conclusion that the concerns were without foundation. Dr Reynolds made her report to the
Coroner based on two particular grounds for concern: the large number of cremation Forms B, and the
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unusual characteristics of deaths, namely that the deceased persons were elderly women who had been
found dead at home, apparently alone and fully dressed, and did not appear to have been ill (volume 2, p. 1).
In short, the inquiry considered that before March 1998, when Dr Reynolds reported her concerns, very few
people had had any concerns about Shipman (p. 24). The inquiry considered that none of these persons were
‘whistleblowers’ per se, as they did not work within the same organisation as Shipman, but were merely voicing
their concerns to those who they felt were the appropriate authorities. Another feature that set those people
apart from the typical ‘whistleblower’ was the fact that most of them were far from confident that their concerns
were justified (volume 5, p. 318).
Factors
The inquiry reviewed the history of the raising of concerns in the health sector (including DHSC guidance
in 1993; a checklist from the second Nolan Report of 1996; and fresh DHSC guidance in 1999, following
the coming into force of PIDA) and considered that further impetus towards a culture of open reporting
within the NHS came from the report of the Bristol inquiry (pp. 329–31).
It noted that although it had always been possible for a doctor who was concerned about the treatment
given to a patient by another doctor to report his or her concerns about that treatment to an appropriate
authority, the culture was that it was ‘not done’. Even with revised GMC guidance in the early 1990s,
‘the old culture lingered on’. The inquiry was told that the culture had not changed until the events that
had occurred at Bristol Royal Infirmary came to light, but ‘[e]vidence received by this Inquiry suggests that,
in some quarters, it survives even today’ (p. 20).
Evidence given to the inquiry suggested that nurses faced particular difficulty in reporting concerns
about doctors, although they had found it rather easier to report concerns about members of their own
profession. Both the Bristol Inquiry report and the Ledward Inquiry report said that the culture in medicine
inhibited the proper reporting of concerns by nurses about doctors (p. 336).
The inquiry pointed to factors that may inhibit reporting, including the unclear duty to report; the fear
of being accused of disparagement; the ‘one-off’ or ‘genuine’ mistake; the insufficiency of evidence;
ignorance of procedures (p. 288–300); the fear of being seen as a troublemaker or ‘maverick’; the fear of
recriminations; a concern that making a report might lead to proceedings for defamation; and a feeling of
impotence grounded in the belief that, even if the report is made, nothing will be done about it. ‘Such
fears may be well founded’ as the experience of Dr Stephen Bolsin (Bristol, above) ‘demonstrated how
serious the consequences of raising concerns can be’ (p. 319). There was a tendency for attention to be
focused on the messenger rather than on the message, and the ‘whistleblower’ may suffer reprisals
(p. 320).
Consequences for the whistleblower
There appear to be no consequences for the whistleblowers.
Consequences for the NHS
In contrast to most of the others, this inquiry stressed the role of ‘whistleblowers’:
I believe that the willingness of one healthcare professional to take responsibility for raising concerns
about the conduct, performance or health of another could make a greater potential contribution to
patient safety than any other single factor.
p. 23154
The inquiry made a total of 190 recommendations. The most relevant appeared to include the need
for a general practice whistleblowing policy; that PCTs should provide information and training about
whistleblowing policies directly to practice staff; and the provision of a telephone helpline.
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It stated that although practice staff technically enjoy the protection of PIDA, there were two potential
problems. First, it was unclear if raising concerns to the PCT was a ‘protected route’, and PIDA should be
amended to clarify this. Second, as working relationships within the practice may break down, the right to
retain employment was an empty one, and the PCT should assist the employee to find a post in another
practice wherever possible (pp. 285–6).
There should be some provision (probably a telephone helpline) to enable any person, whether or not
working within health care, to obtain advice about the best way to raise a concern about a health-care
matter and about the legal implications of so doing (p. 1093).
The report appeared to be rather optimistic about the future. Since Shipman’s arrest, there have been
radical changes within the NHS: the introduction of National Service Frameworks; the CHI (later the
Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection, now the HCC); and the NCAA (p. 10). It stated that
there were signs that the culture of mutual self-protection had changed, although the process was by no
means complete (p. 23). It continued that, since 1998, there had been a considerable change of attitude
towards those who want to raise a concern about some aspect of health care. All NHS bodies now have
a ‘whistleblowing’ policy that advises employees how to raise a concern and gives an assurance that
concerns will be given serious consideration and that there will be no victimisation even if the concern
turns out to be unfounded. PIDA provided a measure of protection against victimisation for all employees
who raise concerns. In addition, independent advice was now provided by a charitable body, PCAW.
Nevertheless, more needed to be done (p. 25):
It appears to me that the position of any person seeking to raise a concern is now very much better
than it was even six years ago, when the PIDA was passed. I think that the PIDA has been of great
value, both in the relief it has provided for individuals and also in changing general attitudes.
However, I am sure that more remains to be done.
p. 339154
Quotations in this section are reproduced from The Shipman Inquiry.154 © Crown copyright. Contains
public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Francis155,156
Concerns about mortality and the standard of care provided at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust
resulted in an investigation by the HCC, which published a highly critical report in March 2009, which was
followed by two reviews commissioned by the DHSC. This inquiry, focusing on the period from 2005 to
2009, was set up by the Labour Secretary of State for Health, Andy Burnham, in July 2009. Its terms of
reference were:
l to investigate any individual case relating to the care provided by Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation
Trust between 2005 and 2008 that, in its opinion, caused concern and to the extent that it
considered appropriate
l in the light of such investigation, to consider whether any additional lessons were to be learnt
beyond those identified by the inquiries conducted by the Healthcare Commission, Professor Alberti
and Dr Colin-Thomé; and, if so
l to consider what additional action was necessary for the new hospital management to ensure that the
trust was delivering a sustainably good service to its local population
l to prepare and deliver to the Secretary of State a report of its findings.
Although the government resisted calls for a full public inquiry, it stated that if the chairperson considered
that he needed powers to compel the attendance of witnesses, then it had the power to convert the
inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 (p. 29).334
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Blowing the whistle
The main material on whistleblowing is given in a section covering pages 279–91. It stated that whistleblowing
could take many forms, including passing information to management or colleagues within the same
organisation or, in some cases, to some external body or individual or even the media (p. 279).
According to the Director of HR, Norma Sadler, there were only 10 incidents in the 6 years that she was in
post (from 2000 to 2006) and some of these were not, in fact, whistleblowing. The inquiry was aware of
the facts of only three whistleblowing reports (below). ‘All give cause for concern as to whether individuals
who blow the whistle are properly looked after and whether the concerns they raise are properly pursued’
(p. 281).
The first case concerned a consultant who, on 30 May 2008, submitted a memorandum to the
Parliamentary Health Select Committee, and later to the HCC, in which he outlined his attempts over
many years to raise concerns. On 30 March 2009, 1 day after the publication of the HCC report, he was
suspended by Dr Suarez, the outgoing medical director, on the grounds of an allegation that he had
behaved in an intimidating manner towards a colleague and a patient (p. 282). One of the first actions
taken by the new medical director, Dr Obhrai, was to remove the suspension. The inquiry noted the
‘unhappy coincidence, to say the least, in the correlation between the timing of the publication of the
HCC report, and his suspension in circumstances which have later been found to be unjustified’ (p. 283).
The second case was drawn to the attention of the inquiry by the whistleblower, the external investigator
and Cure the NHS, but not the trust. The complaint concerned allegations of poor care in ward 3 and was
made by a nurse and a health-care support worker. They raised concerns about the management of the
ward and identified particular members of staff. Both had left the hospital, having made the allegations
under the whistleblowing policy at a formal meeting with the director of human resources on 21 July 2005
(p. 284). The former finance director, Mr Newsham, who was at that time acting chief executive, along
with Ms Brisby, former chairperson of the trust, commissioned an external investigation, in part it seems
because the whistleblowers did not want the director of clinical standards to be involved. Mr Newsham
received the report after Mr Yeates took over as chief executive, and handed the report to him. The inquiry
considered that the report ‘came to a number of damning conclusions’ (p. 285), (such as an increase in the
death rate, poor staffing levels, and poor governance arrangements across the directorate and trust), but
there did not appear to have been any discussion by the board of the serious issues raised. ‘It is striking
that the investigator’s conclusions closely mirror the findings of the HCC and the evidence collated in this
Inquiry’s report’ (pp. 286–7).
The third case occurred on 28 October 2007, concerning an allegation of falsification of patient
documentation in order to avoid the breach of targets in A&E, and a more general allegation against
two sisters working in A&E of bullying and harassment. This was also drawn to the inquiry’s attention by
Cure the NHS. The two nurses against whom the principal allegations were made were suspended from
duty, and the directorate manager for surgery was appointed to investigate, who concluded that there was
no case to answer on the principal allegation (p. 288). A further investigation took place into the more
general complaints of bullying and harassment and into allegations of specific incidents of harassment
following the whistleblowing report. The notes of the investigatory interviews conducted by the external
investigating officer appear to corroborate the whistleblower’s allegation that staff had been instructed
to lie about 4-hour waiting times. The two members of staff who were subject to the complaint were
reinstated to work in A&E, with no explanation being given to the whistleblower, who later stated that her
experience of the process was a principal reason why she left the employment of the hospital (p. 289). The
inquiry concluded that the conclusions the fabrication issue were ‘generous’ and the report did not explain
why the evidence from witnesses other than the principal whistleblower ‘did not lead to a more critical
conclusion’. Moreover, an ‘inadequate degree of protection was given to the whistleblower’ and ‘clear and
cogent evidence that record fabrication was habitual’ did not lead to a general investigation and audit of
records (p. 290). The inquiry’s overall comment was that ‘the experiences of those involved in these three
episodes arising out of raising serious concerns is not encouraging’ (p. 291).
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Factors
The inquiry pointed to an organisational culture which included: a culture of bullying; target-driven priorities;
disengagement from management; low staff morale; isolation; lack of candour; acceptance of poor
behaviours; reliance on external assessments; and denial (p. 152). It stated that fear had also manifested
itself in the reluctance of staff, particularly nursing staff, to come forward to the inquiry (p. 166), and that
the experience of staff who had raised concerns about colleagues suggested that trust management
appeared more keen to protect the subject of the concern rather than the informant (p. 174–5).
Although protecting whistleblowers has been a concern of public policy for a number of years (p. 279),
and although the trust has had a policy on whistleblowing since 2001 (p. 280), there remained a ‘very real
reluctance’ on the part of staff at all levels of seniority in raising concerns (p. 409). The 2008 version of
trust policy stated that its aim ‘is to encourage staff to raise concerns about possible malpractice in the
Trust at an early stage and in the right way, and that the Trust Board ‘is committed to developing a
climate of openness and free expression whereby concerns about the delivery of patient care, financial
malpractice, or other wrong doing is welcomed, appreciated and acted upon positively’.
Consequences for the whistleblower
In the three whistleblowing cases discussed above, a consultant was suspended; allegations made in 2005
that closely matched the 2010 inquiry’s main findings were dismissed; and the whistleblower left the trust.
The executive summary stated that the few instances of reports by whistleblowers of which the inquiry was
made aware suggested that the trust had not offered support and respect to those who took this step.
The handling of these cases was unlikely to encourage others to come forward, and the responses to the
investigation of the concerns raised have been ineffective (p. 20).
Consequences for the NHS
The Inquiry produced 18 recommendations, but only one focuses on whistleblowing. Recommendation
8 states that ‘The Board should give priority to ensuring that any member of staff who raises an honestly
held concern about the standard or safety of the provision of services to patients is supported and
protected from any adverse consequences, and should foster a culture of openness and insight’ (p. 27).
The inquiry stated that there was a ‘very real reluctance’ to raise concerns, linked to the ‘widespread belief
that the protections offered are theoretical rather than real’. It continued that ‘The most important factor
in changing this will not be a new system or policy of protection for whistleblowers, but the fostering of a
culture of openness, self-criticism and teamwork’. This requires ‘leadership by example at all levels as well
as a reinforcement of the formal protections available’ (p. 409). It argued that no employee should suffer
any adverse consequences from management or colleagues for raising or reporting, whether internally or
externally, concerns relating to the standard and safety of care provided to patients based on a reasonably
held belief, even if an investigation subsequently concludes that there are no grounds for such a concern.
It should be a disciplinary offence for any member of management or a colleague to act in a way which is
prejudicial to the continued employment of that employee or detrimental to his or her well-being because
of the raising or reporting of such concerns (p. 410).
Quotations in this section are reproduced from Francis.155,156 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector
information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Francis157–159
The Conservative Secretary of State for Health in the coalition government, Andrew Lansley, decided that
this inquiry should be a public inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005.334 In his view, the previous reports
were clear that the following existed: a culture of fear in which staff did not feel able to report concerns;
a culture of secrecy in which the trust board shut itself off from what was happening in its hospital and
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ignored its patients; and a culture of bullying, which prevented people from doing their jobs properly.
Yet how these conditions developed had not been satisfactorily addressed (pp. 15–16).
Blowing the whistle
This included a mix of the same cases as the 2010 Inquiry (with names and more detail) and some new
cases. The first case concerned Dr Pradip Singh, a Consultant Gastro-Enterologist, who was suspended on
30 March 2009 on the grounds of an allegation that he had behaved in an intimidating manner towards a
colleague and a patient. The second case of the 2010 Inquiry concerned the report of 2005 by Robina Barry,
a clinical psychologist, who was Director of Psychological Therapies for South Staffordshire Healthcare NHS
Trust. The third case of the 2010 Inquiry concerned Helene Donnelly’s complaint. It was disclosed that
Ms Donnelly felt the atmosphere was so unpleasant she approached the RCN for assistance and was offered
advice by the RCN’s Regional Officer. Unknown to her, he was also advising and representing the nurses
who were the subject of the complaint. She described him as being ‘dismissive’ of her complaints, and his
advice was that she should ‘keep her head down’. Effectively he told her there was little that could be done
(p. 109).
The 2013 inquiry discussed doctors who sought to raise issues of concern, but they ‘fared little better than
the nurses’ (p. 238). Dr Daggett, a consultant physician at the trust from 1982 until his retirement in
July 2010, produced a quantity of letters he had written to management from 2001 to 2008 (p. 175).
Dr Singh told the inquiry that he had continuously raised concerns. Mr David, a consultant surgeon,
stated that he and others had raised their concerns in the only way available to them, via the directorate
structure, but the response came back that management said that things would improve once Foundation
Trust status had been obtained (pp. 176–7). Dr Turner, then a specialist registrar in emergency medicine,
was ‘one of the few medical practitioners to raise concerns’ in 2008 to Deanery staff visiting the trust to
review junior doctor training, clinical placements and supervision (p. 120). He later stated that ‘On arrival
at Stafford I found the Emergency Department to be an absolute disaster. Its culture was unlike any other
I had worked in despite being in the NHS for 25 years’ (p. 121). Although he had not seen the HCC letter
before the inquiry, Dr Turner thought that the concerns described in the letter of 23 May exactly reflected
his own concerns about A&E. Dr Turner told the inquiry that he had tried to raise his concerns with
his educational supervisor but ‘got nowhere’. He raised concerns at a meeting of the Royal College of
Emergency Medicine at some point during 2008. He telephoned the HCC twice without a response. On
the third attempt there was a reaction and in due course he was interviewed as part of their investigation
(p. 121–2). Dr Turner said that it should not have been down to him, a trainee, to take on the burden
of challenging the trust leadership (p. 217).
The second and third volume are concerned with the wider NHS, and say little about whistleblowing.
However, there were accusations of a culture of bullying in the CQC and the DHSC. A headline in the
Independent on 15 August 2012 was ‘Exclusive: NHS watchdog claimed that whistleblower Kay Sheldon
was “mentally ill” ‘ (volume 2, p. 989). The tone of a letter from the chairperson of the CQC to all staff
left little doubt as to the board’s view of Ms Sheldon’s decision to give evidence, and clearly implied that
she was undermining the organisation. Looked at from the perspective of a CQC employee, it seemed
unlikely that any member of staff reading this letter could be left reassured about the CQC’s approach to
whistleblowing and, by implication, the response they would get should they ever wish publicly to raise
concerns of their own (volume 3, p. 1470). The chairperson of CQC said that she liked to think that the
issues at the trust would have been detected earlier by the CQC’s processes, with one reason being ‘the
importance accorded to whistleblowers’. This may seem a little ironic given CQC’s reaction to its own
whistleblower (volume 2, p. 1003).
Consultancy reports found ‘a shame and blame culture of fear’ in the the DHSC and the NHS (volume 2,
p. 1282). Although the evidence before the inquiry did not justify a conclusion that there is in fact a culture
within the department that could properly be described as one of bullying, it is possible to see how this could
be interpreted further down the hierarchy as such (volume 2, p. 1347). Finally, a ‘whistleblowing’ e-mail to
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NPSA in 2004 from a senior staff nurse who may have been working at the trust appeared not to have
produced any response (volume 2, p. 1193).
Factors
There appeared to be three main factors why whistleblowing was ineffective. First, Dr Singh felt inhibited
in raising concerns directly because he felt that the trust had an atmosphere of not welcoming criticism,
and that the consultants were completely disenfranchised. Dr Daggett told the inquiry that there were four
or five consultants who tended to raise complaints, but they were seen as ‘naughty boys’ (pp. 238–9).
Second, there was a ‘culture of fear’. Dr Singh took ‘the path of least resistance’, stating that there were
veiled threats that he should not ‘rock the boat’ at his stage in life because, for example, he needed
discretionary points or to be put forward for clinical excellence awards. The inquiry states that his evidence
highlights how easy it is for conscientious professionals to find reasons not to ‘rock the boat’ and the need
for very robust support to enable and empower even senior consultants to raise important issues and to
persist in doing so (p. 177). He told the inquiry that if he had persisted in raising concerns ‘I would have
then ended up becoming either a stroke or a heart attack, and being on the road [i.e. out of a job, linked
to ‘the excuse for destroying your career’] . . . I am brave . . . But I’m not Nelson Mandela . . .’ (p. 239).
The inquiry stated that the impression given by this witness was of a professional who felt that he had
done his best to raise issues, but when that failed to have any effect he became disillusioned and gave up,
focusing on getting on with his job, in part for fear of the effect on his career of continuing to make a
fuss. Dr Singh’s feelings in this regard were likely to have been influenced by his experience in March 2009
of having been suspended following an incident in which he complained to nursing staff about not being
accompanied on a ward round (pp. 239–40).
Third, while the evidence supported what was heard during the first inquiry regarding the disengagement of
doctors, it does not explain why no clinician (even among those who did raise matters internally) appears to
have taken his or her concerns outside the trust to a regulator, the PCT or the SHA. Dr Daggett’s explanation
was that at the time he had no understanding of the roles of these various bodies (p. 238) (although
Dr Turner did contact the HCC).
Consequences for the whistleblower
Helene Donnelly told the inquiry that ‘People saying that they know where I live, and basically threats to
sort of my physical safety were made, to the point where I had to at the end of a shift . . . at night would
have to have either my mum or my dad or my husband come and collect me from work because I was too
afraid to walk to my car in the dark on my own’ (p. 236). She felt that the atmosphere in the department
continued to be poisonous, and left in 2008 (p. 111). The inquiry stated that such treatment was likely
to deter others from following her example. Since she left the trust remaining colleagues told her they
had felt deterred from raising concerns because of what happened to her. Her evidence exposed the
hollowness of the promises in the whistleblowing policy. The experience of Helene Donnelly illustrated one
reason why they may have been deterred from seeking to exploit the so-called protection available to
whistleblowers (pp. 235–7). Helene Donnelly has since been awarded an OBE, and is Ambassador for
Cultural Change at Staffordshire and Stoke-On-Trent Partnership NHS Trust.
In a letter of 2009, Robina Barry reported that the staff who had made the complaints that led to her
investigation had been suspended pending the inquiry and were so traumatised that they had since left
the trust to work elsewhere (pp. 65–6). The story of Dr Pradip Singh (his suspension was in 2009) ‘would
have discouraged colleagues from getting involved’ (p. 176). However, it is fair to record that Dr Turner
experienced no recriminations from within the trust since he communicated his concerns to the HCC.
His promotion to consultant confirms that (p. 241).
Consequences for the NHS
The term ‘whistleblowing’ did not feature in the recommendations, which favoured cultural rather than legal
remedies. The closest approximation was recommendation 12: reporting of incidents of concern relevant to
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patient safety, compliance with fundamental standards or some higher requirement of the employer needs to
be not only encouraged but insisted on. Staff are entitled to receive feedback in relation to any report they
make, including information about any action taken or reasons for not acting (p. 243).
Much was said at this inquiry about ‘whistleblowing’. The experiences described here do not suggest that,
whatever system is in place, it would be easy for staff to raise concerns that are not accepted by those for
whom they work. Theoretical protection is provided by PIDA, but this is unlikely to be of much reassurance
to staff who have to face the wrath of their colleagues. Julie Bailey thought that nursing staff would be
‘petrified’ to come forward (p. 241). Ken Lownds of Cure the NHS made the point that, regardless of
protective legislation and policies, it was the culture that mattered. Without a positive culture it would
never be easy to raise concerns. Peter Walsh of Action against Medical Accidents made a similar point.
They are correct: whistleblowing is necessary only because of the absence of systems and a culture accepted by
all staff which positively welcomes internal reporting of concerns. If that culture is absent then raising concerns
external to the system is bound to be a difficult and challenging matter exposing the whistleblower to pressure
from colleagues. Therefore, the solution lies in creating the right culture, not in focusing on improvements to
whistleblowing legislation, important though such protection is (p. 242).182
Quotations in this section are reproduced from Francis.157–159 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector
information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Responses
Secretary of State for Health
According to the Secretary of State for Health,166 Alan Milburn, the Kennedy report provided a powerful
analysis of the flaws and failures of the organisation and culture, not only at the Bristol Royal Infirmary in
the years in question, but of the wider NHS at that time. Kennedy acknowledged the progress that had
been made in recent years, and the vision and initiatives of the NHS Plan325 had set clearly on the road that
Kennedy described. However, Kennedy also provided a bigger ambition of building a new culture, of trust
not blame, within the NHS, which is a challenge that the government accepted. It accepted most of the
recommendations, with work underway to implement them.
The main document pointed to the establishment since 1997 of new independent standard setting and
inspecting bodies: the CHI and NICE, as well as the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) and the
NCAA to tackle poor clinical practice where it had been identified. It also pointed to national standards in
place for the first time through National Service Frameworks, and help for NHS organisations to improve
performance through the NHS Modernisation Agency. Finally, the NHS Plan325 sought to build on these
developments to give a new direction to the health service (p. 2). The document pointed to the
establishment of a new Council for the Quality of Healthcare and a new Council for the Regulation of
Health Care Professionals (pp. 3–4). In other words, the organisational or institutional fix for the problems
identified in Bristol had already been carried out.
It stated that ‘Bristol was a turning point in the history of the NHS’ (p. 13; © Crown copyright. Contains
public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0). Kennedy set out a vision in
which the patient should be at the heart of the NHS (p. 14). This included ‘responding to patients when
things go wrong’, receiving an explanation and apology when things go wrong, with complaints being
dealt with swiftly and thoroughly (p. 34). This was associated with Recommendations 33–36. In particular,
the government agreed recommendation 33: a duty of candour, meaning a duty to tell a patient if
adverse events have occurred, must be recognised as owed by all those working in the NHS to patients
(p. 34). Recommendations 106–112 focused on a single national system of reporting adverse events.
Recommendations 113–118 were concerned with the reporting of sentinel events. However, it rejected
recommendations 45–46, that codes of professional conduct should be included in the contracts of
employment for health professionals, as compliance with professional codes of conduct were therefore
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already implicit in employment contracts: ‘we do not believe that we need to go further’ (p. 106). The
government agreed ‘in part’ with recommendation 91: managers as health-care professionals should be
subject to the same obligations as other health-care professionals, including being subject to a regulatory
body and professional code of practice. The government did not think it was practicable to establish
self-regulation for senior managers. They agreed that the standards expected of senior NHS managers
should be explicit, but favoured a code of conduct, stronger performance management and tighter
contracts rather than regulation.
The Kennedy report found that the NHS was still failing to learn from things that go wrong and that
the prevailing blame culture is a major barrier to openness and learning. The response states that ‘An
Organisation with a Memory’172 ‘was a turning point’ (although two turning points in consecutive years
seems a little excessive) as, for the first time in 50 years, attention was drawn to the scale of unintended
harm to patients from potentially avoidable error in the health care system (p. 68).
Quotations in this section are © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under
the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Home Secretary and Secretary of State for Health
The preface to this report167 stated that ‘one of the questions that have been continuously debated in the
years since Shipman was convicted is why did nobody in authority realise what was going on?’ (p. 3;
© Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence
v3.0). The government stressed the acknowledgement of the Shipman Inquiry that the NHS today is in
many ways very different from the NHS in which Shipman practised. The priority now must be to ask how
Shipman’s crimes could have gone undetected for so long and why a number of potential warning signals
were ignored or overlooked (p. 5). It continued that the inquiry found that he did let his guard slip on a
number of occasions, leaving clues that could and should have been picked up at an earlier stage (p. 7).
The response then focused on issues in the fifth report of the use of routine monitoring data and of
responding to complaints and concerns. It noted that complaints from patients, and expressions of concern
from fellow professionals, are potentially a rich source of information to help health-care organisations
detect early signs of poor or malicious performance in health professionals. In Shipman’s time there were
already avenues open to complaints from patients, and from 1987 onwards doctors had an explicit ethical
duty to report any concerns about their colleagues, but these potential safeguards were ineffective for
various reasons (p. 10).
The response agreed with most of the 190 recommendations of the Shipman Inquiry. In particular, it
noted that it recommended a number of improvements both to encourage the raising of complaints and
concerns and to ensure that primary care organisations took effective action on them. These key proposals
included that PCTs should treat expressions of concern as seriously, and in the same way, as complaints;
that health-care organisations (including general practices) should clarify the arrangements for raising
concerns about fellow professionals; and that the statutory protection for whistleblowers should be
strengthened. However, it did not consider that PIDA should be amended.
The response surveyed some of the changes that had already taken place in the NHS since Shipman’s day,
concluding that ‘If the processes and attitudes described had been in place then, it is very likely that
Shipman’s misdeeds would have been detected far earlier’167 (© Crown copyright. Contains public sector
information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0). However, the government accepted that
more needed to be done to embed these processes and, more importantly, to achieve the change in
culture needed to instil a true patient focus throughout the NHS (p. 10).
The response stated that the crucial first step in any system for managing professional performance is
the initial identification of cause for concern. In the case of Shipman, a number of potential clues were
missed, and similar lessons emerged from the Ayling and Kerr/Haslam inquiries of failure to recognise
the significance of concerns expressed, coupled – in Ayling’s case – with the failure of different NHS
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organisations to combine the information that they had (p. 22). To identify potential performance issues,
clinical governance units in PCTs and specialist trusts needed to work with two different kinds of
information: indicators of clinical processes and outcomes; and information derived from complaints from
patients and carers, expressions of concern from fellow professionals, and information from other
organisations that have employed the professional (p. 22). It continued that both the Shipman and
the Ayling cases demonstrated that the safety of patients may depend on joining up pieces of ‘soft’
information that, individually, would not justify taking action. In addition, where, following a fair and
thorough investigation, a complaint has been upheld and action taken – for instance, where this has led
to formal disciplinary action or, for doctors, the issuing of a ‘recorded concern’ – this is information that
could well be relevant to handling any further complaints or concerns (p. 22). Subject to consultation,
the government proposed to ensure widespread dissemination of the arrangements to enable fellow
professionals or members of the general public to raise concerns, including arrangements to cater for
situations in which the person raising the complaint feels unable to go to their own management or
organisation (pp. 23–4).
Secretary of State for Health
This response168 set out the action that the government proposed taking in response to four reports
relating to the abuse of trust by health professionals – the Shipman Inquiry’s fifth report, and the reports
of the Ayling, Neale and Kerr/Haslam inquiries. It was noted that although the nature of the abuse differed
between the four reports, the underlying question was the same in each case: why did the NHS at the
time fail to identify the risk and take the appropriate action to protect patients? (p. 5). Together the
reports provided an account of complaints and concerns, the failure to join up information available in
different organisations, and the failure to investigate serious allegations with an appropriate degree of
rigour – as well some specific issues relating to recruitment processes, maintaining appropriate boundaries
between professionals and their patients, and the need for particular precautions in relation to vulnerable
patients such as those suffering from mental illness (p. 6). It stated that this document should be read in
conjunction with the White Paper Trust, Assurance and Safety: The Regulation of Health Professionals in
the 21st Century, which deals with similar issues from the perspective of professional regulation. Action
arising from the two documents was to be carried forward as a single, integrated work programme (p. 7).
It noted that, between them, the reports contain a total of 228 recommendations (p. 8). The government
agreed that complaints (from patients or their representatives) and concerns (from fellow professionals)
can provide vital information in identifying potential risks to patient safety (p. 9). Many of the detailed
recommendations in the Shipman Inquiry’s fifth report are either addressed directly in the White Paper
or will fall to the regulators for the individual professions to take forward in the light of the general
framework that it sets out (p. 14). The response claimed that clinical governance included learning from
patients’ complaints and expressions of concern from professionals (p. 17), while promoting active learning
from mistakes requires moving from a ‘blame culture’ to a ‘safety culture’ in which clinical staff are
encouraged to report errors and near misses so that learning can take place (p. 20).
The response stated that complaints from patients and concerns from fellow professionals may be the first
signals drawing attention to deficient care or abuse of patients (p. 43). It agreed with Shipman Inquiry
recommendation 15, that concerns expressed about a GP by someone other than a patient or patient’s
representative (e.g. by a fellow health-care professional) should be dealt with in the same way as patient
complaints. Both the Shipman and the Ayling cases demonstrate how harm to patients could have been
averted at a much earlier point if concerns of this kind had been taken seriously (p. 51).
It supported Shipman Inquiry recommendation 34, that every general practice should have a written policy
about raising concerns. It also supported Shipman recommendation 39 and Kerr/Haslam recommendation
73 of a telephone helpline, and of a DHSC review of the effectiveness of whistleblowing policies and
initiatives within NHS-funded organisations (although there does not appear to be any record of
this initiative).
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It stated that it fully agreed with the need to support and protect all those wishing, in good faith, to raise
concerns about the actions of a health-care colleague. They should be invited in the first instance to share
their concerns in confidence with local management and with their professional regulator, even though
(as with patient complaints) it may subsequently be necessary for them to make specific allegations if their
concerns are to be further investigated. While these principles may be particularly important in primary
care – where staff may be working with little other support closely alongside the colleague whose
performance or behaviour is giving cause for concern – it considered that they should apply to staff
working in all health-care settings. It therefore proposed that all organisations providing services to the
NHS should have a written policy setting out the procedures to be followed by staff wishing to raise
concerns, and we discussed with stakeholders how this might best be achieved (p. 52). It continued that
it would discuss with the professional regulatory bodies and universities how the current ethics guidance
from the GMC and the other regulators of the duty of all health professionals to raise any concerns they
have about the conduct, health or performance of a fellow professional, especially where this could put
the safety of patients at risk, can be further emphasised. However, the government was not convinced by
Shipman Inquiry recommendation 37 of considering amending PIDA as staff who disclosed concerns to
the HCC are already protected by PIDA, as the Commission is now a ‘prescribed person’ as a result
of the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003.169 It proposed working with
NHS organisations to draw up protocols under the Act that will provide further protection (e.g. for staff
bringing concerns to the attention of the GMC). It supported Shipman Inquiry recommendation 38, that
written policies setting out procedures for raising concerns in the health-care sector should be capable of
being used in relation to persons who do not share a common employment (p. 53).
The government fully shared the Shipman Inquiry’s belief that information is the key to enabling NHS
employers and PCTs to protect patients from unacceptable professional performance. The Ayling, Neale,
Kerr and Haslam cases illustrated the same point: there were enough clues potentially available to indicate
serious problems at a much earlier stage, yet the information was not ‘joined up’ and no effective action
was taken. This partly reflected the then prevailing culture, in which it was almost unthinkable that health
professionals would deliberately set out to harm their patients. Even more, however, it reflected the fact
that NHS organisations did not have the systems and processes to ensure that the relevant information
was brought together and critically scrutinised. It supported Shipman Inquiry recommendation 33, that
PCTs should keep a separate file for each individual GP on their lists, and the Ayling recommendation of a
formal declaration of any other concurrent employment, and of Kerr/Haslam of DHSC guidance as to how
and where any disclosure or complaint of abuse by another health-care professional made to a doctor or
nurse should be recorded in the patient’s medical records (p. 62).
House of Commons Health Committee
The House of Commons Health Committee170,171 considered that NHS remained largely unsupportive of
whistleblowing, with many staff fearful about the consequences of going outside official channels to
bring unsafe care to light. It recommended that the DHSC bring forward proposals on how to improve this
situation. The key tasks of the government were to ensure that the NHS developed a culture of openness
and ‘fair blame’; strengthened, clarified and promulgated its whistleblowing policy; and provided
leadership that listens to and acts on staff suggestions for service changes to improve efficiency and quality
and, by the provision of examples and incentives, encourages and enables staff to implement practical and
proven improvements in patient safety (p. 7). It was noted that, since 2000, the DHSC has sought to move
the NHS away from a ‘blame culture’ (p. 17).
The committee stated that an important measure of an organisation’s safety culture is how it treats
‘whistleblowing’, that is, the ‘spontaneous reporting outside normal channels by individual members of
staff’ (p. 50; © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government
Licence v3.0)325 as a last resort in order to draw attention to unsafe care. It noted that ‘In one sense,
‘whistleblowing’ can be seen as evidence of a failure to learn—people are far more likely to pursue channels
outside their own organisation if there has been a failure to act on or even acknowledge concerns raised
internally. To many a perceived need for external whistleblowing is in itself a sign that organisational culture
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr06300 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2018 VOL. 6 NO. 30
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2018. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health and Social Care. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional
journals provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should
be addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
169
is seriously awry’ (p. 64; © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open
Government Licence v3.0).325 It continued that managers and boards in NHS bodies have a duty to heed
whistleblowers and afford them protection from victimisation for raising genuine matters of concern.
In theory, such protection exists under PIDA;8 it is reinforced in the NHS by executive guidance, issued
in 1999, requiring appropriate local policies and procedures, and is also reiterated in the draft NHS
Constitution. Yet, in practice, it seemed that many NHS staff fear the consequences of whistleblowing.
(p. 89). However, the Secretary of State for Health, Alan Johnson, referred to ‘the mystery of Stafford being
the absence of any whistleblower’ as he considered that adequate legal protection for whistleblowers
existed. Whistleblowing is necessary due to the lack of systems and a culture that welcomes reporting of
concerns. This means that the solution may require creating the correct culture rather than in changing
whistleblowing legislation.335 However, the committee stated that fear of victimisation may well have been
a factor inhibiting staff at the trust from whistleblowing (p. 89). It pointed to evidence from the Royal
College of Nursing arising from a survey of its members according to which:
l 78% of respondents said that they would be concerned about victimisation, personal reprisals or a
negative effect on their career if they were to report concerns to their employers
l 21% had been discouraged from reporting, or told directly not to report, concerns at their workplace
l 64% did not feel confident that their employer would protect them if they spoke up
l 99% of registered nurses understood their professional responsibility to report worries about patient
safety, but fears about personal reprisals meant that only 43% would be confident to report concerns
without thinking twice
l 71% said that their employers had not taken immediate action to resolve the situation after concerns
had been reported
l 35% said that no action was ever taken by employers after concerns had been reported
l 45% did not know if their employer had a whistleblowing policy.
The committee recommended that the DHSC bring forward proposals on how to improve whistleblowing,
and that it give consideration to the model operated in New Zealand, where whistleblowers can complain to
an independent statutory body. It recommend that Annex 1 of the Health Service Circular, HSC 1999/198,
‘The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 –Whistleblowing in the NHS’173 be recirculated to all trusts for
dissemination to all their staff as a matter of urgency.
It was unconvinced of the case for a full public inquiry into Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, given that
the work that has already been done by the HCC, Professor Sir George Alberti and Dr David Colin-Thomé, and
the likely further disruption to the trust. However, it saw merit in the idea, recommended to it by the RCN, of
holding hearings in private to allow members of staff to give evidence confidentially to discover how the state
of affairs had progressed so far without detection by the trust board.
In the second volume,171 the committee considered oral evidence from Dr Daggett and written evidence
from Dr Pradip Singh from the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. The Shadow Secretary of State
for Health, Andrew Lansley, raised the issue of whistleblowing: none of the reviews provided any answers
on whistleblowing, and there were no mentions of the inadequacy of whistleblowing procedures, or
questions raised about why staff inside Stafford Hospital did not feel that they could speak out and stop
what was going on. He stated that he received evidence that potential whistleblowers at Stafford received
intimidating rebuttals from the hospital’s legal team. It was vital to get to the bottom of this mystery
through an investigation of whistleblowing procedures, and the manner in which staff who attempted to
raise their concerns were treated.
Secretary of State for Health
The government174 stated that a toxic culture was allowed to develop unchecked that fostered the
normalisation of cruelty and the victimisation of those brave enough to speak up. For far too long, warning
signs were not seen, or were ignored or dismissed. Regulators, commissioners, the SHA, the professional
bodies and the DHSC did not identify problems early enough, or, when the problems were clear, take swift
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action to tackle poor care (p. 5). It stated that it would listen to patients who raised concerns, respond to
them and learn from them. It would listen to staff who were worried about the quality of care and praise
them for speaking up, even if a concern was misplaced (p. 11). It intended to create the role of chief
inspector of hospitals. Just as Ofsted (Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills) acts as
a credible, respected and independent arbiter of the best and the worst in schools, the chief inspector would
shine a light on how hospitals were serving patients, becoming ‘the nation’s whistleblower’, naming poor
care without fear or favour from politicians, institutional vested interests or through loyalty to the system
rather than the patients that it served (p. 17). The response also pointed to Francis’ five key themes, under
which the majority of his recommendations sit: values and standards; openness, transparency and candour;
leadership; compassion and care; and information. The theme of ‘openness, transparency and candour’
included strengthening the protection and support available to whistleblowers, including a right to raise
concerns within staff contracts; and the amendment of the NHS Constitution to include explicit rights and
pledges on whistleblowing (p. 22). The government supported Francis’ recommendation that any ‘gagging
clause’ that seeks to limit legitimate disclosure of problems with patient safety and care should be prohibited,
stating that the era of gagging NHS staff from raising their real worries about patient care must come to an
end. Staff who show the professionalism and personal courage to speak out in the public interest – which is
difficult even in an open culture – must be celebrated and rewarded, even if, following investigation the
concern turns out to be misplaced. It was stated that the government had already taken a series of steps
to enhance the protections available to whistleblowers, including a right to raise concerns within staff
contracts; amending the NHS Constitution to include explicit rights and pledges on whistleblowing; issuing
new guidance to employers; and extending the national helpline to include staff in social care settings for the
first time. In addition, the annual NSS asks staff if they are aware of how to raise a concern, if they feel safe
to do so and if they believe that their organisation would take action on a concern. On 15 February 2013,
the Secretary of State for Health wrote to all trusts reminding them again of their obligations to have
(PIDA-compliant) whistleblowing policies and asking that they ‘check that the confidentiality clauses in
your contracts (and compromise agreements with departing employees) do indeed embrace the spirit of
[this] guidance’ (p. 47; © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open
Government Licence v3.0). The government agreed an amendment to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
Bill, securing PIDA protections for all NHS staff by adding other NHS contractual arrangements to the
extended definition of ‘worker’ in section 43K of the ERA 1996. It recently welcomed proposals from the
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills to introduce vicarious liability into employment law to provide
even greater whistleblower protections, meaning that if staff who raise concerns about poor care are harassed
by their colleagues, their employer is liable for this conduct (p. 49). However, the government rejected Francis’
recommendation for an independent authority to which staff could turn when their own organisation is not
listening, but would work to ensure all organisations work together to learn from whistleblowers and make
sure that action is taken when people raise concerns (p. 50). Finally, the DHSC established an independent
review to consider the handling of concerns and complaints,179 which includes the handling of concerns raised
by staff, including the support of whistleblowers (p. 52).
British Medical Association
The BMA175 stated that it would do all it could to work with others in developing a new culture in the
NHS to prevent similar catastrophes from happening again. There had to be an urgent shift towards more
openness, transparency and candour throughout the NHS that values learning from mistakes and that puts
the patient at the centre of the health service. A shift in culture was needed to end the climate of fear,
bullying and harassment that can stop clinicians from speaking out against poor care. However, the BMA did
not believe that pursuing the recommendation in the report to move to a statutory duty of candour was the
right way forward. There were already clear professional duties on doctors to raise and act on concerns
about patient safety. A further ‘blunt’ instrument of legislation could create the wrong sort of culture
change, encouraging defensive practice rather than a professional commitment to openness and partnership.
The report raised the responsibility on individuals and organisations to raise concerns about patient safety
and poor standards of care. There were already very clear professional duties on doctors, outlined in the
GMC’s guidance, Good Medical Practice,336 to be open and honest with patients if things go wrong and to
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raise and act on concerns about patient safety. The BMA believed that more could and must be done to
promote and monitor these duties, while also removing any barriers to doctors fulfilling these obligations.
The BMA welcomed the report’s findings that NHS organisations must do more to listen and act on the
concerns of staff. Placing a corresponding duty on health-care providers ‘to listen’ could send a positive
and reassuring sign to staff that they will be heard without fear of punitive action. However, the report
stated that existing obligations on individuals to report concerns did not go far enough in enforcing the
need for staff to disclose important information. The report made two key recommendations: a statutory
obligation to observe a duty of candour, and the introduction of criminal sanctions against those
obstructing the duty of candour. The BMA was concerned that moves to a statutory duty of candour may
create a negative culture of fear, encouraging defensive practice rather than a professional commitment
to openness and partnership. Moreover, the practical difficulties in enforcing a statutory duty of candour
must also be considered. Rather, there was a need to address the underlying culture in the NHS, which can
prevent doctors reporting concerns, and to look at alternative ways of ensuring that doctors feel able to
report their fears, such as a separate reporting route parallel to management.
It would need to reflect on and consider the 290 recommendations in the report, and in particular those
that deal with NHS culture, medical training, regulation, data and information very carefully, and would
respond in detail to specific recommendations in due course.
Royal College of Nursing
The RCN176 revised and publicised its whistleblowing guidance for members and reviewed the way it supported
them to raise concerns. It stated that the role of a chief inspector of hospitals could be an important step
towards redressing the past imbalance between financial measures and quality, experience and care measures.
Future work needed to focus on developing competence in and understanding of the continuum of information
from informal satisfaction ratings, through structured gathering of experiential data, right up to the appropriate
escalation of serious concerns via formal complaints and ‘whistle blowing’ (p. 22). It noted that the term
‘openness, transparency and candour’ in the Francis report17 was wide-ranging, and applied to everything from
informal feedback from patients and their families up to and including whistleblowing (p. 23). It pointed to limited
international evidence that, in situations where all staff have a legal duty to report poor care or unprofessional
behaviour through the available reporting structures, a more open and transparent culture results, particularly
around whistleblowing, and nursing staff tend to view whistleblowing as a high-risk, low-benefit action. Nurses
blow the whistle as a last resort in their role as advocates for patients and promoters of patient safety. Descriptions
of the experiences of nurse whistleblowers show that whistleblowing is a stigmatised activity carried out at
considerable personal expense to the individual and with negative ramifications for the organisation (p. 26).
Nursing and Midwifery Council
The NMC177 did not explicitly mention whistleblowing. However, it pledged that it would undertake a
planned review of the Code and other practice standards, including clear duties on nurses and midwives
in relation to complaints handling, communication with patients and raising concerns, in the next year. It
would ensure that these duties were highlighted in the revised Code, which would form the benchmark
for appraisals and revalidation. It would also take more immediate steps to raise awareness of these
duties and our guidance on raising concerns among nurses, midwives and the public (p. 12). The Code
also placed a clear obligation on nurses and midwives to act without delay if they believed that they, a
colleague or anyone else may be putting someone at risk (p. 13). At a recent listening event for a large
group of stakeholders, there was some support for a statutory duty of candour but considerable concern
about the consequences of introducing criminal sanctions (p. 14). It did not support the recommendation
that the NMC should be tasked directly with investigating systems issues, as the boundaries of the distinct
roles and responsibilities of professional and systems regulators should not be blurred (p. 24).
General Medical Council
The GMC178 stated that in 2012 it launched a confidential helpline for doctors concerned about patient
safety, aimed at those who wanted advice and support about guidance or who felt they could raise a
concern locally. It also produced an online tool to guide people through the process of raising concerns,
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and produced new guidance on raising and acting on concerns about patient safety, which the GMC
sent to every doctor in the UK (p. 5). It considered that proactive steps needed to be taken to encourage
openness on the part of trainees and to protect them from any adverse consequences in relation to
raising concerns, and believed that some good progress has been made in this area, including through the
inclusion of a patient safety question in the National Training Survey, the development of new guidance
on raising concerns and the introduction of the new confidential helpline for doctors (pp. 6–7).
Clwyd and Hart
One of the inquiry’s179 terms of reference included the handling of concerns raised by staff, including the
support of whistleblowers (p. 7). It noted that few organisations provided evidence on whistleblowing,
although there was support from some for a Duty of Candour (p. 25).
Its recommendations focused on four areas for change: improving the quality of care; improving the way
complaints are handled; ensuring independence in the complaints procedures; and whistleblowing (p. 32).
It needed to be clearly stated how whistleblowers were to be protected, and gagging clauses should not
be allowed in staff contracts (p. 34).
It noted that the question of whistleblowing was raised occasionally by both staff and patients during the
review. It welcomed the Secretary of State’s decision to ban the practice of so-called ‘gagging’ clauses,
as such clauses have in the past obliged clinical and other staff to be silent about practices that endanger
patient safety. However, it was aware of repeated concerns about a number of unresolved questions
surrounding this issue. These concerns related first to securing justice for past whistleblowers whose
careers have been seriously jeopardised and who have suffered financially as a result of drawing attention
to malpractice. It urged the DHSC to undertake the review of such cases with a view to both learning
lessons for the future and undertaking restorative justice for those individuals affected. Second, there
remained disquiet about the opportunities available for staff to be heard when they believe that there is
bad practice both within hospitals and in the wider regulatory system. There was uncertainty, too, about
what employment protection was genuinely to be offered to future whistleblowers who reveal their
concerns externally to regulators, or the press and media, for example (p. 37).
It believed that much more needed to be done to avoid the need for whistleblowing in the future, and to
protect those who, with justification, speak out, when there is no other means of drawing attention to
situations in which patient safety is threatened (p. 38). Its recommendations included:
l clear guidance for staff on how they should report concerns, including access to the chief executive
on request
l a board member with responsibility for whistleblowing should be accessible to staff on a regular basis
l a legal obligation to consider concerns raised by staff, and to act on them if confirmed to be true
l in assessing the complaints systems of hospitals, the CQC should investigate the ease with which staff
can express concerns and how whistleblowing is responded to where it has taken place
l the CQC itself should designate a board member with specific responsibility for whistleblowing, and
ensure that it acts on intelligence received from whistleblowers.
It noted that although this was not the first report on complaints handling, and a great deal was known
about what needs to be done, the challenge is to ensure the implementation of the recommendations so
that they lead to real improvements for patients (p. 39).
Berwick
Berwick180 contained no explicit discussion of whistleblowing. However, it noted that in some instances,
including in Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, there were many clear warning signals that were
not heeded, especially the voices of patients and carers (p. 4). It stated that the most important single
change in the NHS in response to this report would be for it to become, more than ever before, a system
devoted to continual learning and the improvement of patient care, top to bottom and end to end (p. 5).
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It produced 10 recommendations, including learning, transparency, and patient and carer voice, but nothing
on whistleblowing. However, it noted that everyone, including staff, should be free to state openly their
concerns about patient safety without reprisal, and that there was no place for compromise agreements
(‘gagging clauses’) that prevent staff from discussing safety concerns (p. 10). Its main message was that
‘In the end, culture will trump rules, standards and control strategies every single time, and achieving a
vastly safer NHS will depend far more on major cultural change than on a new regulatory regime’ (p. 11;
quotations in this section are © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under the
Open Government Licence v3.0). All NHS staff should raise concerns to their colleagues and superiors and
be welcomed in so doing. This vigilance could not come from regulation. It required culture change and
therefore countless, consistent and repeated messages and deeds over a period of years. It meant living
the values of the NHS Constitution. Goals and incentives should be clear, fully aligned and focused on the
interests of patients, with a high level of coherence across the system as a whole. The best way to reduce
harm was for the NHS to embrace wholeheartedly a culture of learning (p. 14). It needed to promote
leadership behaviours that reduced risk and made health care more safe: expecting and insisting on
transparency, welcoming warnings of problems; recognising that the most valuable information is about
risks and things that have gone wrong; hearing the patient voice, at every level, even when that voice is a
whisper; and seeking out and listen to colleagues and staff (p. 14). Everyone should ‘be a quality inspector’,
never knowingly passing on a defect, error or risk to a colleague or patient, putting things right where
possible, and reporting everything, especially where help is needed to put it right (p. 23).
Keogh
Similarly, Keogh181 contained nothing explicitly on whistleblowing. It stated that, during several of the
reviews, staff came forward to tell the review teams about their concerns in confidence. These staff felt
unable to share their anxieties about staffing levels and other issues with their senior managers, which
suggested that staff engagement at some of the trusts was not good. All 14 trusts had recommendations
in their action plans relating to workforce issues, with four trusts taking forward actions to improve
whistleblowing policies (p. 22).
House of Commons Health Committee
The committee182 wanted to establish a culture that is comfortable with challenge, arguing that the
responsibility for establishing a truly open managerial and professional culture, which would make the role
of the whistleblower redundant, lies with each trust board.
The section ‘The Francis Report and whistleblowers’ focused on Helene Donnelly. It considered that, despite
the existence of whistleblowing policies, no adequate support was given to Donnelly, who attempted to raise
concerns about poor practice in the A&E department at Stafford General Hospital. Although her concerns
were investigated, the way in which the investigation was conducted gave little encouragement to other
potential whistleblowers to come forward. There was scant regard for the complainant’s anonymity, and no
formal determination was made as to whether or not her allegations were accepted. She was provided with
no adequate support, endured harassment from colleagues and eventually left the trust.
It considered that the Francis report11 described a culture in which medical professionals felt inhibited in
raising concerns for a number of reasons: they considered that such concerns would not be acted on
effectively, feared negative repercussions from colleagues or feared victimisation by management. A greater
priority was instinctively given by managers to issues surrounding the behaviour of the complainant,
rather than the implications for patient safety raised by the complaint.
In evidence to the committee, Robert Francis stated that it has been remarked that he had not made any
recommendations specifically called ‘whistleblowers’. He considered that, whatever system was in place,
it would not be easy for staff to raise concerns that are not accepted by those for whom they work.
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Although theoretical protection was provided by PIDA, this was unlikely to be of much reassurance to staff
who had to face the wrath of their colleagues. He concluded that:
Whistleblowing is only necessary because of the absence of systems and a culture accepted by all staff
which positively welcomes internal reporting of concerns. If that culture is absent then raising concerns
external to the system is bound to be a difficult and challenging matter exposing the whistleblower to
pressure from colleagues. Therefore the solution lies in creating the right culture, not in focusing on
improvements to whistleblowing legislation, important though such protection is.
© Parliamentary Copyright.182 Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the
Open Parliament Licence v3.0. www.parliament.uk/site-information/
copyright-parliament/open-parliament-licence/
The committee observed that the government claimed, in its initial response to the Francis report, that it had
already taken a number of steps to enhance protection available to whistleblowers. Contracts of NHS staff
would include a right to raise concerns; the NHS Constitution was amended to include explicit rights and
pledges on whistleblowing; fresh guidance on the subject was issued to employers; the national whistleblowing
helpline was extended to include staff in social care settings; whistleblowing questions were included in the
NSS; and an amendment to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013208 extended protection under the
ERA 19967 (as amended by PIDA) to all categories of NHS staff. That Act also introduced a provision aimed at
preventing the victimisation of whistleblowers by, in certain circumstances, extending to employers the liability
for detriment caused to a whistleblowing employee by a colleague.
The committee considered that the government’s actions were welcome, as far as they went, but, as
Francis suggested, a legislative solution focused on protecting whistleblowers was missing the point:
whatever legislation there was about whistleblowers, so-called, it would not in itself stop the sorts of
things that the Stafford whistleblowers had to experience from their colleagues in the ward. It may help
at an employment tribunal later down the line, but it would not help at the time. What was required was
to find a means of making it the normal thing to do to raise concerns about what was going on in the
hospital and, if necessary, about colleagues.
The committee agreed with Francis’ recommendation of a change in the culture, whereby it would be
easier, and more palatable, to raise a genuine concern than not to do so, although it recognised that
there could be serious consequences for individuals who do raise their concerns. The management of each
provider of NHS care had an unequivocal obligation to establish a culture in the organisation within which
issues of genuine concern could be raised freely. Disciplinary procedures, professional standards hearings
and employment tribunals were not appropriate forums for constructive airings of honestly held concerns
about patient safety and care quality.
The committee agreed with Francis that providers of health and care, as well as their regulators, should be
required to be open and transparent. Non-disparagement, or ‘gagging’, clauses, which inhibit the free
discussion of issues of care quality and patient safety, were unlawful. No NHS body should be party to such an
agreement or should seek to enforce an agreement in a way which inhibited the free discussion of such issues.
An Annex considered the case of Mr Gary Walker, the former chief executive of the United Lincolnshire
Hospitals NHS Trust from October 2006 to February 2010, who was dismissed by the trust on grounds of
gross misconduct and then lodged a claim for unfair dismissal with the employment tribunal. The case was
settled outside the tribunal in October 2011, when Mr Walker and the trust entered into a compromise
agreement to settle the claim. Mr Walker stated to the committee that in entering into this compromise
agreement he had been ‘gagged’ by ULHT. In questioning, Andrew George MP noted that ‘culture
of fear’, arguing that although there may be a duty of candour, that candour can be career limiting.
David Bowles (former chairperson of United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust) mentioned the 2009 NHS
Confederation report, which talked about a climate of fear, intimidation and bullying, while the 2008
reports (IHI) talked about the public humiliation of CEOs as being the main improvement tool.
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Dalton and Williams
The report183 stated that, put simply, candour means the quality of being open and honest (p. 2). Its first
recommendation stated that a duty of candour required a culture of candour, and, over the long term, it
encouraged the government to consider how it could ensure that the legal system was most able to support
such a culture (p. 4). The report stated that it had ‘many parallels’ with Berwick,180 and wanted to build on
his recommendations and reaffirm that a culture of openness and honesty required a full commitment from
our health and care organisations to create and maintain effective systems of learning and improvement
(p. 6). It continued that leadership was vital. A consistent and visible commitment to support and learning
rather than blame and punishment from the leaders of health and care organisations and from regulators is
likely to lead to a far greater willingness from staff to act in a candid manner when something goes wrong
(p. 14). However, even in a culture of greater candour, effective whistleblowing and complaints systems
would continue to be vital parts of an open and transparent culture that is committed to improvements in
safety and quality (pp. 14–15). The report continued that fulfilling the duty of candour should be statutory
rather than discretionary or voluntary.183 Its hope was that organisations respond to this signal wholeheartedly,
and make a reality of candour for themselves and the people they serve, and that they do this not simply
because the law is changing, but because they see the value of it for the people who use their services. Bare
compliance and vague endorsement would not be sufficient: a determination to really tackle the challenges
would be required (p. 19).
Department of Health and Social Care
The document275 stated that the introduction of a statutory duty of candour would be a major step
towards implementing a key recommendation from the Francis inquiry (p. 6). It noted that Berwick
also recommended that, for serious incidents, CQC regulations should require that the patient or carer
affected by a safety incident is notified and supported. However, it did not subscribe to an ‘automatic’
duty of candour, whereby patients are told about every error or near miss, as this would lead to defensive
documentation and large bureaucratic overheads that detract from patient care (p. 8).
Secretary of State for Health and Social Care
The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care184,185 made clear that so-called ‘gagging orders’ were
unacceptable. NHS staff would be able to raise concerns about patient care in the knowledge that they would
be listened to and their views would be welcomed. The new chief inspector of hospitals would judge whether
the culture of the organisation actively promoted the benefits of openness and transparency; and staff could
now blow the whistle to their health and care professional regulatory bodies. All health-care professionals
would be protected by the provisions of PIDA. Compromise agreements had to include an explicit clause that
made clear that nothing within the agreement prevented disclosure under the Act. NHS England was to
develop a Friends and Family Test for staff, and the ‘Cultural Barometer’ was piloted and evaluated before a
further roll-out (p. 16). Complaints and concerns from patient groups and whistleblowers could trigger
regulatory action under Monitor’s new Risk Assessment Framework, introduced in October 2013 (p. 34).
It was vital for whistleblowing to be taken seriously: in legislation, inspection and education and training.
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013208 strengthened the position of whistleblowers so that an
individual now had the right to expect their employer to take reasonable steps to prevent them suffering
detriment from a co-worker as a result of blowing the whistle. The CQC was using staff surveys and the
whistleblowing concerns it receives as part of the data in its new intelligent monitoring system to guide
it about which hospitals to inspect. Since September 2013, the CQC’s new inspection system included
discussions with hospitals about how they deal with whistleblowers (p. 48). The Care Bill stated that, as a
registration requirement with the CQC, providers must be open with patients about care failings. ‘The duty
should drive an open culture throughout organisations, including its staff, so we do not believe an individual
obstruction offence is necessary at this time. In addition to candour at the organisational level, it was vital to
ensure that individuals live up to their professional obligations to be candid’184 (p. 48) (© Crown copyright.
Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0).
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It argued that many of the measures set out in this response were designed to ensure that the NHS was a
genuinely open and transparent culture, a culture that would make whistleblowing far less necessary than
at present. There would always, however, be a need to ensure that staff who have concerns are able to
raise them. NHS staff should feel free and able to raise their real concerns about patient care, and the era
of gagging staff must come to an end. The government has acted to ensure that this becomes a reality by:
l extending to all health-care professionals the protections of PIDA by the Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform Act, which received Royal Assent in April 2013
l giving the new chief inspector of hospitals an important role in ensuring that hospital inspections are
not just seen as a ‘tick-box’ exercise by judging whether or not the culture of the organisation actively
promotes the benefits of openness and transparency
l enabling staff to blow the whistle to health and care professional regulatory bodies as of
1 October 2013
l backing the Whistleblowing Helpline’s refresh of the Speak Up for Healthy NHS guidance, as recommended
in its ‘Bridge the Gap’ campaign report of July 2013.184
The government also acted on compromise agreements, updating guidance in March 2013 to make clear
that where a compromise agreement is used it must include an explicit clause stating that nothing within
the agreement prevents an individual from making a protected disclosure under PIDA. NHS Employers
provided guidance in 2013 suggesting some model confidentiality clauses and model wording for the
explicit clause now required in NHS compromise agreements.
The second volume185 provided a detailed response to each of the 290 recommendations made by the
inquiry across every level of the system. It made clear which recommendations were accepted and by
whom, and what progress was being made towards their implementation. The DHSC was to lead the
system in providing an annual report on progress across the system each autumn (p. 4), and the Health
Select Committee confirmed that it agreed with the inquiry’s recommendation that it should monitor the
implementation of all of its recommendations.
The government accepted recommendation 2 on a shared culture; accepted in principle recommendation 7,
that all NHS staff should be required to enter into an express commitment to abide by the NHS values and
the Constitution, both of which should be incorporated into the contracts of employment; and accepted
recommendation 12, that the reporting of incidents of concern relevant to patient safety needs to insisted
on. It accepted in principle recommendation 98, that reporting to the National Reporting and Learning
System of all significant adverse incidents should be mandatory on the part of trusts. It accepted most of
the recommendations on openness, transparency and candour, but accepted in principle recommendation
178 on a incorporating the NHS Constitution into contracts of employed, and recommendation 181 on a
statutory obligation to observe a duty of candour on health-care providers, and on registered medical
practitioners and registered nurses and other registered professionals. However, it did not accept
recommendation 183 for it to be a criminal offence for any registered medical practitioner, nurse, allied
health professional or director of an authorised or registered health-care organisation to make untruthful
statements, although it agreed ‘with the intention behind this recommendation’.
Secretary of State for Health
The foreword186 by Jeremy Hunt states that ‘Almost the first thing I did when I was appointed as Health
Secretary was to read Sir Robert Francis QC’s initial report on the scandal at Mid Staffordshire NHS
Foundation Trust. I was profoundly shocked by what I read’ (p. 3). However, he continued that:
a lot has changed since then. While there is much to celebrate, there is no reason for complacency.
Changing culture takes time, and we have only just started on the journey. We have also raised our
ambition – not only to prevent a repeat of the events at Mid Staffordshire, but also to become the
first healthcare system in the world that truly embraces the standards of safety common in the airline,
nuclear and oil industries. That means creating a learning culture in which doctors, nurses and
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front-line staff always feel able to speak out if they have concerns about safety or care. One of the
four pillars of our response is to get the culture right: more accountability for patients, more
transparency over outcomes and a commitment to put patients in the driving seat for any decisions
taken about them.
p. 4.186 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
One of the more shocking aspects of the events at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust was the way in
which a whole system failed to notice what was happening at the hospital for such an extended period of
time (p. 10). The CQC was regarded as ‘the nation’s whistleblower’, with the independence and expertise
to speak up when services are poor, and to quickly identify failure (p. 12). The document used data from
the NSS to show that the percentage of staff who spoke positively about the quality and openness of
their work and organisation, and who responded that ‘The care of patients/service users is my Trust’s top
priority’ and ‘When errors, near misses or incidents are reported, my Trust takes action to ensure that they
do not happen again’, had broadly increased since 2010. So when NHS staff speak up, it is critical that
the system listens with humility and responds with conviction. Since the publication of the public Inquiry
report, and with a new willingness at the centre of the health and care system to hear the reality of
failings, the voice of a substantial group of NHS people who have spoken up and suffered as a result has
become all the more insistent. Although since 2010 the government had put in place a range of new
measures to strengthen the voice of people who speak up for patients, known as ‘whistleblowers’, there
was still a strong sense that the NHS had yet to turn the cultural corner and face up consistently and with
humility to the hard truths spoken by its staff (p. 16).
The government stated that the online supporting annex to this document set out in detail the substantial
progress made against the 290 recommendations of the public inquiry. However, although this is important,
‘perhaps the most important point is that the ongoing need to change the culture in the NHS to one of
patient-centred, continual improvement in care and safety’ (p. 17). It noted that the CQC and its chief
inspectors would report annually to the Secretary of State for Health with their assessment of how well the
NHS was doing in taking forward the recommendations on both the public inquiry and the Freedom to
Speak Up review (p. 20).
It was claimed that ‘since the publication of the Public Inquiry report the landscape of policy and legislation
to ensure safe, effective, respectful and compassionate care has been transformed’. The inspection regime
has been overhauled, and a programme of robust, expert, thorough and independent inspection has now
been rolled out across health and social care services in England. New sanctions, fundamental standards,
and tighter and tougher accountability have brought a harder edge to the assurance of good care. The
beginning of a revolution in transparency about quality of care is brought the power of open access to
comparative data to bear on the priorities and consciousness of those who govern and lead in health and
social care (p. 30).
It continued that, although these changes were necessary, they were insufficient on their own to secure
the consistency of experience and reliability of care that patients should be able to take for granted, and
that staff are striving to provide. The remaining critical component was culture. Since the publication of
the public Inquiry report, the NHS had undoubtedly made progress in strengthening its culture, but a great
deal more remained to be done. In an organisation as large and as complex as the NHS, no matter how
strong the professional instinct to do the right thing, and no matter how powerful the impulse to care,
there were inevitably times when it might feel easier to conceal mistakes, to deny that things had gone
wrong and to slide into postures of institutional defensiveness. So it was vital that leaders were alert to the
risks and actively work to promote the culture of openness, learning, and professional and institutional
humility, which is the absolute bedrock of safe care. The most important resource available to the NHS was
its staff, and one of the key lessons of the public inquiry, but also of the work of the Keogh Review and
of the new, rigorous inspections undertaken by the CQC, was the importance of listening to staff (p. 30).
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There were, of course, always situations when the ‘normal channels’ were not effective or appropriate,
and an individual feels obliged to ‘blow the whistle’. Whistleblowing played an important role in raising
issues and holding organisations to account across many sectors of life, such as the aviation and off-shore
oil industries, as well as the NHS. Although there were some areas of good practice in the NHS, all too
often staff raising concerns felt that they were not taken seriously, and those who blew the whistle could
feel isolated and undermined (p. 31). The government was determined that the NHS should be the safest
and most transparent health-care system in the world. To achieve this, individuals must feel safe to raise
the alarm about matters which are in the public interest and be confident that action will be taken when
concerns are raised (p. 31). The public inquiry exposed a toxic and intimidating management culture,
which deterred staff from raising concerns. When concerns were raised in good faith, they were ignored,
and staff were vilified for speaking up. There was an instinct to deny rather than to learn, to defend rather
than to improve (p. 31). The government introduced a number of measures to make it easier for those
working within the NHS to raise concerns. These included:
l issuing unequivocal guidance to NHS organisations that all their contracts of employment should cover
staff whistleblowing rights
l the publication of new guidance by the whistleblowing helpline in March 2014
l adding the health and social care regulatory bodies, NHS Trust Development Authority and auditors of
foundation trusts to the Prescribed Persons list, increasing the number of organisations to which staff
can blow the whistle
l applying the concept of vicarious liability to the whistleblowing legislative framework, which means
that when there is any bullying or harassment of a whistleblower by a fellow worker, this is treated as
being done by the employer
l the Secretary of State writing, in March 2014, to all chairpersons in NHS trusts and foundation trusts in
England to reiterate the importance of fostering a culture of openness and transparency in the NHS,
in which concerns about care can be raised, investigated and acted on (p. 31).
The Secretary of State for Health commissioned Francis to carry out the independent Freedom to Speak Up
review to provide independent advice and recommendations on creating a more open and honest reporting
culture in the NHS. The review was asked to identify measures to help to foster a culture of reporting and
in future better protect people who do speak out about patient safety, as well as learning lessons from the
existing culture in the NHS by listening to those who have experiences to share, both positive and negative.
The aim was to learn from other areas where safety is vital – such as aviation, nuclear power and the oil
industry – about how to foster a culture in which it is simply the norm to flag up problems, risks and mistakes
as they occur and in which everyone – from the CEO to the cleaners – does the right thing without hesitation
and without fear of comeback. The review2 is being published alongside this report,186 and the Secretary of
State for Health will set out the government’s response (p. 32).
Quotations in this section are reproduced from Culture Change in the NHS186 © Crown copyright. Contains
public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Francis
In his letter to Secretary of State, Francis2 stated that:
[P]art of the progress since the Public Inquiry is an increasing recognition of the contribution staff can
make to patient care through speaking up. However you identified a continuing problem with regard to
the treatment of staff who raise genuine concerns about safety and other matters of public interest,
and the handling of those concerns. You asked me to conduct an independent review and to make
recommendations for improvement in this area. A listening system is a safer system. Organisations which
ignore staff concerns, or worse, victimise those who express them are likely to be dangerous places for
their patients . . . I would have liked to report to you that there was in fact no problem with the treatment
of ‘whistleblowers’ and their concerns. Unfortunately this is far from the case. This is a ‘serious issue’ that
requires ‘urgent attention’. There was near unanimity among staff, managers, regulators and leaders
who assisted the Review that action needs to be taken. In our trust survey, over 30% of those who raised
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a concern felt unsafe afterwards. Of those who had not raised a concern, 18% expressed a lack of trust
in the system as a reason, and 15% blamed fear of victimisation. This is unacceptable. Each time
someone is deterred from speaking up, an opportunity to improve patient safety is missed.
pp. 4–5.2 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
The effect of the experiences has in some cases been truly shocking. We heard all too frequently of
jobs being lost, but also of serious psychological damage, even to the extent of suicidal depression.
In some, sad, cases, it is clear that the toll of continual battles has been to consume lives and cause
dedicated people to behave out of character. Just as patients whose complaints are ignored can
become mistrustful of all, even those trying to help them, staff who have been badly treated can
become isolated, and disadvantaged in their ability to obtain appropriate alternative employment. In
short, lives can be ruined by poor handling of staff who have raised concerns (p. 5). There is a need
for a culture in which concerns raised by staff are taken seriously, investigated and addressed by
appropriate corrective measures. Above all, behaviour by anyone which is designed to bully staff
into silence, or to subject them to retribution for speaking up must not be tolerated. The measures
recommended in this report are largely about doing better what should already be done. They build
on the progress made in implementing the culture change started following the earlier report. Francis
set out 20 Principles which he believed should guide the development of a consistent approach to
raising concerns throughout the NHS, while leaving scope for flexibility for organisations to adapt
them to their own circumstances. The overarching Principle is that every organisation needs to foster a
culture of safety and learning in which all staff feel safe to raise a concern.
p. 6.2 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
In the executive summary, Francis pointed to ‘a remarkable consistency in the pattern of reactions described
by staff who told of bad experiences’2 (© Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed
under the Open Government Licence v3.0). Whistleblowers provided convincing evidence that they had
raised serious concerns that not only were rejected but were met with a response that focused on
disciplinary action against them rather than any effective attempt to address the issue they raised. It was
concluded that there was a culture within many parts of the NHS that deterred staff from raising serious and
sensitive concerns and that, not infrequently, has negative consequences for those who raise them (p. 8).
He argued that the legal and policy framework surrounding whistleblowing is not easy to understand and has
many layers. The legislation which theoretically provides protection for whistleblowers is contained in the ERA
1996, as amended by PIDA. Where a worker makes a protected disclosure, he/she has a right not to be
subjected to any detriment by his employer for making that disclosure. However, for a number of reasons this
legislation was limited in its effectiveness. At best the legislation provided a series of remedies after detriment,
including loss of employment, has been suffered. The legislation was limited in its applicability, and does
nothing to remove the confusion that exists around the term ‘whistleblowing’, which does not appear in it at
all. In recent years there has been a range of measures which may encourage, or impose a responsibility on
staff to speak up. These include introduction of a new Statutory Duty of Candour, the Fit and Proper Person
Test and (CQC’s new inspection and ratings regime (pp. 9–10).
He defined a whistleblower, in the context of the NHS, as:
a person who raises concerns in the public interest. For the purpose of concerns relating to the NHS,
and in particular patient safety concerns, the term ‘whistleblower’ is used in this report to apply to
those who speak up when they see something wrong usually relating to patient safety but also to the
integrity of the system.
p. 221.2 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
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Francis stated that over 600 individuals and 43 organisations wrote in response to the review‘s invitation
to contribute and over 19,500 responded to the staff surveys sent out by independent researchers. He
continued that they met with over 300 people through meetings, workshops and seminars, held four
seminars in different parts of the country with a cross section of invited delegates to consider different
stages of the process of raising concerns and potential solutions, and commissioned independent
qualitative and quantitative research (p. 10).
It was suggested that some may not be comfortable seeking advice from a Freedom to Speak Up guardian
if, for example, they are from a different professional background. There should therefore be a range of
others to whom people can go for advice and support. This should include at least one executive director,
which may be the person responsible for safety and/or the medical director; at least one nominated
manager in each department; and one external organisation, such as the Whistleblowing Helpline (p. 16).
It was the responsibility of boards to ensure that there is no victimisation of or retaliation against
whistleblowers, and they should be held to account for it (p. 18). The review highlighted the lack of any
co-ordination between the various regulators in their approach to whistleblowing (p. 19). The legislation
applied to all employers, not only those in the NHS, so it would not be appropriate to make recommendations
for amendment which might have an impact on other sectors in ways that I am not aware of. However I am
particularly concerned by one aspect of the legislation, which is that it does nothing to protect people who
are seeking employment from discrimination on the grounds that they are known to be a whistleblower. This
is an important omission which should be reviewed, at least in respect of the NHS. I invite the Government to
review the legislation to extend protection to include discrimination by employers in the NHS, if not more
widely, either under the Employment Rights Act 1996 or under the Equality Act 2010 (p. 22).
The review included two recommendations, 20 principles and 38 actions (p. 22).
The main reports opened with the words of the statement of Dame Janet Smith in the fifth report on the
Shipman Inquiry:154 ‘I believe that the willingness of one healthcare professional to take responsibility for
raising concerns about the conduct, performance or health of another could make a greater potential
contribution to patient safety than any other single factor’ (© Crown copyright. Contains public sector
information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0). Francis added that this statement still
rang true. Staff who raise concerns about any issues of patient safety can, and do, save lives. When a NHS
worker speaks up, they are making a vital contribution to the quality and safety of patient care (p. 30).
Francis reported that in recent years there had been a number of reviews that considered whistleblowing
or related issues in the NHS and other sectors (e.g. Francis;11,155,156,159 National Audit Office;187,188 PCAW;162
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills189), while other relevant reviews include Berwick,180 Clwyd
and Hart179 and Dalton and Williams.183
Francis considered that each of these reports considered measures that contributed to an open and honest
culture, including organisational transparency and leadership. There were also a number of reviews that
took place in parallel to this review, the findings and recommendations of which were likely to be relevant
to the issues considered in this report, including the Assurance Report by Kate Lampard CBE on the Jimmy
Savile Investigations; Lord Rose’s review of NHS leadership; the GMC’s review of whistleblowing by Sir
Anthony Hooper; and the Health Select Committee’s Inquiry on complaints and raising concerns,245 which
was published after completion of the Francis report (p. 34).
Francis stated that the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 introduced significant changes to the
1996 Act. In particular, it introduced vicarious liability for the bullying or harassment of whistleblowers
(p. 40). He also discussed the NHS Constitution, the statutory duty of candour, and the Fit and Proper
Persons Test. He continued that there was a risk that such a plethora of information, advice and guidance,
and the various ways it could be obtained, might be confusing for NHS workers who have concerns. They
might not know where to go for the best advice or whether, having spoken to any particular organisation,
they still need to report their concerns elsewhere; or whether even speaking to that organisation affected
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr06300 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2018 VOL. 6 NO. 30
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2018. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health and Social Care. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional
journals provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should
be addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
181
their rights under the 1996 Act. There was also the risk of conflicting advice, including different definitions
of the term ‘whistleblowing’ (p. 43).
Francis also pointed to the complexity of the current position. The quantity of activity in the fields of
legislation, policy and guidance indicated a continuing institutional recognition that more needed to be
done to support the freedom of staff to speak up, and concern that the measures already in place were
insufficient. He felt that this had resulted in a somewhat piecemeal and reactive approach to this issue and,
moreover, that the law seeking to protect whistleblowers was cast entirely in an employment context (p. 49).
Unsurprisingly, given the nature of this review, positive experiences of whistleblowing were a small
minority. They were generally attributed to working in an organisation with a culture of openness, having
a good knowledge of whistleblowing policies and procedures, feeling supported during the process and
maintaining good working relationships with colleagues (p. 53).
The hostile culture was likely to have been reinforced by the negative language often used in reference to
speaking up. Contributors described how those who raised a concern, whether internally or externally,
were often seen as ‘troublemakers’ or ‘backstabbers’. Some suggested that different words should be
used, such as ‘raising concerns champion’. At the seminars conducted as part of the background to the
Francis Report, there was widespread confusion about the meaning of the term ‘whistleblowing’ and its
relationship to a protected disclosure, but there was agreement that the term had negative connotations.
It was stressed that people who raise concerns did not always think of themselves as whistleblowers, and
some contributors wanted the words whistleblower and whistleblowing changed (p. 57). Although the
majority of staff were aware of their local whistleblowing policies and procedures, a significant minority
were not (p. 58).
From the evidence, the following themes emerged: the need for culture change; improved handling of
cases; measures to support good practice; particular measures for vulnerable groups; and the extension if
legal protection (p. 88):
Only if the good intentions of any law are matched by a change in culture can a safe alternative to
silence be created.
Dehn and Calland, p. 94337
There was near-universal agreement that the most important factor affecting people’s willingness to speak
up or raise concerns was the culture of the organisation (p. 94).
Francis considered whether the term ‘whistleblowing’ itself contributed to the barriers. He saw three
problems. First, there is confusion about what qualifies as whistleblowing. Some people consider
whistleblowing to be concerned with criminal wrongdoing such as fraud rather than relating to a patient
safety concern. Some consider it applied when escalating a concern outside the normal management
chain, or about a more senior colleague. Some believe that it only applied to raising a concern outside the
organisation, or even that it was limited to disclosure to the media or otherwise into the public domain.
Second, the complexity of the legislation and confusion among contributors about what constitutes a
‘protected disclosure’ was unhelpful. Third, the term had negative connotations (p. 100).
He gave serious consideration to recommending that the term ‘whistleblower’ should be dropped. Although
he still had reservations about the term, he was persuaded that it was so widely used, and in so many
different contexts, that this would probably not succeed. Instead, he felt that the focus should be on giving
the term a more positive image, believing that the measures recommended in the report would do much to
promote the acceptance of ‘whistleblowing’ as normal and positive behaviour in health care (p. 100).
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He concluded that, although the existing legislation is weak, he did not recommend a wholesale review of
the 1996 ERA for two reasons:
First, he did not think that legislative change could be implemented quickly enough to make a difference
to those working in the NHS today. What is needed is a change in the culture and mindset of the NHS so
that concerns are welcomed and handled correctly. If this can be achieved, fewer staff will need recourse
to the law. Second, this Review is concerned only with the position of disclosures made within one part
of the public sector, the NHS. The Act covers all forms of employment, whether in the public or private
sectors. There may well be different considerations in other fields.
However, he did consider that there were two steps that should be taken. First, extending the list of
prescribed persons to ensure that NHS workers are protected if they raise a concern with any relevant
person/body. There are some surprising omissions from this list: most notably clinical commissioning groups
and NHS England, as commissioners of services, are not included. A wide variety of bodies responsible for
training are not included and among scrutiny bodies neither Healthwatch England nor local Healthwatch,
unless by implication from the fact the former is a subcommittee of CQC, are included.
Second, he proposed extending statutory protection to all students studying for a career in health care
rather than just student nurses. The government’s response to its ‘Whistleblowing Framework Call to
Evidence’ indicates that it might consider extending the scope to ‘other student arrangements similar to
student nurses’. In his view, there is a compelling case for taking this step. In addition, he stated that
consideration needed to be given to extending discrimination law to protect those who make a protected
disclosure from discrimination either in the ERA 1996 or the Equality Act 2010 or to finding an alternative
means to avoid discrimination on these grounds.
Francis concluded that it was clear that the concerns that had led to the setting-up of the review were
justified. What was needed was not radical, but rather a careful and committed application of the
principles of a culture of safety and learning. His report set out 20 principles that:
when implemented together with the measures already being progressed following my previous report
into the failings at Mid Staffordshire, will, I believe, go a long way to reduce the number of upsetting
cases and deliver the open and honest culture that staff in the NHS need. Each principle was accompanied
by recommended actions.
p. 197.2 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
Recommendation 1: All organisations which provide NHS healthcare and regulators should implement
the Principles and Actions set out in this report in line with the good practice described in this report.
Recommendation 2: The Secretary of State for Health should review at least annually the progress
made in the implementation of these Principles and Actions and the performance of the NHS in
handling concerns and the treatment of those who raise them, and report to Parliament.
p. 197.2 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
Finally, Annex B set out actions by organisation.
Hooper
This was an independent review192 for the GMC of how it engaged with individuals who regarded
themselves as whistleblowers. Whistleblowing was defined as ‘the raising of a concern, either within the
workplace or externally, about a danger, risk, malpractice or wrongdoing which affects others’ (p. 1).
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The report presented the definition from Francis2 of ‘a person who raises concerns in the public interest’.
Hooper192 added that:
It is sometimes said that a whistleblower is a person who raises concerns externally, that is, with
persons other than his or her employer. This is not right. Many persons who raise concerns do not
necessarily, at the time of raising the concerns, see themselves as whistleblowers. They may, at that
time, be ignorant of the protections afforded to persons who raise such concerns. They are likely to
come to regard themselves as whistleblowers if they suffer detriment as a result of raising the
concerns or if no action is taken on their concerns.
p. 2.192 Reproduced with permission
Hooper cited Dame Janet Smith154 in the fifth Shipman report:
I believe that the willingness of one healthcare professional to take responsibility for raising concerns
about the conduct, performance or health of another could make a greater potential contribution to
patient safety than any other single factor.
p. 2.154 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under the
Open Government Licence v3.0
It was stated that the GMC recognised the vital importance of raising concerns. He discussed paragraphs
24 and 25 of Good Medical Practice,336 which state that:
You must promote and encourage a culture that allows all staff to raise concerns openly and safely.
You must take prompt action if you think that patient safety, dignity or comfort is or may be
seriously compromised.
Failure to comply with paragraphs 24 or 25 may amount to ‘misconduct’ and a finding that a doctor’s
fitness to practise is impaired. Good Medical Practice states in paragraph 6 that: ‘Serious or persistent
failure to follow this guidance will put your registration at risk’ (p. 3; reproduced with permission).336
According to the chief executive of the GMC, Niall Dickson:
We know that many front line staff can feel under enormous pressures and that the culture of the
institutions in which they work is vital in creating the conditions for openness and honesty – not a
blame culture but a learning culture. And that means everyone in the healthcare team feeling able
to raise concerns. The feedback we have received suggests there is some way to go in this – some
doctors are not confident they would be supported if they raised a concern, while others need to
know where to take their concerns. The awful reality that emerged from Mid Staffs and indeed other
inquiries was that doctors knew about our guidance but were not empowered by it. They felt it was
acceptable to ‘walk by the other side of the ward’ knowing that there was unsafe and unacceptable
practice going on. We must all do what we can to make sure that does not happen again. The joint
statement we have signed, is an important milestone and makes it clear that the professional duty of
candour sits with every healthcare professional, regardless of their field of practice.
p. 4. © GMC.336 Reproduced with permission
There was considerable evidence that, in the workplace, persons who raise concerns about a danger, risk,
malpractice or wrongdoing that affects others may well suffer, or believe that they will suffer, reprisals at
the hands of an employer or fellow workers (p. 5). Hooper stated that reprisals may take many forms. The
effect of the reprisals on individuals at work and at home is likely to be devastating. Doctors who have
devoted their lives to the care of others face the prospect of their careers being brought to an end. One of
the consequences may be that the doctor against whom the retaliatory measures are being taken becomes
clinically depressed. Their depression may then be used as justification for further action against them.
It was self-evident that the fear of suffering reprisals acted as a powerful disincentive to raising concerns,
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as did also a belief that the concern will be ignored. The attainment of the objective of patient safety
therefore required that the risk of reprisals was reduced or eliminated, and that concerns were not ignored
(p. 6). Hooper was concerned that employers may use the process of making an allegation to the GMC
about a doctor’s fitness to practise as an act of retaliation against a doctor because they have raised
concerns or, simply, as an inappropriate alternative to dealing with the matter in house. If that happened,
the GMC would unwittingly become the instrument of the employer in its campaign against the doctor (p. 7).
The evidence from ‘Patients First’174 to the Francis review11 offered support for the proposition that some
employers use referral to punish healthcare professionals who raise concerns, which has been termed
‘retaliation by referral’ (p. 8). Hooper therefore made a total of eight recommendations to reduce these,
including declaring if the doctor being referred has raised concerns about patient safety or the integrity of the
system, and fully training investigators to understand ‘whistleblowing’, particularly in the context of the GMC
and the NHS; and a simple, confidential and voluntary online system to record concerns, run by an organisation
independent of the regulators. In December 2012, when the GMC launched a helpline, Mr Dickson said:
The eyes and ears of health professionals are often the most valuable means of protecting patients
and ensuring high quality care.
p. 20192 Reproduced with permission
Except where otherwise stated, quotations in this section are © Crown copyright. Contains public sector
information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
House of Commons Health Committee
The Committee193 stated that:
Just as we expect the NHS to respond in a timely, honest and open manner to patients or families
raising complaints or concerns, we should expect the same for staff. The treatment of whistleblowers
remains a stain on the reputation of the NHS and has led to unwarranted and inexcusable pain for a
number of individuals. The treatment of those whistleblowers has not only caused them direct harm
but has also undermined the willingness of others to come forward and this has ongoing implications
for patient safety. Although the committee was clear that professionals have a duty to put patients
first and to come forward with their concerns, it recommended that those who had suffered harm as a
result of doing so and whose actions were proven to have been vindicated should be identified and
receive an apology and practical redress.
pp. 3–4.193 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
The CEO of the GMC, Mr Dickson, freely acknowledged that there were instances in which a trust could
seek to use a referral as retaliation against a registrant raising legitimate concerns about practices in the
trust, and stated that ‘there is history around this of individuals who are classic whistleblowers’ (p. 32).
The government argued that whistleblowers are protected from detriment by PIDA, but evidence from
PCAW and others argued that PIDA was a deterrent rather than a remedy, and that if an employee had to
have recourse to PIDA’s provisions then his or her prospects were already substantially impaired (p. 35).
The committee had stated previously that employment tribunals and related fora were no place for
honestly held concerns about patient safety and similar issues to be debated.182 A means had to be found
for health and care service workers to be able to speak up safely about professional concerns (p. 35).
The committee’s position had long been that there was an unambiguous professional duty on professional
registrants to speak up, but that equally that there was a similar duty on employers to establish an open
culture that encouraged concerns to be raised and acted to address and resolve them, rather than
punishing the person raising them (p. 35).
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr06300 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2018 VOL. 6 NO. 30
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2018. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health and Social Care. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional
journals provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should
be addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
185
The Francis review was welcome:
As the treatment of whistleblowers is a stain on the reputation of the NHS and has led to unwarranted,
inexcusable pain for the courageous individuals affected. The aim for an NHS complaints and raising
concerns system must be to establish a reporting culture in the health and care sector which parallels the
open reporting culture on other safety-critical sectors such as aviation and nuclear energy: one in which
the concept of the whistleblower is quite simply redundant.
p. 36.193 © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licenced under
the Open Government Licence v3.0
The failure to deal appropriately with the consequences of cases where staff have sought protection as
whistleblowers had caused people to suffer detriment such as losing their job and, in some cases, being
unable to find similar employment. This undermined trust in the system’s ability to treat whistleblowers
with fairness. This lack of confidence about the consequences of raising concerns was seen to have
implications for patient safety (p. 36).
The committee expected the NHS to respond in a timely, honest and open manner to patients, and the
same had to be expected for staff. It recommended that there should be a programme to identify
whistleblowers who have suffered serious harm and whose actions were proven to have been vindicated,
and provide them with an apology and practical redress (p. 36).
House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee
The government329 accepted Francis’ recommendation that trusts should appoint a person to receive
concerns and offer advice, to ensure that cases are properly investigated and issues are addressed without
repercussions for the person who raised an issue: Freedom to Speak Up guardians. The Secretary of State
for Health and Social Care explained that these people would be ‘part of the organisation but just there,
so that, if you do not want to tell your line manager, you have someone else you can talk to in the Trust’.
There was also to be, he explained, a national Freedom to Speak Up guardian, ‘so there is someone
outside the hospital if you ultimately needed it’ (p. 6; © Parliamentary Copyright. Contains Parliamentary
information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0. www.parliament.uk/site-information/
copyright-parliament/open-parliament-licence/).
South West Whistleblowers Health Action Group told the committee that:
[T]he department was ‘currently part of the problem’: In 2000 the Department of Health published
‘An organisation with a memory’. The fact that the Committee is carrying out an inquiry into
complaints and clinical failure nearly 15 years after this report was produced is a testament to the
failure of the Department of Health and Governments since 2000 to drive forward improvements.
p. 12.329 © Parliamentary Copyright. Contains Parliamentary information licensed
under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0. www.parliament.uk/site-information/
copyright-parliament/open-parliament-licence/)
The committee stated that the Department for Transport’s Air Accidents Investigation Branch came up
frequently in the evidence, and much of the commentary was very positive (p. 34). The Secretary of State
for Health explained how things work in air accident investigation: every single death is investigated by the
Air Accidents Investigation Branch, and every single death is avoidable. In that industry, as in the nuclear
industry and the oil industry, the presumption is zero deaths, and so, when there is a death, it immediately
triggers a process. The Secretary of State for Health told the committee that the ‘processes that we are
trying to create have been modelled on those in the airline industry, which are designed to make it
incredibly easy for pilots to speak up’329 (© Parliamentary Copyright. Contains Parliamentary information
licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0. www.parliament.uk/site-information/copyright-
parliament/open-parliament-licence/).
APPENDIX 4
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
186
The Secretary of State told the committee that he and Mike Durkin of NHS England put together a
report containing data on ‘whether trusts have an open and honest reporting culture’, which showed
that around 20% of trusts did not have this. Mr Hunt said that there should ultimately be no need for
whistleblowers, because ‘we should have a culture where people want to find out that things have gone
wrong and why they have gone wrong, and to learn from them. You only have whistleblowers when you
have a system which is not doing that’ (p. 37)329 (© Parliamentary Copyright. Contains Parliamentary
information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0. www.parliament.uk/site-information/
copyright-parliament/open-parliament-licence/).
The committee welcomed the proposal for Freedom to Speak Up guardians recently accepted by the
government, but in order for them to be effective, the information given to guardians had to be protected
from disclosure, so that information could not be used to publish or penalise those making whistleblowing
reports to guardians; that would require legislation (p. 50). It also welcomed the decision of the Secretary
of State for Health to invite Mike Durkin to look at the possibility of setting up a new independent
patient safety investigation body to conduct clinical investigations. This would not solve all of the
problems identified, but was an essential step. It was struck by the fact that no public inquiry into an
aviation accident had taken place since the 1970s, for which just such a body exists in the form of the Air
Accidents Investigation Branch. The present situation in the NHS, where investigations of clinical incidents
and complaints were tangled together and often prove hard for the patient and their family to navigate,
needed to be replaced by a more rational and easy-to-understand system. The committee therefore
concluded there was a need for a new, permanent, simplified, functioning, trusted system for swift and
effective local clinical incident investigation conducted by trained staff, so that facts and evidence could be
established early, without the need to find blame, and regardless of whether a complaint had been raised.
This would greatly reduce or remove the need for costly major inquiries into clinical failure (p. 50).
Some quotations in this section are © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under
the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Secretary of State for Health
This was a response194 to the Freedom to Speak Up consultation associated with Francis,2 the Public
Administration Select Committee329 report Investigating Clinical Incidents in the NHS, and the Morecambe
Bay Investigation.338
It was stated that the evidence amassed by Francis2 detailed the price paid by far too many NHS staff who
spoke up with concerns about the quality of care. Those who should have listened to those concerns –
and acted on them- responded instead in many cases with evasiveness and hostility (p. 4). The response
continued that a lot was asked of the people who worked in the NHS, but they should never be put in a
position where they had to choose between telling the truth and keeping their job. Francis heard troubling
accounts of whistleblowers who struggled to find alternative employment after raising their concerns. In line
with his recommendation, the response agreed that NHS England, Monitor and the NHS Trust Development
Authority should devise a support scheme to help whistleblowers who can demonstrate that they were
having difficulty finding employment as a result of raising concerns to find alternative employment.
Furthermore, a regulation-making power was enacted to prohibit discrimination by prospective NHS
employers against a job applicant on the grounds that the applicant appeared to have made a protected
disclosure. Regulations to implement this prohibition were to be made (p. 11).
The DHSC accepted Francis’2 two overarching recommendations, and consulted on a package of measures
to implement them (p. 15). The consultation showed that most responses supported the role of the
Freedom to Speak Up guardian, while the majority of these supported the INO role hosted by CQC (p. 18).
The government proposed that:
l the CQC should consult in summer 2015 on how the INO role would be implemented, taking into
account principle 15 and its associated actions in the Freedom to Speak Up report
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l the INO should be appointed by the CQC by December 2015. Once in place the INO was to produce
guidance on local implementation of the Freedom to Speak Up guardian role and how this role
would develop
l Health Education England should produce guidance on the training that would be needed for the
Freedom to Speak Up guardian role
l the department would share the responses to this consultation with the relevant organisations and the
INO to help inform the guidance they will develop.
Local NHS organisations were expected to take forward the actions in an effective, proportionate and
affordable manner (p. 21). The document considered whether the Freedom to Speak Up guardian should
report to the board of the organisation that appointed them, or directly to the INO. It favoured Francis’11
recommendation that the Freedom to Speak Up guardian should be appointed by the chief executive of the
organisation to act in a genuinely independent capacity, and should raise concerns with the trust’s chief
executive or the board. However, the government recommended that the Freedom to Speak Up guardian be
able to raise concerns with the INO if they had lost confidence, or if they considered that good practice had
not been followed, in how the organisation was handling concerns (p. 28).
Professional codes are guidance on behaviour and how to deal with particular situations such as communication
with patients, delegation, seeking consent, treating people with dignity, and what to do if a professional has
witnessed something about which they have concerns. The response stated that Professor Sir Bruce Keogh was
currently considering the professional codes, including how they covered the issue of raising concerns, and was
to report back shortly (p. 36).
The Freedom To Speak Up report proposed legislative change in principle 20 concerning legal protection.
Since the publication of the report, a regulation making power was added to the Small Business, Enterprise
and Employment Act 2015222 to prohibit discrimination against whistleblowers (or applicants believed by the
prospective employer to have been whistleblowers) when they apply for jobs with prescribed NHS employers
(p. 36). The Act also introduced a regulation-making power to impose a duty on prescribed persons (such as
the CQC, Monitor and the professional regulatory bodies) to report annually on whistleblowing disclosures
made to them. Going forward, taking account of the Freedom To Speak Up report’s proposal, it was intend
that further organisations would be added to the Prescribed Persons Order (p. 36).
The government also considered the PASC329 report. It accepted the recommendation of the committee to
create a new independent patient safety investigation body to conduct investigations in the NHS: the
Independent Patient Safety Investigation Service (p. 39). The committee had considered that information
given to the Freedom to Speak Up guardians must be protected from disclosure, which requires legislation.
However, the government claimed that the committee was mistaken: as Freedom to Speak Up guardians
would be employees of their organisations, existing legislation would apply to them. When a whistleblower
makes a protected disclosure to a Freedom to Speak Up guardian who is also an employee of the
whistleblower’s employer, they would potentially be making a protected disclosure to their employer under
existing legislation. Therefore, the whistleblower has a statutory right not be subjected to any detriment by
their employer and there is no intention to make new or amend existing legislation (p. 50).
The government expected all NHS organisations to have in place whistleblowing policies that were compliant
with the ERA 1996, as amended by the PIDA, and with best practice. In addition, it supported a
free helpline, run by Mencap, that provides independent and confidential advice to staff in the NHS and
social care who want to raise a concern but are unsure how to do so or what protections they have in law
if they do so. The whistleblowing helpline also gives employers advice on best practice in implementing
whistleblowing policies that are compliant with the Employment Rights Act 1996 (p. 50).192 It noted that,
in March 2014, revised NHS and Social Care Whistleblowing Guidance was published, aimed at staff and
employers (www.wbhelpline.org.uk/resources/raising-concerns-at-work/) (p. 50).
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Finally, the government responded to the Kirkup338 report on Morecambe Bay. Kirkup produced four
recommendations on openness and transparency (recommendations 24–27). The government accepted
recommendation 24 on a duty of candour. Similarly, it accepted recommendation 26 by accepting in
principle the recommendations of Francis: ‘We commend the introduction of a clear national policy
on whistleblowing. As well as protecting the interests of whistleblowers, we recommend that this is
implemented in such a way that ensures that systematic and proportionate response is made by Trusts
to concerns identified. Action: The Department of Health’ (pp. 76–7).
Quotations in this section are © Crown copyright. Contains public sector information licensed under
the Open Government Licence v3.0.
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